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Introduction: From absence to presence, from silence to voice? 
The story of victims of mass atrocities and their role within international criminal 
proceedings is told as a path from absence to presence, from silence to voice 
(Karstedt 2010). Starting at Nuremberg, which is commonly described as the origin 
of institutionalized international criminal justice, where the victims of the tried 
crimes hardly played any role, through a recognition of victims’ rights to truth, justice 
and reparations in human rights law, up to the recognition of respective procedural 
rights, granting victims participatory status in international criminal proceedings at 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon and Kosovo and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Victim 
participation was celebrated as a milestone in the acknowledgement of victims as 
stakeholders in transitional justice processes. Following a therapeutic ethic (Robins 
2012) which was attributed to the general transitional justice narratives, truth, and 
truth-telling are described as having a healing effect for victims, and for societies as a 
whole (Colvin 2006). Accordingly, truth-telling and the establishment of an official 
historical record was said to have a reconciling function both for individuals and 
collectivities. Against this backdrop, courts were criticized for silencing victims and 
being counter-productive within the transitional justice context, striving for the re-
storation of peace and justice in war-torn societies. In this vein, the alleged 
retributive rationale of international criminal courts was scrutinized and a more 
restorative approach propagated (Findlay and Henham 2005; Musila 2010). That way, 
the therapeutic ethic was introduced into the international criminal justice narratives, 
as it was assumed, that truth-telling through testimony and having a voice in the 
criminal legal proceedings can contribute to the healing process. The victims are said 
to re-gain their dignity by participating actively, because they are recognized as 
subjects in the proceedings. Within this narrative framework, the introduction of 
victim participation at the ICC was accompanied by a lot of expectations and hopes. 
The participatory framework is said to introduce restorative justice elements into the 
otherwise retributive proceedings. According to the Revised Strategy in Relation to 
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Victims, “[T]he Court was created with both a punitive and restorative function, 
with the Rome Statute giving victims a right to directly participate in proceedings.”1
Now, after 15 years since its inception, and after years of “almost romantic 
enthusiasm”, the ICC is “going through turbulent times” (Clarke et al. 2016, p. 1). 
There is ample criticism concerning, among other “issues facing the ICC” (Steinberg 
2016), the implementation of the victim participation framework and the 
prosecutorial strategy towards African States. With regard to victim participation it is 
increasingly argued that the developments in the organization of legal representation 
lead to the bureaucratization of participation and this is turn resulted in a 
marginalization of the participants (Hébert-Dolbec 2015). And that the abstract 
victims are referred to as a constituency legitimizing international criminal law, while 
the juridification of victimhood narrows the number of actually participating victims 
to strictly legally relevant ones (Kendall and Nouwen 2013; Fletcher 2015). 
Furthermore, the claim that victim participation metes out restorative justice 
aspirations is scrutinized given the actual practical implementation of the legal 
framework (Garbett 2017). At the same time, victim participation is still valued for 
“[V]ictims, at least some of them, are able to exercise some form of legal agency 
through their legal representatives…” (Killean and Moffett 2017, p. 740) Those who 
still generally support the institution of victim participation at the ICC criticize that 
the participants are reduced to being: “statistical Victims” within the organization of 
participation and demand a re-consideration towards more inclusionary practices in 
its implementation (Haslam and Edmunds 2017). Accordingly, victim participation is 
supposed to be meaningful to those who participate (Moffett 2015). Those who were 
more sceptical from the beginning claim that the restorative approach, participation 
is related to, is structurally incompatible with the retributive approach of 
international criminal law. Consequently, a “victim friendly” version of the ICC is 
argued to be the most effective option and the “restorative justice limb” should be 
abandoned (Vasiliev 2015, p. 5). In this context, at the Court, reform discussions are 
lead. The victim participation system was reviewed “with a view to ensuring its 
sustainability, effectiveness and efficiency”, and a panel of nine independent experts 
 
                                                 
1 Assembly of States Parties, International Criminal Court, Report of the Court on the 
Implementation in 2013 of the Revised Strategy in Relation to Victims. ICC-ASP/12/41, 11 October 
2013, para. 28 (hereafter: Assembly of States Parties, ICC-ASP/12/41). 
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concluded in 2013 that reforms were necessary in order to ensure that victims can 
“participate meaningfully”2 The resulting Registry Re-Vision proposal suggests a 
streamlining of participation.3
Among academics and practitioners alike, the question if and how victims of the 
crimes tried are, and should be, present and have a voice within the proceedings is as 
controversial as ever. After a short period of uncritical celebration of the fact that the 
ICC started its work and the newly established institutionalization of victim 
participation, a phase of disillusion and re-consideration began.  
 
In this phase, other general questions going to the very foundations of the ICC 
appear. Especially its relation to African States and the African Union (AU) is 
problematized. The AU and some African Head of States are criticizing that the ICC 
is unproportionally targeting African States, accusing the Court with a neo-colonial 
interventionist logic underlying its prosecutorial practice. This is discussed as a 
legitimacy crisis of the Court and one of the main contemporary issues facing the 
ICC (Smith 2009). Within the discussions, “the victims” are called upon, especially by 
the Prosecution, as a constituency legitimizing the interventions of the ICC:  
“About targeting Africa: All the 32 people who are, or have been the subject of 
Summons, or Warrant of Arrest (public) are Africans. However there are also 
more than 5 million „African victim“s displaced, more than 40,000 „African 
victim“s killed, thousands of „African victim“s raped, and hundreds of 
thousands of African children transformed into killers and rapists. All victims 
are African. Is this not a factor to be considered? There are so many voices in 
this debate, but where are the voices of the victims? We must never forget our 
real constituency.”4
The “Victim issue” and the “African issue” are closely related and point to a 
deeper problematic of international criminal courts - their legitimizing constituency. 
 
                                                 
2 ICC Registry, ReVision Project, Basic Outline of Proposal to establish Defence and Victims Offices 
(2014), p. 2. 
3 ICC Registry, ReVision Project, Baysic Outline of Proposal to establish Defence and Victims Offices 
(2014). 
4 Batohli (2014, p. 50); similarly: “Millions of African victims’ fervent belief in an independent judicial 
mechanism that could curb these types of mass atrocities and their belief in this institution to bring 
justice to them remains as strong now as it was seventeen years ago when the Rome Statute was 
adopted. This is what gives the ICC legitimacy, not the wishes of a few select individuals who seek to 
shield themselves from the law by castigating the ICC ‘s legitimate efforts to end their impunity.”, 
Bensouda, Fatou, The International Criminal Court and Africa: A Discussion on Legitimacy, 
Impunity, Selectivity, Fairness and Accountability, Keynote Address GIMPA Law Conference 2016, 
https://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/otp/Keynote_Speech_of_the_Prosecutor-
GIMPA_Law_Conference_on_the_ICC_and_Africa.pdf, last accessed 8/2/2018. 
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In this context, the ICC referrs to “the victims” on whose behalf it allegedly operates 
and who are described as the beneficiaries of truth and justice produced by the 
Court. This lead to the introduction of victim participation in the first place, because 
based on these legitimizing narratives, advocates could argue that “the victims” need 
to be present and to have a voice within the proceedings, otherwise the claim of 
truth and justice would just be symbolic. Now, in the context of the “Africa 
problem” (Clarke et al. 2016, p. 3), the “African victims“ are again referred to as the 
legitimizing constituency. At the same time, the victim participation framework is 
harshly criticized for just not providing a space or giving a voice to participants 
within the proceedings. The discrepancy between legitimizing rhetoric and 
organizational reality then becomes particularly evident vis á via the „African victim”. 
Where are the voices of the “African victims“, then?  
Currently, this legitimacy gap is mostly approached independently from one 
another. Concerning the “Victim issue”, the argumentation is described above, either 
commentators demand a more inclusionary practice while acknowledging the 
organizational restraints. Or, they emphasise the effectiveness of the proceedings and 
argue that the ambitious goals initially attributed to victim participation have to be 
adjusted to the organizational realities. This leads to the narrowing of space and voice 
for participants in the proceedings. In the more recent past, empirical work within 
this field increased, still commentators state that there is not enough empirical 
research (Killean and Moffett 2017, p. 713; Edmunds and Haslam 2012, p. 871). 
With regard to the “Africa issue”, one can distinguish between legalistic 
approaches, seeking solutions within the legal framework, rebutting the reproach of 
the AU, while at the same time urging the Prosecution to open cases in non-African 
situations to counter the unfavourable image (Werle and Vormbaum 2015; Werle et 
al. 2014; Mbizvo 2016). And approaches that analyse the relationship from an 
international relations and politics perspective (Vilmer 2016; Dersso 2016). It is clear 
that the opposition from African States and the AU undermines the ICC’s legitimacy 
and therefore poses a serious challenge (Ibid., p. 63). 
In this dissertation, the relationship of the “Victim issue” and the “African issue” 
and the intertwinement with legitimizing claims will be addressed as an interrelated 
problematic of international criminal justice.  
9 
 
The first part (Part I) aims at conceptualizing the relationship of international 
criminal courts and “the victims” to then theoretically scrutinize the legitimizing 
function of “the victims” within international criminal justice narratives. Building on 
an eclectic selection of theoretical approaches an alternative reading of the 
legitimizing narratives is suggested in order to rethink the conception of presence 
and voice of the „African victims” within the proceedings at the ICC.  
In Chapter I the, above mentioned, narrative from - absence to presence, from 
silence to voice - from Nuremberg to The Hague, is analysed. The aim is to carve out 
the narrative framing of the images of international criminal courts and the image of 
“the victim” respectively. The purpose is to contribute to a more nuanced and 
differentiated understanding of the interrelationship of international criminal courts 
and “the victims”. 
The discrepancy between legitimizing rhetoric and organizational reality - is 
scrutinized more closely in Chapter 2. In order to refine the position of victims 
within international criminal justice, the general discussions on the purposes and 
objectives of international criminal proceedings are elaborated. This helps to 
differentiate the either/or logic of retributive vs. restorative justice prevailing in the 
discussions about victim participation and to determine the role of victims in the 
legitimizing narratives framing the ICC.  
In Chapter 3 the discrepancy between the theorization of international criminal 
law, the role of victims therein, and the empirical disillusion about the assumed 
effects is scrutinized from a critical theoretical perspective.  
In the second part (Part II), the participatory and representational practices 
within the organization of victim participation at the ICC are reconstructed. Against 
the backdrop of the theoretical conceptions, the silencing effects inherent in 
representational practices are revealed and the exclusionary violence of the 
definitions of “the victims” scrutinized. I empirically trace the (im)possibilities of 
presence and voice within the practice of victim participation at the ICC. 
Therefore, in Chapter 4, post-colonial methodological approaches are outlined 
that guide the empirical analysis of the practice of participation and representation. 
The questions I intend to answer are:  
10 
 
- Who is speaking for whom - who is speaking about whom, when are the modes 
of representation conflated and what does this imply within the practice of 
participation.  
- How is the image of the victim and the court mutually reproduced within the 
organization of participation and representation?  
- Which subject position of “the victim” is constituted within the practice of 
victim participation and representation. Which position do the participating victims 
have to assume to be heard within the legal framework? What is silenced through the 
representation of this subject position?  
- Where are the gaps and irritations within the representational practices striving 
for truth, justice and closure? How does the resisting potential of (im)possibility 
manifest within the practice of participation? 
Accordingly, in Chapter 5 the legal framework of representation from the 
application phase to the allocation of legal representatives is reconstructed. Guided 
by the research questions, the framework of speaking and hearing is reconstructed 
and the silencing effects of representation are traced.  
In Chapter 6, the definition of victims who are allowed to participate in the 
proceedings and the modes of participation are analyzed, tracing the shaping of the 
subject position of “the victims” and the role they are ascribed to within the 
proceedings.  
In Chapter 7, the regulation of the direct encounter, through testimony and/or 
presenting views and concerns in person, of one of the participants with the Court 
are described. Thereby the subject position of the “relevant victim” is carved out 
determining the space from which the participants can be heard within the legal 
framework. 
In the last Chapter 8, the organization of the encounter of those who work 
directly with the participants is reconstructed. They are delegated the responsibility of 
representing “the victims” and of selecting the “relevant victim” who may appear 
before the Court.  
11 
 
Beginning with the application forms, ending with the contact between the legal 
representatives and their clients, the different forms of representation and the 
irritating potential of an encounter with the participants are reconstructed. Based on 
the theoretical assumption that a legitimacy gap (the justice gap) is inherent in the legal 
strive for closure underlying the legitimizing narrative of bringing truth and justice to 
victims, the silencing effects within the organization of victim participation are 
revealed. At the same time, the resisting potential of the always already immanent 
(im)possibilities can be conceived of as constructive irritations, deferring closure. 
Thereby, the very concepts of presence and voice, propagated when claiming that 
„African victims“ voices are represented at The Hague are scrutinized.  
With regard to the “Victims issue” and the “Africa issue”, I suggest to, on the one 
hand, take post-colonial critique of representational relations seriously. This implies a 
reading of legal practices that reflects the always already inherent justice gap and the 
entailed exclusionary violence of representation. The justice gap, and not the notion of 
truth and justice as a tangible product delivered to the „African victims“, is the 
starting point to engage in a less-hierarchical, more reflective relationship of the ICC 
with its constituencies.  
There is no presence without absence and no voice without silence. With this 
dissertation I intend to contribute to a reflection of the absence in presence and the 
silence in voice in the practice of representation of the „African victims“ at the ICC. 
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Part I  
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Chapter 1: Foundations 
1. Narrative of the need to involve victims from Nuremberg to the 
The Hague 
“No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives 
that locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic, for 
each decalogue a scripture. Once understood in the context of the narratives 
that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, 
but a world in which we live.” (Cover 1983, p. 4) 
The rise and importance of modern international criminal law is described as an 
“exciting development with no end in sight” (Shabas and Bernaz 2011, p. 1). The 
beginning of this development is traced back to the first international military 
tribunals installed after the Second World War. When the Allied Forces were 
confronted with the mass atrocities committed by the National Socialists before and 
during the war, both within Germany and in the occupied countries, the idea to hold 
individuals criminally responsible before an international body of law emerged.5
                                                 
5 It is exemplary for the visibility of mass atrocities committed during colonial rule, that I only 
mention them in a footnote to the story of the development of international criminal law, where they 
play hardly any, or no role at all. The crimes committed during WWII by the National Socialists are 
described to be unprecedented and unimaginable and it is said that they called for a reaction. The 
genocide committed by the Germans in Namibia, which was only recently acknowledged by the 
German authorities, and other colonial crimes did not cry for a reaction and still do not seem to cry 
loud enough. For a critical analysis of the search for historical origins: Tallgren (2014). 
 The 
tribunal at Nuremberg then, operating without precedent, should demonstrate that a 
legal response is a possibility besides politics and force and is therefore regarded as 
the foundation of institutionalized international criminal law. (Minow 1998) The 
subsequent evolution of international(ized) criminal tribunals and the parallel and 
interrelated story of the role victims played at and for these courts, is mostly 
described to be a more or less gradual process, a history of success from Nuremberg 
through Tokyo, Jerusalem, the Hague, Arusha, Free Town, Phnom Penh to the 
permanently operating ICC in the City of Peace and Justice. (Nouwen 2012) 
International criminal law grew relatively fast, both institutionally and substantially. 
The same pertains to the role of victims in international law in general and 
respectively also for international criminal law. From having barely any rights 
(domestically and internationally) and no distinctive role at the time of the 
Nuremberg trials, which was considered to be insufficient given the mass 
14 
 
victimization and the character of the crimes, to a broad range of rights and a 
distinctive participatory role in the proceedings at the ICC. The narrative arc is one 
of “lessons learned”, improving the situation for victims with the practical 
experiences gained, using the whole “toolkit” of transitional justice, such as truth 
commissions to complement the courts. 
“Today we accept without argument the idea that state actors responsible for 
atrocities should have to answer for their conduct in courts of criminal law – be 
they domestic, international, or of a hybrid character.” (Douglas 2012, p. 276)  
The development is narrated as a triumph of law over politics and violence, 
piercing national sovereignty and assigning individual responsibility to those 
responsible of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide - the worst of all 
crimes (Nouwen 2012, p. 329). A similar story is told about the victims of these 
crimes and their role for and in international criminal justice. The implementation of 
the victim participation and reparation framework into the Rome Statute is 
repeatedly referred to as a milestone in international criminal justice (Donat-Cattin 
2001, p. 182).6
While the ideas to hold individuals criminally responsible and to involve victims in 
the respective legal process are generally accepted, having a closer look it becomes 
clear that the concrete implementation is highly contested. 
 
Without disparaging the achievements, it is worthwhile looking at this history of 
victims in international criminal law, as it is commonly narrated in the respective 
doctrine. A focus lies on the controversial discussions and tensions the 
implementation of victims’ participatory rights is said to have caused within the 
international criminal legal system, in order to trace this discrepancy between the 
generally accepted claim to bring truth and justice to “the victims” and its 
concretization. It is insightful to analyse the narratives telling the success story of 
international criminal law in general and victims’ role therein, in particular and in the 
subsequent chapter, to critically examine the legal theoretical discussions on the 
                                                 
6 Only recently, Presentation of the Court’s annual report to the UN General Assembly, Judge Silvia 
Fernández de Gurmendi President of the International Criminal Court, 5 November 2015, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/presidency/151105_ICC_President_speech_to_UNGA-Eng.pdf, 
last accessed at 27/1/2016. 
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legitimatory basis of the ICC.7
The following analysis is structured more or less chronologically. Each sub-
section cursory introduces the legal framework and consequently traces the narrative 
framing of the implementation of said framework. The selection of topics and 
institutions analysed here are representative of the selection underlying the success 
story told within the narratives around victim participation at international criminal 
courts from Nuremberg to The Hague.
 When shifting the focus from the genuinely legal 
aspects of participation and reparation to the underlying narratives on victims and 
the criminal legal process, the images associated with “the victims” remained more or 
less stable while the need to rhetorically reiterate the importance of “the victims” for 
international criminal justice increased significantly. “The Victims” are depicted as 
the emotional, political and unpredictable and therefore potentially destabilizing within the 
rational, unpolitical and predictible legal process. Given these images, a tension is 
diagnosed, which is mostly discussed under the topic of purposes of international 
criminal law and subsumed under the headline of retributive vs. restorative justice. 
The suggested cures to ease the tension vary depending on the various normative 
understandings of law, it is framed within the question of how to involve victims in a 
meaningful and effective way and can be summarized under three main streams: 
collectivization and representation; externalization and a general reconsideration of 
the structure of criminal law.  
8
1.1. Nuremberg – documents don’t lie 
    
“Never before WWII had the world encountered an authoritarian power that 
combined a ruthless will to conquer the world with an explicit doctrinal of racial 
superiority […]” (Nino 1996, p. 5).9
                                                 
7 For a general overview over the developments, among others: Garkawe (2012). 
 After the liberation of numerous concentration 
8 Three types of analyses can be distinguished, that were the basis for this chapter. Analyses dealing 
with the development of victims’ participatory rights explicitly, f.e. Aldana-Pindell (2004). Analyses, 
mostly monographs, dealing with victim participation at the ICC or ECCC more specifically and that 
begin with a historical recourse on the different forms of participation, f.e. McGonigle Leyh (2011), 
Moffett (2014), and analyses of the current participatory framework drawing on the history and 
development of the victims’ role within proceedings to critizise the current model exercised at the 
ICC.  The last analyses in most cases only shortly observe that the reason for the establishment of the 
righ to participate at the ICC was the failure of the ad-hoc tribunals. See: Friman (2009), Pena (2010), 
McAsey (2009).  
9 Elegently ignoring the racially doctrinated colonial violence that was still ongoing by the time of the 
Nuremberg trials. Interestingly, Hannah Arendt mentioned the possibility that people in Congo could 
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and extermination camps, and the experiences of the massive destruction resulting 
from the war, the Four Major Allied Powers (Great Britain, France, the USSR and 
the US) negotiated how to react to such gruesome atrocities committed on a large 
scale. In August 1945 they established the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at 
Nuremberg, deciding to react legally and to charge the major war criminals and a 
range of representatives of influential professions in subsequent proceedings thereby 
intending to symbolically put the whole Nazi system on trial. The first trial against 21 
of the highest representatives of the NS regime who were charged with conspiracy, 
crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity, was the first of its 
kind in world history. It is uncontroversial that these proceedings laid the 
foundations for the development of institutionalized international criminal law 
(Bassiouni 2013, p. 75). Since the IMT was an unprecedented enterprise in 
international law, theoretical and philosophical considerations and discussions 
concerning the legitimacy and purposes of international criminal law, still valid today, 
were prevalent at the time of its creation and in the legal analysis that followed. I will 
discuss the legal philosophical discussions taking place at that time and following 
Nuremberg below. There is a range of accepted legacies of Nuremberg, first and 
foremost the Nuremberg principles. For the purpose of this chapter it is important 
to note that individual criminal responsibility and liability of state actors for crimes 
against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity was established, which 
contributed to the creation of a new concept of criminality and a shift insofar that 
the individual became a subject of international law (Mettraux 2011, p. 11). The latter 
is described as the paradigmatic shift pushing for a broader notion of responsibility 
and paving the way for the recognition of individual rights, which will become 
important for international human rights law and eventually for the evolution of 
victims’ rights (Funk 2010, pp. 34–35). 
Despite this accepted shift, victims and survivors were nowhere mentioned in the 
founding Statute of the IMT. Although rhetorically, the trials were among other 
reasons held to provide millions of victims of the Nazi regime with a sense of justice 
(Mettraux 2011, p. 5), in 1949 since the focus of the proceedings was on the crime 
                                                                                                                                     
take the Eichmann trial as an example and initiate courts to try advocates of apartheid, which she 
found to be highly problematic, Arendt (2013, p. 386). 
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against peace the Allies regarded themselves as the victims of the war during which 
unimaginable atrocities were committed (Brants and Klep 2013, p. 39). 
In the interpretation and narrative framing of the Nuremberg Trials and its 
relation to victims, it was mainly criticized for being too restrictive, in the selection 
and emphasis of the different charges, in the selection of witnesses and that this lead 
to a distorted picture of the crimes committed during WWII (Douglas 2001, p. 22). 
The systematic character of persecutions and executions of European Jews, Sinti and 
Roma and the persecution of political opponents was not known to the extent it is 
now, and it is criticized that the Nuremberg Prosecution with its exclusive focus on 
crimes committed during the war contributed to this ignorance. Crimes committed 
before the outbreak of the war, which are crucial to understand the anti-Semitic and 
racist politics leading up to the extermination- and concentration camps where 
thereby excluded from the evidence and record of the proceedings (Bloxham 2001, 
p. 64). This limitation was said to be reinforced by the marginalisation of victims’, or 
survivors’10
                                                 
10 Interestingly, in the context of Holocaust trials, victims of the Holocaust are referred to as 
survivors, emphasising that victimhood and victimization is over. I will deepen the discussion about 
terms used with respect to victims/survivors etc. further below. For now I use survivor and victim 
interchangeably for victims of WWII and victim in the other cases. 
 voices, primarily due to the prosecutorial strategy based mainly on 
documentary evidence which was considered to be more reliable (Ibid., p. 17). 
Among the witnesses heard at Nuremberg, most were former SS members, camp 
guards and NSDAP members, survivor testimony, by contrast, was peripheral to the 
proceedings (McGonigle Leyh 2011, p. 136; Garkawe 2006, p. 86). In fact, only 14 
victim-witnesses testified (Moffett 2014, p. 62). This strategy is not unusual given the 
common law approach of an adversarial system (Garkawe 2006, p. 93). The criminal 
process in domestic systems was conceptualized as a confrontation of the state and 
the alleged perpetrator with victims used as witnesses for the state’s case against the 
accused. Victims are rendered invisible as victims and are only instrumentalized for 
the case as the less reliable because more subjective form of evidence (Doak 2003, p. 2). 
The assumption was that victims’ interests equal that of the Prosecution (Ferstman 
2011, p. 408). While this is an assumption that is characteristic for modern criminal 
law, the different domestic legal traditions continue to play a role when negotiating 
victims’ rights at the various international tribunals. For the proceedings at the IMT 
it was actually submitted that prosecutors with civil law traditions were less reluctant 
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to call witnesses to the stand than those from common law countries (Garkawe 2006, 
p. 91). 
The rationale behind the strategy chosen by the main prosecutor for the U.S. 
Robert H. Jackson and the criticism it provoked is revealing about the image of “the 
victim” in criminal proceedings. It is said that “[B]y privileging historical document 
over personal testimony”, Jackson aimed at “establishing incredible events with 
credible evidence”(Douglas 2006, p. 97). The Prosecution was of the opinion that 
victims were emotionally and psychologically too unstable to testify given their horrific 
experiences. In consideration of the unpredictability of cross examination possibly 
challenging the reliability and the objectivity of victim testimony, they were perceived 
as potentially counter-productive to the Prosecution’s case (Garkawe 2006, p. 92). The 
decision to rely on documents was justified by Jackson, saying that: 
“The prosecution early was confronted with two vital decisions… One was 
whether chiefly to rely upon living witnesses or upon documents for proof of 
the case. The decision was to use and rest on documentary evidence to prove 
every point possible. The argument against this was that documents are dull, 
the press would not report them, the trial would become wearisome and would 
not get across to the people. There was much truth in this position, I must 
admit. But it seemed to me that witnesses, many of them persecuted and hostile 
to the Nazis, would always be chargeable with bias, faulty recollection, and even 
perjury. The documents could not be accused of partiality, forgetfulness, or 
invention, and would make the sounder foundation, not only for the immediate 
guidance of the tribunal, but for the ultimate verdict of history. The result was 
that the tribunal declared, in its judgment, ‘The case, therefore, against the 
defendants rests in a large measure on documents of their own making’." 
(Robert Jackson, Introduction, Harris 1995, xxxv-xxxi) 
This approach and the need to translate original documents into the official 
languages of the court, in fact, lead to a situation where each document was read into 
the transcript to be translated, which caused commentators to call the proceedings a 
“citadel of boredom” with a “grip of extreme tedium” on everybody (West 2010, 
p. 1). The strategy chosen by the Prosecution was not uncontroversial even within 
the US Prosecution team. There were calls for more dramatic representations of the 
crimes and survivor testimony was considered to be one means to this end. It is 
submitted that more survivor witnesses testifying about the crimes subsumed under 
crimes against humanity would have better reflected the enormousness of the crimes 
(Bloxham 2001, p. 73; Douglas 2001, p. 78). Accordingly, Douglas understands the 
Eichmann trial in the 60s to be the respective revision of Nuremberg. By putting the 
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Holocaust into the centre of the trial and offering survivors the opportunity to testify 
the Eichmann trial was seen to be the more comprehensive treatment of the 
traumatic history. The challenge at Nuremberg to “assimilate evidence of 
unprecedented atrocity into a legal category of criminality” would have, according to 
Douglas, only be met by making use of the novel category of criminality, namely 
crimes against humanity (Ibid., pp. 158–160). Hence, the horrors of WWII were said 
to having been presented in an incomplete fashion at Nuremberg (Ibid., p. 100). 
Similarly, Bilsky argues that the current conception of crimes against humanity and 
the importance of victim-witness testimony was established at Jerusalem serving as a 
precedent for later tribunals (Bilsky 2014). The central role of survivors as witnesses 
was a deliberate decision by Attorney General Hauser in the Eichmann trial, for 
whom Nuremberg served as a negative example (Felman 2002, p. 133). The 
marginalisation and exclusion of victim-witnesses is perceived to be unjust for 
different reasons and again, the criticism is insightful for the underlying assumptions 
and pictures related to victims. As mentioned, survivors could have contributed to 
shift the focus to the genuinely unique crimes of WWII. They would have “injected 
real life experiences and stories to the proceedings, thereby making the trial much 
more dramatic and memorable.” (Garkawe 2006, p. 88) Denying the right to testify 
to all survivors was perceived to be unjust, because the victims were thus deprived of 
an opportunity to experience the cathartic effect of testifying (Ibid., p. 89). Hence, 
victims are associated with courtroom drama, which results in more media attention and 
consequently in more public interest, which is the basis for reaching educational 
purposes. At the same time, victim-testimony, for the very same reasons, is 
considered less objective and therefore not suitable for the legal staging of sobriety. 
But, victim-witness testimony can shed light to the character of the crimes and 
ensures that the extent and dimension of the crimes committed are represented in 
the proceedings. The criticism of the Nuremberg trial, iterating that victims were 
deprived of an opportunity to testify, already indicates the idea of an individual right 
of victims they can be deprived of, when they are excluded from the proceedings and 
forecasts the current situation where victims have individual rights in national and 
international proceedings. These criteria of evaluating victim participation in 
proceedings can be traced throughout the analysis of the respective international and 
national courts and become more nuanced over the time.  
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Albeit generally ambivalent, the IMT’s legacy for international criminal law is 
impressive and it can justifiably be said that the Nuremberg principles laid the 
foundations for the establishment of the following tribunals. For that reason, the 
following courts had to stand comparison.  
1.2. Tokyo 
A tribunal that is often mentioned in one breath with the IMT, without being 
further analysed in the narrative of progress in international criminal law is the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). The IMTFE was 
established through a proclamation by U.S. General Mac Arthur in January 1946 and 
arguably it does not stand the comparison with the Nuremberg proceedings. (Boister 
2011) The Tokyo trial is described as victor’s justice of the worst kind and the lesson 
learnt is that it should never be repeated (Ibid., p. 17). The distinctions emphasised 
between the IMT and the IMTFE are informative about the fundamental 
assumptions of an adequate international criminal trial. It is said to having been 
motivated not by the atrocities committed by Japan, but primarily by the experiences 
of defeat of the U.S. The bench was composed of eleven members of different states 
(Australia, Canada, China, France, Great Britain, India, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, the Soviet Union and the United States of America) that 
followed their different national interests. The judges were said to be biased arguing 
that those from former colonial powers did not admit the historical parallels between 
Japanese and European imperialism. It is furthermore submitted that the selection of 
those criminals that were committed for trial was based on an incoherent exercise of 
discretion. This also applied to the selective prosecution of certain crimes with an 
emphasis on crimes against peace, thus neglecting the crimes against the civilian 
population in the occupied countries (Ibid., p. 28). This was most manifest with 
regard to gender-based violence in the form of sexual enslavement of mostly Korean 
and Chinese women. Since the Japanese successfully destroyed documentary 
evidence of their crimes, more witnesses testified at Tokyo than at Nuremberg, but 
among the victim-witnesses called were exclusively persons who could testify to the 
guilt of the accused. The selection was criticised for not reflecting the realities of the 
crimes committed, particularly disregarding numerous victims of the above 
mentioned sexual enslavement in the form of forced prostitution in the so called 
21 
 
comfort station (McGonigle Leyh 2011, p. 136). Implied in this criticism lies the 
image of a proper international criminal court the installation of which has to be 
motivated by the outrage and shock over the atrocities committed, national interests 
should not play and role, it should not be entangled in colonial relations. The 
expectation that the crimes charged at an international criminal court should be 
reflective of the crimes committed is not different from the criticism voiced at 
Nuremberg. The exclusion of gender-based violence at the WWII tribunals, is 
reflective of the lack of gender awareness in the formulation of the crimes and the 
priorities of prosecution and how the selection of crimes charged reinforces the 
silencing of certain groups of victims at that time and still nowadays.11
Victims’ testimonies are seen to be essential to make sure that the whole range 
and dimension of crimes is covered by the indictment and thus dealt with in the 
proceedings. They aim at completing the picture of crimes committed during wars 
and conflicts negotiated and drawn before the courts. At the same time this supports 
the assumption that victims are deprived of their right to be taken into account 
before national and international courts, if the selection of charges excludes the 
crimes they suffered from.
  
12
The issues raised with regard to the Tokyo tribunal, the image of a perfect 
impartial, unpolitical tribunal on the one hand and the association of “the victims” with 
providing an insight into the scope and the dimension of the crimes to a certain 
extent resemble that at the IMT. 
  
1.3. Eichmann and the collapsing witness 
The trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1960 is mostly discussed because it 
provided a stage for victim-witness testimony in an almost truth-commission-like 
                                                 
11 To overcome the legal and societal silence Sakomoto (2001, p. 51), after 54 years, national and 
international women’s rights and human rights organizations staged the Women’s International 
Tribunal on Japanese Military Sexual Slavery in December 2000. The tribunal was a non-legal 
mechanism adopting the legal form applying procedural rules common to international courts. The 
legal form was used to acquire a powerful moral instrument assigning individual and state’s 
responsibility for crimes largely neglected. Chinkin (2001) Thereby it was claimed that the systematic 
violation of basic human rights as a characteristic of Japanese colonialization was revealed. Chinkin 
(2001, p. 336) Many victims were given a chance to testify before the court compiling an allegedly 
comprehensive record of gender-based crimes committed during WWII in Asia. Nevertheless, they 
testified as witnesses and the procedural approach taken was adversarial, like at Nuremberg. 
12 This is one of the basic underlying assumptions of the Right to Truth and Justice which will be 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
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manner, allowing survivors to narrate their stories, instead of merely testifying to the 
guilt of the accused. Whereas the IMT and the IMTFE, are mostly seen as the 
starting point for international criminal law, the Eichmann trial, with its emphasis on 
survivors testimony is discussed for the formation of a collective memory and with 
regard to pedagogical purposes of criminal proceedings (Bilsky 2014, p. 29).13 
Accordingly, it is submitted that the victims and their stories were the most 
memorable sequences of the proceedings in which a “jewish-israeli” narrative of the 
holocaust was shaped (Yablonka 2012, pp. 177–178; Bilsky 2014, p. 42).14
“In any criminal proceedings the proof of guilt and the imposition of a penalty, 
though all-important, are not the exclusive objects. Every trial also ... tells a 
story ... Our perceptions and our senses are geared to limited experiences ... We 
stop perceiving living creatures behind the mounting totals of victims; they turn 
into incomprehensible statistics. It was beyond human powers to present the 
calamity in a way that would do justice to six million tragedies. The only way to 
concretize it was to call surviving witnesses, as many as the framework of the 
trial would allow, and to ask each of them to tell a tiny fragment of what he had 
seen and experienced ... Put together, the various narratives of different people 
would be concrete enough to be apprehended. In this way I hoped to 
superimpose on a phantom a dimension of reality.” (Hausner 1967, p. 292) 
 This was 
famously criticised by Hannah Arendt, who took a restrictive viewpoint on the 
purpose and scope of criminal proceedings (Arendt 2013, pp. 71–72). Considering 
the different theoretical approaches developed in the context of the proceedings, 
although it is a domestic trial, it is very insightful for the purpose of analysing 
victims’ role in and for criminal law. Firstly, it becomes clear that the space provided 
for victims’ stories in the proceedings is closely related to the discussion of purposes 
of criminal proceedings, secondly, the possibility and impossibility of bearing witness 
to unimaginable mass atrocities is broadly discussed, historically (Platt 2011; Langer 
1991; Wieviorka 1999) and philosophically (Felman 2002; Agamben 2003) and lastly, 
albeit the “progressive” prosecution strategy with regard to victims, the discussions 
before, during and after the trial among jurists resemble that at Nuremberg. This is 
reflected in a quote by Attorney General Hausner: 
                                                 
13 Arguing that the Eichmann trial developed international criminal law in terms of relying on crimes 
against humanity and submitting that the genocide convention is customary international law with a 
deterrent purpose, and in terms of liability for collectively committed atrocities; Emphasising the 
importance of the Eichmann trial for international law, Schabas (2013). 
14 Bilsky (2014, p. 42), sees the role of victims in the proceedings as going beyond the construction of 
a collective memory as providing the necessary connection between the documentary evidence of a 
bureaucratically organised crime and the effects this had on the victims thereby demonstrating the 
protected social value behind the crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity. 
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The decision to primarily and extensively rely on victims’ testimonies was not 
born out of procedural necessity. As for the Nuremberg trial, enough documentary 
evidence existed to proof the guild of the accused Adolf Eichmann. It is submitted 
that General Attorney Gideon Hausner decided out of didactic reasons: “to capture 
the imagination and conscience of a domestic Israeli and world audience.” (Douglas 
2006, p. 97). Although this is what the Eichmann trial is famous for, during the 
preparations of the trial, the strategy was not uncontroversial. Discussions, similar to 
that at Nuremberg, took place as to why, how and for what purpose witnesses should 
be introduced. The prevailing opinion was that victim-witnesses are the less reliable 
form of evidence (Yablonka 2000, p. 382). The investigating unit of the Israeli police, 
Bureau 06, preparing the criminal file, had reservations about supplementing the 
documentary evidence with witness testimony, finding that the probative value of 
documents is higher and that witnesses are an unpredictable source of knowledge, 
potentially counter-productive to the case (Ibid., p. 379). Like in subsequent Holocaust 
trials, and at international tribunals, it was victims’ organizations pushing for a 
broadening of the scope of the charges and consequently for a distinctive role in the 
proceedings. Concerning the purpose of testimony, Ya’kov Robinson an assistant of 
the prosecutor, exemplarily argued that,  
“[g]hettoization is a hackneyed term and does not express the suffering actually 
entailed in it. Any testimony must be able to describe the "transports." 
Descriptions must be supplied of the suffering of people packed for days on 
end in horribly crowded conditions in closed cattle trucks. There must be 
descriptions of the hopelessness, the living conditions in the camps, the hunger 
and, in later stages, the desire for the end to come. To create the picture of the 
horrors of separating families and especially the way in which children were 
torn away from the arms of their mothers. To stress the fact that people were 
murdered right in front of their relatives or parents. In general, it should be 
borne in mind that the objective behind live testimony is to introduce tension 
into the trial and to raise the trial above the shadow of the mundane.”15
While playing a major role in the public perception of the trial and for the victim-
centred approach of the Prosecution, the testimonies were described by the judges as 
by-product of the trial not substantially impacting the judgement: 
 
“Without a doubt, the testimony given at this trial by survivors of the 
Holocaust, who poured out their hearts as they stood in the witness box, will 
                                                 
15 Yablonka (2000, p. 382), citation of Ya'akov Robinson from a meeting at Yad Vashem Holocaust 
Museum, held on Nov. 23, 1960, on file with ISA, Bureau 06, File No. R.A./02, 3056/A (Hebrew) 
(regarding Holocaust survivor witnesses at the trial). 
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provide valuable material for research workers and historians, but as far as this 
Court is concerned, they are to be regarded as by-products of the trial.”16
Accordingly, the judges heavily relied on documentary evidence in their decisions, 
witness testimony was used to corroborate the more reliable form of evidence. 
Testimonies, it is admitted, do play an important role, but rather for purposes beyond 
the law (Yablonka 2012, p. 195). In light of the numerous witness testimonies, the 
judges felt the need to re-emphasise the limits of law:  
 
“It is the purpose of every criminal trial to clarify whether the charges in the 
prosecution's indictment against the accused who is on trial are true, and if the 
accused is convicted, to mete out due punishment to him. Everything which 
requires clarification in order that these purposes may be achieved, must be 
determined at the trial, and everything which is foreign to these purposes must 
be entirely eliminated from the court procedure. Not only is any pretension to 
overstep these limits forbidden to the court - it would certainly end in complete 
failure.”17
It is this understanding of criminal law that was appreciated by Hannah Arendt, 
stating that it was the rational and objective style of the presiding judge Moshe 
Landau who is described to be bound to the voice of justice, saving the proceedings 
from turning into a mere show-trial (Arendt 2013, pp. 70–72). Emphasising the limits 
of law and implying that victim-witnesses when being allowed to narrate rather than 
testify overburden legal proceedings, is a common criticism in relation to victims 
(Landsmann 2012, pp. 116–117). It is submitted that “The courtroom was flooded 
with heart-rendering evidence that constantly assaulted the judge´s neutrality.” (Ibid., 
p. 71)  
 
Furthermore, given the international competition for attention, “bloody evidence 
that makes headlines and fosters sympathy” was said to be needed to gain national 
and international attention to reach pedagogical purposes (Ibid., p. 84).  It is 
remarkable that, despite the very different judgements on the value of witness-
testimony in the Eichmann trial, the underlying narrative is quite similar. They serve 
pedagogical purposes, because they are dramatic representations of suffering. Either 
commentators consider that pedagogical purposes are legitimate, given the character 
of crimes, and or think that the representation of suffering by victims is essential to 
                                                 
16 District Court of Jerusalem, Criminal Case No. 40/61, Judgement introduction para. 2., 11 
December 1961, English translation. 
17 District Court of Jerusalem, Criminal Case No. 40/61, Judgement introduction para. 2., 11 
December 1961, English translation. 
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reflect the crimes more comprehensively in their impact (Felmann 2000, pp. 505–
507). Or, commentators find that these purposes go beyond the scope of law, 
emphasising its boundaries (Arendt 2013, pp. 70–72; Landsmann 2012, pp. 70–72).  
Another similar divide with regard to the Eichmann trial, is the contribution on 
the discussion of the possibility and impossibility to bear witness to what is described 
to be un-imaginable crimes (Brunner 2012; Langer 1991; Agamben 2003; referring to 
Levi 1995). This is related to a shift in the psychological narrative on trauma, being 
triggered by Holocaust testimonies and their analysis (Stern 2000). The related 
theories about trauma and language, trauma and testimony will be discussed in more 
detail below. Here, the exemplary interpretations and interferences triggered by a 
victim, a survivor of Auschwitz, collapsing in the witness stand are briefly outlined. 
They illustrate the challenges faced by traumatized victims having to testify before a 
court and the respective diverging interpretations concerning the relationship of 
trauma, victims and criminal courts.  
The witness for the Prosecution Yehiel Dinoor was called on June 7th 1961. He 
was expected to be an important witness, since he saw Eichmann personally at 
Auschwitz and could therefore testify to the guilt of the accused. Yehiel Dinoor had 
published books about his experiences in Auschwitz, which he referred to as the 
chronicles from a planet called Auschwitz, under the name K-Tzetnik (standing for 
all those who died – those with no name) before the trial. When he, shortly after 
being introduced as a witness, talked about this planet and its inhabitants without 
names, he was interrupted by the prosecutor, demanding to ask some questions. Mr. 
Dinoor ignored this and continued speaking. Then Judge Landau intervened and 
asked the witness to listen to the prosecutor and himself. All of a sudden, Mr. 
Dinoor got up from his seat and collapsed, falling to the floor. Policemen carried 
him out of the courtroom, after the presiding judge called for a recess.18
                                                 
18 
 The witness 
remained in coma for two weeks. This incident was largely covered by the press and 
allegedly became one of the most memorable moments of the trial. Although, Mr. 
Dinoor did not recover to testify again, and the testimony until his collapse was not 
relevant in the strictly legal sense, it found entrance into the judgement:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m3-tXyYhd5U, Dinoor’s testimony, the collapse and the 
reaction of the audience is depictd from min. 0.00 – 12.25. 
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“If these be the sufferings of the individual, then the sum total of the suffering 
of the millions - about a third of the Jewish people, tortured and slaughtered - 
is certainly beyond human understanding, and who are we to try to give it 
adequate expression? This is a task for the great writers and poets. Perhaps it is 
symbolic that even the author, who himself went through the hell named 
Auschwitz, could not stand the ordeal in the witness box and collapsed.”19
The case of K-tzetnik, collapsing in the witness box was commented and 
interpreted in fundamentally diverging ways. Once again, it depended on whether the 
commentators followed a more restrictive understanding of the criminal legal 
process, or a more extensive one. Hannah Arendt, representing the first approach, 
commented sarcastically, stating that “In response [to the invitation to listen to the 
prosecutor and the judge A/N] the disappointed witness, probably deeply wounded, 
fainted and answered no more questions.” (Arendt 2013, p. 336) She emphasised that 
this was an exception confirming the rule during the Eichmann trial, which was that 
most witnesses were not able to simply describe past events, let alone separate past 
events from what they heard and read about them in the meantime (Ibid.). She called 
this the procession of the witnesses, establishing their right not to talk on the matter 
in question (“Das Recht der Zeugen, nicht zur Sache zu sprechen” “The right of the 
witness to be irrelevant”) (Ibid., p. 337). In the same vein, it is alleged that:  
 
“The clash between the desire to bear witness and the demands of the 
courtroom were here dramatized in the most powerful way. The cost of 
Hausner's importuning was substantial. One can hardly resist speculating about 
the impact of this scene of an emotionally and physically crushed Holocaust 
victim on the trial judges.” (Landsmann 2012, p. 94) 
The victim-witnesses and their almost unbearable stories are described to have an 
uncontrollable and unpredictable effect on the judges and to be a burden on the 
psychological and emotional stability of the involved lawyers which might have an 
effect on their impartiality (Ibid., pp. 94–95). The stories are said to be irrelevant to 
the charges and the guilt of the accused and “likely to trigger the strongest emotional 
response” both from the lawyers and from the victims themselves who should be 
protected (Ibid., p. 94). The conclusion is that the policy of a witness-driven atrocity 
trial spread beyond Holocaust cases and profoundly influenced the ICTY. “In all 
these cases it has yielded long, slow trials with rafts of highly prejudicial victim-
                                                 
19 District Court of Jerusalem, Criminal Case No. 40/61, Judgement, para. 119, 11 December 1961, 
English translation. 
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witness testimony that contributed to flawed proceedings and questionable results.” 
(Ibid., pp. 100–101; similarly Combs 2010)  
The diverging and more favourable interpretation similarly assumes that the 
collapse of Yahiel Dinoor aka K-tzetnik symbolizes the clash between the language 
of the witnesses, their traumatic experience beyond understanding and the 
requirements of the legal process. But unlike the foregoing authors, they argue that 
the clash is not a burden but a moment in the legal proceedings where the 
dimensions of crimes against humanity are grasped (Felman 2002, p. 144; similarly 
Bilsky 2014). Or, “[T]he missed encounter allows for insights that an encounter, or a 
cohesive moment, might have foreclosed.” (Felman 2002, p. 144) In conclusion, 
these moments are essential for the so called “jurisprudence of atrocity” (Bilsky 2014, 
p. 57), dealing with vast scale victimization experiences. The distinction between 
purely legal purposes and historical, and/or didactic purposes is rejected, aiming at a 
broader understanding of legal proceedings in the context of mass atrocities .20 These 
diverging views are emblematic for a deeper, theoretical discussion with respect to 
the possibilities and impossibilities of international criminal trials in general and their 
aims, effects and restraints vis á vis victims, in particular.21
1.4. After the Cold War: Re-emergence of institutionalized international 
criminal justice 
 
In the aftermath of WWII and with the experiences of the two military tribunals 
and the following Holocaust trials all over Europe and in Israel, efforts to establish a 
permanent international court were made by the UN.22
                                                 
20 Douglas (2012), Douglas (2001), Douglas et al. (2007). 
 As early as in 1948, the 
General Assembly requested the International Law Commission to study the subject-
matter, the resulting report came to the conclusion that an international body of law 
is both desirable and feasible. Thereupon, the Committee on International Criminal 
Jurisdiction was set up, consisting of seventeen member-states of the UN who 
drafted two statutes, one in 1951 and one in 1953. In the course of the Cold War the 
21 A discussion that is elaborated in the following two parts.  
22 Hannah Arendt and Carl Jaspers, when discussing the limits of law and the proceedings in 
Nuremberg and Jerusalem, saw a better solution in an international criminal court, dealing with crimes 
committed during WWII. Arguing that these crimes (crimes against humanity and genocide) are on 
the one hand beyond the law, on the other, they concern humanity and are not bound to national 
borders. Arendt et al. (1993, 452 et seqq.).. 
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actual creation of such a court was on hold. To secure the transition, in the wake of 
the authoritarian regimes in Latin America and Southern Europe, amnesties were 
options chosen after the dictatorships. In that period there were hardly any 
international and national trials, other than Holocaust trials. Only after the Cold War, 
the efforts towards an international court were resumed. In 1989 the issue was re-
introduced by a coalition of sixteen Caribbean and Latin American states. The 
recommendations of a new working group, installed after the initiative, were adopted 
by the General Assembly the same year they were submitted, 1992. Meanwhile, in the 
70s and 80s debates on transitional justice matters in Latin America arouse. 
Following the authoritarian regimes, although demands for truth and justice were 
formulated and the possibility of punishing human rights violations debated, the 
need for a peaceful transition to democracy and to establish a corresponding nation-
building narrative, with many higher ranking perpetrators still in power, amnesties 
were granted and truth and justice were approached very cautiously (Brants and Klep 
2013, p. 42). “Recovery and stability it seems were achieved again by amnesties and 
victims were sidelined.” (Karstedt 2010, p. 22) Victims and their families, mostly of 
disappeared persons, played a crucial role in the establishment of truth commissions, 
calling for truth with regard to the whereabouts of their relatives and justice for what 
has happened to them. The expressive call for truth and justice emerged in the 
context of the state induced forced disappearances. This was interrelated with an 
international development, comprising the emerging discipline of victimology and its 
internationalization and the gradual establishment of a victim’s right to truth and 
justice and the state’s corresponding duty to prosecute in human rights law (Aldana-
Pindell 2004, pp. 607–610). These developments will be discussed below, since they 
developed somewhat parallel to international criminal law and were later 
incorporated into the debates about victim participation at the ICC, the ECCC and 
the STL.  
1.4.1. The ad hoc tribunals – bringing justice to victims? 
Before the establishment of the planned permanent international court, the crimes 
committed during the war in Yugoslavia and shortly after in Rwanda lead the Security 
Council to discuss possible reactions. In 1993, it established an ad hoc criminal 
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tribunal, dealing with serious violations of international humanitarian law in the 
territory of former Yugoslavia since 1991. 23
“Convinced that in the particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia the 
establishment as an ad hoc measure by the Council of an international tribunal 
and the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law would enable this aim to be achieved and would 
contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace, 
 
Believing that the establishment of an international tribunal and the 
prosecution of persons responsible for the above-mentioned violations of 
international humanitarian law will contribute to ensuring that such violations 
are halted and effectively redressed,”24
After the first international military courts in the wake of WWII, the 
establishment of the ICTY was seen as the revival of institutionalized international 
criminal law and as a starting point for a new era of international criminal justice 
(McGonigle Leyh 2011, p. 138).  
 
Interestingly, it is again emphasized that the motivation for the establishment of 
an international criminal court lies in the shocking character of the crimes committed 
striking human consciousness. Furthermore, as apparent from the quote, victims, 
once again, like at the tribunals after WWII, are not mentioned in the official legal 
foundations of the court. Given the fact that the tribunals were established based on 
a Chapter VII resolution, the expressive purpose is that by providing redress for 
serious violations of humanitarian law, the latter are stopped, and peace can be 
restored and maintained. Due to this distinct legal basis and due to the fact that 
crimes existed prior to the conflicts and were subsumed under customary 
international law, the discussions regarding legitimacy differed from that at 
Nuremberg (Morris and Scharf 1995, p. 37 et seqq.). It was discussed whether an ad 
hoc tribunal was within the competences of the Security Council under Chapter VII, 
not, if criminal justice itself was a legitimate mean (a.o. Alfred P. Rubin 1994; Alvarez 
1996; Lombardi 2003). Despite this discussion, in November 1994, the International 
Tribunal for Rwanda was established through a similar resolution of the Security 
Council.25
                                                 
23 S/RES/808, 22 February 1993 and S/RES/827, 25 May 1993. 
 The procedural rules adopted by the ad-hoc tribunals are based on a draft 
prepared by the U.S. and are hence shaped according to the adversarial model. A 
24 Ibid. 
25 S/RES/955, 8 November 1994.  
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proposal to introduce victim participation through a separate victims counsel was 
rejected for fear that such an institution might conflict with the Prosecution’s case. It 
was submitted that third party participation “would divert attention from the relevant 
issue of the criminal proceedings.” (Morris and Scharf 1995, p. 167) According to the 
model adopted, the Prosecution, by representing the interests of the international 
community, was representing those of the victims. The only distinct interests of the 
latter were considered to be compensations, which was outside the courts mandate 
anyways (McGonigle Leyh 2011, pp. 145–147).  
Due to the common law approach with regard to victims, granting only the 
opportunity to testify, to submit amicus curiae observations and having the 
Prosecution submit impact statements, victims are hardly ever able to tell their stories 
in a narrative form. The stories have to fit into the narrow legal framework and the 
predetermined story of the case defined by either one of the parties. (Tochilovsky 
1999) Following the U.S. American model, victim statements submitted by the 
Prosecution were the only possibility, beside testifying if being called, for victims to 
tell their story. These statements were considered in the context of sentencing 
deliberations.26
But unlike Nuremberg, the ad-hoc tribunals, lacking the documentary evidence, 
had to rely heavily on eye-witness testimony (Combs 2010, p. 6; Rydberg 1999, 
p. 455) Or, in the words of a former ICTY judge: “Victim-witnesses are the soul of 
war crimes trials at the ICTY.”  (Wald 2001, p. 107) 
 
Given the developments in victimology, international human rights law and 
transitional justice, the drafters of the statutes were more sensitive to victim’s security 
situations and in contrast with Nuremberg, the ICTY and ICTR Statutes introduced 
a number of progressive measures to assist and protect victims (Garkawe 2012, 
p. 283). Accordingly, a Victim and Witnesses Unit was established at the Registry of 
the courts and the courts were provided with the legislative power to develop 
measures to protect victims with special consideration for vulnerable ones (Rydberg 
1999, p. 458 et seqq.) Ideas to locate this Unit with the Office of the Prosecutor were 
dismissed by the judges, which is interpreted as exemplary for a shift in awareness 
                                                 
26 Prosecutor vs. Tolimir, Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Judgement Trial Chamber II, 12 December 2012, 
para. 1218, considering the long term effects on victims, the so called Srebrenica syndrome. 
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away from victims as evidence for an effective prosecution to a more human concern 
supporting victims as witnesses (Morris and Scharf 1995, p. 166). This awareness is 
again reflective of broader international developments. Concerning the value and 
purpose of victim-witness testimony, similarly to the statements of prosecutors at the 
previous courts, Carla del Ponte holds that:  
“The courtroom testimonies of eyewitnesses are fundamentally important – 
they tell us about the horrifying conditions of the detention camps, ethnic 
cleansing campaigns, torture, rape and sexual slavery, mass executions, 
destruction of property and religious institutions, plunder and looting. Most 
importantly they tell us about human suffering. They must be told and listened 
to. […] Their personalized stories make us feel how it was to be there – in that 
particular place at that particular time.[…] Those willing to listen will 
understand that the testimonies of the very modest, not sophisticated people, 
very ordinary people can bring to understanding the core issues.”27
The instrumental approach towards victims, and the pressure of cross 
examination, caused disappointment among victims testifying and, was criticised for 
being too restrictive and possibly re-traumatizing by commentators (Haslam 2004; 
Stover 2005; Mischkowski 2002). Empirical analysis revealed a gap between the 
rhetorical promises, such as “[B]ringing war criminals to justice Bringing justice to 
victims”
 
28
“However, the apathy and indifference towards the war crimes trials among 
victims betray a sense of hopelessness and utter lack of expectations that such 
trials will change much when it comes to their current status and relations in 
their communities. Victims’ expectations now appear to be solidly focused on 
individual perpetrators being removed from their midst. The dominant 
perception among Prijedor victims is, however, that a comprehensive, 
transformative, sort of justice is beyond reach and that war crimes trials cannot 
deliver on such promises in the present political and communal climate.” 
(Hodzic 2010, p. 133) 
 and the realities for victims and their communities (McGonigle Leyh 2011, 
p. 147). Furthermore, criticism pertaining to the purpose of the ad-hoc tribunal, 
bringing peace, especially within former Yugoslavia came up:  
The only provisions that solely aimed at victims’ alleged interests, the 
compensation regulations were criticised for being ineffective, because there is no 
mechanism to properly enforce said rights before domestic courts (Ferstman 2002, 
p. 671). In 2000 then Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte, aware of the criticism and the 
                                                 
27 McGonigle Leyh (2011), citing an excerpt of an Address by Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte at the 
conference on „Establishing the truth about war crimes and conflicts”, Zagreb, Croatia, 8-9 February 
2007. 
28 http://icty.org/, slogan on the official web page of the tribunal.  
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described gap, suggested to incorporate victim compensation and a form of 
participation into the RPEs.29 The Judges, while generally being in favour of the idea, 
rejected it for reasons of new allocation of resources, the fear that the length of the 
proceedings would be affected and that it would possibly infringe upon the rights of 
the accused.30
The main possibility to include victims’ voices, the victim statements were first 
and foremost valued because they “provide a picture of the defencelessness of the 
victims and the gravity of the crimes” (McGonigle Leyh 2011, p. 144). They were 
interpretated as an indication for the “degree of suffering.”(Ibid., p. 147) The 
Chamber in Krstić submits that by means of the impact statements, a “voice to the 
suffering of the victims” is given.
  
31 And these voices “[…] paint a picture of 
shattered lives and livelihoods, and of tremendous ongoing pain and trauma. The 
Trial Chamber is therefore mindful of the suffering of these victims […]”32
As previously mentioned, this treatment of victims as witnesses and 
representatives of suffering was broadly criticised for being insufficient with regard 
to the broader goals of the ICTY and ICTR, namely restoring and maintaining peace 
(in this vein Paterson 2003). Since criminal courts are, according to this 
understanding of their mandate, considerate of their impact on society as a whole, it 
was claimed that victims as central members of society play a crucial role as 
stakeholders in transition.
  
33
                                                 
29 S/2000/1063, Appendix. Already referring to the respective provisions in the Rome Statute. 
 Accordingly, the reduction of victims to evidence, rather 
than subjects with interests of their own, caused the tribunals to be perceived as 
disconnected from the affected societies (Donat-Cattin 2008, 3; Pena and Carayon 
2013, p. 521; Kamatali 2005; SáCouto and Cleary 2008, p. 80 et seqq.). Contrary to 
the criticism voiced concerning the lack of witness testimony at Nuremberg, here, it 
is alleged that the victims were deprived of an opportunity and that being 
instrumentalized as a witness is a de-humanizing and potentially re-traumatizing 
experience (Franke 2006, p. 818; Dembour and Haslam 2004, p. 167 et seqq.)  
30 S/2000/1063, Appendix. Already referring to the respective provisions in the Rome Statute. 
31 Prosecutor vs. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33, Judgement Trial Chamber I, 2 August 2001, para. 703. 
32 Prosecutor vs. Bralo, Case No. IT-95-17, Sentencing Judgement Trial Chamber III, 7 December 
2005, para. 40. 
33 ICC-ASP, Court’s Revised strategy in relation to victims (5 November 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-38-ENG.pdf. Accessed 30 October 2014. 
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In the words of Judge Claude Jorda, the ICTY and the ICTR failed to “take into 
account the fact that, by participating in the proceedings . . . a victim may be able to 
regain his dignity, thereby contributing, ultimately, to the restoration of peace and 
security in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.” (Jorda and Hemptinne 2002, 
p. 1389)  
This marks a shift in the understanding of the role of victims for the courts and 
the role of the courts for victims. Firstly, the latter question: What does being a 
victim witness mean, was already discussed broadly in the context of the Eichmann 
trial, but now, telling one’s story and being participated beyond testifying is a 
consideration to meet the victims’ right to be acknowledged within the legal process 
as a subject rather than an object, as individuals with dignity who have the right to be 
recognized as persons before the law (Wemmers 2012, p. 80). This is put into the 
larger purpose of restoring peace and security (Baumgartner 2008, pp. 435–437; 
Hobbs 2014, pp. 28–29). The indicated shift to the recognition of individual rights of 
victims has arguably also lead to the shift in evaluating international criminal courts. 
Now it is not about avoiding boring proceedings by introducing victim-witness 
testimony which is considered more dramatic and or representing the whole 
dimension of the crimes but it is furthermore about doing justice to victims’ needs 
related to the legal process. While this aims at the recognition of victims as subjects, 
they remain means to pursue the broader goal of re-storing trust into the justice 
system and rebuilding the rule of law in order to restore and maintain peace.34
                                                 
34 I will further elaborate this shift when discussing the two legitimizing narratives with regard to 
victims, truth and justice and healing through participation. 
 In a 
further step, the rhetorical shift of affirming that one of the the ad-hoc tribunals 
purposes is bringing justice to victims, it is considered to be to a certain extend 
irreconcilable with the retributive institutional design of the courts (Clark 2009).  
Once again, victims’ possible involvement is discussed within the framework of 
purposes of international criminal courts and consequently related to the limits of 
criminal law - wherever they are drawn. If international criminal law is strictly 
confined to so called retributive purposes, victims have to be excluded as victims. 
Criminal proceedings are not about hearing the “tens of thousands of victims of 
crimes”, but focussing on the individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrators, 
thereby its efficiency is maintained but at the same time a certain perception of void 
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is created (Chifflet 2003, p. 110). Apart from the shift in recognizing victims as 
subjects with certain human rights to be involved in legal proceedings, this 
negotiation of the limits of law vis à vis “the victims” and their stories and the related 
perception of a gap, if they are absent, like in Nuremberg, and of overburdening the 
proceedings like at Jerusalem, are recurring patterns.  
Against the backdrop of the so called transitional justice toolkit which did not 
exist at the time of the first military tribunals, the perceived gap between the the 
claim of bringing justice to victims and their limited role left at the ad hoc tribunals, 
is suggested to be filled among others with the establishment of the so called 
alternative mechanisms, the most prominent of which are truth commissions (Ibid.). 
Thereupon, different approaches were taken, to address the alleged interests of 
victims, to live up to the developments in international human rights law and to close 
the gap (Mendez 2009, p. 60).  
1.4.2. International(ized) Courts and truth commissions 
„Unless, in a matter of months, the steps taken by the Government of 
Indonesia to investigate TNI involvement in the past year’s atrocities bear fruit, 
both in the way of credible clarification of the facts and the bringing of justice 
to perpetrators (…) the Security Council should consider the establishment of 
an international tribunal for the purpose.”35
The government of Indonesia opposed an international tribunal and so a new 
species of international courts emerged – the so-called hybrid – or internationalized 
courts, the characteristics of which are either/or/and that they are made up of mixed 
domestic and international personnel, are located in the country were the crimes took 
place and have a hybrid (domestic/international) legal basis. Accordingly, the 
approaches differ, depending on the model chosen.  
  
Following the atrocities committed in the wake of the vote for independence of 
East Timor in 1999 which was reported by an international investigation team, the 
UN installed a transitional administration responsible, among others, for the 
administration of justice (McGonigle Leyh 2011, p. 151). Instead of the proposed 
international tribunal, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET) established the Special Panels for Serious Crimes (SPSC) at the District 
                                                 
35 UN Doc A/54/660, para 74.6. 
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Court of Dili. This was the first internationalized court ever established36. With 
regard to victim involvement, the SPSC employed a progressive model, incorporating 
international developments in human rights law and procedural provisions similar to 
that of the Rome Statute (Ibid., p. 152). In accordance with this approach, although 
not granted an absolute right to participate, victims had a right to request being heard 
at any stage of the proceedings other than the review hearing. Furthermore, similar to 
the ad hoc tribunals, the victims’ safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity 
and privacy are protected, and they were able to request a review of the prosecutors’ 
decision not to pursue investigations.37
Observers contend that hybrid courts were an “experiment” taking into 
consideration the above outlined criticism of the ad hoc tribunals (McAuliffe 2011, 
p. 23; citing a.o. Linton 2001). The aim was to bridge the gap between the courts and 
the affected society, not only geographically, and to render the justice process closer 
to “the victims” (Dickinson 2003, pp. 301–303). In fact, often the courts were rather 
a political compromise due to the political realities in the respective countries.
 
38
Despite this broad set of rights, victims hardly played any role since participatory 
possibilities were practically not used. This might also be the reason why the SPSC is 
almost never discussed in the context of victim participation, au contraire to the 
Extraordinary Chambers at the Court of Cambodia (ECCC) and, in a different 
context, the Special Court for Sierra Leone (henceforth SCSL). For different 
institutional and political reasons Stanley concludes that “Timorese individuals have 
been marginalized in different ways – for example, in the omission of certain, less 
powerful groups from recognition as victims […] and in the exclusion of local 
population from participation in the legal practice.” (Stanley 2009, p. 108) 
  
Besides the SPSC and the SCSL, another form of internationalized court structure 
was established under the UMIK mandate in Kosovo. In this case, a number of 
                                                 
36 Although at that time, negotiations as to how atrocities could be prosecuted were ongoing in 
Cambodia and it is said, that he design of the SPSC is based on the Cambodian model. Linton (2001), 
p. 203. 
37 UNTAET Regulation 2000/30, 25 September 2000, amended by UNTAET Regulation 2001/25, 14 
September 2001, Sections 12, 14.3, 36. 8. 
38 This was the case for East Timor and Cambodia where NGOs were in favour of an independent 
international tribunal on the model of the ad hoc tribunals, fearing for too much political interference 
of the governments.  
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international judges and prosecutors were introduced to the already existing judiciary 
for reasons of fear for the impartiality against the backdrop of the continuous 
division of the Kosovan society which was accentuated by the war (Hartman 2003, 
p. 7 et seqq.). Since the Kosovan Criminal Law provides for a broad standing of 
victims in the proceedings, typical in civil law countries, this also applies for victims 
of the war. They can participate as subsidiary prosecutors or as an injured party 
(McGonigle Leyh 2011, p. 157). Therefore, victims in Kosovo, if they assumed their 
rights, would be parties to the proceedings, represented, or unrepresented (Ibid.). 
Against this background, it would be instructive to have more empirical information 
about how this broad standing is perceived by all participants to the process, 
unfortunately, little is known about this (Ibid.). It seems as if victim protection plays 
a crucial importance in Kosovo when it comes to assuming one’s rights to 
participate. In the context of the success story of victims in international criminal law, 
these internationalized courts are hardly ever discussed.  
1.4.3. Truth Commissions as a victim-friendly alternative? 
In the cases of East Timor and Sierra Leone, another relatively new mechanism 
was established – the truth commission. It was hoped that the two transitional justice 
tools would create synergy effects, not least because it was felt to be necessary to 
provide victims with an opportunity to narrate their stories. The experiences made, 
with regard to victims, varied from country to country, despite this variation 
dependent on the political and societal context, yet again empirical studies observed 
that the mechanisms did not live up to the expectations and the narratives produced 
were criticised to be exclusive.  
Parallel to the criminal legal mechanism in Timor Leste, a truth commission 
(Commission of Truth and Friendship CTF) was established in July 2001. Thereby it 
was alleged that „Victims of human rights violations were given the opportunity to 
share their experiences, in their own words and language, in an open public forum. 
(…). It assisted in restoring some to the dignity they had lost by encouraging 
acknowledgement of their struggle and contribution.”39
                                                 
39 CAVR report 2006, Section1, para 94. 
 But while this reference to 
victims was generally made, commentators criticised that “no specific role or 
responsibility was designated to them in the Regulation (on the Community 
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Reconciliation Progress A/N)” (Kent 2004, p. 44). With regard to the objective of 
reconciliation in the CRP (a related reconciliation mechanism) the criticism 
concerning victims’ limited voice therein, resembles that of the TRC in South Africa 
(Ibid.; Moon 2008). Although ideally the work of the truth commission should have 
complemented the work of the SPSC, the overall conclusion for both transitional 
justice mechanisms is rather negative not only with regard to victims involvement 
therein, which was mainly said to be due to political and economic restraints (Stanley 
2009, pp. 102–108; Kent 2004; Linton 2001). This means that there again was a gap 
between the noble motives somewhat predefined by international developments in 
victim’s rights and the concrete implementation. A combination of hybrid court and 
truth commission that gained more attention than the case of East Timor, is the the 
SCSL. It was established after the ad-hoc tribunals as a treaty based sui generis court 
of mixed jurisdiction and composition based in Freetown and operating in most part 
from there. Since its legal framework mirrors that of the ICTR, the situation for 
victims at the court resembles that of the ad-hoc tribunals. At the same time a truth 
commission was instituted were victims could testify in a narrative form and without 
being selected by the Prosecution (Mibenge 2013, p. 128). This co-existence is 
described to be one of the most notable aspects in the Sierra Leonean transitional 
justice context (Mendez 2009, pp. 66–67; Schabas 2004, p. 180). In accordance with 
the suggestions of ICTY President Jorda, to establish a truth commission parallel to 
the court to meet victims expectations and needs, the situation in Sierra Leone is 
portrayed to be a positive example of the cooperation of two distinct transitional 
justice mechanisms to provide victims with the possibility to tell their story and to be a 
more comprehensive form of justice, closer to the communities affected (Mendez 
2009, p. 63; Smith 2004). Victims are considered to be the primary beneficiaries of 
the synergy effects of the SCSL and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) 
(Ibid., p. 127). William A Shabas draws the picture of the relationship, as the TRC 
being the plumber and the SCSL the electrician, both work in different parts of an 
unfinished house. “Nobody would want to live in a finished house that lacked either 
electricity or plumbing. In this sense, the ‘relationship’ is synergistic, but it probably 
involves little or no formal cooperation, as the practice of the two bodies in Sierra 
Leone appears to be demonstrating.” (Schabas 2004, p. 180) A closer look at both 
mechanisms shows, that albeit the limitations of the criminal legal framework vis à 
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vis victims is often described to lie within the retributive framework as opposed to 
the restorative approaches of TRCs, there are general limitations integral to both 
mechanisms when it comes to the truth-telling function (Buckley-Zistel 2015; Krog 
2011; Kelsall 2005). This is closely related to the image of the victim and the alleged 
interests of victims and how they relate to the actual participating victims. In April 
2003 the TRC began to hold public hearings in Freetown and twelve provincial 
districts. Throughout the proceedings, 9000 statements were taken, more than 450 
people testified in thousands of hours of testimony (Ibid., pp. 363–364). The 
objective was, similarly to East Timor and other truth commissions, to create and 
provide  
“an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and 
international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, 
from the beginning of the Conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace 
Agreement; to address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims, to 
promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations 
and abuses suffered.”40
With regard to victims the work of the TRC should “help restore the human 
dignity of victims and promote reconciliation by providing an opportunity for 
victims to give an account of the violations and abuses suffered […]”
 
41
                                                 
40 TRC Act 2000, Article 6(1); found at 
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/resources/collections/commissions/SeirraLeone-
Charter.pdf. 
 Contrary to 
what is expected of “the victims” and of the healing effect of truth-telling, empirical 
studies alleged that victims testifying before the TRC seemed to be disconnected 
from the process, seeing it as a trade-off of the story for a share of the government’s 
economic resources in form of reparations (Ibid., p. 371). In line with this, it was 
noted that the stories told were more an “offering a version of the truth composed 
of cold facts and little more” in order not to be emotionally overwhelmed (Ibid.). 
Now the expectation, that the victims need was to narrate their story in an emotional 
and truthful way, was disappointed by the presentation of cold facts, which in turn is 
exactly what victims are expected to offer when testifying before a court. Of course, 
it is the cold facts chosen by the victims and not by the requirements of the case or 
under the pressure of cross-examination. Notwithstanding that the style of 
interrogation by the commissioners was partly described as “indeed very much like 
41 TRC Act 2000, Article 6(2)b. 
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that of an opposing attorney in court.” (Ibid., p. 374) Furthermore, it is criticised 
that:  
“This imposition of a transitional justice response and model is revealed in the 
evident disconnection between the TRC Report and the lived reality of Sierra 
Leonean men and women. It manifests itself in an elitist tendency to devalue 
indigenous processes in order to legitimize elite institutions such as 
commissions and courts.” (Mibenge 2013, p. 154)42
Moreover, 
  
“[T]he overriding effect of the TRC Report’s presentation of gender and 
gender-based violence in armed conflict, and the periods preceding and 
following it, was that the voices of women were not as loud as the legal analysis 
and legal definitions of the war experience.” (Ibid.) 
Truth Commissions, like courts, have a limited mandate, depending on the 
respective founding documents. The acceptable truth told has to fit into this 
postulated narrative and depends very much on the implementation and practice 
shaping the hearings and therefore the truth constructed. Just like before courts, 
there is no simple truth to be uncovered, but truth is the outcome of a process of 
narration. In the case of truth commissions, the past is constructed through the 
process of narrating before the commission, victims in this context, albeit they have 
more space and time to narrate, adapt to the requirements and the narrative form of 
the respective truth commission. The truth told has to fit into the causal emplotment 
and is directed by the commissioners conducting the hearings (Buckley-Zistel 2015). 
This does not only hold true for East Timor and Sierra Leone, but was famously 
criticised in the case of South Africa, which is considered to be the prototype of 
TRC, although it was not the first one.43
                                                 
42 Similary: Shaw (2005), holding that: “Sierra Leone’s TRC, like South Africa’s, valorized a particular 
kind of memory practice: “truth telling,” the public recounting of memories of violence. This 
valorization, however, is based on problematic assumptions about the purportedly universal benefits 
of verbally remembering violence.”, p. 1. 
 Within this mandate, victims can narrate 
more or less freely without the evidentiary restrictions of a court, but still the 
expected cathartic effect, for both the victim and the society is highly contested 
(Shaw 2005, p. 7). Also, the criticism shows that the pitfalls of establishing a truth-
telling – truth-searching mechanism, namely being exclusive and elitist, remain, 
43 Hayner (2011), p. 74, citing Mahmood Mamdani who claimed that the commission produced a 
compromised truth that has written the vast majority of victims out of history.  
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regardless if it is legal, or so called alternative.44 The truth uncovered will always “be 
shaped by the investigative methodologies” (Bisset 2012, p. 35). “What is also 
increasingly clear is that the idea of a single, objective truth is a false construct.” 
(Ibid.) The South African truth commission therefore differentiated between four 
notions of truth: factual or forensic truth; personal or narrative truth; social or 
‘dialogue’ truth (see below) and healing and restorative truth.45 Whereas personal and 
narrative truth is associated with the individual, subjective truths of victims (and 
perpetrators), the factual, or forensic truth is described to be “[T]he familiar legal or 
scientific notion of bringing to light factual, corroborated evidence, of obtaining 
accurate information through reliable (impartial, objective) procedures, featured 
prominently in the Commission’s findings process.”46 In contrast” [T]he stories told 
to the Commission were not presented as arguments or claims in a court of law. 
Rather, they provided unique insights into the pain of South Africa’s past, often 
touching the hearts of all that heard them.”47 By providing victims with the 
possibility to narrate their truths, the TRC claims to recognize the healing potential 
of telling one’s story and at the same time “[I]n so doing, it also sought to contribute 
to the process of reconciliation by ensuring that the truth about the past included the 
validation of the individual subjective experiences of people who had previously been 
silenced or voiceless.”48
                                                 
44 Kastner (2008, p. 157), holding that there was never a truth commission that was considered to be 
successful, which she does not consider to be the essential function. She rather sees the latter in the 
generation of the Bedingung der Möglichkeit to address the past.  
 Similar to the descriptions at the courts, victims are 
associated with the subjective, emotional and non-legal – non-factual truth, while 
forensic and factual truth is associated with the legal (scientific!) requirements of 
truth. The perception of the victim and her or his role does not differ significantly 
from the foregoing descriptions in the discussions at national and international 
courts. Above that, in all cases, a gap between the noble motives of victims’ 
involvement in truth-finding mechanisms and the practical implementation is 
observed and criticised.  
45 TRC report Volume I Chapter 5 para. 29, 
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/Volume%201.pdf last accessed, 20 October 2015. 
46 Ibid., para 30. 
47 Ibid., para 36.  
48 Ibid., para 37. 
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1.5. The Extraordinary Chambers in The Courts of Cambodia 
As in the East Timorese case, the investigating group of experts who reported on 
the crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, initially recommended to 
establish a purely international court under the UN mandate. Given the Cambodian 
refusal to agree to such a tribunal, in January 2001, after four years of protracted 
negotiations, Cambodia’s National Assembly approved the Law on the 
Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in The Courts of Cambodia (ECCC).  
Notably, neither the agreement between Cambodia and the United Nations, nor 
the law on the establishment of the extraordinary Chambers provide for a right for 
victims to participate (SáCouto 2011, p. 303). However, proceedings are to be 
conducted in accordance with Cambodian criminal procedures. Under the 
Cambodian Code of Criminal Procedure, victims are allowed to bring, as civil parties, 
an action to seek compensation for injuries endured. The purpose of the Internal 
Rules of the ECCC as a hybrid court then was to ‘consolidate applicable Cambodian 
procedure for proceedings before it’. Given this structure, the ECCC draws upon 
Cambodian civil law tradition allowing victims to participate as a partie civile in the 
proceedings which is unique in international criminal law. The central norm with 
regard to the purpose of civil party participation at the ECCC is, Internal Rule 23:  
1. The purpose of Civil Party action before the ECCC is to:  
a) Participate in criminal proceedings against those responsible for crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the ECCC by supporting the prosecution; and  
b) Seek collective and moral reparations, as provided in Rule 23 quinquies 
The purposes of victim participation at the ECCC are described independently 
from this rule, according to the same international principles other international 
courts refer to when interpreting norms on participation.49 Along these lines, the Pre-
Trial Chamber noted that “the inclusion of Civil Parties in proceedings is in 
recognition of the stated pursuit of national reconciliation.”50
                                                 
49 See Pre-Trial Chamber, Case against Nuon Chea, Decision on Civil Party Participation in 
Provisional Detention Appeals, 20 March 2008, No. 002/19-09-1007-ECCC/OCIJ/PTC01, C11/53, 
paras 30-31 referring to the Declaration and the Guidelines. 
 It is emphasised that in 
order to pursue reparation claims, Civil Parties have the right to participate in 
50 Ibid., para 37, referring to the General Assembly Resolution 57/228, 18 December 2002nd the 
Preamble of the Internal Rules.  
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proceedings against those responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
ECCC.51 As opposed to the ICC, Civil Parties do not need “to show any special 
interest in any stage of the proceedings.”52
Furthermore, contrary to most other courts and due to the civil legal tradition 
with the institution of an Investigating Judge, civil parties have far reaching rights in 
the investigation phase of the proceedings. Like the other parties, they can request 
the Investigating Judge to conduct investigations on their behalf, a respective denial 
has to be explained. Furthermore, decisions taken during this phase can be appealed 
before the Pre-Trial Chamber. Since the scope of the case is determined at this early 
stage of the proceedings, the right provided for victims leave them with a distinct 
role in influencing the crimes charged and thus shape the trial. As aforementioned, 
the lack of respective influence became important with regard to the inclusion or 
exclusion of gender-based violence. In the case of the ECCC it was the initiative of 
civil parties that lead to the inclusion of forced marriage into the charges of case 02.  
 This reflects the civil legal tradition where 
victims participate as parties and participation is among other objectives aimed at 
receiving a title for reparation claims. 
Another difference to the ICC is the formulation ‘by supporting the Prosecution’, 
while Chambers at the ICC referring to jurisprudence of the ECtHR underline that 
the interests of victims are independent and distinct from those of the Prosecution.53
                                                 
51 Trial Chamber, Case against. Kaing Guek Eav alias “Duch”, Decision on Civil Party Co-Lawyers’ 
Joint Request for a Ruling on the Standing of Civil Party Lawyers to make Submissions on Sentencing 
and Directions concerning the Questioning of the Accused, Experts and Witnesses testifying in 
Character, 9 October 2009, No.001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, E72/3, para. 11.  
 
Here, the express role of victims is to support the latter, repeatedly, the Defence 
raised concerns regarding the right to a fair trial and the equality of arms principle, 
complaining that Civil Parties became second prosecutors (Kirchenbauer et al. 2013, 
pp. 4–5). As opposed to this, in some instances, civil party lawyers made submissions 
presenting opposing positions to the Prosecution which were then criticised for the 
lack of coordination at the cost of the expediency of the trial (Ibid.). This controversy 
reveals a systematic tension within the ECCC participation scheme. On the one 
52 Pre-Trial Chamber, Case against Nuon Chea, Decision on Civil Party Participation in Provisional 
Detention Appeals,  20 March 2008, No. 002/19-09-1007-ECCC/OCIJ/PTC01, C11/53, para 49. 
53 La Chambre Péliminaire I, Situation en République Démocratique du Congo, Décision sur les 
demandes de participation à la procedure de VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 et VPRS 6, 
17 janvier 2006, ICC-01/04-101, para 51. 
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hand, Civil Parties in domestic jurisdictions are parties to the proceedings and thus 
independent actors with a broad set of procedural rights. Their interests and 
strategies are not, and do not have to be, identical to the Prosecutions’. On the other 
hand, Civil Parties at the ECCC are supposed to support the Prosecution, without 
becoming second prosecutors, which draws a thin line between undue interference 
with the rights of the accused and legitimate assistance. This tension and the 
pervceived difficulties of implementation is dealt with in a central decision on victim 
participation and a strong dissent thereto, exemplifying a shift in addressing victims’ 
rights, namely a restrictive approach, and the re-consideration of the purpose and 
limits of international criminal law vis à vis victims. In line with the decision, 
amendments to the Internal Rules decisively restricted the participatory scheme at 
the ECCC. The restriction of victims’ rights through the amendment of the victim 
participation scheme is reflective of a general re-consideration of victims, courts, 
their relation and purpose, while the narrative patterns constructive of the victim 
remain the same. 
In its decision on the participation of Civil Parties in sentencing, the majority of 
the Chamber in Case 001 reiterates that the civil party model, developed in the 
ECCC Internal Rules and based upon Cambodian criminal procedure, must be 
consistent with the specific nature of criminal proceedings of persons who were 
senior leaders and most responsible for crimes committed against millions of people 
in Cambodia. Consequently, it held that features of more traditional civil party 
models are devised for less complex proceedings and thus require adaptations.54 
Interpreting the ECCC Law and the nature of the respective proceedings as 
limitations which must be acknowledged, the majority concluded that a restrictive 
interpretation of the rights of the Civil Parties is required.55
                                                 
54 Trial Chamber , Case against. Kaing Guek Eav alias “Duch”, Decision on Civil Party Co-Lawyers’ 
Joint Request for a Ruling on the Standing of Civil Party Lawyers to make Submissions on Sentencing 
and Directions concerning the Questioning of the Accused, Experts and Witnesses testifying in 
Character, 9 October 2009, No.001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, E72/3, para. 12.  
 Notwithstanding that the 
number of victims and in general the complexity of the proceedings is a difficulty 
faced by all courts in international criminal law, this conclusion is unique. Contrary to 
the ICC, where victim’s rights are positively defined against the backdrop of the 
supplementary requirement of the personal interest which has to be affected, the 
55 Ibid., para 13.  
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interpretation of the majority in this case leads to a restrictive definition of rights that 
are already provided for under the civil party regime.  
Concerning the role of Civil Parties and the reason behind the inclusion of victims 
in the proceedings at the ECCC, the majority holds that “[T]he clear policy reason 
for this right of participation is that it is in the interest of both of the Cambodian 
community, as represented by the Co-prosecutors, and of the Civil Parties 
themselves to obtain a decision on the criminality of the actions of the Accused.”56 
Having determined the different motivations of the parties to the proceedings, the 
issue of equality of arms is addressed and solved by saying that “while the Civil 
Parties have the right to support or assist the Prosecution, their role within the trial 
must not, in effect transform them into additional prosecutors.”57 Consequently, 
each party should remain within the clearly defined roles, “in keeping with their 
particular interests and responsibilities at trial”.58 Accordingly, rule 23 (1)(a) must be 
read against the backdrop of the Civil Parties principle pursuit of reparations and as a 
prerequisite for this a criminal conviction. Therefore, they are primarily interested in 
the Trial Chamber determining the elements of the crime as a possible basis for their 
civil claim.59 In light of this “fundamental interest in securing reparations”60
Judge Lavergne in his dissenting opinion, addressing the difficulties faced, while 
agreeing to the need of changes and adaptations, asks: “How far can one go without 
breaching the spirit of the law, or fundamentally distorting the meaning of the 
involvement of Civil Parties before the ECCC and the purpose of the trial as a 
whole, characterized by the coexistence of two interrelated actions, namely criminal 
and civil actions.”
, the 
interest in the establishment of the truth is reduced to facts and factors relevant to 
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the Accused as well.  
61
                                                 
56 Trial Chamber , Case against. Kaing Guek Eav alias “Duch”, Decision on Civil Party Co-Lawyers’ 
Joint Request for a Ruling on the Standing of Civil Party Lawyers to make Submissions on Sentencing 
and Directions concerning the Questioning of the Accused, Experts and Witnesses testifying in 
Character, 9 October 2009, No.001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, E72/3, para. 25. 
 He recalls that the opportunity to intervene as a civil party in the 
proceedings is aimed at, inter alia, establishing the criminality of the alleged acts that 
57 Ibid., para 26. 
58 Ibid., paras 26-27. 
59 Ibid., paras 32-33. 
60 Ibid., para. 34. 
61 Ibid., dissenting opinion, para. 4. 
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caused the harm suffered and to identify and prosecute the perpetrators of such acts. 
It is within this general framework that Civil Parties may seek reparations in the 
course of the very same trial. Accordingly, victims may participate throughout the 
legal proceedings “the common purpose of which is to ascertain the truth concerning 
the accused’s criminal responsibility, which might also be the basis for his or her civil 
responsibility.”62 In the context of this interrelation of civil action and criminal 
proceedings victims participating as Civil Parties enjoy a broad set of rights 
throughout all stages of the proceedings and in consequence unless otherwise 
provided by the rules, “it must be assumed that Civil Parties have the same rights and 
obligations as all other parties. Any other interpretation can only be contrary to the 
law.”63
Fearing the difficulties arising of a high number of Civil Parties in Case 002 the 
respective considerations subsequently lead to an amendment of the Internal Rules 
to the effect that Civil Parties, represented by their lawyers are confined to a single, 
consolidated group represented by two Co-lead lawyers in Court. Only at Pre-Trial 
stage the Civil Parties have the right to be represented by their lawyer before the Co-
Investigating Judges. A single claim for collective and moral reparation has to be 
formulated for all parties. The claim must identify the harm suffered as a result of the 
crime committed by the convicted person and outline how these reparations will 
provide specific benefits to the Civil Parties to address their particular harm (Ibid., 
p. 47). This is criticised for effectively undermining the concept of civil party 
participation since it does not even reach the minimum level of rights provided for 
under Cambodian Law (Diamond 2010-2011; Bair 2008; Studzinsky 2011)  
  
Since initially, the broad standing of victims as civil parties was celebrated as a 
success taking into consideration the best practices of the previous courts, the 
restrictive amendments were broadly discussed. While the ECCC was first celebrated 
for its keen approach towards victims, saying that “accepting victims as civil parties, 
parties to the proceedings, the PTCI took a major step forward in making tribunals 
places that do not simply lay blame on those most responsible for mass crimes, but 
                                                 
62 Trial Chamber , Case against. Kaing Guek Eav alias “Duch”, Decision on Civil Party Co-Lawyers’ 
Joint Request for a Ruling on the Standing of Civil Party Lawyers to make Submissions on Sentencing 
and Directions concerning the Questioning of the Accused, Experts and Witnesses testifying in 
Character, 9 October 2009, No.001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, E72/3, dissenting opinion, para.6. 
63 Ibid., para. 13. 
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also promote healing and national reconciliation in a meaningful way for those most 
affected by them.” (Bair 2008, p. 545) After the significant restriction of 
victims’rights at the ECCC, the narrative describing the possibilities of victim 
participation shifts from victim’s individual rights and the overall effect of the courts 
with regard to peace and reconciliation, to involving them meaningfully and 
effectively. This discussion is once again closely linked to what is considered to be 
the limits and purpose of international(ized) criminal courts. The interpretation, 
discussion and critique of causes, and necessity of the institutional and legal changes 
of the participatory framework at the ECCC is illustrative of the perception of an 
alleged tension resulting from the classical image of the victim and the inter-related 
image of the law and its function.  
In accordance with the narrative arc of increasing victims’rights in international 
criminal law, before the amendments to the civil party framework at the ECCC it was 
hold that contrary to the ICC, which is “sanitizing victims participation in the interest 
of justice rather than for facilitating justice in the interest of victims” (Ibid., p. 546), 
the Cambodian framework provides a robust mandate for victims at the court. 
Referring to Special Chambers of East Timor and Kosovo in their argument that 
civil party participation is in line with international standards. (Ibid.)  
The ECCC was considered to provide a more meaningful way to involve victims 
compared to their standing restricted to the witness box, thereby further writing the 
story of progress: from paying lip service to victims too getting them closer to the 
center at the ICC (Ibid., p. 512). At the same time, the narrative of empowerment 
maintained: “Participation in these types of proceedings is a tool of empowerment 
[for victim civil parties]…People can tell their story, feel that what happened to them 
is a consideration, a recognizing that what happened to them should not have 
happened.”64
                                                 
64 Gabriela González Rivas , deputy head of the ECCC’s victims unit, interview with Seth Mydans in 
Khmer Rouge Tribunal, Victims will not stand idly by, New York Times, June 17, 2008. 
 It was hold that victims could, given the biased Cambodian judiciary 
and the political influence still exerted by the Cambodian state, introduce impartiality 
into the trials, but at the same time, it was broadly feared that the participation as 
parties to the proceedings could negatively impact the accused right to a fair trial 
(Ibid., p. 520; Safferling 2011). Similarly to the other courts, it was the representation 
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of suffering that should have had a place within the proceedings: “It allows victims 
to feel that their suffering is as much the focus of the trial as it was the focus the 
crimes.” (Bair 2008, p. 552)  
„You could hear a pin drop in the courtroom, in terms of the amount of 
attention that everyone was giving to the Civil Parties giving their testimony – 
because they were speaking from their heart, and they explained how that loss 
of a husband, son, or family members […] how that affected their whole life 
for the last thirty years. So they really brought out the impact of the crimes [...] 
that was brilliant.“ (Hoven 2014b, p. 690 citing a prosecutor) 
Accordingly, it was alleged that „The greatest value that the Civil Party lawyer can 
bring, is by communicating the perspective of their clients in as real and as human 
way possible.” (Ibid., p. 692 citing a legal professional working at the ECCC ). This is 
often described as the the human side of the otherwise technical legal mechanism, 
reminding the involved lawyers of what their work is really about:  
“Prosecutors and judges agreed that the civil parties ‘brought a sort of 
humanity to the proceedings that otherwise they won’t have’ and reminded the 
other parties of the true importance of their work. Since criminal trials of mass 
atrocities tend to focus on complex questions of individual responsibility, 
proceedings would risk becoming technical and losing touch with the interests 
and needs of victims.” (Hoven 2014a, p. 103) 
Whilst this was on the one hand appreciated to ground and also legitimize the 
proceedings, with the time criticism arouse, emphazising the rights of the accused 
alleging that civil party participation clog procedural mechanisms, reduce the 
effectiveness of the ECCC and again – rather than reminding the lawyers of the 
purpose of their doing, victims were said to divert attention from the legal issues at 
hand (Bair 2008, p. 550). It is alleged that supporters of civil party participation now 
have to convince others that victim participation will not disrupt the proceedings 
with irrelevant and repetitive evidence, outbursts and unprofessional behaviour 
(Ibid.). One example for the direct confrontation of the Chamber with what they 
perceived to be a misappropriation of the proceedings by a victim party resulted in 
the introduction of the obligation to be legally represented in court.  
“Theary Seng is manipulating the process. I do not think that the process will 
be well managed if we allow [her] to stand on her soapbox… I used to think 
highly of victim participation, but I realize that individual victims cannot be 
allowed to speak in court as they are emotional. Judges do not want to hear 
only about their mental anguish alone, that is for a psychiatrist, not a court of 
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law. Common legal representation is necessary ” (Mohan 2009, p. 755 citing an 
interviewee) 
The shift in the perception of victim participation at the ECCC, which was then 
legally institutionalized by collectivizing, representing and externalizing victims and 
their emotions, is strongly expressed: 
„At the beginning of the trials, I welcomed the notion of the novel concept of 
victims having a formal status in the trial. I welcomed that in theory, but in 
practice – in my view – it was not particularly successful as a way of providing 
justice for victims [...] I don’t think you will find now anybody at the court any 
longer who says, yes it has to get louder voices for victims who are willing to 
extend proceedings until I don’t know when‘. I think some of them say well, 
why did we do it?‘“ (Hoven 2014b, p. 690 citing a judge the author interviewed) 
And also the representation of suffering and the mere appearance of victims in 
the courtroom was described as a pack of wolves infringing upon the fairness of the 
proceedings: „I had the feeling that the accused must have felt he had a pack of 
wolves looking at him [...] all these lawyers and the prosecutors glaring at him [...] It 
just didn‘t feel fair.“ (Ibid., p. 691) 
Another issue arising at the ECCC, which was mentioned as a reason for not 
introducing victim participation at previous international criminal courts, is the 
allegedly difficult relation to the task of the prosecution. Traditionally, in modern 
criminal law, it is assumed that the prosecution as a representative of the state (in 
international law the international community) represents the victim’s interests, 
thereby rationalizing the process. The tension described at the ECCC is, that now the 
accused is confronted with multiple prosecutors and that the prosecutions’ coherent 
representation of the case is impaired by diverging interests and consequently too 
many versions of the same case.  
„Asking them [the Civil Party Lawyer] now to understand and reflect on the 
total picture, that’s not where their strength is, that’s the Prosecutions job.“ 
„We have a vision of Civil Party lawyers being you’re not the prosecutor, you’re 
here to speak for your clients, to express what they went through but you’re not 
a prosecutor.“65
                                                 
65 Hoven (2014b, p. 692). Similarly Mohan (2009, p. 765) citing an interviewee : “During 
investigations, after a while the bones become beautiful and the ghosts become your friends, but the 
victim survivors – they can be diﬃcult. This is because they are deeply emotional beings. We should 
not discount that. Many still suﬀer from deep psychological scarring and it can be transmitted across 
generations.”drawing the consequence that: “Victim civil parties are not and should not be the driving 
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With this argumentation, the legal restrictions of the civil partie framework are 
partly represented as inevitable to avoid a complete failure and the overburdening of 
the court by millions of victims. (Hoven 2014a) It is argued that the natural boundaries of 
law have to be considered and therefore, realistically one has to determine that the 
alleged interests of victims cannot be satisfied by a court of law and that for the 
collective search for truth in the sake of national reconciliation, civil partie 
participation was not necessary in the first place (Hoven 2014b, p. 689). More critical 
studies conclude that:  
“Undoubtedly, there are bound to be gaps between the ECCC’s promise and its 
operational impact. However, these gaps should prompt a vigorous self-
examination on the ECCC’s part, not a retroactive restriction of victims’ rights. 
Concerns about practicality and expedience, though merited, are often self-
referential. They are a safe-refuge for legal conservatism: judges who may fear 
that victims may not bend to the will of their endeavour, defense lawyers who 
may fear that victims may strengthen the elbow of the prosecution, and 
prosecutors who may fear that victims may show them up.” (Mohan 2009, 
pp. 756–757) 
At the same time empirical studies again suggested a discrepancy between theory 
and practice of victim participation:  
“Based on my conversations with and observations of Cambodian victims and 
civil parties, I argue that the promises of victim-centrism are rhetorical devices 
that have little practical resonance for Cambodians. If anything, they soothe the 
ECCC’s aﬃliates (and bolster their legitimacy), not victims, some of whom 
complain that their token participation has “revive(d) memories, bitterness and 
misery”, and a “loss of faith in the ECCC.” (Ibid., p. 737)  
Against this background, they, like their allegedly conservative counterparts, 
suggest to rely on mechanisms beyond the law to better satisfy victims’interests and 
need in post khmer rouge Cambodia (Ibid., p. 738).  
Once again, victims were portrayed as those who provide the human face and the 
cultural background to the proceedings which was initially welcomed. Then tensions 
with the other participants were observed, tensions that were already anticipated at 
previous courts. The tension with the prosecutor is said to consist in the 
determination of the case to proof the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt 
and the possibly diverging strategies of the victims’ representatives. The tension that 
                                                                                                                                     
force of the court – they are at best an auxiliary force. What is their role? Well, someone has to tell the 
story, but it is unresolved if this is best left to [Prosecution] witnesses rather than civil parties.” 
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was problematized from the very beginning, was the confrontation of the accused 
with multiple accusers and the infringement of his/her right to a fair trial. 
Furthermore, the discussions around the ECCC civil party participation framework 
revealed another tension, that was mainly discussed in the Eichmann trial, namely the 
difficulties judges describe in containing the legal proceedings given the multiple 
emotional stories. Apart from the tensions perceived among the parties to the 
proceedings, there are systematic tensions repeatedly referred to, namely, the tension 
between factual truths, represented by the lawyers and emotional truths represented 
by the victims; the tension between the legal language and the language victims 
speak, this is framed to potentially overburden the proceedings.  
1.6. Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
I will only very briefly mention the Special Tribunal of Lebanon (STL), which is 
mentioned to demonstrate that the introduction of a victim participation framework 
is a standard when installing international criminal courts. The framework at the STL 
is oriented towards the version of the ICC. Like article 68 (3) of the Rome Statute, 
article 17 of the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and rule 86 (B)(ii) and 
(iii) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence contain the requirement of an affected 
personal interest to present views and concerns. Likewise, there is no definition of 
these requirements. The Pre-Trial Judge held that when interpreting these concepts 
according to their object and purpose, recourse is made to jurisprudence of other 
international tribunals, especially the ICC given the similarity of the concepts, but 
also the ECCC, the Declaration and if appropriate Lebanese Law. 
Contrary to the other courts, there are only few victims participating in the 
proceedings at the STL due to the limitation of the mandate to hold trials for the 
people accused of carrying out the attack of 14 February 2005 which killed 22 
people, including the former prime minister of Lebanon, Rafik Hariri, and injured 
many others in Beirut. Therefore, the STL hardly plays any role in the discussions 
about victims in international criminal law, it is simply not representational.  
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1.7. The International Criminal Court 
Against the backdrop of the described developments in international law and the 
criticism of the ad-hoc tribunals, victim participation was introduced at the ICC 
(Pena and Carayon 2013, pp. 520–521). 
Initially, although demands for justice for victims played an important part in the 
drafting phase of the Rome Statute, the introduction of victim participation was a 
contested issue and the cause of victim participation was mainly promoted by NGOs 
and certain states (Tsereteli 2010). Especially France, Amnesty International, Human 
Rights Watch and the Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice, pushed for the 
incorporation of a victim participation framework. In the words of the French 
Minister of Justice:  
“Such is the magnitude of our mission: to put the individual back at the heart 
of the international criminal justice system by giving it the means to accord the 
victims their rightful place. A noble task, but one whose difficulty is readily 
appreciable by all. Since the aim is to allow the victims, concretely, to become 
parties to the international criminal proceedings, without undermining the 
effectiveness of the International Criminal Court, without diverting it from its 
task of law enforcement.”66
This was said on “The International Seminar on Victims Access in the 
International Criminal Court” initiated by the French Government, on which draft 
rules of procedure were developed, which later formed the basis of the negotiations 
at the Second Preparatory Commission of the ICC in 1999 (Haslam 2004, p. 321). 
There are a number of provisions in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE) 
dealing directly with victims, who are distinguished from witnesses. This underlines 
the assumption that victims have distinct interests in the proceedings, especially 
distinct from those of the prosecution. The definition of victims is, in line with 
developments in international human rights law, broad. Like at the ad hoc tribunals, 
there are special provisions providing for the protection of victims and witnesses and 
a Victim and Witnesses Unit established. The Rome Statute, furthermore, contains a 
reparation framework and the unique institution of the Trust Fund for Victims. 
Unlike claimed in the quote of the French Justice Minister, victims cannot participate 
as parties to the proceedings (even though the provisions are not always clearly 
  
                                                 
66 Opening address of Paris Seminar “Access of Victims to the International Criminal Court,” Paris, 
April 27, 1999; cited in Haslam (2004, p. 316). 
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formulated). The victim participation framework in the Rome Statute is rather 
unique. The plurality of approaches to victim involvement in criminal proceedings 
rendered it difficult for the drafters of the Rome Statute to clearly define a mode of 
participation at the ICC. Hence, victim participation in general, and the central 
provision, Article 68 in concrete, albeit generally accepted as an important positive 
development and acknowledged to playing a central role within the ICC framework, 
is no clearly defined set of rules. Consequently, article 68 (3) is an almost literal 
counterpart of Article 6 (b) of the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for 
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (in the following referred to as the 
Declaration) which is one of the legal texts resulting from the parallel development in 
international human rights law which will be discussed later.67 There was no 
discussion of the elements of the legal text by the Preparatory Commission. 
Consequently, while generally agreeing that the participatory rights of victims should 
at least be compliant with the Declaration and therefore with the human rights 
standards, there was no further specification because the drafters of the ICC Rules 
did not feel authorized to fill these gaps left by diplomatic exercise.68
The concrete design of victim participation is basically left to the discretion of the 
Chambers defining victims’ interests and ruling on the modalities of presenting views and 
concerns accordingly. This interpretative exercise is practised against the backdrop of 
balancing victims’ interests with the rights of the accused, the general necessity 
expeditious trial and the fact that there is no explicit requirement and accordingly no 
specifications of participation in international law. I will discuss the legal framework 
and its implementation in more detail below. In this chapter it is important to note, 
that, similarly to the narrative shift occurring with the practical implementation of 
victim participation at the ECCC, now, more than a decade after the celebration of 
the introduction of victim participation into the Rome Statute as a milestone, the 
practice of the ICC is under increased scrutiny.  
  
                                                 
67 UN Doc. A/RES/40/34 (1985), article 6 (b) : 6. The responsiveness of judicial and administrative 
processes to the needs of victims should be facilitated by:(…) 
(b) Allowing the views and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at appropriate stages 
of the proceedings where their personal interests are affected, without prejudice to the accused and 
consistent with the relevant national criminal justice system.” 
68 UN Doc. A/AC.249/1998/L.13 (1998), The report of the Inter-Sessional meeting from 19-30 
January 1998 in Zutphen only mentions that: “The rules of procedure shall include provisions giving 
effect to the United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and 
Abuse of Power”, p.117; Vasiliev (2015, p. 1147). 
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From the very beginning of the Courts initiation, officials claim that bringing 
justice to victims is one of the objectives of the Court. According to the Preamble of 
the Rome Statute, the rationale of the ICC’s existence is to address the suffering of 
millions of children, women and men who have been victims of unimaginable atrocities shocking to 
the conscience of humanity in ending the impunity for such crimes by punishing its 
perpetrators. Recognizing what is referred to as a restorative justice mandate beside 
the traditional retributive purpose, the ICC organs reiterate their responsibility for 
“bringing justice” to victims.69 This narrative is supported by NGOs who from time 
to time remind the Court of the legitimizing function of victim participation, 
emphasizing that by providing local ownership over the criminal process the gap 
between the Court and the affected communities can be bridged and this will 
contribute to more confidence into the system, not only the international criminal 
justice system, but also the local judicial systems.70 Like at previous courts, it is now 
emphasised that on the one hand “the positive engagement with victims can have a 
significant effect on how victims experience and perceive justice and, as such, 
contribute to their healing process.”71 On the other hand, “[V]ictims also bring a 
unique perspective to the judicial process.”72
Nevertheless, given the occurrence of immense practical challenges in the 
implementation of victim participation, calls for a general reconsideration get louder 
(Pena and Carayon 2013; Garbett 2013, 2017; Musila 2010; Moffett 2015; Vasiliev 
2015). Accordingly, a gap is detected between the limited role victims actually play in 
international criminal proceedings and the continuous reference to victims as the 
raison d’être of the ICC (Kendall and Nouwen 2013). Critics argue that victim 
 For these reasons the Rome Statute was 
lauded to provide “[T]oo often ignored, victims’ voices” with “an attentive audience 
at the Court.” (Little 2007, p. 365) 
                                                 
69 ICC-ASP, Court’s Revised strategy in relation to victims (5 November 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-38-ENG.pdf. Accessed 30 October 2014, para 2: (…) 
the ICC has not only a punitive but also a restorative function; that positive engagement with victims 
can have a significant effect on how victims experience and perceive justice; and that it can contribute 
to their healing process.” 
70 The Importance of Victim Participation, Submissions to The Hague Working Group of the 
Assembly of State Parties, Victims’ Rights Working Group, 2013, 
http://www.vrwg.org/VRWG_DOC/2013_July_VRWG_HWG_ParticipationFINALrevised.pdf. 
71 ICC-ASP, Court’s Revised strategy in relation to victims (5 November 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-38-ENG.pdf. Accessed 30 October 2014. 
72 Ibid., p. 1. 
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participation in proceedings dealing with crimes implying large scale victimization is 
virtually impossible:  
“(…)it may well be that victims’ participation in criminal trials of the kind that 
are held before the ICC, i.e., trials with massive amounts of victims, cannot be 
more than symbolic, […], may be a new cause of secondary victimization.” 
(Van den Wyngaert, Darby 2012, p. 495) 
The issue of victims in international criminal proceedings seems to be as 
contested as ever. There are several modes of participation developed by the 
Chambers and the organisational structure around participation is not fixed, stricken 
by financial restraints and still topic of debate.73
“As an experiment, the attempt to institute victim-focused justice at the ICC 
can claim both successes and deficits. To date, several thousand victims have 
been accepted as participants, their lawyers have made numerous submissions 
in Court processes and some have spoken in The Hague — not simply as 
witnesses, but as a voice for their fellow victims. Additionally, the TFV has 
provided critical assistance to several thousand victims in Uganda and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and has suggested helpful guidelines for 
future reparations. At the same time, there is a widespread call for victims’ 
participation to be reformed to make it yield a greater impact at a lower cost. 
There is not yet consensus on how that should be achieved, or what that 
impact should be.” (Chris Tenove 2013, p. 6)  
 Until now, one gets the impression 
that victim participation is not only discussed against the background of its design, 
but its effectiveness, for both victims and the Court, is contested generally (Vasiliev 
2015).  
This could also be observed at the international(ized) courts discussed previously. 
International criminal law and its institutionalized courts are generally under closer, 
more critical scrutiny than in the beginning, were their implementation was mostly 
celebrated and faith that international criminal justice is a progress and will serve the 
traditional purposes of deterrence and the strengthening of the rule of law, etc. 
prevailed. Now, also with the empirical knowledge produced, the legitimizing 
narratives of deterrence, the affirmation of the rule of law, the promotion of peace-
building and reconciliation, the creation of an authoritarian historical record etc. are 
questioned, not only with regard to the involvement of victims. (Drumbl 2007) 
                                                 
73 Expert Initiative on Promoting Effectiveness at the International Criminal Court, Mettreux, G et al., 
2014, http://ilawyerblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Expert-Initiative-on-Promoting-
Effectiveness-at-the-International-Criminal-Court-December-2014.pdf, last accessed 31/5/2018. 
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The particular procedural issues problematized in relation to victim participation 
at the ICC, comprising possible participation during the investigation phase (the 
positive impact of which on the scope of the charges is emphasized with regard to 
the failure of previous courts to take into account especially gender based violence), 
leading and challenging evidence the different modes of representation and the 
prolongation of the proceedings due to the number of applicants will be discussed in 
more detail in the outline of the legal framework. Generally, the broader problem is 
again identified in the possible impact of the pervasive victim centric culture on the 
rights of the defendant that require a “neutral, dispassionate setting in which 
relatively neutral, dispassionate actors go about their business” (McAsey 2009, p. 124; 
similarly Baumgartner 2008). 
At the same time victims are appreciated for providing “local knowledge” 
(Carsten Stahn 2015, p. 49) helping the Chambers in their truth finding mission.  
“Regularly, only a few of those involved in the proceedings are thoroughly 
familiar with the local context and customs that are relevant to understanding 
the manner and impact of the commission of the crimes and to interpreting the 
evidence.” For these reasons victims help to “better understand the contentious 
issues of the case in light of their local knowledge and socio-cultural 
background” (Pena and Carayon 2013, p. 524) 
Finally the question was posed whether the aims associated with victim 
participation such as healing, peace and the best kind of restorative justice, could be 
achieved and if not if a reconsideration of the framework was due (McAsey 2009, 
p. 125).  
Now, empirical studies revealed that this was exactly not the case, but that there 
was a significant gap between the aims and the type of justice imagined and expected 
by the victims (Clarke 2015). And it was concluded that “the very nature of the 
retributively driven juridical process may at times deliver unsatisfying results for 
victims.”74
                                                 
74 Clarke (2015, p. 290), citing Kendall and Nouwen (2013) who refer to the victimhood constructed 
at the ICC as juridified victimhood. Fletcher (2015) draws similar concluions. Moffett (2015) asks 
what impact victims actually had on the decisions of the Chambers and his conclusions are likewise 
not positive.  
 With different normative standings towards victim participation in general 
many authors criticised the practical implementation of victim participation at the 
ICC. The different normative approaches are informed of different understandings 
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of the purpose and limits of criminal proceedings which will be discussed in the 
following. The discussions are lead under the buzzword of meaningful and effective 
(Moffett 2015), whereas the questions of meaningful and effective for whom, or 
what is contested and hardly ever really specified (Vasiliev 2015). Meaningful and 
effective participation, in fact, seems to imply that while participation is effective for 
the court, in the sense of, fitting into the legal framework and still being feasible 
within the means of international criminal courts; it is still meaningful for the victims. 
The criteria for the latter however remain vague. At the ICC, meaningfully is 
opposed to symbolically, somewhat sensing that the factual representational 
frameworks seem to be symbolic in a legitimizing function for the court without 
actually providing victims with effective participatory rights.75 A criticism that is 
brought forward not only with regard to the ICC and which is almost always linked 
to broader considerations of the purpose of criminal justice76
“Is it possible to integrate the interests of victims through their participation in 
criminal proceedings, without a fundamental revision of the role and interests 
of victims and defendants, thereby bringing about a grave distortion of the 
criminal justice system? Are we experiencing a paradigm shift in the criminal 
process or has this already occurred?” (Safferling 2011, pp. 185–186)  
 The central question, 
linking this to the very confines of criminal justice posed in the discussions about 
victims in criminal proceedings seems to be:  
1.8. From retributive – to restorative – to retributive? 
Just like the ECCC the ICC is struggling how to accommodate victim 
participation into the legal framework and the practical functioning of the court 
(Friman 2009). The strong language utilized in this regard underlines the necessity to 
undertake a deeper analysis of the narratives. Scholars argue that issues of victim 
participation have led to “ideological controversies” within the court and that “what 
seems to be at stake ultimately is the very idea of international justice.” (Vasiliev 
2015, 4, 7) This has practical implications insofar as reconsiderations of the structure 
of victim participation, streamlining it to become efficient and still meaningful, are 
                                                 
75 For a more detailed analysis, see Part II Chapter 5. 
76 Expert Initiative on Promoting Effectiveness at the International Criminal Court, Mettreux, G et al., 
2014, http://ilawyerblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Expert-Initiative-on-Promoting-
Effectiveness-at-the-International-Criminal-Court-December-2014.pdf. 24/5/2018. 
57 
 
made on the highest level – the Assembly of State Parties77, resulting in numerous 
expert initiatives and NGO reports.78
“…those who were in favor of the system and those within the Registry with 
the task of trying to make it work have been slowly pushed into a corner. With 
ever shrinking budgets, ever expanding tasks dictated by the different and often 
inconsistent Chamber rulings and little remit of their own to re-structure the 
work more efficiently, Registry officials are put in a position where they are 
destined to fail, which simply fuels the skeptics and contributes to the calls to 
further shrink the budget.”
 It is not difficult to imagine that these 
insecurities with regard to the future of victim participation and its framework led to 
tensions among commentators as well as among those who are working at the court.  
79
Now, current expert opinions, scholarly commentators, official courts statements 
and NGO expertise addressing the topic mostly negotiate to find a balance in order 
to close the gap between expectations, rights and resources (Ibid., p. 5) which is 
located between the two alleged poles of criminal justice purposes, the classical, taken 
for granted purpose of retributive justice understood as prosecution and punishment 
of perpetrators and the so called restorative complex
  
80
Others allege that whereas it is not about achieving restorative notions of justice 
(Henham 2004; Findlay and Henham 2005), it is about finding broader concepts of 
justice, involving victims’ interests, ensuring that justice mechanisms are responsive 
to victims’ needs according to a procedural justice rationale (Moffett 2015). And 
again others, hold that restorative justice, against the contrary assertions of the ICC 
itself, was never really within the mandate of the court, but what is subsumed under 
remedial or reparative justice, or just victim oriented justice: 
 And/or to reconsider the 
justice concepts within the international criminal justice context generally, favoring a 
victim constituency in order to gain legitimacy of those most effected.  
                                                 
77 Draft resolution on the impact of the Rome Statute system on victims and affected communities, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/ICC-ASP-8-Res.9-Annex.VI-ENG.pdf, last 
accessed 9/3/2016. 
78 Expert Initiative On Promoting Effectiveness At The International Criminal Court, May 2014, 
http://ilawyerblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Expert-Initiative-on-Promoting-
Effectiveness-at-the-International-Criminal-Court-December-2014.pdf. Last accessed 24/5/2018. 
79 Redress, The Participation of Victims in International Criminal Court Proceedings: A Review of the 
Practice and Consideration of Options for the Future, p. 7,8; https://redress.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/121030participation_report.pdf. Last accessed 24/5/2018. 
80 Vasiliev (2015), Moffett deliberately calling it reparative, or victim friendly, Moffett (2015). 
McGonigle Leyh (2011), rejecting the term restorative justice. Garbett (2013), Musila (2010), Pena and 
Carayon (2013), Sarah Ehlers (2012), Tsereteli (2010).  
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“However, in contrast to the informal nature of restorative justice, the 
proceedings of the ICC are ‘lawyer dominated’, and retain a retributive focus, 
limiting victims’ interests as participants in deference to the two parties of the 
prosecution and the defence. Moreover, given the scale and the ideology which 
drives international crimes, restorative justice may be inappropriate as it ‘is a 
relatively narrow concept that requires dialogue between the offender and the 
victim.’Instead the drafting of the Rome Statute and the jurisprudence of the 
ICC have been more influenced by UN Victims’ Declaration and human rights 
law than restorative justice.” (Ibid., pp. 6–7) 
Similarly:  
“[…] autonomous participation by victims in proceedings […] may offer a 
tangible avenue for expressing emotional suffering but it does not necessarily 
make a process restorative. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between 
victims' procedural rights within criminal trials and restorative justice processes. 
[…] extensive procedural rights for victims within the framework of a 
traditional criminal justice system may be granted without necessarily 
transforming that system into a restorative one. […]These domestic 
proceedings, while not adopting a restorative justice approach, most certainly 
adopt a victim-oriented approach (in an attempt to meet the needs and 
concerns of victims) and it is this approach which most closely resembles the 
victim schemes at the international courts, Thus, the application of the phrase 
'restorative justice' to the international criminal law construct is misleading.” 
(McGonigle Leyh 2011, p. 63)  
Summarizing the current debate, there are streams suggesting to return to the 
retributive mandate, streamlining victim participation consistent with the efficient 
and effective operation of the court according to what they understand to be its core 
functions (Vasiliev 2015; Safferling 2011; Hoven 2014b; Van den Wyngaert, Darby 
2012). Streams that generally accept this core mandate but claim that it has to be 
broadened in order not to be perceived as paternalistic, or generally to be in line with 
international human rights standards and international developments (McGonigle 
Leyh 2011, p. 63). And again others who opt for a re-conceptualization of 
international criminal justice within a governance framework taking into 
consideration a communitarian approach to justice, in which victim-constituency is 
the key factor for perceived legitimacy. The latter opt for a harmonization of the 
dualistic conception of retribution and restoration (Findlay and Henham 2005; 
Lambourne 2008).81
                                                 
81 Criticising that the distinction of retributive and restorative justice is oversimplified. 
 The main-stream within scholarly debate and also on the 
institutional level seem to be in favor of a reversion to what is considered to be the 
core function of international criminal law, namely retribution (Vasiliev 2015; Van 
den Wyngaert, Darby 2012). With regard to victim participation this implies a turn to 
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collectivization, representation and externalization, as well as it was the tendency at 
the courts discussed previously:  
“The scaling down of the grand restorative ambitions in developing the 
participatory scheme is the most affordable of the sacrifices for the Court; this 
is a key lesson that the ICC must have learnt after the protracted journey of 
rediscovering itself as a primarily retributive justice institution. ” (Vasiliev 2015, 
p. 1139)  
Since the critique of the retributive focus of the first courts and the respective 
disregard for victims as subjects with an active role in the proceedings and with 
interests going beyond those of the prosecution was the alleged reason to include 
victims at the ICC and celebrated as a progress in the more or less linear plotting of 
the success story of international criminal law, it is peculiar that the proposed way to 
go now is backwards without taking the previous criticism into consideration. Staying 
within the tracks of the tale of international criminal justice, it is hence due to have a 
closer look at the concepts of retribution and the purposes considered within 
international criminal justice generally, in order to refine the problematic of the 
justice-gap, the discrepancy of claim and reality.82
2. Conclusion 
 
There was a shift insofar that at Nuremberg, the Prosecution did not face major 
opposition when deciding on their strategy to leave out victims as witnesses, and in 
the Auschwitz trial, it was normal that there was no psychological support for victims 
while nowadays there is a strong lobby and support for victims’ right that can rely on 
human rights law and jurisprudence when claiming a broader standing for survivors 
in the proceedings. The Prosecution has to justify its strategy, the scope of charges 
etc. with respect to its effect on victims and even more than before, “the victims” 
became central for legitimizing international criminal law rhetorically (Clarke 2009, 
2015). The abstract victim (Kendall and Nouwen 2013; Fletcher 2015 calling it 
'imagined victim' )became central to the international criminal legal stage (Karstedt 
2010). At the same time, the role of victims as participants in the proceedings 
remains contested and the traditional criminal justice conceptions did not change, 
                                                 
82 Damaska (2009); This discrepancy is observed by many others and will be outlined in more detail 
below.  
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therefore, the discussions around victim participation evolve around the core 
questions of why, how, in whose name and for whom criminal legal proceedings are 
conducted and judgements are rendered. (Van den Wyngaert, Darby 2012) Regarding 
the latter questions there was no major shift, whereas the need to involve victims 
became more prevalent in contemporary discussions of atrocity trials, the underlying 
assumptions and images associated with victims remain the same. “The Victims” are 
granted access – they are beneficiaries of the proceedings, they are an extra, 
providing the human face, the emotional aspect, and local knowledge but generally trials 
could do without them. Relying on objective truths rather than subjective memories. “The 
Victims” help to create a story that can serve educational and restorative purposes 
The latter are at the same time framed to not belong to the classical purposes of law 
– being political (see criticism Eichmann trial and the respective submissions by the 
judges in Jerusalem and at the ECCC). At the same time, something is missing 
without victims, an unease is felt when they are not involved (Nuremberg, 
ICTY/ICTR). This lead to increased advocacy for a broadening of the scope of 
victims’ rights and the rhetorical re-iteration that victims are the centre of 
international criminal proceedings, emphasising the central role of victims in 
international law and transitional justice. The discrepancy between the rhetorical 
iterations and the practical implementation is underlined by the insistence on 
participation to be meaningful as opposed to be purely symbolic. And still, victims 
are associated with extra-legal mechanisms like truth commissions, which are said to 
better serve the victims’ alleged desire to tell their story. And involving victims is 
always a broadening of the purpose of criminal proceedings, which is generally 
jeopardizing the well-functioning, efficacy, sobriety, objectivity and impartiality of the 
endeavour. To achieve this ideal of efficacy, sobriety, objectivity and impartiality, it is 
discussed to return to the retributive justice rationale, which is associated with the 
roots of criminal justice at Nuremberg, providing it with a “victim friendly” touch, 
achieved through collectivization of the alleged claims and interests of victims. Going 
“back to the roots, getting rid of the restorative complex” (Vasiliev 2015) is said to 
ensure the ICCs efficiency and prevent victims’ frustration caused by the unrealistic 
expectations that were raised by the claims of bringing truth, justice and reparation to 
victims (Ibid.). Questions of the structure and legitimacy of international criminal law 
and jurisprudence seem to be at the heart of the discussions of victim participation 
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within international criminal justice. Victim participation is related to restorative 
justice concepts, or victim friendly versions which are conceptualized as being a 
“more” to retributive concepts which are described as the classic purpose of criminal 
justice and international criminal justice. At the same time restorative and retributive 
justice rationales are dichotomised and consequently described as not fully 
reconcilable in an international criminal court. (Clarke 2015) And, to make matters 
even more complex, international criminal law, as opposed to domestic criminal law 
is undertheorized since it was prevailingly shaped by practical political initiatives that 
made use of windows of opportunities for the advancement of international criminal 
law in international politics rather than developed from the theoretical sketch. (Koller 
2008) Accordingly, there is no fixed understanding of the theoretical foundations of 
international criminal law and some hold that it is a matter of faith rather than sound 
theoretical justification. (Ibid.) Within this structural and theoretical tension, victim 
participation is located and negotiated. And analysing the practical implementation a 
justice gap is observed between legitimizing theory and practice which is then ascribed 
to the tension between the two conceptions of justice.
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Chapter 2: The justice gap 
1. Legitimizing International Criminal Law  
Tracing the developments of victim’s role and participation in international 
criminal law, in the previous chapter it became clear that the discussions on the role 
of victims seems to be closely linked to discussions on the legitimacy of international 
criminal justice in general. The participation of victims is said to broaden the purpose 
of the courts. Consequently, the purposes of punishment which are seldom 
distinguished from the purpose of the proceedings, as they are negotiated within the 
victim participation narrative, go from retributive (neglecting victims’ interests 
(Nuremberg/Tokyo and the ad hoc tribunals) to reparative/restorative or more 
reluctantly just victim-oriented concepts (ECCC/ICC). 
And now, with the observation of difficulties in the implementation of the 
different victim participation frameworks, the tendency is to demand a return to a 
slightly modified retributive justice rationale (discussing collectivization, 
representation and externalization of victims).  
While within the discussion of victim participation and the victims’ role for the 
courts, the either retribution (perpetrator/public order) or restoration 
(victims/society) logic (Mégret 2015, p. 38) prevails, the above mentioned 
dichotomisation of justice approaches seems a side issue in the theoretical 
considerations of international criminal justice as a whole. This reveals that the 
discussions regarding the role of victims for, and in international criminal law are 
theoretically unfounded, or at least uncorroborated, when it comes to the reference 
to alleged purposes of punishment.  
Interestingly enough, retribution is commonly rejected as a (sole) purpose of 
punishment by those discussing legitimacy of international criminal law generally 
without putting a focus on victims. For this reason it is worthwhile to take a step 
back and look at the problematic of legitimacy in international criminal law more 
generally in order to put the discussions on victim participation into a context. 
Hence, in the following I will proceed by tracing the doctrinal discussion on 
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purposes of punishment and the legitimacy of international criminal courts more 
generally, in order to refine the position of victims within the narratives of 
international criminal justice by differentiating the prevailing either/or logic and the 
dichotomization of restorative and retributive justice.  
In these discussions, just like in domestic contexts, a multifaceted range of 
theories and approaches are discussed regarding the question of the why and how of 
international criminal law and punishment. Most doctrinal analysis of purposes of 
punishment in international criminal law start by discussing the classical domestic 
theories of punishment, such as retribution and utilitarian approaches like deterrence, 
general and specialized negative and positive prevention (Ambos 2013b, p. 67 et 
seqq. ). The discussions about legitimacy and purposes of punishment then proceed 
to either confirm the general applicability of classical theories (Akhavan 2001; Werle 
and Jeßberger 2016, p. 49 et seqq,), and/or discuss its limitations given the 
criminology of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the tension of peace and 
justice efforts in post-conflict societies and the general lack of empirical verification 
(Nouwen 2012).  
What is striking is that, when considering purposes of punishment and the 
legitimacy of international criminal justice and courts, a general lack of theorization is 
symptomatic. This is characterized by a negligence to seriously consider discussions 
concerning domestic philosophical and legal policy approaches to the purposes of 
criminal law. Consequently, this uncritical application of domestically developed 
theories leads to a flawed theoretical debate on the international level. At the same 
time, the discrepancy between theorization and empirical validation seems to be just 
as disillusioning in the discussions on legitimacy of international criminal law in 
general as within the discussions on victim participation. Consequently, the practice 
of international criminal law and its alleged effects are mostly based on uncritically, 
taken for granted assumptions. When being confronted with theoretical scrutiny 
and/or empirical analysis, there again appears a gap between claim and reality of 
international criminal justice. While this seems to be commonly recognized, it is by 
some valued as the triumph of faith over rationality necessary to realize a project like 
international criminal justice in an international environment dominated by 
Realpolitik (Koller 2008, pp. 1049–1050). Others call for general reconsiderations 
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and criticise the believe that the “proliferation of criminal justice institutions as 
constituting a self-evident cause for celebrations” as a result of complacent thinking 
(Drumbl 2003, p. 4) 
In order to address these shortcomings, a distinction between the criminal justice 
approach and the security, peace and human rights approach is drawn to not limit the 
discussions to classical criminal justice theories (Ambos 2013a; Ambos 2013b, 
pp. 68–69). In an attempt to fill the gap, different strategies and theoretical 
considerations are discussed, a very prominent of which is establishing a victim 
constituency, a victim-oriented purpose of punishment relying on the internationally 
acknowledged rights to truth, justice and reparation and victimological approaches to 
criminal justice (Drumbl 2003; Möller 2003; Stehle 2007; Findlay 2009; Moffett 
2014). 
These narratives implicitly build on the conceptions of the rule of law – truth and 
justice, the subject and violence and incorporate a distinct notion of trauma and 
healing. Indeed, it is problematic, that given the lack of scrutiny these implicit 
conceptions mostly remain unchallenged and nevertheless are highly influential in 
structuring relations in international criminal law.  
By stepping out of the narrow discussions on victim participation and its 
entanglement with alleged purposes of international criminal justice mechanisms, it 
ought to become clear that victims play a distinctive role in justifying international 
criminal law by filling a gap in legitimizing international criminal justice generally.  
1.1. Classical Theories and their gaps 
The following elaborations will sketch the concepts drawn upon to legitimize 
international criminal justice as they are discussed in doctrine. Since, deep theoretical 
considerations of the concepts are missing in the discussions on international 
criminal justice, the focus will not be to comprehensively elaborate on the 
philosophical concepts but will be limited to the discussions represented in 
international criminal legal debates. Portraying these debates helps to carve out the 
problematic of legitimization in international criminal law and the peculiar role of 
victims therein in order to subsequently scrutinize the theoretical flaws and the taken 
for granted assumptions underlying the legitimizing narratives.  
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1.1.1. Retribution and deterrence: always referred to while highly contested 
Retribution was explicitly referred to by both, the ICTY and the ICTR in their 
sentencing judgements. Although highly contested, it is still referred to in almost all 
discussions concerning international criminal justice. Retribution is derived from the 
part of the preamble of the ICC stating that most crimes of general concern to the 
international community must not go unpunished. It is alleged that genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes are just so horrible that the mere fact that they are 
committed warrants punishment regardless of any other possible effect of the 
punishment (McGonigle Leyh 2011, p. 60). This is also referred to as absolutist 
theory. Retributivism in its pure form, as deserved punishment and an end in itself, 
associated with the Kantian concept, justifies punishment to re-institute elementary 
justice as just desert regardless of any societal effect, positive or negative.83
This notion is broadly rejected within domestic and international criminal law
 
84 
and is described to be referred to when there is no other justification left (Loick 
2012, p. 32). Theorists who nevertheless evoke retributivist theories for international 
criminal law reconceptualize the “pure” form into “relational” theories with a focus 
on the alleged relational structure lying in the relation between the offender and the 
victim. This relation it is said to then “give[s] rise to a duty of a punishing agent, 
owed to the victim, to punish the offender. The legitimate authority of the punishing 
agent derives from its reciprocal relations with the victim to whom the duty to 
punish is owed and with the offender from whose wrong the right to punish 
derives.”85
                                                 
83 The Kantian exemplification is, that “Even if a civil society resolved to dissolve itself with the 
consent of all its members--as might be supposed in the case of a people inhabiting an island resolving 
to separate and scatter themselves throughout the whole world--the last murderer lying in prison 
ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out. This ought to be done in order that every 
one may realize the desert of his deeds, and that blood-guiltiness may not remain upon the people; for 
otherwise they might all be regarded as participators in the murder as a public violation of justice.” 
Kant (2005). 
 This approach deviates significantly from the “traditional” retributive 
theory in which the center of attention is just not the victim, but the legal order as 
such, which is violated and has to be re-affirmed through punishment (Aldana-
Pindell 2004, pp. 620–622). Furthermore, it anticipates the “victim constituency”, 
84 Koller (2008), stating that it is fundamentally incompatible with human rights standards; Others try 
to develop a retributivist theory if ICL Haque (2005); Greenawalt (2014). 
85 Haque (2005), p. 278.; this conception is interesting against the backdrop of the alleged 
incompatability of retributive paradigms and victims, which is postulated in the discussion of victim 
participation and the retributive vs. restoratice debate. 
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already indicated, and is indicative of the important role victims play in legitimizing 
international criminal justice in the context of a theory that is commonly described as 
victim unfriendly. I will return to the special role of victims further below.  
One of the main argument which is particular for crimes tried at The Hague, 
quoted both for and against retribution, is, that genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes are just so enormous and often described as unimaginable, that they 
can never be adequately addressed given that – “the balance of the suffered wrong is 
plainly unthinkable” (Ambos 2013b, p. 68). At the same time, the crimes appear to 
be just so gruesome that they warrant punishment regardless of any possible effect. 
To this effect, “good reason retributivism” declares: 
“As the competing retributive theories all reveal, the most that retributivism 
can provide is a powerful, but non-exclusive, reason to punish. According to 
this value pluralist understanding, the wrongdoing of the offender provides a 
prima facie argument in favour of punishment.” (Greenawalt 2014, p. 978)  
Retributivism with its underlying de-ontological logic is thus relied on, because it 
provides intuitive reasons for punishment without arguments and is therefore just 
one, non exclusive reason. Consequently, when referred to in the discussions, it is 
rather understood as “an expression of the determination to not leave these crimes 
unpunished“ (Ambos 2013b, p. 70). Aside from that, retribution is often referred to 
in one sentence with ending impunity, which is then connected to the alleged 
deterring effect of international criminal courts. This lack in precision referring to 
already established concepts, illustrates the above mentioned undertheorization, the 
concept is not seriously considered rather “it is just assumed” (Drumbl 2003, p. 14). 
In this vein, Osiel holds that retribution is a powerful intuition in the face of such 
horrendous crimes, “if ever there were an “easy case” (in the moral sense at least) for 
punishment, surely this is it.” (Greenawalt 2014, p. 978) Consequently, authors who 
understand retribution in this more traditional way refute it as “inherently anti-
empirical, drawing its strength from an explicit appeal to a moral order for the 
universe” (Koller 2008, p. 1025). Most scholars who analyze purposes of punishment 
and legitimacy of international criminal law hold that other theories are better suited 
to explain and legitimize the work of the courts and the development of international 
criminal justice (Ambos 2015; Ambos 2013b, p. 71 et seqq. ; Drumbl 2007). 
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Given the foregoing, retribution as a justification for international criminal courts 
seems to play an ambiguous role. On the one hand, in the founding documents of 
international criminal courts, it is referred to as one of the primary justification for 
punishment and perpetuated within the discourses of legitimacy. It seems to be 
understood in a sense that punishment is just an imperative of elementary justice 
(Werle and Jeßberger 2016, p. 117). On the other hand, current legal philosophical 
discussions, both domestically and internationally, retribution is described to be an 
outdated, anti-modern justification. The reference to retribution without 
consideration of the respective critique demonstrates the serious flaws in the 
theorization of international criminal law. And this, in turn, shows that legitimizing 
narratives of international criminal justice do not scutinize taken for granted 
justifications. As it is the case with other penal justice theories discussed below, it in 
deed seems as if retribution is relied on due to its de-ontological and intuitive 
character. And thus it evokes the impression that the international criminal courts’ 
practice is a manifestation of faith. The imagination of a just international legal order 
based on the rule of law both within the sovereign national states composing this 
order and internationally is the basis of this faith. This just legal order has to be 
rectified vis á vis the wrongdoer symbolically (Tallgren 2002, p. 580). 
1.1.2. Deterrence 
Deterrence, in both its manifestations (specialised and general negative 
prevention), relies on the rational ability of individuals, be it the individual 
perpetrator or the individuals in a community, to freely decide whether it is 
worthwhile to commit a crime taking into consideration the possible punishment. 
The rationale is twofold, firstly it is claimed that holding individuals accountable of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity on an individual level prevents the 
perpetrator from recidivism for once because s/he is incapacitated through 
imprisonment for a considerable time and also through stigmatization (specialized 
negative prevention) (Burkhard 2010, pp. 35–36).  
Beside special deterrence aimed at the individual perpetrator, it is further argued 
that international criminal trials, even of a small number of high ranking perpetrators, 
might have a general deterring effect. According to this view, international 
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prosecutions can stigmatize criminal behavior.86
Deterrence then faces the same criticism other purposes face when being 
confronted with empirical provabilily.
 The deterrent effect should 
accordingly work in preventing potential war criminals from committing the crimes 
in question, and warning head of states with the message that impunity is no longer 
an option and that they are never save from prosecution (specialized and general 
positive prevention) (Wippman 1999). 
87 The empirical record regarding deterrence is 
at least inconclusive domestically and even more so, internationally (Zolo 2004, 
pp. 730–731). This is partly attributed to the high selectivity and the related lack of a 
convincing threat of prosecution on an international level (Koller 2008, p. 1027).  
Another criticism pertains to the special criminology of war crimes, against the 
background of which the assumption regarding perpetrator rationality is generally 
unproven and difficult to maintain (Drumbl 2007, p. 17). The collective nature of 
violence creates an environment in which the behavior of the individual is 
conformist rather than deviant which then inverts the rational calculation of costs 
and benefits since in the very situation of the commission of the crime, it would 
probably be more costly to adhere to social norms that were valid in peaceful times. 
In this situation of upended social order international criminal law asks individuals 
just not to act conformably.88
                                                 
86 Gilligan (2006); Akhavan (1998), p. 749; also cited in Wippman (1999).; General deterrence is 
difficult to distinguish from the purpose of strengthening the rule of law, norm stabilization or general 
prevention in títs positive form. Whereas the former relies on the negative deterring effect on the 
community, the latter relies on positive impulses re-inforcing, stabilizing, or establishing the rule of 
law and a general acceptance of human rights standards. These theories will be discussed in the next 
part.   
 Therefore authors postulate that a discursive shift is 
due to recognize the criminological insight of mass violence and their collective 
87 Ku and Nzelibe (2006), Ku and Nzelibe even suggest that International Criminal Tribunals have an 
exacerbating rather than a deterring in the case of politically indispensable individuals and a very low 
to no deterring effect in most of the cases falling under the mandate of the Tribunals.  
88 Neubacher (2006); Reuss (2010) Drumbl (2003). Sloane (2006). This applies to the case of Adolf 
Eichmann famously characterized as the incarnation of the banality of evil by Hannah Arendt – the so 
calles “Schreibtischtäter”, as well as to soldiers and paramilitaries in the former Yugoslavia who 
among other factors rationalized their behaviour as self-defense and probably even more so to current 
cases at the ICC where former child soldiers who were abducted and intoctrinated by violent 
conditioning stand trial. On the other hand the question arises, and is hardly ever addressed, who is 
the primary addressee of the deterring message. Is it the perpetrator on the ground, or rather head of 
state, chief of military and the like. If the latter is the case, they are called upon not to create a 
situation of upended social order of collective violence. Given the selectivity of the prosecutions it is 
still doubtful if the alleged deterring effect is existent. Furthermore, the question arises, if there is such 
a thing as clean warfare, or if this is just an illusion that is legitimated through the distinction made in 
humanitarian law. I will come to this critique later, Dauphinee (2008). 
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nature in the context of proceedings dealing with international crimes at the Hague 
(Drumbl 2011).  
Similar to retribution, the discussion on deterrence amounts to the conclusions 
that it relies on empirically unproven assumptions, which are theoretically highly 
controversial. Therefore, albeit called upon to justify punishment in international 
criminal law, it has limitations in and of itself and with regard to the particularities of 
the crimes in question this becomes even more obvious. Nevertheless, deterrence, 
just like retribution, is still regarded to be one of the primary justifications in 
international criminal law (Ku and Nzelibe 2006, p. 779; Wippman 1999). The fact 
that deterrence is nevertheless defended by saying that there generally is a deterring 
effect – it is just not enough to have a visible effect– yet, again demonstrates the 
faith-like character of justification. The international community is called upon to 
invest more in the face of empirical failings:  
“Instead of despairing over the prospects of deterrence, the international 
community should enhance the probability of punishment by encouraging 
prosecutions before national courts, especially of third states, by making ad hoc 
tribunals effective and by establishing a vigorous, standing international 
criminal court.” (Meron 1999, p. 201)89
The believe is, that principally international criminal law and punishment works, 
just not yet, it has to be steadily improved according to its inherent penal- legal logic 
and one day the effects will be visible. The gap between theory and practice is 
bridged by believing even harder (Nouwen 2012, p. 344).   
  
1.2. The civilizing mission in International Criminal Law 
Against the backdrop of the described limitation of the traditional criminal legal 
theories, already the criminal philosophical discussions dealing with Nazi crimes 
advocated a stronger focus on norm stabilization/rehabilitation. In the German 
debate it is referred to as “positive Generalprävention” (positive general prevention) 
which resembles theories of expressivism in the non-German speaking scholarly 
discussions.  
                                                 
89 This is a powerful illustration of what Nouwen referred to, when she describes the justification of 
international criminal law by international criminal lawyers – true believers never stop believing and 
people who doubt are recommended to believe harder, Nouwen (2012). 
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A purpose indicated in the preamble of the Rome Statute, which is associated 
with positive general prevention, is the promotion of the rule of law. In the debate 
on purposes of punishment, proceedings and legitimacy more abstractly, it is 
discussed as the more general creation and reinforcement of an international 
awareness of law – more specifically humanitarian law and human rights law – as an 
aspect of said rule of law. In this context, the preventive function of international 
criminal law and its broader socio-political effect in the targeted societies is 
addressed.90
The first dimension of the theoretical debate is more philosophical and asks if 
there are already established norms and fundamental values on an international level 
that could be stabilized and with which legitimacy these norms are created/re-
inforced internationally, assuming universality. These values are simultaneously those 
underlying the above mentioned symbolic retribution and are the norms the 
international order ideally should be based on.  
  
The question which socio-political functions the international criminal courts 
should, and could, fulfill nationally is related to the discussion of an international 
order. This relates to the discussions about the functions of international criminal 
court within the toolkit of transitional justice and its relation to other mechanisms. 
Here, victims and their position within societies and states play a major role. In this 
respect, the “alternative” legitimizing narratives pivotally rely on victims to fill a gap 
left by the “weaknesses and precariousness of other constituencies.” (Mégret 2015, 
p. 38)  
1.2.1. International criminal law as ultima ration in human rights protection 
Justifying a supranational punitive authority of international criminal law 
normatively proves to be a difficult philosophical question. A common normative 
ground for punishing, which is taken for granted within the nation state, but not 
necessarily on an international level, has to be constructed.91
                                                 
90 Burkhard (2010, p. 38), In the German terminology the preventive purpose is implied in the name: 
positive Generalprävention. 
 While mostly this 
common ground is just assumed, as became clear from the foregoing, Ambos 
91 Loick (2012), also summarized the critical voices within domestic criminology who question 
punishment as such. 
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explicitly formulates this normative foundation which in turn is indicative of the 
purposes of punishment assumed.92 The normative foundation of international 
criminal law is mostly derived from a combination of human rights law and its 
alleged universalist foundation in human dignity.93 This is traced back to the Kantian 
idea, according to which human dignity is the source of fundamental human 
(civil)rights, which ultimately have to be enforced by (international criminal) law 
(Ambos 2013a, p. 304). This vision is internationalized by Kant’s conception of 
eternal peace founded on a world order constituted of republican States that 
guarantee the liberty and equality of their citizens and accept “inalienable rights” and 
on the international level a world citizen law (Ibid., pp. 305–306 citing ; Kant 2013). 
Interpreted in modern language, the rights of the citizens equal human rights and 
permanent peace is predicated on its recognition and respect which necessitates that 
violations have to be stigmatized as wrongs and consequently punished (Ambos 
2013a). “Following Kant […] scholars have argued that the State and the 
international community is called upon to protect the human dignity by way of 
criminal law.” (Ibid., p. 306; similarly Merkel 1996; Gierhake 2005) Human dignity is 
furthermore understood to be the moral source of subjective rights in international 
law which hence have to be enforced by international criminal law.94
According to this understanding, human rights, justice and a cosmopolitan notion 
of an international community that is bound by common values are accepted as 
universally and interculturally recognized principles. The development of 
international criminal law and the respective establishment of courts is therefore 
regarded as a progress in civilization (Neubacher 2006). The ICC is regarded as an 
 Or, in the words 
of Bassiouni: “The shield of human rights protection necessitates the sword of 
international criminal law enforcement.” (Bassiouni 2013, pp. 46–47) 
                                                 
92 Ambos developes in a first step the normative foundations of the punitive power in international 
law to then, in a second step develop what he calles a combined Rechtsgut-harm theory: Ambos 
(2013a); Ambos (2015). 
93 Arbour (1997, p. 531), describing the practical challenges in the approach to “marry” international 
law which is consensual and criminal law which is essentially coercive; Emphasising the civilizing 
mission and the universality: Cassese (2011);  
94 Garapon (2004); Orentlicher (2007) who reconsiders her strong claims by emphasising the role of 
victims and a cross-cultural perspective; Findlay and McLean (2007), as mentioned above the 
foundational stone of considering individual rights within international law were said to have been laid 
at Nuremberg. This was closely related to the beginning of a modern human rights movement – 
which will be discussed with regard to vicrims’rights below. Teitel (2014), Clapham (2003), describing 
the introduction of the individual into international law as a paradigmatic shift. 
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endeavor of global civil society, which is thereby constructed as the constituency, 
establishing the rule of law against political power and arbitrariness (Safferling 2004, 
p. 1475). Parallel to the justification of modern liberal state systems it is alleged that 
the 
“[C]riminalization of the most heinous human rights infringements and 
prosecution of these norms relies on the international social contract of the 
global civil society. Every individual has a legal claim to be protected in these 
core rights. The protection is one of criminal law.” (Ibid., p. 1487)  
This universal normative basis then legitimizes international criminal legal 
interventions into state sovereignty. Accordingly, “the history of the development of 
human rights as individual subjective legal claims is thus a history of failure of 
national states.” (Ibid., p. 1475) Adopting a functional account of sovereignty, the 
imposition of international criminal law is to be accepted by nation states, when they 
fail to protect, or even violate the basic rights of their people.95
From this combination of collective (world order, international community) – 
individualistic (subjective human rights) aims, the function of international criminal 
courts is derived, developing a combined Rechtsgüter-harm theory of punishment, 
determining which crimes fall under the realm of international criminal law (Ambos 
2015). The function of international criminal law strictu sensu would then be “to 
protect fundamental Rechtsgüter that are individualistic and collective at the same 
time by way of preventing actual harm to these Rechtsgüter.” (Ibid., p. 324) 
Punishment, accordingly, aims at creating and re-inforcing a universal legal 
consciousness and thereby constructing a cosmopolitan identity which could be 
understood in a positive general preventive way.  
 The aim of 
prosecutions in this context is „to recover the universality of law, its equal 
application to all, by re-establishing individual rights.” nationally and internationally 
(Humphrey 2003, p. 498).  
“The ultimate value of international criminal law may rest not in its functions of 
retribution or deterrence, but in its role in identity construction, in particular in 
constructing a cosmopolitan community identity embracing all of humankind.” 
(Koller 2008, p. 1060) 
                                                 
95 Altman and Wellman (2004, p. 51), comparing the state to parents and the citizens to children to 
then draw the analogy to the intervention of the state when the basic rights of the child are violated. 
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At the same time, this concept aims at reconciliation of the affected societies also 
referred to as a restitutive effect of punishment, forming a new national identity, 
which is conformant with the vision of said cosmopolitan international world order 
(Altman and Wellman 2004).  
Admittedly, international criminal justice as “the gentle civilizer” (Koskenniemi 
2002) of the world and the Kantian vision of eternal peace seems to be a compelling 
thought, especially because it legitimately always remains to come. Which, in turn, 
renders it close to the, above mentioned, tendency to believe in an idea rather than to 
consider empirical consequences, let alone, political implications of this idea. But, 
one does not have to refer to the dialectic of enlightenment to reveal the inherently 
destructive notion of this faith. Post-colonial, feminist and critical legal scholars 
reveal the inherent exclusionary epistemic effects the reference to a universal, the 
human, humanity etc has. Therefore, the appeal to a peaceful cosmopolitan 
international community consisting of democratic states protecting international 
human (civil) rights with penal means as an aim to be pursued, an order to be 
constructed, is based on very problematic and violent foundations.96
1.2.2. Expressivism 
 
Whereas expressivist motives in international criminal law are not new, the 
articulation as an expressive purpose of international tribunals is. Apart from the 
alleged focus on retribution at Nuremberg, the expressive function of the court and 
the intended message was a central concern for the prosecutors: 
“The privilege of opening the first trial in history for crimes against the peace 
of the world imposes a grave responsibility. The wrongs which we seek to 
condemn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, 
that civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot survive 
their being repeated. That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung 
with injury stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive 
enemies to the judgment of the law is one of the most significant tributes that 
Power has ever paid to Reason. […]97
                                                 
96 I will scrutinize these foundations in the following chapter. 
 
97 "Second Day, Wednesday, 11/21/1945, Part 04", in Trial of the Major War Criminals before the 
International Military Tribunal. Volume II. Proceedings: 11/14/1945-11/30/1945. [Official text in the 
English language.] Nuremberg: IMT, 1947. pp. 98-102. 
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As a reminder, the boring proceedings relying on documentary evidence were at 
that time already regarded as counter-productive to send the intended message. By 
implication, Nuremberg was described as a retributive court, but other purposes were 
always also considered and valued. It was attended to educate the German people 
and have a preventive function as well as communicating the power of law over 
politics.  
Expressivism is described to be “an attempt to theorize courts’ potential to send 
messages as a key feature in thinking about the relationship between normative 
legitimacy, support and utility of international trials.” (Meijers and Glasius 2013, 
p. 720) As such, expressivism is the corresponding theory to the claim of 
international criminal justice to contribute to the re-enforcement of human rights 
and provisions of international law more generally in elaborating on the discursive 
effect of international criminal proceedings relying on a social constructivist rationale 
(Drumbl 2005, p. 592 et seqq. ). Accordingly, law is understood to reflect “society’s 
values, what it esteems, what it abhors.” (Amann 2002, p. 118) This does not only 
apply positively, in a re-enforcing manner, but also negatively, in the condemnatory 
pronouncement which finally carries consequences. It is alleged that crimes against 
humanity and war crimes have all too long gone unpunished which in turn striped 
the norms of authority which is now re-installed through effective criminal 
prosecution. As a Judge at Nuremberg emphasised: “only by punishing individuals 
who commit [crimes against international law] can the provisions of international law 
be enforced.”98
While the classical purposes of punishment and criminal proceedings are 
undermined by the particularities of international crimes, expressivism would still be 
a valid reason to establish international criminal tribunals with punitive power 
(Wringe 2006, p. 160).  
 
“Over time, punishment by international criminal tribunals can shape as well as 
express social norms. And the international sentencing process can reinforce 
                                                 
98 Kirsch, Phillip, Applying the Principles of Nuremberg in the ICC, Keynote Address at the 
Conference “Judgment at Nuremberg” held on the 60th Anniversary of the Nuremberg Judgment, 20 
September 2006, p. 3, https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ED2F5177-9F9B-4D66-9386-
5C5BF45D052C/146323/PK_20060930_English.pdf, last accessed 25/5/201. 
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and vindicate those norms even if it cannot, alone, realistically be expected to 
deter or fulfil retributive aspirations held by each affected local constituency.”99
Therefore, expressivism can be located between the deontological logic of 
retributivism and the consequentialist approach behind deterrence (Amann 2002, 
p. 120). The difference is that expressivist theorists do not see their approach as a 
self-sufficient justification of punishment, but analyse expressivism as a function and 
essential characteristic of criminal law as a social institution (Sloane 2006, p. 38). As a 
normative matter, expressivist scholars rely on a distinct moral context of human 
rights and a cosmopolitan notion of international law described previously. The latter 
understanding presupposes a very clear idea of what could be a right message and 
what is the wrong expression of international criminal law. This implicit underlying 
morale could be observed when carving out what is a proper international court in 
the comparison of Nuremberg and Tokyo, for example. According to a modern 
understanding of law, the court sends the message of rationality, sobriety and impartiality 
in the face of violence, by confining power with reason.  
 
In this context Osiel analyses the dramatic potential of atrocity trials and their 
influence on collective memory. He emphasises the potential of criminal trials to 
“contribute significantly to a certain underappreciated kind of social solidarity arising 
from reliance on procedures for ensuring that moral disagreement among antagonists 
remains mutually respectful, within the courtroom and beyond.” In so doing, trials 
can be “public spectacles and consistent with liberal legality” and constitute 
“moments of truth” for both, the individual and the collective (Osiel 1997, pp. 2–3).  
The basic criticism of these kind of messages and the assumption that they are 
universally applicable and valuable will be discussed in the following parts, for now, 
the scepticism remaining within the confines of the general acceptance of these 
paradigms will be addressed. The first critical issue is, which community is, or should 
be, the primary referent of international criminal proceedings? Is it the cosmopolitan 
international community referred to when adopting Kant’s vision of eternal peace? Is 
                                                 
99 Sloane (2006, p. 56). Sloane expressly distinguishes between proceedings and punishment while 
focussing on the analysis of the latter.; Reuss (2010), Reuss discussed civil courage as a purpose of 
international criminal law and proceedings, saying that pure norm stabilization should not be enough 
and that rather, in the sense of positive general prevention, with a focus on prevention, people should 
be educated to show deviant behaviour in situations of state induced terror. Möller (2003), would not 
go as far as asking for civil courage, but wants that criminal law intends to establish another normative 
level, she calls her approach “educative Systemprävention”. 
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it the societies affected by the violent conflict in question? Is it the grassroots level? 
Is it victims within the society? Or rather the perpetrators who are the focus of 
retributively designed courts? It seems as if the assumption of a universal character 
of the norms expressed go hand in hand with the assumption that the potential 
addressees of these universal norms do not matter, just because they are self-
evidently good.100
“Trials and truth commissions of some form are considered to be ubiquitously 
good, or at least so clearly well intentioned and firmly grounded both morally 
and legally that their outcome cannot but be positive.” (Mani 2005, pp. 514–
515) 
 Or, in the words of Rama Mani:  
At the same time, a discrepancy appears between the interests of states “that 
maintain strong commitments to emerging international human rights norms” and 
the interest of the concrete state affected, and another gap between the international 
and national interests and different interest groups, victims, veterans, and other 
individuals (Sloane 2006, pp. 11–12). Henry calls this the gap between law in rhetoric 
and law in action (Henry 2010). As described above, there always seems to be a 
disconnection between the courts and the constituent community, be it the collective 
or individuals, a gap that is raising fundamental questions about the legitimacy of the 
criminal proceedings. Given this gap, the norms associated with international 
criminal law and punishment do not necessarily correspond with and therefore are 
abstracted from the moral universe of the community and individual in the respective 
post-conflict environment (Tallgren 2002, p. 582). This is not to say that mutual 
respect and the adherence to human rights is not rooted in the respective societies It 
might just not be a priority and the appellation of these “universal values” might be 
misplaced or even ridiculing against the background of the socio-political and 
material societal situations and given the deeply rooted injustices related to colonial 
and post-colonial entanglements. 
“No one who attends transitional justice conferences in post-conflict societies 
can long fail to notice the near total disconnect between the discourses of local 
participants, often focussed in historically specific grievances about who did 
what horrible thing to whom, and of we more “cosmopolitan”, peripatetic 
                                                 
100 McEvoy (2007, p. 414) McEvoy distinguishes between thick and thin theories, whereas “thin 
writings on law tend to emphasise the formal or instrumental aspects of the legal system. They are 
inclined to assume the self-evident rightness of the rule of law.” 
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academic consultants, touting larger lessons drawn from other countries 
recently facing similar predicaments.”101
Furthermore, the weakness of all applied theories, namely the selectivity in 
prosecution also weakens the universalist, cosmopolitan, humanitarian statement 
invoked by expressivists. Therefore, in conclusion,  
  
“each of the justification is compromised by the intractable selectivity, 
pervasive discretion, and excruciating political contingency of the process of 
international law. Although all domestic criminal law bureaucracies are 
susceptible to contingent enforcement, the susceptibility of the international 
criminal law bureaucracy is materially greater. Choices of which atrocities to 
judicialize and which individuals to prosecute are so deeply politicized that it is 
problematic to pretend that they are in any way neutral or impartial, two 
characteristics often attributed to and propounded by law.”102
Despite this general legitimacy gap in international criminal justice, the prevailing 
paradigm of prosecution and punishment remains in large parts untouched. In 
current debates on victim participation, as could be seen previously, the retributive 
paradigm is even lauded to be the only feasible way to go for international criminal 
justice. Nevertheless, scholars have argued for a more holistic understanding of the 
functions and purposes of international criminal law given its deficiencies to fulfil the 
traditional purposes, the specificity of the crimes and the embeddedness in the 
transitional justice framework against the backdrop of which “the methodology by 
which perpetrators are punished, the theory of sentencing and the process of 
determining guilt each remain disappointingly ordinary” and the “quest for simplicity 
and legitimacy squeezes out the complexity and dissensus central to any process of 
justice and reconciliation.” (Drumbl 2003, 2, 6) 
 
In order to fill the gap, left by classical modern state theories on punishment, 
rationales from transitional justice approaches are transferred to legitimize 
international criminal courts as one means in the re-storation of peace and justice in 
post-conflict societies. Victims play a crucial role in this context. 
1.3. The transional justice “limb” filling the gap 
“It would seem that the logic of punitive justice is not enough to legitimate the 
political and material investments of states in the field of international criminal 
                                                 
101 Osiel (2005, p. 1756),  this gap is observed by many others, among which, McEvoy (2007). 
102 Drumbl (2005, p. 550); similarly Brants (2007), focussing on the problematic of victor’s justice and 
the political implications on the formation of a collective memory. 
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law, requiring a humanitarian supplement to the objectives of the institutions 
such as the ICC.” (Kendall 2015, p. 375) 
Given the observed gap in legitimization, or the inapplicability of traditional 
criminal legal theories and the embeddedness of international courts in a transitional 
justice setting, broader goals of international criminal justice, are considered (Ambos 
2013b, p. 72). Consistent with the mandate of the ad-hoc tribunals, such additional 
goals are the restoration and maintenance of peace in the respective conflict zones. 
This conception of law introduces a strong causality between peace and justice in 
post-conflict societies. According to this conception, justice is the precondition – an 
almost conditio sine qua non - for the establishment of a peaceful coexistence. In the 
words of former prosecutor at Nuremberg: "There can be no peace without justice, 
no justice without law and no meaningful law without a Court to decide what is just 
and lawful under any given circumstance." (Benjamin B. Ferencz, cited in Gordon 
1995, p. 218) This marks a decisive turn in the conception of post-conflict politics, 
especially against the background of the transitional justice processes in Latin and 
South America and Spain, where amnesties were the path chosen to achieve relative 
stability and peace.  
“In this rapidly changing political context, the expanded humanitarian legal 
regime reflects the reframing of the meaning of security and the rule of law in 
global politics. The turn to international law enforcement through punishment 
is connected to a number of political projects associated with the present 
moment, involving aims from punishment to peacemaking.” (Teitel 2011, p. 86) 
According to this legalist understanding103 of international criminal justice and 
transitional justice, law plays a central role in social repair. Accordingly, securing 
peace by strengthening the rule of law and contributing to reconciliation by 
providing a historical record aimed at drawing a clear line between the past and the 
present to facilitate healing, are aims to be pursued.104
                                                 
103 Vinjamuri and Snyder (2004), Vinjamuri and Snyder distinguish between legalist, pragmatist and 
emotional psychology approaches to transitional justice.  
 Within this rationale, the 
truth-finding function of the courts, with its authoritative verdict, should clearly 
establish responsibility for the past wrongs and lay a foundation for a profound 
societal engagement with the past, preventing revisionist tendencies. In this context, 
it is alleged that the search for truth, not retribution or punishment is the most 
104 Donat-Cattin (2001, 2008, 3); Luban (2008, p. 8). Luban emphasises that these are goals of trials 
and not the punishment. 
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significant goal of the ICC proceedings. (Donat-Cattin 2001) The individualization of 
guilt through criminal trials should, beyond deterrence, also serve a broader societal 
purpose, namely helping the community or society to move on by removing 
accusations of collective guilt which threaten to continually divide societies. (Werle 
and Burghardt 2012) Thereby, trials further channel the desires for revenge and help 
to prevent the alternative spiral of violence (Minow 1998; Bass 2000). 
These rationales are legally fixed in the Right to Truth and the Right to Justice. 
The root of the victim’s Right to Truth and Justice goes back as far as 1985, with the 
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 
(in the following referred to as the Declaration).105 The main instruments that played 
a part in the introduction of victim participation into the Rome Statute and 
constituted its basis were said Declaration and the UN Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law (henceforth referred to as the Guidelines).106
The ICC repeatedly refers to this right in its decisions on victim participation.
 
107 
As elaborated above, the central provision (article 68 (3) of the Rome Statute) of the 
victim participation framework at the ICC is a blueprint of article 6 of the 
Declaration. Special Rapporteur Louis Joinet worked out a set of principles108
                                                 
105 UN Doc. A/RES/40/34 (1985). 
 
defining the material scope of these abstract rights. His elaborations demonstrate the 
interrelatedness of transitional justice narratives, connecting the societal re-storation 
with individual re-covery and vice versa with the rationale of the right to truth and 
justice. He distinguished between a victim’s right to know (Part I), to justice (Part II) 
and to reparations (Part III). The right to know does not only include an individual 
106 UN Doc. A/RES/60/147 (2006), Annex. ; ICC-ASP, Court’s Revised strategy in relation to 
victims (5 November 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-38-
ENG.pdf. Accessed 30 October 2014, para 6. 
107 Trial Chamber III, Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba-Gombo, Fourth Decision on Victim 
Participation,  12 December 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08-320, para 88; La Chambre Péliminaire I , 
Situation en République Démocratique du Congo, Décision sur les demandes de participation à la 
procedure de VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 et VPRS 6, 17 janvier 2006, ICC-01/04-
101, para 50. 
108 Commission on Human Rights, Questions of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights 
Violations (Civil and Political), 1997, Final Report prepared by Mr. Joinet pursuant to Sub-
Commission Decision 1996/119 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20, Annex II, Set of Principles for 
the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity.  
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dimension to know the truth about what had happened to the victim and his or her 
family, but it went further by understanding it to be a collective right of the society 
“drawing upon history to prevent violations from recurring in the future.”109 The 
right to justice, according to the Set of Principles, comprised a right to a fair and 
effective remedy in the form of trials and reparations, including investigation into the 
crime, prosecution and if found guilty, the punishment of the perpetrator. Again, this 
was put into the broader context of securing a stable peace based on the assumption 
that without a response to the need for justice there can be no reconciliation.110
Fletcher and Weinstein differenciate five aims and the respective assumptions in 
transitional justice, wherein the relation of truth – justice and victims, implied in the 
material scope of the right to truth and justice, is illustrated. Firstly, discovering and 
publicizing the truth, which consists of a new authoritative and impartial record that 
could serve as a basis for a new national consensus is contended to be an aim of 
transitional justice. With regard to victims, it is alleged that knowing the truth has a 
potential healing effect, because it frees the victims from being trapped in the past. 
Again, a similar effect is inferred on the societal level – by knowing the truth about 
past atrocities, the society as a whole can finally move on (Fletcher and Weinstein 
2002, p. 586). The link between truth – victims and the law is drawn by declaring that 
the “most authoritative rendering of the truth is possible only as a result of judicial 
inquiry” (Orentlicher 1991, p. 2546). The special authority, and with it legitimacy, of 
legal truth is said to lie in the widespread acceptance of its objectivity and the related 
impartiality (Fletcher and Weinstein 2002, p. 587; McEvoy 2007, p. 417). This is in 
accordance with the image of the criminal legal proceedings that was carved out in 
the previous chapter and its self representation as being the Other of politics. The 
second aim and assumption within the transitional justice framework is 
accountability, which is according to the legalist approach equated with prosecution 
and punishment as a necessary precondition for a peaceful coexistence (Bassiouni 
1996). The rationale is, that only by showing serious efforts to bring to book the 
perpetrators of past atrocities, the newly established state apparatus can distance 
  
                                                 
109 Commission on Human Rights, Questions of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights 
Violations (Civil and Political), 1997, Final Report prepared by Mr. Joinet pursuant to Sub-
Commission Decision 1996/119 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20, Annex II, Set of Principles for 
the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity., para 17; For a 
more recent analysis of these two dimensions: Brunner and Stahl (2016). 
110 Ibid., para 26. 
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itself from its predecessor and trustworthy state structures are thereby validated. 
Furthermore, the state by showing a moral and ethical response, acknowledges the 
suffering of victims which is thereby alleviated, or compensated (Fletcher and 
Weinstein 2002, p. 590). Thirdly, and related to the second point,  
“trials are effective symbols because a legitimate legal judicial process is the 
antithesis of violence. Through a judicial process, a new regime is understood 
to re-establish the orderly function of the civil state and so to triumph over 
those who had deployed state power violently to achieve their own ends 
bringing about the destruction of civilians and subverting state institutions.” 
(Ibid., p. 596)  
That way, trials serve to clearly demarcate the violent past from a peaceful future. 
With regard to the alleged connection to reconciliation, trials are promoted as means 
to encourage societies to address their painful past in order to “come to terms with 
it”, to achieve a sense of closure which is often compared to the therapeutic notion 
of healing and closure after traumatic experiences. (Ibid.) And, very generally, trials 
are also described to be responsive to victims’needs of truth, acknowledgement, 
justice and healing (Ibid., pp. 592–595). 
Some expressly discuss the purpose of “dealing with the past” or transitional 
justice as a distinct aim of international criminal justice (Stehle 2007, p. 45). Others 
discuss it within the realm of expressivism (Osiel 1997), and/or restorative justice 
(Burkhard 2010). In the rationalization of these general assumptions on the potential 
socio-political effect of international criminal proceedings in the affected societies, 
victims play a crucial role. They are called upon to legitimize international criminal 
law locally, nationally and internationally. And whereas the existence of a special 
victim-related purpose of punishment is controversial within doctrine, it is not 
contested that “justice for victims” is a means of accomplishing local and national 
reconciliation and has at least a symbolic value for the courts. Already the ad hoc 
tribunals, but still more recently the ICC, repeatedly emphasise their responsibility 
for “bringing justice to victims”.111
                                                 
111 ICCs revised strategy in relation to victims, (5. November 2012); Donat-Cattin (2001), Zappalà 
(2005). 
 Emphasizing that by providing local ownership 
over the criminal process, the gap between the Court and the affected communities 
can be bridged and this will contribute to more confidence into the system, not only 
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the international criminal justice system, but also the local judicial systems.112 The 
Court submits to be committed to a rights-based perspective that confirms and 
empowers the victim “as a vital actor in the justice process rather than a passive 
recipient” whose participation in the proceedings should “contribute to closing the 
impunity gap and is one step in the process of healing for individuals and 
societies.”113 Along the same lines, NGOs propagate that being involved in the 
redress mechanisms of the crimes they suffered from enables the restoration of their 
dignity which is the “ultimate objective in the provision of redress.”114
These narratives of truth and justice for victims and healing through participation 
are often uncritically reproduced abstractly and are implicitly reproduced in the grand 
narratives of international criminal justice. 
 This narrative 
is tightly related to the legitimization of victim participation and its alleged function 
within the legal framework of the ICC. The victim’s rights to truth and justice, 
developed in human rights law are referred to when elaborating on the positive effect 
trials can have on individuals and the respective societies. Correspondingly, the said 
right to truth and justice have, according to reports elaborating on their material 
scope, a collective and an individual dimension and victim participation is one mean 
to achieve the presumed positive effects in post-conflict societies. 
2.  Legitimizing International Criminal Law: A matter of faith?  
All theories referred to when legitimizing international criminal justice have gaps 
and victims play an important role filling these gaps. Coming back full circle, the 
development narrated as a success story of international criminal law in general, and 
victims’ role therein in concrete, is not that linear. Analysing the theoretical level of 
legitimization and the empirical level of implementation and the reciprocal effects, 
                                                 
112 The Importance of Victim Participation, Submissions to The Hague Working Group of the 
Assembly of State Parties, Victims’ Rights Working Group, 2013, 
http://www.vrwg.org/VRWG_DOC/2013_July_VRWG_HWG_ParticipationFINALrevised.pdf. 
113 ICC-ASP, Court’s Revised strategy in relation to victims (5 November 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-38-ENG.pdf. Accessed 30 October 2014, paras 6, 10. 
114 The Importance of Victim Participation, Submissions to The Hague Working Group of the 
Assembly of State Parties, Victims’ Rights Working Group, 2013, p. 1, referring to CAT, General 
Comment No. 3: Implementation of article 14 by States parties, 2012, UN Doc. CAT/C/GC/3, para 
4 “The Committee emphasizes the importance of victim participation in the redress process, and that 
the restoration of the dignity of the victim is the ultimate objective in the provision of redress.” 
http://www.vrwg.org/VRWG_DOC/2013_July_VRWG_HWG_ParticipationFINALrevised.pdf. 
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interruptions can be traced. Chronologically, the theorization of international 
criminal law, as well as the narratives framing victim involvement seem to go from 
undertheorized enthusiasm and taken for granted effects in the very beginning of 
international criminal justice, to a disenchantment caused by first experiences with 
international criminal courts and criticism pertaining to the legitimizing narratives 
based on more theoretical, but overall on empirical findings. One of the lessons 
learnt from this disenchantment in the effort to close the gap between expectations 
and realities was that victims’ interests should be considered somehow in the criminal 
legal process. Due to the parallel developments in human rights law, victims were 
called upon in the legitimizing narratives and consequently calls for more 
participation grew louder. Building on TJ terminology, the narratives of truth and 
justice and healing through participation were referred to, abstractly. Since the grade 
of involvement increased, undertheorized enthusiasm in the narrative framing of 
victims and international justice and the possible improvement in legitimacy 
prevailed. And like before with international criminal law in general, it was the 
empirical analysis and experiences with the concrete implementation of the once so 
celebrated legal frameworks of victim participation at the ECCC and the ICC that 
debunked the noble theoretical goals. What appears to interrupt the linear plot of 
success of international criminal law in its search for justice in general, and justice for 
victims in particular, as a virtue and a tangible product, is the confrontation of the 
self-legitimizing practices and narratives with the actual situation and with the actual 
victims. The latest solution to bridge the gap, returning to the alleged retributive 
origins of international criminal justice, on the one hand misread Nuremberg as a 
purely retributive enterprise and on the other hand does not seem to seriously 
consider the theoretical implication of retribution and the respective criticism. If one 
took the demand to get rid of the “collective peace and security limb” and instead to 
rely on the classical function of a criminal tribunal – bringing the responsible to book 
(Ambos 2013a, p. 294 citing ; Damaska 2008) – seriously, the slogan “bringing war 
criminals to justice – bringing justice to victims” would read: “bringing some war 
criminal to justice, in some cases.” This is probably not the most convincing 
legitimization, and it is definitely not compatible with the image of an impartial, 
rational, unpolitical court consistently painted in rich colors within the narrative of 
international criminal law. Nevertheless, the new slogan of the ICC illustrates a turn, 
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scaling down the general expectations vis á vis the Court. It just reads: “Trying 
individuals for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity”115 Still, the ICC 
prominently stages the citation of former United Nations Secretary General Kofi 
Annan: “This cause…is the cause of all humanity.”116
“Justice is a key prerequisite for lasting peace. International justice can 
contribute to long‐term peace, stability and equitable development in 
post‐conflict societies. These elements are foundational for building a future 
free of violence.”
 And, in accordance with the 
transitional justice vocabulary it is held that:  
117
Thus, the doubtful legitimations were, and are called upon, to justify international 
criminal law and punishment. Given the gaps in classical theories legitimizing 
international criminal justice, an alternative left to bridge the gap is to believe in a 
universal cosmopolitan world order based on a Kantian eternal peace framework, 
which is created and reinforced through international criminal law and therefore 
legitimately always remains to come. 
  
“In a disenchanted modern universe desperately seeking an unimpeachable 
moral core, the ICC has, for some, come to embody the transcendent and 
sacred. And helped to forge a new global self-conception founded on justice by 
means of a radical application if the rule of law.” And while it is to be 
supported that there is this moral court given the architecture of international 
affairs before, “the antiseptic strictures and internal finality of the legal process 
make it a particular tempting instrument for creating a false sense of closure 
within a self-absorbed utopia” (Akhavan 2003, p. 721) 
Indeed, the practice of international criminal law has often been described as a 
religious exercise, relying on the faith of lawyers in the ability of law to transform, or 
even replace politics: “lawyers tend to share the faith that law is “the instrumentality 
of justice, as man’s highest achievement in his reaching after righteousness.” (Koller 
2008, p. 1050) More critical approaches disclose the simplifying and reassuring effect 
this has:  
“International criminal law carries this kind of a religious exercise of hope that 
is stronger than the desire to face everyday life. Focusing on the idea of 
international criminal justice helps us to forget that an overwhelming majority 
of the crucial problems of the societies concerned are not adequately addressed 
by criminal law. The ideology of a disciplined, mathematical structure of 
                                                 
115 https://www.icc-cpi.int/, last accessed 25/5/2016. 
116 https://www.icc-cpi.int/about, last accessed 25/5/2016. 
117 https://www.icc-cpi.int/about, last accessed 25/5/2016. 
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international criminal responsibility serves as a soothing strategy to measure the 
immeasurable. The seemingly unambiguous notions of innocence and guilt 
create consoling patterns of causality in the chaos of intertwined problems of 
social, political and economic deprivation surrounding the violence. Thereby 
international criminal law seems to make comprehensible the 
incomprehensible.” (Tallgren 2002, pp. 593–594)118
More recently scholars analyze which constituencies are called upon by the ICC 
and thereby produce the field of “symbolic economy” of international criminal law 
rather than asserting any theoretical or empirical constituency per se (Mégret 
2015).
 
119
3. Conclusion 
 The conclusion of these approaches is more sobering, namely that the fact 
that diverging, sometimes conflicting constituencies are invoked suggests that the 
ICC’s main constituency might in fact be “nothing but itself” (Ibid., p. 45). More 
critical approaches contend that there are general limits inherent to courts as means 
to achieve post-conflict justice and international criminal justice is therefore either 
critically, or uncritically thought to be a matter of shared faith and to a certain extent 
immune to empirical consequences (Nouwen 2012, p. 344; Drumbl 2011). 
Consequently, “when confronted with contrary empirical evidence, true believers 
continue to believe and doubters are advised to believe harder.” (Nouwen 2012, 
p. 344) Following this criticism it is claimed that until now, effectiveness based 
critique dominated over assumption based critique, the former is mainly aimed at 
strengthening the existing structures (Schwöbel 2014, p. 3). 
To conclude, truth and justice for victims and healing through participation are 
two of many arguments for the necessity of legal proceedings in the aftermath of 
massive human rights violations, and they fill a gap, left by the application of classical 
criminal legal theories in international criminal law. International criminal law seems 
to fail to fulfil promises leaving the impression that there is a justice-gap, a discrepancy 
between claim and reality which haunts international criminal proceedings and which, 
I claim, cannot be bridged by progressively improving the structures and thereby 
confirming them generally. Accordingly, in the next chapter I will discuss this justice-
                                                 
118 Nouwen (2012) diagnoses international criminal lawyers with cognitive dissonance and faith one 
coping mechanism beside denial and blame shifting. 
119 With a critical focus on victims: Kendall and Nouwen (2013); Fletcher (2015). 
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gap from a theoretical perspective that refrains from providing answers within the 
flawed discussions on the restorative-retributive framework of criminal law. In my 
deconstructivist reading of the legitimizing narrative of criminal law – truth and 
justice –  international legal proceedings are analysed to always already be in need of 
the strict distinction between politics and law; emotions and rationality; subjectivity 
and objectivity; facts and values to reach a fictive closure. This reading will be 
combined with a psychoanalytical and trauma theoretical discussion of the question 
raised by Tallgren: 
“[…] whether criminal law could ever be able to provide closure to large-scale, 
deep-rooted injustice and suffering, and whether the expectation of finality 
after a criminal trial has established the truth by identifying the guilty could in 
fact violently silence other truths, other kinds of responsibilities. Perhaps there 
is a pain which has no closure.” (Tallgren 2002, p. 593) 
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Chapter 3: Taking the gaps seriously 
1. The justice gap 
In the first part I showed that within the ‘success story’ of international criminal 
law and victims: 
Firstly, discussions on victims in international criminal law are closely related to 
debates about legitimacy of international criminal courts in general, and that; 
Secondly the image of the victim is constructed and inter-related with the 
construction of the ideal of international criminal law – the victim is described as 
irrational, emotional, unpredictable, partial, political, subjective; whereas international 
criminal courts are portrayed to be rational, sober, predictable, impartial, unpolitical 
and objective. 
Thirdly, when zooming into discussions about victim participation at the 
respective courts, these diverging conceptualizations lead to tensions. The suggested 
reforms to dissolve the tensions that arose in the confrontation of actual victims and 
international criminal courts are lead under the heading of restorative vs. retributive 
justice. At the courts, measures of externalization, representation and collectivization 
were applied to render victim participation more effective.  
Since the recent debates concerning the ICC are flanked by theoretical discussions 
that dichotomize retributive and restorative justice rationales, and the mainstream 
seems to suggest to return to the alleged retributive origins of international criminal 
law, in Chapter 2, I took a step back and looked at the legitimacy of international 
criminal law in general. Given the initial discussions on the purposes of the 
proceedings at Nuremberg, and the related criticism of the alleged retributive focus, 
which is considered to be insufficient, legitimacy in general seems to be controversial 
in international criminal law. The conclusion when looking at legitimizing theories 
generally is that: 
Firstly, discussions on the legitimacy of international criminal law are theoretically 
flawed and when being confronted with thorough theoretical scrutiny and/or 
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empirical analysis there is a gap between the noble goals and the not so noble reality, 
which I refer to as the justice gap, and that; 
Secondly, victims play a crucial role in legitimizing international criminal law and 
thus are referred to, in order to fill the described gap. Victims are repeatedly referred 
to as the constituency in need of international criminal justice. The narratives rely on 
assumptions lent from transitional justice presuming that international criminal 
courts bring truth and justice to victims and that truth, justice and participation 
contributes to healing of individuals and societies. 
Thirdly, the practice of international criminal law and its alleged effects are mainly 
based on uncritically taken for granted presumptions which by some is described as 
faith. This culminates in the claim that international criminal law contributes to the 
creation of a universal cosmopolitan world order based on a Kantian eternal peace 
framework which legitimately always remains to come and does therefore not depend 
on empirical verification. 
This chapter addresses what I described as the justice gap in the previous chapters – 
the gap between theorization of international criminal law, the role of victims therein 
and the empirical disillusion about the assumed effects - from a critical legal 
perspective. 
Through an eclectic perspective combining a variety of authors and theoretical 
concepts and contexts, the underlying narratives of victim participation will be 
deconstructed and thereby I hope to provide a different reading of victims’ role at 
international criminal courts. This perspective then guides my empirical engagement 
with the practice of victim participation at the ICC.  
Firstly, the inherent exclusionary epistemic violence in both narratives, truth and 
justice through law and healing through participation is step by step unearthed. A 
deconstructive reading of the gap in justification reveals that it is inherent in the legal 
claim to find the truth and bring justice and that the very reference to these ideals 
obscures the exclusionary violence of legal truth finding efforts. The narrative of 
healing through participation and the respective notion of the rational autonomous 
subject will be scrutinized from a psychoanalytical Lacanian perspective. On the basis 
of Lacan’s notion of the split subject, trauma theoretical conceptions then reveal that 
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the peculiar cherishing of the idea to bring truth and justice to victims and to thereby 
contribute to the healing of the traumatized victim can be conceptualized as inherent 
in the strive to reach closure after traumatic events. However, given the specific 
structure of trauma, closure will never have been possible. Once understood as a 
shared fiction with a distinct purpose, the characterization of international criminal 
lawyers as believers and the bridging of the theoretical lack with faith is a 
precondition to preserve the fiction while the realization of the lack inherent in the 
legal endeavour to reach closure, seems to be unbearable within this symbolic order. 
The narratives of truth and justice for victims and healing through participation then 
are read as trauma narratives attempting to transmit, manage and contain the 
overwhelming experience of traumatic violence and finally re-integrate the victims 
into the symbolic order. However, like law’s inherent aporia to find the truth and 
reach justice, the re-integration of traumatic events into the symbolic order is 
impossible and continuously communicates its inherent inadequacy which generates 
further narratives to reach the fictive closure of the traumatic lack.  
 
Against this theoretical backdrop, secondly, the practices of excluding, 
representing and collectivizing victims are conceptualized as effects of the 
exclusionary epistemic violence inherent in the conceptualization of the victim in the 
narratives that frame the relation between international criminal courts and victims. 
The mutually constituting images – that of the rational, sober, impartial and objective 
criminal courts and that of the irrational, emotional, partial and subjective victim – 
can only be uphold by excluding, representing and collectivizing the actual victims.  
Thirdly, in the context of this theoretical conceptions, one has to take into 
account the situatedness of the ICC within the global order to reveal the hierarchical 
structures within the representational practices. This adds a crucial dimension to 
understand the epistemic violence which can be traced in the language used and in 
the representational practices of „African victim“s at The Hague. It is the „African 
victim“ that is portrayed as the emotional, irrational representative of the lack which 
has to be closed by the rational Western-style criminal court. In the narrative 
framing, truth and justice are delivered to those who are incapable of finding it by 
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themselves. Based on Spivak’s text Righting Wrongs (Spivak 2004) the slogan of the 
ICC could be: We right your wrongs for you!  
On a more abstract level, the „African victim“ and African countries serve to 
produce an image of trauma and violence which re-produces the image of a rational 
non-violent version of Western rule of law, which, if implemented world-wide, can 
provide peace and security for all. The ideal cosmopolitan international legal order is 
represented as the trustworthy, peaceful global order to strive for, the symbolic order 
into which victims need to be re-integrated. At the same time the inherent injustices 
of this order and the interrelated exclusionary violence vis á vis the African subjects 
are obscured.  
Finally, I will shortly elaborate on what I call the beyonds of justice, the theoretical 
reflections on the possibility of ethics beyond a fixed understanding of truth and 
justice. Against this background, I suggest to make use of law’s inherent 
(im)possibilities and its relation to its emotional others and to continuously reflect 
the post-colonial dimension of the representational practices to be more attentive to 
the ethics of listening developed in trauma theory. 
2. Truth and Justice through law? 
The possibility of truth and justice is a genuine philosophical/ethical/moral 
discussion and it seems peculiar that this is hardly ever addressed when raising the 
truth to the level of a right that can be enforced though law.120
“[…] the gap seems to be widening between the views on truth prevailing in a 
variety of theoretical disciplines and the understanding of truth in the social 
practice of adjudication. One of the working assumptions of the practice of 
adjudication is that truth is in principle discoverable, and that accuracy in fact-
finding constitutes a precondition for a just decision.” (Damaska 1998, p. 289)  
 Or, in the words of 
Damaska: 
This working assumption of legal adjudication is the basis of the right to truth and will 
be theoretically scrutinized in this chapter. Through a deconstructive reading I hope 
to step by step work out a different perspective on the conceptions of truth, law, 
justice and consequently on the victim subject within these proceedings.  
                                                 
120 See previous Chapter 2. 
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But let us start with the working assumption of legal adjudication and see if the 
description is not downplaying the role of the affirmation of truth for law and justice, 
especially in criminal law, since according to the classical criminal legal 
understanding:  
“Knowing exactly what has happened, who the culprit is, and why he 
committed the offense, is a necessary prerequisite for any attempt to re-
establish social peace through justice. The determination of the truth is 
indispensable for yet another reason – criminal sanctions are society’s most 
severe expression of moral blame. It is therefore imperative that criminal 
sanctions be imposed (only) upon those who are in fact guilty.” (Weigend 2003, 
p. 158)  
For these reasons,  
“[I]t seems obvious that adjudication cannot draw on this radical thought 
(post-modern, or post-structuralist theories A/N) for inspiration. When we 
engage in social practices such as adjudication, we presuppose a world beside 
our statements. And as factfinders, we embrace a vision of the world in which 
there is reality beyond language.” (Damaska 1998, p. 290)  
These statements, exemplary for the discussion of the problematic of truth and 
law when being confronted with philosophical scrutiny, reveal how truth together 
with justice is not just any working assumption for the law, but probably the working 
assumption. Put differently, it is the assumption law works on. One of the 
foundations without which, this is admitted, adjudication – the law – would not be 
what it is now and what it has been. It is one of the legitimizing premises of law in 
general, and criminal law in particular. Interestingly, in the discussion, all theories that 
might radically call into question this basis – namely so called post-structural theories 
– are rejected as too radical, sceptic (Patterson 1992), relativist or just not 
constructive or helpful (Damaska 1998). The farthest the consents to post-modern 
questioning of truth as accessible and justice as achievable can go, is to affirm that 
legal truth is constructed following legal premises, that something is true in the eyes 
of the law (Balkin 2003). On this basis, the assumption is that the concrete legal truth 
produced through its conventions, norms, rules and application is a mis-
representation, distortion, of a truth before the law. Or, that legal truth conflicts with 
other forms of truth and other disciplines producing truths. According to this truth 
and knowledge are shaped by institutional purposes. Interestingly, the terminology 
then often shifts to the distinction between facts and legal truth. What before was 
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referred to as truth, now is facts transformed/translated into a legal truth in the legal 
proceedings. If we cannot rely on a truth before the law, we can rely on facts that can 
be uncovered and implemented into a legal emplotment – the legal truth. 
After considering post-modern conceptions of truths, Naqvi, who appears 
generally more favourable to the theories, comes to the conclusion that truth is a 
social matter at the same time it can be verified or at least corroborated by evidence, 
it may consist of an official statement or judgement, it is the obligation to say that 
what happened indeed happened always relative to present needs and consequences 
(Naqvi 2006, pp. 253–254). Post-modern/post-structuralist121
This generalization of very diverse theories is once again a sign for the 
undertheorization and the lack of critical and substantiated discussions concerning 
the foundations of international legal provisions like the right to truth and justice 
relied upon in the legitimizing narratives of international criminal justice. Reading the 
narrative of truth and justice for victims from their gaps entails that the theoretical 
discussion takes as its starting point those theories that seem to be precluded from 
the range of theories considered helpful to discuss the problematic of truth and 
justice as achievable through law. Despite the critique that these theories would 
render legal truth-finding efforts preposterous, I claim that they provide a lense 
through which the exclusionary violence inherent on the criminal legal practice 
become visible. Hence, the stakes for truth and justice are even raised, since the 
exclusionary violence of positing, entailed in referring to the truth and the justice, is 
not obscured and has to be considered. In the words of Derrida:   
 thought is then 
summarized as seeing the most appropriate concept of truth as that version of facts 
acceptable to all concerned (Ibid., p. 272).  
“This justice always addresses itself to singularity, to the singularity of the other, 
despite, or even because it pretends to universality. Consequently never to yield 
at this point, constantly to maintain a questioning of the origin, grounds and 
limits of our conceptual, theoretical or normative apparatus surrounding justice 
– this is, from the point of view of a rigorous deconstruction, anything but the 
neutralization of the interest of justice, an insensitivity toward justice. On the 
contrary, it hyperbolically raises the stakes in the demand for justice, the 
sensitivity to a kind of essential disproportion that must inscribe excess and 
inadequation in itself.” (Derrida 1990, p. 955)  
                                                 
121 Mostly used interchangeably, with the exception of Patterson (2003). 
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2.1. Truth, the Law and Justice 
In his basic understandings, Derrida builds on Nietzsche’s “[…] suspicion of the 
values of truth (‘well applied convention’), of meaning and of being, of ‘meaning of 
being, the attention to the economic phenomena of force and of difference of forces 
and so forth.” (Derrida 1995, pp. 30–31)  
For Derrida, Nietzsche provides an “entire thematics of active interpretations, 
which substitutes an incessant deciphering for the disclosure of truth as a 
presentation of the thing itself.” (Ibid., p. 33) The “entire thematics of active 
interpretation” is the process of signification, which is the starting point for the 
development of the concept/strategy122
“The structure of reference works and can go on working not because of the 
identity between these two so called component parts of the sign [signifier and 
signified A/N], but because of their relationship of difference. The sign marks 
a place of difference.” (Ibid., p. 22)  
 of deconstruction or deconstructionist 
reading. In this sense, signification is the quest for the proper word for the thing or 
thought – where in fact, there will never be a correspondence between thing/thought 
and word – there will never be an identity of signifier and signified. Accordingly, the 
thing beyond language is never accessible. Truth is always already represented within 
language. Language is understood as a system of signification within which the 
signifier can only be “defined” by its difference from its opposite. 
The understanding of signification as a process of infinite referral without ever 
arriving at meaning per se lies at the heart of Derrida’s understanding and his reading 
of texts and accordingly his relation to the truth. Contrary to Heidegger’s 
understanding of a referral to a transcendental signified, Derrida admits that there is 
a desire for closure, but rejects such “metaphysical desires” to instead look for 
openings within language (Ibid., p. 29). Since this process of infinite referral of 
signifier and signified produces a surplus of the unrepresented, the unsaid and 
therefore leaves traces of the excluded, looking from within means, finding the 
traces, finding the present absence within a text, reject closure and exactly not strive 
                                                 
122 Describing deconstruction is as impossible and necessary in this context as describing and grasping 
truth, justice etc. Derrida himself rejects the labelling of deconstruction as a method, which would 
perhaps best fit within the scientific framework. Rather, because deconstruction is a questioning of the 
foundations of exactly these frames and therefore balks at being framed at all. Deconstruction 
happens – all texts are deconstructable. Deconstruction is used here as a form of reading, aware of the 
per se inappropriateness of this framing. 
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for identity. “The structure of the sign is determined by the trace or lack of that other 
which is forever absent. […] the trace is the mark of the absence of a present, an 
always already absent present, of the lack at the origin that is the condition of 
thought and experience.” (Ibid., pp. 23–24) Like mentioned in the Introduction, 
there is no presence without absence, and no voice without silence. Deconstruction, 
accordingly reveals the excluded others, the traces of the surplus in the process of 
signification, it “dramatized the exclusions, brings them to an extreme” (Vismann 
2005, p. 7).  
Actually, Derrida claims that the problematic of justice lies at the very heart of 
most of his texts, since, and this is what he will come to in his elaboration on law and 
justice, he somewhat provocatively states that deconstruction is justice.  
“It is a deconstructive interrogation that starts, as this one did, by destabilizing, 
complicating or bringing out the paradoxes of values like those of the proper 
and of property in all their registers, of the subject, and so of the responsible 
subject, the subject of law (droit), and the subject of morality, of the juridical or 
moral person, of intentionality, etc., and of all that follows from these, such a 
deconstructive line of questioning is through and through a problematization of 
law and justice. A problematization of the foundations of law, morality, and 
politics.” (Derrida 1990, p. 931) 
Against the backdrop of the justice gap in international criminal law and the serious 
flaws in the theorization of its legitimacy, it may seem heretical to call into question 
the already thin foundations. But I claim that only by taking gaps seriously, by 
applying a deconstructionist reading of the legitimizing narratives one can reveal the 
inherent violence of a forgetful narrative, reflect one’s own gaps and take 
responsibility for law’s (im)possibilities and aporias. By finding the traces of the 
unrepresented in law one can open up spaces from within. In order to do so, I will 
start by introducing Derrida’s reading of the possibilities of justice through law in his 
text “Force of Law The “Mystical Foundation of Authority” which is the central 
deconstructionist text on the relation of law and justice (Ibid.).  
Derrida starts by looking at the language of law discussing the wording “to 
enforce the law” in which he sees the remains of the Ursprungsgewalt.123
                                                 
123 This term is from Benjamin’s Benjamin (2016), which Derrida refers to. 
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“The word “enforceability” reminds us that there is no such thing as law (droit)  
that does not imply in itself, a priori, in the analytic structure of its concept, the 
possibility of being “enforced”, applied by force.” (Ibid., p. 925) 
But force does not necessarily mean violence, which, according to Derrida is 
always judged unjust. “Is there a just force, or a nonviolent force?” (Ibid., p. 927) To 
approach this distinction between justified and therefore nonviolent force of law and 
unjust violence, Walter Benjamin’s essay Zur Kritik der Gewalt (On the Critique of 
Violence) (Benjamin 2016), in which the latter denounced the Ursprungsgewalt of law 
permeating in law-positing and law-maintaining, is referenced. According to 
Benjamin, the two legal schools justifying legal force and therefore determine its 
nonviolence, positivism and natural law, both rely on the same circle of dogmatic 
presuppositions: positive law remains blind towards the unconditionality of ends; 
natural law to the conditionality of means (Derrida 1990, p. 983). Both neglect the 
founding violence which is perpetuated in the monopoly of violence, since the latter 
does not protect legal ends, but law itself, it is always also the so-called law 
preserving violence. In Derrida’s words:  
“ A “successful” revolution, the “successful foundation of a State (...) will 
produce après coup what it was destined in advance to produce, namely, proper 
interpretative models to read in return, to give sense, necessity and above all 
legitimacy to the violence that has produced, among others the interpretative 
model in question, that is, the discourse of self-legitimation.”124
Every foundation in this sense is a promise. Every positing of law permits and 
promises; it posits by setting and by promising. “And even if a promise is not kept in 
fact, iterability inscribes the promise as guard in the most irruptive instant of 
foundations. Thus it inscribes the possibility of repetition at the heart of the 
originary. … Position is already iterability, a call for self-preserving repetition.” (Ibid., 
p. 997)  
 
Accordingly, preserving and positing violence are intertwined, Derrida calls this 
differential contamination. The violence of foundation positing the law must contain 
preserving violence and cannot break with it, and the preserving violence always 
                                                 
124 Derrida (1990, p. 993), Derrida refers in Unabhängigkeitserklärungen to this phenomenon of future 
anterior. Derrida (2000). 
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envelops positing violence since by re-iterating it always also alterates – iteration is 
always also alteration.125
“[T]he operation that amounts to founding, inaugurating, justifying law (droit), 
making law, would consist of a coup de force, of a performative and therefore 
interpretative violence that in itself is neither just nor unjust and that no justice 
and no earlier law with its founding anterior moment could guarantee or 
contradict or invalidate.” (Ibid., pp. 942–943) 
 
This origin of law’s authority, resting on nothing but itself, makes law and justice 
deconstructable, it calls for deconstruction, because this lack at the origin leaves 
traces. And all theories that do not conceive of this interrelatedness of violence and 
law, but instead seek to find justifications for the founding violence and establish 
ends legitimizing legal means, cover the traces of this violence with myths. They 
thereby contribute to the violence, they force closure (McCormick 2001). Derrida, in 
this critique expressly and in the following implicitly, refers to the Kantian idea of the 
categorical imperative, civil (human) rights and eternal peace as such justifications. 
“As long as they do not give themselves the theoretical or philosophical means 
to think this co-implication of violence and law, the usual critiques remain naïve 
and ineffectual. [...] The reference to the categorical imperative  ("Act in such a 
way that at all times you use humanity both in your person and in the person of 
all others as an end, and never merely as a means", however uncontestable it 
may be, allows no critique of violence. Law (droit) in its very violence claims to 
recognize and defend said.” (Derrida 1990, p. 1003) 
Deconstruction instead aims at uncovering the aporias located between law and 
justice, in the calculation of the incalculable. Justice as law claims legitimacy or 
legality, law is a stabilizable, statutory and calculable (dispositive), a system of 
regulated and coded prescriptions, whereas justice is infinitive, incalculable, rebellious 
to rule and foreign to symmetry, heterogenous and heterotropic (Ibid., p. 947). Since 
law claims to exercise in the name of justice, the problematic lies in between the two, 
the problematic lies in law’s invocation of justice.  
“Instead of just one can say legal or legitimate, in conformity with a state of 
law, with rules and conventions that authorize calculation, but whose founding 
origin only defers the problem of justice. For in the founding of law, or in its 
institution, the same problem of justice will have been posed and violently 
resolved, that is to say buried, dissimulated, repressed.” (Ibid., p. 963) 
From this, Derrida develops three aporias of law:  
                                                 
125 Derrida calls this iteration, or iterability. 
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The first is the fresh judgement: Every legal decision is based on a law/rule/article 
but has to be taken without it. That is to say, the decision has to maintain the basis 
while at the same time substantiate and thereby destroy its abstract character.126
The second is the haunting of the undecidable. Building on the conception of traces, 
decisions, or fresh judgements, bear traces of the undecided, of the buried justice. 
The ghosts of undecidability are haunting every decision that would not be a 
decision, if it were not undecidable. “The undecidable remains caught, lodged, at 
least as a ghost - but an essential ghost - in every decision. Its ghostliness 
deconstructs from within any assurance of presence, any certitude, or any supposed 
criteriology that would assure us of the justice of a decision, in truth of the very event 
of a decision.” (Ibid., p. 965) Like différance defers signification, the ghosts of 
undecidability defer justice, which remains to come.  
 In 
every decision the question arises: is this just? And in the next instance it is decided 
and thus buried again – leaving something undecided. Justice and violence are hence 
entailed in every fresh judgement. 
And the third aporia is urgency obstructing the horizon of knowledge (Ibid., p. 967): A just 
decision cannot wait for infinitive knowledge, it must be taken immediately. “It 
cannot provide itself with the infinite information and the unlimited knowledge of 
conditions, rules or hypothetical imperatives that could justify it.” (Ibid.) And since it 
is always also a new foundation, a reinstitution of the knowledge and rules it relies 
on, even if a decision could rely on unlimited knowledge, it would at the same time 
“mark[s] the interruption of the juridico-, ethico-, or politico-cognitive deliberation 
that precedes it” (Ibid.). 
In conclusion, the legal concept of justice is intertwined with its justice burying 
violence and finally serves to mask and obscure it. Derrida rejects to embrace any 
idea of a regulative idea of justice in the Kantian sense, he rejects to anticipate any 
horizon for justice to make a promise of justice for the future, because, “[A]s its 
Greek name suggests, a horizon is both the opening and the limit that defines an 
infinite progress or a period of waiting.” (Ibid.) The justice to come, à venir, im 
Kommen, Derrida has in mind, does not have a horizon of expectation, since it is no 
                                                 
126 This is a similar problematic, that was described previously and is called iterability by Derrida. See 
fn. 125. 
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future in the temporal sense which would close the horizon again and thereby 
promise impossible closure. Justice is the excess over calculation, rules, programs, 
anticipations, it is the overflowing of the performative, it is the traces of the absent 
present (Ibid., 969, 971). “Perhaps it is for this reason that justice, insofar as it is not 
only a juridical or political concept, opens up for l’avenir the transformation, the 
recasting or reforming of law and politics.” (Ibid., pp. 970–971)  
Reading legal practice based on this deconstructivist notion of justice implies to 
take the gaps seriously, to take into consideration the excess of signification, to carve 
out the traces inherent in every legal decision, to be sensitive to ghosts. These traces 
endlessly defer the promised closure of the legal system (Douzinas 1991, p. 142). 
Like différance defers the process of signification, and the sign is marked by the 
memory of the trace of the unrepresented, the legal process of signification is 
deferred by the excess of the (just) decision.  
As described in the previous chapter, more recently, theorists ask whether the 
constituency of the ICC rests on “nothing but itself” (Mégret 2015, p. 45). This legal 
authority resting on nothing but itself is exactly what renders international criminal law 
deconstructable. The justice gap in international criminal law, not only vis à vis 
victims, can be interpreted against this backdrop as traces of the aporias of law and 
justice. This ghostly gap is haunting the legitimizing narratives that reach for closure 
and finality and invoke a concept of justice that is not reflective of its inherent 
violence but tries to justify it. The narratives of justice in international criminal law 
are impelled by the traces of its impossibilities that are in turn attempted to be closed 
again by new legitimizing arguments that are deemed to fail, since justice always 
exceeds law. Closing the gaps, taking decisions, claiming justice implies exclusionary 
violence which permeates law in its ghostly appearance.  
3. The lacking subject – trauma and violence 
In the previous section I outlined the deconstructivist critique of the 
interrelationship between truth, the law and justice. The focus of this section, in 
which I discuss psychoanalytical concepts of the subject, will be the progression 
from a violent past, through law as present into a peaceful future and the 
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transformation/empowerment of the victim object, through legal participation into a 
subject. I will proceed by scrutinizing the underlying subject-position - namely the 
Cartesian idea of an autonomous cogito – with the help of a Lacanian notion of a 
split subject build around a lack. To subsequently address the scattering effect of 
traumatic events on the Cartesian subject- position and the function of the narrative 
of healing, restoring and re-integration of the subject into a symbolic order. By 
introducing a cultural conceptualization of trauma that is based on the notion of the 
Lacanian subject position, the law’s function within these narratives is scrutinized. 
Finally, I will discuss the consequences of this psychoanalytical – cultural – 
understanding of trauma, the subject and law and its implications for international 
criminal law within transitional justice and the healing through participation 
narrative. 
3.1. Lacan and the subject 
Building on the assumption that the unified autonomous subject is as fictive as 
the notion of accessible truth, and that the quest for identity might be located in the 
unconscious, Lacan introduces a respective notion of the subject reflecting the 
always already lacking subject and the (im)possibility to access truth beyond 
language127
                                                 
127 I will not address the discussion if Lacan’s notion can still be called subject, or if it is not rather the 
human, since subject does always imply some idea of identity. I consider this discussion unnecessary 
in the context of this work, since the healing through participation narrative of transitional justice and 
international criminal law refers to the subject and its re-paration etc., it would be rather confusing to 
introduce a different term as I want to suggest a different conception.  
. Opposing the so called I-psychology, or ego-psychology, building on the 
common Cartesian notion of the subject which is at the same time the basis for the 
mythology of presence – of the truth, critiqued by Derrida, Lacan in his 
psychoanalytical approach conceives the subject to be split and decentred and 
remarks that “this experience sets us at odds with any philosophy directly stemming 
from cogito.” (Lacan 2005, p. 75) Furthermore, in his involvement with Freudian 
thought, Lacan combines psychoanalytical assumptions with structuralist linguistic 
theories, emphasizing the crucial role language plays, not only structuring the social 
order, but as well in the interrelated structuration of the unconscious and 
consequently in subjectivization. Thereby, he reveals the continuous intertwinement 
of subjective and social reality through language. In the context of this analysis and in 
relation to Derrida’s critique, Lacan’s conception of the subject is crucial for the 
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understanding of the search for truth and justice and the embeddedness of the 
subject within the social, and politico-juridical field. Whereas Derrida cursory touches 
upon the problematic of the subject throughout his texts, Lacan focussed on it and 
problematizes, what Derrida does on a textual level, namely the striving for closure 
(Zichy 2006, p. 99). Especially against the backdrop of traumatic experiences, the 
decentralized conception of the subject is crucial to understand the political 
dimension of the claim to re-store the subject position of victims with legal means 
and to thereby re-integrate subjects into the symbolic order of post-conflict societies 
propagated according to a legalist approach to transitional justice.128
“Contrary to the notions of the ego as “centered on the perception-
consciousness system or as organized by the “reality principle” – the expression 
of a scientific bias most hostile to the dialectics of knowledge…” rather “takes 
as our point of departure the function of misrecognition that characterized the 
ego in all the defensive structures…” (Lacan 2005, p. 80) 
 Given that a 
certain conception of the unified subject is the basis for our understanding of the 
functioning of the world, the questioning of this conception, just like Derrida’s 
revealing of the aporias between law and justice, radically calls into question our 
conceptions of law, the state, and the global order. It reveals the aporias, the 
(im)possibilities of identity and closure with regard to the subject and thereby reveals 
the exclusionary violence entailed in the pursuit of healing and closure.  
The starting point for the conception of the split subject, build around a lack is 
what Lacan calls the mirror stage. In this early stage the infant first recognizes itself 
in a mirror and mistakenly conceives of the image in the mirror as the self-identical I 
which is actually always already represented in an image and only reflected. 
“This moment at which the mirror stage comes to an end inaugurates, through 
identification with the imago of one’s semblable […] the dialectic that will 
henceforth link the I to socially elaborated situations.” (Ibid., p. 79) 
Following from this, there cannot be any direct, unrepresented conception of the 
I, since we never get an unrepresented glimpse at ourselves, we are always looking 
for reflections of the self in the eyes of the other. 
“‘The Mirror-Stage’ development of the ego…our precious identity is imaginary 
(that is, arising from our fascination with and captivation by the image in the 
mirror) but also antagonistic: it arises from the subject’s first desire to be 
                                                 
128 See previous Chapter, Part I Chapter 2.  
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recognized by the other. Which is deemed to fail. […] The subject cannot attain 
self-consciousness from witnessing her own mirror image, from what her eye 
can see, because the mirror image is literally an image: a mirage and therefore 
an imaginary.” (Aristodemou 2014, p. 82) 
In the mirror the subject appears to be whole, complete, separate and individual, 
when in fact it is only a representation which is subsequently aspired in the eyes of 
the other (Edkins 2006, p. 103). Accordingly this imaginary wholeness is strived for 
when entering into the symbolic order – the social order. Lacan differentiates 
between the symbolic order, the imaginary order and the Real. The symbolic order is 
structured by language which is itself, as we could see in the previous part, centred 
around a lack, or excess of signification.129 Just like Derrida, Lacan130
“[w]hat psychoanalysis calls ‘fantasy’ is the endeavour to close this gap by 
(mis)perceiving the pre-ontological Real as simply another ‘more fundamental 
level’, level of reality – fantasy projects on to the pre-ontological Real the form 
of constituted reality …” (Ibid.)  
 sees in language 
and the process of signification within the symbolic order an enabling and disabling 
factor. This lack at the centre of the subject on the one hand always represents the 
failure of representation and on the other hand is the driving force of representation. 
The lack “… creates a void and thereby introduces the possibility of filling it. 
Emptiness and fullness are introduced into a world that by itself knows not of 
them.” (Aristodemou 2014, p. 34 citing ; Lacan 1996) “The lack is both, what keeps 
us going as well as what perennially troubles and tortures us.” (Aristodemou 2014, 
p. 34) On the one hand, language is responsible for inflicting the lack on the subject, 
the “gap that forever separates the domain of (symbolically mediated, i.e. 
ontologically constituted) reality from the elusive and spectral real” (Žižek 2000, 
p. 57). Being lacking, the subject strives for fullness and attempts to fill the lack, 
fantasising closure.  
The subject striving for wholeness, aspiring the identity of an I, is located in the 
imaginary order and therefore is deemed to fail. The lack is introduced through 
language and the subject that is inevitably precipitating towards the signifier, once the 
word is pronounced, realizes that it never really fits – there is always an excess or a 
                                                 
129 Here, Lacan, just like Derrida relates to Saussure’s and Levi-Strauss. 
130 One must say, just like Lacan, Derrida sees… because Lacan was the first and both relied on 
Claude Lévy-Strauss structuration theory. 
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lack – there never will have been identity, and there never will be, since the lack is at 
the centre of the subject itself. (Ibid., p. 58)131
Žižek conceptualizes this not all and/or too much in the process of signification 
within the symbolic order as the immanence of the Real in the Symbolic. The 
encounter with this immanent Real is the encounter with the lack – with the aporias, 
using Derrida’s conception. Lacan then introduces the German Legal terminology to 
illustrate the repeated failure of the subject to reach closure, to fill the lack. He 
introduces a triad, the already mentioned Symbolic, the Real and the Imaginary. Then 
he distinguishes between the Ding (the Thing) and the Sache, used within German 
legal terminology according to which the Thing is located in the order of the Real, it 
is beyond language, and therefore inaccessible, whereas the Sache is the 
representation of the Ding in the symbolic order (Vismann 2011, p. 20). But, just like 
signified and signifier, Ding and Sache never correspond, the Real is inaccessible, 
there will never be identity between the two.
 
132
Just like the process of signification is endlessly deferred, leaving traces of the 
unsaid and unrepresented, the subject is haunted by the lack and excess of reaching 
for fullness and closure of identity. So, the subject like the social order – the 
symbolic – is radically incomplete with a lack at its centre (Edkins 2006, p. 104). 
Accordingly, all conceptions of an autonomous, self-conscious subject that are 
central to our conception of law and the modern state are fantasies of a complete, 
contained social order that we construct to heal the lack. “If the object is always lost 
and the subject is always a loser, then what we put in place of the lacking subject is 
the fantasy object that will heal the lack.” (Aristodemou 2014, p. 154) 
 From this Vismann derives that at 
court, the unspeakable Thing/Ding is transformed/translated into the speakable 
Sache which, given the impossibility of identity, will again leave traces of the unsaid 
and unrepresented, because the object is always already lost when we assume subject 
position within the symbolic order. “C’est de sa nature que l’object est perdue comme tel. Il ne 
sera jamais retrouvé.” (Lacan 1996, p. 65) 
                                                 
131 Contrary to Freud, the castration of the subject according to Lacan appears when entering language it 
is the always already lost real. 
132 This is why Lacan uses the German terminology that distinguishes between Ding and Sache, whereas 
the French translation would be la chose for both. Vismann (2011), 
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Lacan calls the fantasy objects the master signifier concealing the lack, this could 
be god, the nation, justice etc. The master signifier conceals the lack and obscures the 
exclusive violence inherent to reaching closure – the violence vis á vis the other in 
the process of signification.  
“The social order is held together by the ‘master signifier’, which quilts the 
sliding signifiers and makes sense of the whole social field. In the past ‘God’ 
has fulfilled this role, or ‘science’. The ‘nation’ has a similar symbolic function. 
A narrative comes into being that can explain everything, and that gives no 
space for the lack: the social field is totalized and made to appear impregnable.” 
(Edkins 2006, p. 104) 
This is a radically different conception of the subject than the subject underlying 
the narratives of truth and justice for victims and the possibility of healing. The 
understanding of the unconscious as structured by language which brings about the 
inevitable intertwinement with the social order – its embeddedness in the symbolic 
order – provides an alternative understanding of the function of the notions of truth 
and justice for victims as something tangible, constructed in the narratives 
surrounding victim participation at the ICC as a fantasy. It can be perceived as a 
fantasy that is totalizing the field of international criminal law and transitional justice. 
When international criminal lawyers are described to be believers, who, facing the 
gaps in legitimization, construct an all good things go together logic (Zolkos 2015, 
p. 164) and urge all doubters to believe harder (Nouwen 2012, p. 344), this is 
representative of the fantasy function of international criminal law. “Our legal rules 
are by implication just as many fictional constructs whose existence as well as efficacy 
depend on the degree to which we belive in and suscribe to them.” (Aristodemou 
2014, p. 192) It is important that we believe in the justification of the legal violence 
after the fact, that we believe that it was no violence and it will never have been.  
This fiction of a basically non-violent closed symbolic order is scattered by the 
individual and collective experiences of violence, we call traumatic violence suffered 
from by the victims of the crimes tried at The Hague. The narrative of a functioning, 
closed global order, relying on separate modern states, that are based on the rule of 
law and constituted through autonomous citizen subjects, that allegedly stands for 
peace, security and justice – for the eternal peace envisioned by Kant - is questioned 
by the very fact of the extreme violence exercised within this global order. Therefore, 
narratives have to be invoked to explain the interruption and to subsequently close 
104 
 
the related gap again. The terminology used is revealing – peace has to be re-stored, 
the rule of law re-stored, the victim re-integrated…etc. With the prefix re-, suggesting 
that there once was this stable, closed order which has to be re-stored, re-paired and 
implying a certain progression of time – past – present – future. The narratives 
appeal to a closure that has to be re-stored, but which was, according to Lacanian 
theory, never there in the first place.  
“In other words, ethical norms and legal rules create an illusion that politics 
with its means can overcome injustice in a society; but actually believing that 
political means will bring to life a perfect society rests on the assumption that 
this society was once just and equal and that shared moral principles are 
anchored in some material or mythical source which will reveal itself once the 
time is right.” (Zevnik 2016, p. 218)  
3.2. Trauma theory and the (im)possibilities of healing 
In Chapter two, I described the healing through participation narratives 
underlying the transitional justice rationale and the victim’s right to truth and justice. 
Individual and societal healing, reconciliation and the re-storation of trust – through 
telling one’s story is described as one of the possible benefits of participation in legal 
proceedings. Since the development of these narratives is closely related to a specific 
conception of trauma133
In this section, the therapeutic ethic is scrutinized as an ideological project to re-
institute the fiction of the modern global order and the interrelated image of the 
subject.  This conception of trauma not only exposes the aporias of healing, but also 
the fictive notion of a linear progression of time. In this vein, a radical re-reading of 
the narratives of truth and justice and healing through participation through this 
trauma theoretical lens can once again help to find the traces of the excluded, to 
search for the ghosts of victim participation in international criminal law and to 
reveal the inherent exclusionary violence of the underlying subject position. 
 and the interrelated image of the physically and 
psychologically wounded individual and society after mass violence, it is also referred 
to as the therapeutic ethic, which is thereby introduces into legal rationalizations 
(Fassin 2008; Bonacker 2012). 
                                                 
133 “PTSD, or post-traumatic stress disorder, is an anxiety problem that develops in some people after 
extremely traumatic events, such as combat, crime, an accident or natural disaster. People with PTSD 
may relive the event via intrusive memories, flashbacks and nightmares; avoid anything that reminds 
them of the trauma; and have anxious feelings they didn’t have before that are so intense their lives 
are disrupted.”, http://www.apa.org/topics/ptsd/, last accessed 29 June 2016.  
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The memory of the Holocaust and dealing with the survivors was the starting 
point for contemporary thought about individual and collective trauma and how to 
“deal with it” (Fassin and Rechtman 2009, p. 17). With regard to legal proceedings, 
the Eichmann trial was especially indicative of a new conception of trauma, the 
cathartic effect of telling and the link between individual stories and collective 
acknowledgement, memory and healing. For Fassin and Rechtman this connection 
between the individual and the collective, that is also underlying the right to truth and 
justice, has turned out to lie at the heart of what they call politics of trauma: 
“Thus, in psychoanalysis the analogy between what is happening at the 
collective level and what is going on at the individual level establishes a 
connection which today lies at the heart of the politics of trauma: the collective 
event supplies the substance of the trauma which will be articulated in 
individual experience; in return, individual suffering bears witness to the 
traumatic aspect of the collective drama.” (Ibid., p. 18)  
This connection between the individual and the collective is also underlying the 
rationales of the right to truth, justice and healing. According to Fassin and 
Rechtman, this is partly due to the psychological and cultural mode of representation 
which defines a new modality of expressing violence in terms of trauma and which 
can therefore serve as an expression of a state of the world (Fassin 2008, p. 532). 
Similarly, Zolkos holds that 
“[T]he last two decades have witnessed a proliferation of various medical, 
psychological and therapeutic initiatives addressed at post-conflict political 
contexts, aiming at the investigation, management and prevention of mental 
health consequences of mass political violence. The concept of trauma has been 
at the core of these initiatives.” (Zolkos 2015, p. 168)  
She goes on to explain that it is a very specific clinical conception of trauma that 
influenced the development of redress mechanisms: 
“Importantly the conceptual framework of their engagement addresses trauma 
primarily within the rubric of PTSD, and places the process of therapeutic 
recovery at the cross section of the individual and the collective social realities.” 
(Ibid.) 
Fassin and Rechtman claim that trauma has become a major signifier of our age 
and that the figure of PTSD “enable individuals to be described (by others) and 
identiﬁed (by themselves) in the public arena.” (Fassin 2008, p. 533) As a 
consequence trauma became a mean of relating present suffering to past violence and 
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is the basis for designing post-conflict redress mechanisms, like legal proceedings. 
Brunner calls this the medicalization of testimony through the label PTSD or more 
broadly traumatized (Brunner 2012).  
The contemporary conception of trauma mainly relies on the definition of PTSD 
– the clinical notion and the transfer of the very same notion to a collective level. 
Critics argue that there is “often an excessive emphasis on trauma in transitional 
contexts, which coincides with the institutionalization of the distinctively Western 
therapeutic paradigm of PTSD diagnosis and the related “talking cure” (Zolkos 2015, 
p. 166). Furthermore,  
“With regard to the mass violation of human rights that transitional justice seek 
to address, traumatisation of individuals and societies is considers the central 
subjective mediation of the post-atrocity State, the emphasis on trauma 
coincides with the emergence of the therapeutic modes of governance (Moon) 
where the State’s raison d’être is to achieve the psychosomatic well-being of the 
State subjects.” (Ibid., p. 165) 
Addressing the suffering from PTSD is causally linked to re-storing a stable peace 
and re-establishing the social order into which the subject is then re-integrated. A 
causal relationship is affirmed between the overcoming of the individual trauma and 
successful societal reconciliation. The dignity of the victims has to be re-iterated and 
secured, the trust in the symbolic order re-build.  
Accordingly, the underlying assumptions behind victim participation at the ICC is 
that  
“victim’s participation empowers them, recognized their suffering and enables 
them to the establishment of the historical record, the truth as it were of what 
occurred. Victims play an important role as active participants in the quest for 
justice and should be valued in that way by the justice process. Moreover, their 
participation in the justice process contributes to the closing of the impunity 
gap and is one step in the process of healing for individuals and societies.”134
This exemplifies that 
 
 “[D]espite of the scarcity of affirmative empirical findings, there has been a 
consistent and strong conceptual and political investment in constructing 
transitional justice as the way to address the effects of war on traumatized 
communities and bring justice.” (Ibid., p. 166)  
                                                 
134 UN Doc. A/RES/60/147 (2006), Annex. ; ICC-ASP, Court’s Revised strategy in relation to 
victims (5 November 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP11/ICC-ASP-11-38-
ENG.pdf. Accessed 30 October 2014, para 10. 
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The reactions assume a certain underlying conception of trauma that is somehow 
illustrated in Jean Améry’s elaboration on his experiences of torture and the effect on 
him. Namely, the conception of trauma as a wound, a bodily-altering injury causing a 
rupture and the absolutely defencelessness showing the “existential vulnerability 
articulated in relation with another person.” (Ibid., p. 170) The therapeutic ethic of 
healing implicitly and sometimes explicitly (Möller 2003, p. 606) relies on a depiction 
of torture and its effects by Jean Améry, where he writes that with the first instance 
of beating, he lost his trust in the world. He describes the existential transgression of his 
bodily limits reducing him to pure flesh and the utter helplessness this caused:  
 “Not much is said when someone who has never been beaten makes the 
ethical and pathetic statement that upon the first blow the prisoner loses his 
human dignity. I must confess that I don’t know exactly what that is: human 
dignity. I don’t know if the person who is beaten by the police loses human 
dignity. Yet I am certain that with the very first blow that descends on him he 
loses something we will perhaps temporarily call “trust in the world”. Trust in 
the world includes all sorts of things: the irrational and logically unjustifiable 
belief in absolute causality perhaps, or the likewise blind belief in the validity of 
the inductive inference. But more important, as an element in the trust in the 
world, and in our context, what is solely relevant, is the certainty that by reason 
of written or unwritten social contract the other person will spare me – more 
precisely stated, that he will respect my physical, and with it also my 
metaphysical, being. The boundaries of my body are also the boundaries of my 
self. My skin surface shields me against the external world. If I am to have trust, 
I must feel on it only what I want to feel. … At the first blow, however, this 
trust in the world breaks down. The other person, opposite whom I exist 
physically in the world and with whom I can exist only as long as he does not 
touch my skin surface as border, forces his own corporeality on me with the 
first blow. He is on me and thereby destroys me.” (Améry 1980, pp. 27–28)  
What is derived from this depiction within the classical narratives of healing is a 
conception of trauma as a wound inflicted from the outside, and the related 
helplessness and dependence of the tortured subject. This is then often described as 
the objectification of the subject by the torturer – the reduction to flesh. As a 
consequence it is alleged that healing must re-subjectify and re-turn the lost dignity and 
the idea of re-storing the lost trust in the world occurs (Möller 2003, p. 606; Andrieu 
2015, pp. 100–101). But, something which seems to be neglected which is already 
indicated in Améry’s temporally definition of trust in the world, is that it is exactly 
the belief in the symbolic order, the social contract founding it and the basic 
understanding of causality etc. that is scattered – beyond repair.  
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“But with the first blow from a policeman’s fist, against which there can be no 
defense and which no helping hand will ward off, a part of our life ends and it 
can never again be revived.” (Améry 1980, p. 29) 
And here lies the difference between classical conceptions of trauma underlying 
the healing through participation narrative and trauma theoretical thought from 
cultural studies. What the conventional conceptions seem to ignore is, that Améry, 
and in fact many others, described that something is lost beyond repair. Suggesting that 
breaking the silence and telling one’s story helps to turn the once objectified victims 
into active citizen subjects with dignity and trust in the world, the narratives violently 
ignore the impossibilities implied in this statement. They disregard three major points 
made by Améry: Firstly, that the experience is located at the limit of the capacity of 
language to communicate,  
“It would be totally senseless to try and describe here the pain that was inflicted 
on me. […] The pain was what it was. Beyond that there is nothing to say. 
Qualities of feeling are as incomparable as they are indescribable. They mark 
the limit of the capacity of language to communicate.” (Ibid., p. 33)135
Secondly, that the shame of destruction cannot be erased and finally that the trust 
in the world will not be regained causing a feeling of foreignness.  
 
“If from the experience of torture any knowledge at all remains that goes 
beyond the plane nightmarish, it is that of great amazement and a foreignness 
in the world that cannot be compensated by any sort of subsequent human 
communication. […] Whoever was succumbed to torture can no longer feel at 
home in the world. The shame of destruction cannot be erased. Trust in the 
World, which already collapsed in part at the first blow, but in the end, under 
torture, fully, will not be regained.” (Ibid., p. 40) 
It is exactly these three points, the impossibility of symbolizing trauma – the limits 
of language; the deconstruction of the Cartesian self – the limits of the subject; and the 
embeddedness of the subject in the social order – the radical relationality with the other, 
which is at the heart of Derrida’s and Lacan’s thought and which is revealed in this 
conception of trauma. 
According to Lacan trauma is the missed encounter with the Real. Because there 
is no access to the Real in any case, the traumatic experience causes that the 
difference between Imaginary and Real is blurred. It can be conceptualized as an 
invasion of the Real causing a rupture in the Symbolic order which is a synonym for 
                                                 
135 Elaine Scarry famously analysed this unspeakability of pain: Scarry (1987). 
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the description of trauma as unspeakable, as something that cannot be expressed in 
language. Correspondingly, losing the trust in the world is a rupture in the symbolic 
order within which subjects are constituted. This rupture of the symbolic frames that 
constitute meaning, leaves the traumatized with an experience beyond 
communication, because what falls outside the commonly constituted framework 
cannot entirely be expressed within this framework.  
“The trauma is the confrontation with an event that, in its unexpectedness or 
horror, cannot be placed within the shemes of prior knowledge. […] For the 
survivor of trauma, then, the truth of the event may reside not only in its brutal 
facts, but also in the way that their occurrence defies simple comprehension. 
The flashback, or traumatic re-enactment conveys, that is, both the truth of an 
event, and the truth of its incomprehensibility.” (Caruth 1995b, p. 153) 
In such flashbacks, the linear time-frame, which is constitutive of our shared 
symbolic order, and which is a crucial component of the narrative of international 
criminal law, is radically called into question. Traumatic events are re-lived as a 
continuous present and accordingly resist becoming past events for the traumatized 
(Assmann et al. 2014, p. 13).“Trauma undoes the self by breaking the ongoing 
narrative, severing the connections among remembered past, lived present, and 
anticipated future.” (Brison 1999, p. 41)  
Trauma bars its signification, it evades its integration into the symbolic order. This 
is not to say that victims of traumatizing violence cannot articulate their experiences, 
it is to say that their always remains something that is not expressible in ‘our’ 
language, something that is radically calling into question ‘our’ symbolic order. 
Hence, 
“Trauma, is the betrayal of a promise or an expectation. Trauma can be seen as 
an encounter that betrays our faith in previously established personal and social 
worlds and call into question the resolutions of impossible questions that 
people have arrived at in order to continue with day-to-day life.” (Edkins 2006, 
p. 109) 
Accordingly, Brison, referring to Améry exlplains that feeling at home in the 
world is as much a physical as an epistemological accomplishment (Brison 1999, 
p. 44). Trauma constantly remind us of the impossibilities, the aporias and hence the 
lack in our centre. It reminds us of the fictious character of social reality that is 
constantly constructed and re-constructed through language and the striving for 
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closure. Trauma radically defers closure, because it is a present past that cannot “be 
put behind”, it cannot simply be overcome (Ibid., p. 49). 
By the same token, the Cartesian self is destroyed, as Améry puts it. Like 
described in the mirror stage by Lacan, Améry conceived of his outer boundaries – 
his skin – as the boundaries of the self, which is at the same time the metaphysical 
being. This fictious conception of the I is destroyed through extreme violence. 
Repeatedly, traumatized victims state that they are not the same as they were before 
the violent experience.136
“Traumatic memory blurs the Cartesian mind-body distinction that continues 
to inform our cultural narrative about the nature of the self.” (Ibid., p. 42) 
  
Trauma destroys the sense of the self as continuing over time. Thereby it also 
reveals, what Jenny Edkins calls radical relationality, namely, the always already 
embeddedness of the subject within the symbolic order, the imaginative character of 
the image in the mirror. This revelation of radical relationality is twofold. On the one 
hand it is, as described by Améry, the relationality that is betrayed by radically 
violating the skin as boundaries vis á vis the other and as confinement of what we 
conceive of as the Self. On the other hand, this betrayal shows that radical 
relationality is constitutive of our subject position which is normally forgotten to 
maintain the fiction of the identical autonomous subject (Edkins 2006, p. 108). 
“The radical relationality of bodies, and of bodies and other ‘things’, is revealed; 
traumatic events tear us from ourselves, bind us to others, transport us, undo 
us, implicate us in lives that are not our own, irreversibly, if not fatally. […] this 
vulnerability consists in and is comprised of our radical relationality.” (Ibid., 
p. 110) 
For the containment of the symbolic order the traumatic event137 and the 
representatives thereof, the victims of traumatic violence pose a danger, because they 
represent the revelation of the mutual fiction.138
                                                 
136 Primo Levi is one of the most famous among the survivors: Levi (1995). 
 In reaction to this, within the 
137 To conceptualize this radical experience and to explain it within its political and cultural meaning, 
different terms were developed: Anne Fuchs calls it impact event, referring to Badiou and Žižek, 
Jenny Edkins calls it trauma time.  
138 I deliberatly do not call the lack at the centre around which the fiction is built – traumatic lack, or 
traumatic kernel, since it would, and here I agree with Fassin and Rechtman Fassin and Rechtman 
(2009), in a way trivialize the trauma caused by extreme violence. I nevertheless refer to Cathy Caruths 
conception, which they call humanist Caruth (1995a) and Žižeks understanding that they call radical, 
because I do not agree with them that the universalization of the description of trauma in itself is a 
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symbolic order, narratives are formed to contain and manage and consequently fill 
the gap left by the traumatic experience.  
“Trauma is clearly disruptive of settled stories. Centralized, sovereign authority 
is particularly threatened by this. After the traumatic event, what we call the 
state, moves quickly to close down any openings produced by putting in place 
as fast as possible a linear narrative of origins.” (Ibid., p. 107) 
Now, this narrative is ambivalent. On the one hand, as Brison explains, it is 
essential to re-claim the self after trauma. A narrative memory has to be formed in 
order for the victim/survivor/traumatized to reconstruct a self within the symbolic 
order “in the sense of a remembered and ongoing narrative about oneself.” (Brison 
1999, p. 45) The healing through participation narrative is relying on this neccessity. 
However, and this already became apparent in the misappropriation of Jean Améry, 
this narrative has to be reflective of the inherent impossibilities of closure. Hence, 
and this is the crucial aspect, the narrative is at the same time impossible because, 
“our language lacks words to express this offense, the demolition of a man.” (Ibid., 
p. 50 citing Primo Levi) This does not mean that we do not have to speak about 
trauma because we have no adequate language. Quite the contrary, according to this 
understanding of trauma, we are forced to speak about it, because there will never be 
the right words. Like the deconstructive stance on justice, understanding trauma 
raises the stakes for healing. It is our responsibility to continuously listen because 
trauma will never have been dealt with for the survivors.  
Without being reflective of these (im)possibilities and without being radically 
open to the absolute unpredictable, the narrative of healing through participation and 
truth and justice through law are not only not reflective of the inherent violence as 
demonstrated by Derrida and Lacan, they, by the same token, violently impose 
symbolic images that force (im)possible closure on traumatized victims. As could be 
seen from the underlying assumptions of the right to truth and justice, as trauma 
narratives, they explain the rupture within the symbolic order and temporalize it by 
                                                                                                                                     
trivialization. Because, I think that, given the radical relatedness, one has to take into account the 
cultural – implying political and legal – dimension of trauma. Since, and here again I would concur 
with Žižek, the aspiration to overcome, to fill the “traumatic kernel” – the lack at the centre – is a 
totalizing tendency that can lead to extreme violence committed in the name of an ideology 
propagating the man as harmonious being without antagonistic tension. The traumatic violence 
experienced by those who suffered from this exact ideology and the related extreme acts of violence 
and destruction, reveal the lack – and the ideology connected to filling the lack. Žižek (2008). 
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allocating it into the past, that is overcome by the present. This present time is not 
violent, but the time for the re-institution of the rule of law and everything this 
entails. “The Victims” should tell and contribute their story, because it is said to be 
essential for them to heal. Within the symbolic order these narrative framing of 
individual and collective trauma serves to “overcome” and to “move on”. The 
symbolic frames constituting the subject and the society within the symbolic order 
are re-instituted by implying that the subject can be healed and that traumatic 
violence can be “dealt with”.  
But, just as the decisions taken in legal procedures, these narratives communicate 
their own inadequacy, they bear the traces of impossibility within them. The 
representatives of the traumatic violence radically call into question the very symbolic 
framework that is attempted to be re-instituted. Survivors and their traumatic 
experience then are at the same time those who have to be re-integrated and those 
who represent the impossibility of integration and with it the aporias of law. But, and 
this is a revenant: The clear cut difference of past and present is questioned by 
traumatic experiences – trauma is the insurmountable present of the past. It is an 
ongoing present of a non-experienced present in the past. An image that is often 
used to describe this present absence, or absent presence, is, not entirely 
coincidentally, the ghost haunting the living (Assmann et al. 2014, p. 13). And this, 
again, opens up a possibility for reflection of the inherent exclusionary violence 
entailed in the symbolic order. 
4. Whose truth? Whose justice?  
Post-colonial critique, sits uneasily within the theorization of international law, 
because, just like deconstruction, it challenged the foundations, questions its origins 
and reveals the inherent founding and perpetuated violence that is obscured by 
notions of universality, humanity, justice and the Eurocentric conception of the 
subject and trauma. And while up to today, all cases at the ICC are situations from 
the African continent, there is hardly any post-colonial analysis of this fact. Being 
aware of the post-colonial situatedness does not mean to acknowledge the violent 
colonial past, but to consider the continuity of epistemic violence within the 
narratives described in the first and second Chapters reproduced over and over again. 
113 
 
For the purpose of this work, post-colonial critique reveals the hierarchical 
structuring of representation within the global order which can also be traced in the 
representational practices of the victim as the other in international criminal justice. 
Post-colonial critique makes the power structures underlying textual representations 
of the others visible and addressable by unearthing the naturalization of hierarchies 
within the narratives of progress and universality. 
4.1. The hierarchy in representation 
In the narrative of international criminal law and its relation to victims of mass 
violence, the idea that perpetrators are held accountable is portrayed as the victory of 
law over politics, a milestone of civilization following a modernization rationale of 
progress. Especially those who argue that international criminal law is an expression 
of the Kantian thoughts of internationalized citizenship, argue for the general 
applicability of originally Western laws on the basis of what they assume as the 
universal essence of the human nature – human dignity.  
“They call human rights transhistorical and “natural”, yet they are drawing on a 
particular tradition (i.e. the Western liberal rights tradition of Euro-North 
America), and on a political history that originates in granting rights to few 
(male property owners) and denying them to many (women, nonpropertied 
classes, non-white people). The end result is that the promulgation of human 
rights amounts not to the promotion of universal rights, but to the 
universalization of the Western legal tradition.” (Kapoor 2008, p. 82) 
The West and its philosophical tradition of Enlightenment is represented as the 
site of progress ignoring the extreme (foundational) violence on which this alleged 
progress was based and excluding discussions on the still ongoing violence that is 
based on the post-colonial entanglements, mainly in the socio-economic field. 
Hereby it is neglected that modernity itself is a cultural system, and, as Koskenniemi 
analysed, referring to modernity, it was always European modernity that was 
referenced, as the idealized Europe, nationhood, capitalism, liberalism, the rule of law 
mark the horizon of imagination and “Europe is their geographical, political and 
conceptual centre.” (Koskenniemi 2011, p. 154) 
Hand in hand with this idealization, Europe could demarcate itself positively from 
the non-modern, non-liberal, un-civilized etc.  
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“Although there was never a clear-cut standard of civilization, the language of 
civilization remained to mark a difference that seemed palpable but that did not 
yield itself to a detailed articulation. It became a practical instrument for 
managing difference and satisfying oneself of the moral power of the law.” 
(Ibid., p. 156) 
Portraying the West and European ideas as rational, peaceful, liberal, logical can 
be seen in a continuity from colonial times, through decolonization struggles to post-
colonial times139
“…The relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of 
domination, of varying degrees of complex hegemony…what we must respect 
and try to grasp is the sheer knitted together strength of Orientalist discourse, 
its very close ties to the enabling socio-economic and political institutions, and 
its re-doubtable durability.” (Said 1978, pp. 5–6) 
 – the others are respectively portrayed to be irrational, violent, 
illiberal etc. The differential identity formation and the respective representations of 
the one and the others is hierarchically structured. 
The roots of the narratives that naturalizes differences and universalizes Western 
philosophical and legal concepts, goes back to colonialism and has become a cultural 
hegemony. Especially the interrelatedness with socio-economic and political 
institutions is broadly ignored portraying the institutions as unpolitical and neutral. 
For international criminal law generally and the ICC in particular, 
“Constructions of both the criminal and the victim are normalised by their 
genealogy in historical tropes of the African subject, which emphasise the 
distinction between civilisation and barbarity. The representation of the 
criminal utilised by the ICC builds on oppositional binaries of past and future, 
in which criminal Africa is seen as the status quo of the present and the past, 
while lawful Africa creates a stark contrast and elicits a hopeful vision of a 
radically different future. The self-image of international law as a natural 
progression towards the critique of the abuses of modern statehood is framed 
through the continued reification of the parallel dichotomies of criminal–
victim, insider–outsider and civilisation–barbarism.” (Sagan 2010, p. 10)  
Simultaneously, this portrayal together with the depiction of human rights as 
universal forms a narrative of urgency to intervene on behalf of the „African 
victim“s. Demarcating a clear distinction between good violence and bad violence – 
                                                 
139 The term postcolonial is controversial, some would claim that the post suggests that colonialism 
and its violence is over and done with, they emphasise that it is still about de-colonization in a cultural 
Understood broadly) meaning. I do not disagree, but I think it is clear that postcolonial theory is 
exactly about the post – effect of colonialization and the (im)possibilities of decolonization cultural-
wise. There is no pure decolonized subject that can be rescued, we are all entangled in the symbolic 
order and there is no returning to something untouched.  
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civilized and uncivilized violence and totally ignoring the own economic and political 
complicity in this violence, the narrative is inherently forgetful. 
“…the ‘distinction between “civilized” and “barbarian”’ represents an 
‘entrenched logic … within the Western political imaginary’. This distinction is 
descriptive of other dichotomies, including masculinity and femininity, as well 
as what Hutchings refers to as ‘“good” violence’ which is ‘associated with the 
controlled and civilized violence of the state and “bad” violence with the 
supposedly uncontrolled violence of the racialized tribal or barbarian “other”… 
The victim at the ICC is a signifier of the beneficiaries of the protection 
provided by cosmopolitan society and its covenants, such as the Rome Statute.” 
(Ibid., p. 16)  
The portrayal of the other, hence, tells us a lot about the idealized picture we want 
to draw of ourselves and the obscured, normalized violence inherent in this image. 
As we could see from Derrida and Benjamin, the inherent violence in law and legal 
decisions is normalized violence it is the justified violence and therefore does not 
even count as violence anymore, but it has to rely on the other violence which is 
aberrant, extreme to be conceived as normal and necessary. The aberrant violence 
committed by the others calls for urgent intervention by the West, re-instituting the 
international and national rule of law, justifying its own interventionist violence.  
At this point, post-colonial critique and -politics aim at re-turning the gaze at 
ourselves and to critically reflect the Eurocentric ideals and the epistemic violence 
within these representational practices.140
                                                 
140 Epistemic violence in its “clearest available example … is the remotely orchestrated, far-flung, and 
heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as Other. This project is also the assymetrical 
obliteration of the trace of that Other in its precarious Subject-ivity.” Spivak (1988, p. 76). 
 The “universal teleology of progressive 
humanitarianism” (Koskenniemi 2011, p. 156) appealed to in the narrative of fighting 
impunity and bringing truth and justice for victims, always ignored the, at the time of 
Nuremberg still ongoing colonial violence. And, when the colonies fought for 
independence, and the colonial violence, committed, for example in former French 
Algeria became apparent, there was no cry for urgent legal intervention to re-install 
the global rule of law. The crimes committed by the Nazis were said to be the first 
instance of racially-doctrinated mass violence ever. Interestingly, Hannah Arendt 
mentioned the possibility that courts in Ghana or Congo could take the Eichmann 
trial as a precedent and initiate trials against advocates of apartheid (whom they 
kidnapped in the U.S. but it is not quite clear if it is only the kidnapping, or the trials 
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as such that she was worried about) which she found to be highly worrisome because 
of the respective violation of sovereignty (Arendt 2013, p. 386). This demonstrates 
the double standard when it comes to the noble fight against impunity.141
In psychoanalytical terms, in order to uphold the fiction of the idealized global 
order, the intertwined structural violence has to be ignored – or justified – and with 
this, differentiations in the framing of suffering and victimhood are introduced. Or, 
using Butlers terminology, the epistemological framing of violence and suffering 
determines who counts as lose-able or injurable and who does not, and this framing 
is inherently racist and sexist and depends on a Western conception of modernity 
and subjectivity (Butler 2010).  
  
In the “differentiating order of otherness” (Bhabha 2004, p. 45), the construction 
of the rational, impartial, objective international criminal courts, relies on its others, who 
are portrayed to be irrational, partial, subjective. By referring to the theoretical 
underpinning of the universality of the modern understanding of legality and human 
dignity, this dichotomic representation is normalized. For the ICC this implies that 
the differential identity construction described in the first chapter is hierarchically 
structured. According to the modern ideal, rationality is valued over emotionality, 
impartiality over partiality, objectivity over subjectivity and the latter are always at the 
same time constituting and endangering the identity of the court.  
4.2. We right your wrongs? 
The narrative of truth and justice for victims is intimately tied to the paternalistic 
notion of Western intervention on behalf of „African victim“s. They are portrayed as 
incapable of finding the truth and justice because African states lack the necessary 
structural pre-condition – the (criminal) legal system capable of trying international 
crimes. Accordingly, the history of the development of human rights as individual 
subjective legal claims is described as a failure of nation states (Safferling 2004, 
p. 1475) and the function of the ICC is “to recover the universality of law, its equal 
application to all, by re-establishing individual rights” (Humphrey 2003, p. 498). This 
re-establishment of human rights “necessitates the sword of international criminal 
law enforcement.” (Bassiouni 2013, pp. 46–47) The language used is telling, the state 
                                                 
141 At the same time, Hannah Arendt denounced the racist violence in the colonies and drew a line 
between colonial violence and the Holocaust. Arendt (1968). 
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is compared to parents and the citizens to children to then draw the analogy to the 
intervention of the state when the basic rights of the child are violated. Accordingly, 
the “African parents” fail their children and the ICC has the moral duty to intervene 
on behalf of the “African children”.142
Above that, the concept of trauma and its treatment underlying transitional justice 
narratives of healing can be located in a variety of medical and psychological 
discourses dealing with European and American experiences (Craps 2014, p. 48). The 
underlying assumptions illustrating this bias are the clear distinction of past violence 
– present dealing and healing – making the subject “whole” again – and the future 
that is described as providing the necessary peace and security based on the re-
instituted symbolic order. The assumption that the patient is returned to a state of 
stability and security is just an illusion, given the living conditions of many of the 
victims who still have to struggle to make a living. In many cases the conflict has 
destroyed the basis on which people had survived, which was often already 
precarious before. Therefore, while the fiction of the peaceful and secure modern 
global order is re-installed and is said to ensure the safety of all human beings, the 
structural violence underlying this global order continues and is excluded from the 
realm of violence that counts. Its visibility would question the clear demarcation of 
past – presence – future and reveal the continuity of violence inherent to the re-
installed symbolic order. Also, in countries were civil war is ongoing for a long 
period of time, many people might never have had the experience of peace and 
security – hence, the re-storation is literally impossible. “Western standard of 
normality – are actually the exception rather than the rule” (Ibid., p. 53) As a 
consequence, these narratives are deemed to fail to depict the “reality” of many of 
the victims. The narrative of healing and re-storing trust aims at re-storing the 
symbolic order constitutive for our sovereign state system and thus is reproductive of 
a global order, based on the same Western conceptions and its inherent structural 
violence. This conception of trauma as curable implicitly enforces a certain 
conception of relevant violence causing relevant trauma and thereby normalizes the 
structural violence inherent in the global world order. Or in the words of Frantz 
Fanon:  
 
                                                 
142 Altman and Wellman (2004, p. 45): “If a parent is either horribly abusive or woefully negligent, 
third parties have a moral right, and perhaps even a duty, to interfere on the child’s behalf.” 
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“If psychiatry is the medical technique that aims to enable man no longer to be 
a stranger to his environment, I owe it to myself to affirm that the Arab, 
permanently an alien in his own country, lives in a state of absolute 
depersonalization…The social structure existing in Algeria was hostile to any 
attempt to put the individual back where he belonged.” (Fanon 2008, xxiii 
foreword by Homi Bhabha) 
More abstractly, the post-colonial subject position challenges the Western notion 
of closure and independence, because it reveals the dependence of the symbolic 
order, its production within the process of signification and the respective differential 
relation to its African other.  
“The social virtues of historical rationality, cultural cohesion, the autonomy of 
the individual consciousness assume an immediate, Utopian identity with the 
subjects on whom they confer a civil status. The civil state is the ultimate 
expression of the innate ethical and rational bent of the human mind....For 
Fanon such a myth of Man and Society is fundamentally undermined in the 
colonial situation…Finally, the question of identification is never the 
affirmation of a pre-given identity, never a sef-fulfilling prophecy – it is always 
the production of an image of identity and the transformation of the subject in 
assuming that image. The demand of identification – that is, to be for an Other 
– entails the representation of the subject in the differentiating order of 
otherness. Identification, as inferred from the preceding illustrations, is always 
the return of an image of identity that bears the mark of splitting in the Other 
place from which it comes.” (Bhabha 2004, p. 45) 
What follows from this? Contrary to the accusations of relativism and/or that this 
critique has a paralysing effect, post-colonial thinkers have developed multiple 
strategies addressing the entanglement in post-colonial violence. The epistemological 
frames determining grievable life, the “worlding” of what is today called the Third 
World (Spivak 1985, p. 247) are structured by language and therefore they are 
instable, temporal and slippery. The consolidation of a world order defined by 
modern states of a European origin aspires wholeness and closure and fails, 
encountering the inherent lack – the aporia. And once again the critical potential lies 
exactly within this aspiration for and subsequent failure in the striving for wholeness. 
In the post-colonial conceptualization – the potential is discussed under hybridity 
and hyper self-reflection of the impossibilities and the embeddedness. Again, 
criticism cannot claim a space outside, referring to Derrida, critique is itself a process 
of signification and therefore always already inside the narrative or discourse. 
Similarly, Lacan would hold that we cannot step outside the symbolic order 
structured by language, because we assume subject positions through language. 
Therefore, the inherent epistemic violence in the dominant narratives – the 
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exclusionary violence entailed in the symbolic order’s interrelationship with the Real. 
And the resulting aporias entail enabling violence and “their enablement must be 
used even as the violation is renegotiated.” (Spivak 2004, p. 524) 
This also applies for the conception of trauma underlying the healing through 
participation narrative. The image of the traumatized victim on whose behalf the 
Western court has to re-install the universalized symbolic order of human rights and 
the rule of law into which the victims have to be re-integrated to re-assume the 
autonomous subjects position necessary to re-claim said rights, is inherently unstable. 
It is ‘split’ in its ‘enunciations’ of closed identities and subject positions so that ‘in 
every practice of domination the language of the master becomes hybrid’ meaning 
haunted by ghosts (Kapoor 2008, p. 32 reffering to Homi Bhabha). And yet again, 
the focus must lie on these ruptures within the mutually constitutive images that are 
deemed to fail, leaving the justice gap:  
“Lacan has elaborated as the ‘process of gap’ within which the relation of 
subject to Other is produced. Although these images emerge within a certain 
fixity and finality in the present, as if they are the last word on the subject, they 
cannot identify or interpellate identity as presence. This is because they are 
created in the ambivalence of a double time of iteration that, in Derrida’s 
felicitous phrase, “baffles the process of appearing by dislocating any orderly 
time at the center of the present. The effect of such baffling … is to initiate a 
principle of undecidability in the signification of part and whole, past and 
present, self and Other, such as there can be no negation or transcendence of 
difference.” (Bhabha 2004, p. 54) 
5. (Im)possible ethics 
“The ethical act cannot look for guarantees within ethics itself: ethics by 
definition cannot define what is ethical, because what is ethical is what breaks 
and remakes the parameters of ethics. For the same reason, the ethical act is 
not only illegal, but beyond legality: it re-defines the parameters of what is legal 
and what is illegal. Rather than presupposing any notion of the Good. The 
‘subject’ therefore cannot be said to be obeying or disobeying the law as the act 
re-defines what the law is.” (Aristodemou 2014, p. 240) 
From the foregoing it became obvious, that the approaches discussed refuse to 
draw a horizon for justice – there is and never will have been a fixed definition, or 
defined requirements to reach a just world, because justice and ethics accordingly 
always exceed signification. Consequently, according to these readings, the 
legitimizing narratives of international criminal law that are called upon to justify the 
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interventions in the name of law and that try to fix justice to a given notion of the 
global order and the related concepts of truth, justice and the subject are deemed to 
fail.  
This failure is reflected in the justice gap haunting international criminal law. 
Neither of the legitimizing theories invocated in the international criminal justice 
debates can satisfactorily legitimize the positing violence of international criminal 
courts. The classical theories of punishment fail when applied to the international 
level.143
“In this way, we could read … the graph as designating the dimension ‘beyond 
interpellation’: the impossible ‘square of the circle’ of symbolic and/or 
imaginary identification never results in the absence of any remainder, there is 
always a leftover which opens the space for desire and makes the Other (the 
symbolic order) inconsistent, with fantasy as an attempt to overcome, to 
conceal this inconsistency, this gap in the Other.” (Žižek 2008, p. 139) 
 Read through the developed theoretical lens this justice gap – the failure to 
convincingly legitimize international criminal law – is inherent in all theoretical 
attempts that draw a horizon for justice through law and therefore reach for closure. 
Furthermore, these narratives communicate their own inadequacy of closure after 
mass violence and hence new narratives have to be produces to continuously fill the 
gap. One narrative, produced to fill the justice gaps left by the first courts is that 
international criminal law, beside and through trying individuals for war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide, can bring truth and justice to victims and 
thereby heal their and the societies’ traumatic wounds. But, just as the previous 
limitation to “purely retributive” purposes, law’s invocation of truth and justice is the 
legitimizing working assumption which will never have been fulfilled, because there 
is a lack at its centre – the Real. 
Accordingly, the narratives of truth and justice through law and its underlying 
assumptions of the subject are fictions aspired for, but never reached. International 
criminal law is always also a matter of faith, it is a fantasy masking the inconsistencies 
in the symbolic order and a compensation for failed identification. “Fantasy is a 
means for an ideology to take its own failure into account in advance.” (Ibid., p. 142) 
                                                 
143 Many of these theories are also highly controversial within domestic criminal law. See, Loick 
(2012).  
121 
 
But this faith is a Eurocentric re-affirmation of a global symbolic order that 
constantly re-produces its others and thereby re-produces a symbolic order burying 
its inherent exclusionary violence and the lack at its foundation. Post-colonial critique 
reveals that the representational practices of differential identity formation, necessary 
to uphold the fiction of closure, is hierarchically structured. The rational, impartial, 
objective Western court relies on the irrational, partial and subjective image of the 
victims on whose behalf it works to legitimize and constitute its existence.  
Victims with their memories of traumatic violence represent at the same time the 
constitutive emotional other of international criminal law and the potentially 
overwhelming Real. They stand for the impossibilities of closure and the radical 
relationality of subjectivities. The narrative of healing through participation and truth 
and justice for victims then suggests the possibility of the re-integration of these 
victims into the symbolic order built on the fiction of closure and autonomy. This 
again can only be a fictive closure which is not confronting the impossibility of 
symbolizing trauma – the limits of language– the limits of the subject; and – radical 
relationality.  
The critical potential of these theoretical thoughts is that it reveals the aporias, the 
lack, the impossibilities of symbolization and the related exclusionary epistemological 
violence. But they go beyond mere critique. All of the approaches indicate that the 
critique is the starting point to go beyond fixed understandings of justice, truth and 
the subject. They locate these beyonds exactly within the impossibilities of justice and 
identity.  
Be it Derrida, who appeals to the justice to come, im Kommen, or à venir. 
“Paradoxically, it is because of this overflowing of the performative, because of 
this always excessive haste of interpretation getting ahead of itself, because of 
this structural urgency and precipitation of justice that the latter has no horizon 
of expectation (regulative or messianic). But for this very reason, it may have an 
avenir, a “to come” which I rigorously distinguish from the future, that can 
always reproduce the present. Justice remains, is yet, to come, á venir, it has an, 
it is à-venir, the very dimension of events irreducibly to come. It will always 
have it, this à-venir, and always has.” (Derrida 1990, p. 967) 
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The future loses its openness, the coming of the other (who comes), without 
which there is no justice; and the future can always reproduce the present, announce 
itself or present itself as a future present in the modified form of the present. 
Or, the psycho-analytical approach to the recognition of the lack at the centre 
which is the 
“freedom from symbolic links, where the empty place is acknowledged and 
confronted in all its abyssal emptiness rather than being filled with idolatrous 
gods from laws to goods. It is the hallmark of an ethical subject who, difficult 
as that is, has finally come to terms with her own lack as well as that of the big 
and small others around her. The Other, in other words, is finally 
acknowledged to be just like the subject herself: divided, lacking, impotent.” 
(Aristodemou 2014, p. 386) 
Taking this as a starting point, trauma theoretical approaches see the 
acknowledgement of radical relatedness revealed through trauma as a possibility of 
resistance to the fixed conceptions of the modern rule of law and the related subject 
position – and therefore to the ideology of our symbolic order: “Memories of trauma 
are, potentially, a mode of resistance to a language that forgets the essential 
vulnerability of flesh in its reification of state, nation and ideology.” (Edkins 2006, 
p. 100) 
When trauma reveals the radical relatedness that being embedded in the symbolic 
order implies and the fragile and fictional character of this order, it involves “the 
recognition of realities that most of us have not begun to face.” (Caruth 1995a, vii) It 
is the encounter with the other, with the unrepresented, with the excluded, with the 
impossibility of the self without the other that is recognized to be a precondition of 
resistance and the political:  
“[h]ybridity initiates the project of political thinking by continually facing it with 
the strategic and the contingent, with the countervailing thought of its own 
‘unthought’. It has to negotiate its goals through an acknowledgement of 
differential objects and discursive levels articulated not simply as contents but 
in their address as forms of textual or narrative subjections – be they 
governmental, judicial or artistic.” (Bhabha 2004, pp. 64–65) 
Consequently, a critical analysis of the practice of victim participation needs to 
refrain to strive for closure and instead look for the openings and gaps within the 
representational practices implied in the textual and narrative framework of victim 
participation. 
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Part II 
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Chapter 4: Methodology  
1. Bridging the gap between the theoretical and the empirical  
This chapter draws the connection between the theoretical conceptions and the 
empirical research on the organization of victim participation and representation at 
the ICC. I will lay out the premises guiding my approach and discuss the 
consequences of the theoretical thoughts for the methodological concept chosen to 
analyse the practice of victim participation. In a first step I will elaborate on the 
ethics developed from the theoretical beyonds of justice discussed in the previous 
chapter. As already indicated, contrary to the criticism of relativism, the assumption 
of non-foundation of truth, justice and healing does not lead to giving up the very 
ideas of truth and justice. Instead, the conceptions of truth and justice raise the stake 
for justice, since they take into consideration the always already inherent exclusions. 
Therefore, I will rely on the ethics of representation, the ethics of listening and the 
idea of measuring and enduring silences in order to develop the questions leading my 
empirical work and the resulting approach to the organization of victim participation.  
Accordingly, drawing on the ethics of representation, the representational 
practices have to be reconstructed to trace the in-and exclusions within the practice 
of participation. The question is who speaks for/about/on behalf of whom? 
Drawing on the ethics of listening, the structuring of speaking and hearing has to be 
revealed. And drawing on the idea to measure and endure silence, the subject 
position of the victim has to be reconstructed in order to find the space within the 
organization of participation and representation from which the participating victims 
can be heard. Against the backdrop of the assumption of differential identity 
formation, when reconstructing the representational practices, I ask: How is the 
image of the victim and the court mutually reproduced within the practice of 
representation – the organization of participation and representation? And, taking 
into account the beyonds of truth and justice, the gaps and irritations within the 
representations have to be analysed to trace their resisting potential to closure within 
the practice of participation.  
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As developed in the first Chapter, the binary image of the victims and the 
international courts cause irritations when victim participation is practiced at the 
courts. Therefore, to reconstruct the practices of participation and representation 
and to go beyond the legitimizing images, I had to approach the behind the scenes 
day to day work at the ICC. Hence, I will discuss organizational ethnography as a set 
of methods, participant observation, interviews and document analysis, that enabled 
me to operationalize my approach. Since ethnography demands heightened self-
reflexivity from the researcher, I will reflect on my positionality within the 
organization and the ethic implications of representing the practice of victim 
participation and representation within my own research. The purpose of this 
chapter is to render my approach transparent and to reveal the pre-conditions for the 
knowledge produced in this dissertation.  
2. Ethics of representation 
“Our encounters with, and representations of, our ‘subjects’ are therefore 
coded or framed in terms of an us/them dichotomy in which ‘we’ aid/develop 
civilize/empower ‘them’. Changing this relationship is not a question of mere 
good intentions or semantics…So caught up are we in this coding that it 
becomes important in our encounters with the Third World to ask who 
represents, and what baggage positions us in this us/them manner.” (Kapoor 
2008, p. 92) 
In order to scrutinize the representational practices vis à vis participating victims 
at the ICC, the implication of ‘our’ representations have to be reflected. The 
‘baggage’ analysed and the relationality revealed to trace the exclusionary inherent 
violence. This was already addressed in the previous chapter. Here, I want to reify 
this theoretical position drawing on Spivak’s ethics of representation to carve out the 
questions that guided my empirical approach.  
For Spivak, the epistemic violence of imperialism has meant the transformation of 
the Third World into a sign, the production of which has been obfuscated to the 
point that Western superiority and dominance are naturalized. In the above quote, 
this is referred to as the us/them dichotomy, in which we aid/develop - bring truth 
and justice to them. One means of this naturalization, according to Spivak, is the 
conflation of representation as speaking for (Vertretung) and re-presentation as 
speaking about (Darstellung). Whereas speaking for implies a mandate, speaking 
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about draws an image of the represented. Both meanings are implied in 
representation, but once they are conflated and not rendered transparent, the own 
complicity in silencing those for/about whom one claims to speak is obscured. As a 
consequence, the image drawn represents an allegedly coherent subject, which for-
closes all other subject-positions. The image determines the subject position from 
which one is heard within the episteme and this image is always already a 
representation in the sense of Darstellung.  
The critique takes into account the embeddedness of listener and speaker within 
post-colonial symbolic order that has yet to be decolonized. Referring to Derrida, 
Spivak emphasises that there is no critique from outside which implies that not 
speaking for the subaltern is never an option, because the subaltern in any way 
cannot be heard within the post-colonial patriarchal episteme framing what can be 
heard and said (Spivak 1988). In a critique of Foucault and Deleuze she shows that in 
claiming not to speak for the subaltern, they render themselves transparent within 
the episteme and thereby neglect their positionality in the re-production of the Third 
World as Other and, in turn, Europe as the Subject (Ibid.). From thereon, Spivak 
develops what Kapoor calls the post-colonial ethics of representation. Similar to 
trauma theoretical approaches, speaking and listening, according to this approach, 
form a mutually constituting union – “speaking and hearing complete the speech 
act.” (Kapoor 2008, p. 112) The self-reflexive listener and representative has to 
differentiate between representation in the sense of Vertretung – speaking for, being 
mindful of the mandate and authorization – or lack thereof, and representation as 
Darstellung – speaking about. And, by the same token, learning to represent implies 
learning to re-present (darstellen) ourselves within the representational relationship. 
“To confront them is not to represent (vertreten) them but to learn to represent 
(darstellen) ourselves.” (Spivak 1988, pp. 288–289) Derived from these theoretical 
thoughts, it is always also returning the gaze on ourselves. Returning the gaze on the 
European Subject that seeks to produce the Other and others that would consolidate 
its subject status. “The itinerary toward representing the Other ‘over there’, requires 
scrutiny of the ‘here’. Or it necessitates reversing the gaze…” (Kapoor 2008, p. 115)  
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2.1. Who speaks for / on behalf of whom 
For the analysis of victim participation and representation at the ICC this means 
that the representational relations have to be reconstructed to ask: Who is speaking 
for whom - who is speaking about whom, when are the modes of representation 
conflated and what does this imply within the practice of participation. Which image 
of the victim is represented and what does this imply for the image of the Self - the 
court - or the representatives? Furthermore, the spaces for a reflection of the modes 
of representation have to be detected.  
According to this understanding of representation, the practical organization of 
representation has to be traced. How is representation organized - from the selection 
of a representative to the communication with the clients to the drafting of 
submissions and the presentation of views and concerns on behalf of these clients. 
This is the practical organization of representation. Furthermore, drawing on the 
described understanding of representation, the speaking about dimension has to be 
taken into account. This means that the image of the victim drawn within the 
implementation of victim participation - the representation of the victim - has to be 
carved out. How are the victims described in the legal texts, the informal texts, by 
their representatives etc. Thereby the twofold meaning and the silencing effect of 
representation can be analysed and described.  
3. Measuring silence 
“The archival, historiographic, disciplinary-critical and, inevitably, 
interventionist work involved here is indeed a task of ‘measuring silences’. This 
can be a description of ‘investigating, identifying, and measuring…the 
‘deviation’ from an idea that is irreducibly differential” (Spivak 1988, pp. 286–
287) 
According to Spivak, “the task of measuring silences, whether acknowledged or 
unacknowledged” becomes relevant when critically engaging with victim 
representation (Ibid., p. 286). In this vein, silence and silencing are intimately linked 
and therefore listening to silence always also implies “returning the gaze” to the 
silencing practices inherent in differential identity constitution. Since what is being 
heard within the representational practices is determined by the us/them dichotomy 
described in the previous section. As described in the first chapter, we are rational - 
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they are emotional etc. (Kapoor 2008, p. 163) With regard to the “ideological refusal” 
to represent otherwise, the omissions of dealing with colonial violence in the 
historiography of international criminal justice, described in Chapter 3, spoke 
volumes. The selection of cases chosen as representative within the success story of 
international criminal justice in the legitimizing narratives has to be exclusive in order 
to draw and maintain the image of international courts as rational, objective, 
unpolitical. Thus, the representation of these courts as the suppliers of truth and 
justice and contributors to the progression of humanity is uphold. The images drawn 
rely on these silences, that which is omitted, which have to be measured in order to 
disturb these images and to reveal the inherent exclusionary violence. 
3.1. What is heard? The subject positions 
Re-turning the gaze implies that special attention must be put to the mutually re-
producing images of the victim from the global South and the European idea of 
justice incorporated in the operation of the ICC. Which narratives are stabilized by 
othering the emotional victim, and how does the inherent exclusionary violence 
manifest in the practice of victim participation and representation. Where does the 
silencing take place within the practice of victim participation and representation. 
Which subject position of the victim is constituted within this practice. Which position 
do the participating victims have to assume to be heard within the episteme of the 
organization? What is silenced through the representation of this subject position?  
4. Ethics of listening 
„The difficulty of listening and responding to traumatic stories in a way that 
does not lose their impact, that does not reduce them to clichés or turn them all 
into versions of the same story, is a problem that remains central!” (Caruth 
1995a, vii) 
This quote refers to the challenge of listening to traumatic memory withstanding 
the urge to fill the gaps in the symbolic order by reproducing clichés and reducing its 
complexity, depriving the stories of their unique character. Both, listening and 
representing within a post-colonial setting and listening and representing traumatic 
memory requires heightened self-reflexivity and the ability to listen. Taking the idea 
of radical relationality revealed through traumatic experiences seriously implies that 
listening is always also enduring silence - enduring not to answer - not to know. 
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Silence vis á vis traumatic violence and the silence of the subaltern within the 
Western episteme of listening is a central aspect when reflecting on the 
(im)possibilities of listening to and translating victims’ stories, a central aspect in 
representation. While representation is always also silencing, silence might have a 
deferring potential in the reach for closure.  
Silence, accordingly, is one signifier for the gap, and enduring the silence is 
therefore an (im)possible, yet urgent endeavour in taking the gaps seriously and listen 
to traumatic memory. While the listener of traumatic memory must “listen to and 
hear the silence, speaking mutely both in silence and in speech, both from behind 
and from within the speech. He or she must recognize, acknowledge and address that 
silence, even if it simply means respect – and knowing how to wait” (Felman and 
Laub 1991, p. 58). Similarly, the ‘non-speakingness’ of the subaltern, the “refusal to 
answer or submit to the gaze and questioning” of the international lawyer has to be 
recognized as forms of resistance and agency (Kapoor 2008, p. 120). Accepting and 
enduring silence thus seems to be characteristic of both theoretical approaches. 
This implies the necessity of enduring silence instead of silencing through 
representation, it means that one sometimes has to refrain from knowing and 
speaking in order to learn to listen. By being sensitive to silences, traces of one’s own 
silencing ideology can be revealed and reflected in the process of representation. 
Taking silence seriously implies that listening embraces the refusal to foreclose 
stories through legal or historical ‘facts’. Sometimes, what cannot be said within the 
legal episteme of listening, is nevertheless extremely loud. One powerful example of 
this is the fainting of K-Zetnik in the Eichmann trial discussed in the first chapter. 
He exemplifies the limits of the legal episteme in grasping trauma exactly through his 
failure to communicate, and in so doing he disrupts the smooth progression to 
closure through legal means (Felman 2002, p. 145). His collapse can be seen as a 
trace of the (im)possible search for truth, as a “closure and totalization of the 
evidence and of its meaning” about traumatic violence (Ibid., p. 151). The silencing 
effect of the foreclosure through legal knowledge and the resisting potential and 
respective alternative knowledge can only be detected by listening to that which is 
not said. Laub elaborates on a certain knowledge within silence which he contrasts to 
historical knowledge through facts, drawing on a case of a women testifying about 
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the upheaval in Auschwitz-Birkenau. According to him, listening to the silence 
involves respecting the constraints and boundaries of the own knowledge in order to 
listen to, “what the woman did know in a way that none of us did – what she come 
to testify about” (Felman and Laub 1991, p. 61). Only through listening to her silence 
and accepting one’s own limitations, her knowledge could be heard.  
“She was testifying not simply to empirical historical facts, but to the very 
secret of survival and of resistance to extermination. The historians could not 
hear, I thought, the way in which her silence itself was part of her testimony an 
essential part of historical truth she was precisely bearing witness to.” (Ibid., 
p. 62) 
The capability of listening embraces the openness to unlearn, had the historians 
“unlearned history” they would have heard the dimension of the testimony 
represented in the silent part.  
Learning to speak to and learn from within a post-colonial setting is likewise 
described as necessarily entailing the un-learning of own privileges and certainties. 
Learning to learn to listen,  
“is refraining from always thinking that the Third World is ‘in trouble’ and that 
I have solutions; it is resisting the temptation of projecting myself or my world 
onto the Other. Spivak cautions for instance, against assuming that such 
concepts as ‘nation’, ‘democracy’, or ‘participation’ are neutral, good, or 
uncontestable. To impose them unproblematically in the field is to forget that 
they were ‘written elsewhere, in the social formations of Western Europe’ 
Unlearning means stopping oneself from always wanting to correct, teach, 
theorize, develop, colonize, appropriate, use, record, inscribe, enlighten: ‘the 
impetus to always be the speaker and speak in all situations must be seen for 
what it is: a desire for mastery and domination” (Kapoor 2008, pp. 116–117) 
Combining this with the trauma theoretical conceptualization of listening, 
listening requires refraining from imposing the very same symbolic order that was 
scattered by the traumatic experience, one has to refrain from trying to close the gap 
left by trauma and instead acknowledge the own embeddedness within this symbolic 
order and accept the lack at its centre.  
Accepting the lack at the centre – or the impossibilities of closure would render 
the listener more humble, because notions of ‘nation’, ‘democracy’ and ‘participation’ 
are revealed to be incomplete, always lacking and the inherent violence maintaining 
the order is exposed.  
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In fact, “listening to survivors’ stories, is, […] “an experience in un-learning; both 
parties are forced into a Dantean gesture of abandoning all safe props as they enter, 
and without benefit of vigil, make their uneasy way through its vague domain.“ 
(Brison 1999, p. 49 citing Lawrence Langer) 
Accordingly, the listener to traumatic memory from the global South has to be 
open to be fundamentally confused, bewildered, injured when listening to the 
traumatic memory. And instead of claiming to cure the victim and thereby close the 
gap, a space is needed for these feelings, without always already knowing how to 
answer. 
“The relation of the victim to the event of the trauma, therefore, impacts on 
the relation of the listener to it, and the latter comes to feel the bewilderment, 
injury, confusion, dread and conflicts that the trauma victim feels.” (Felman 
and Laub 1991, pp. 57–58)  
Putting this trauma narrative into a linear and manageable form neglects this 
bewilderment and confusion, which will always haunt the narrative. As an ethic 
claim, the bewilderment and confusion confronting international criminal 
proceedings with their own (im)possibilities should be taken seriously and not 
excluded by referring it to the emotional others. One has to be aware that “the 
surface is never an adequate explanation, but is rather to be interpreted in terms of 
gaps, symptoms, slips, repetitions and other indications of repression or unconscious 
cause.” (Goodrich 1995, pp. 184–185) For my analysis of the practice of victim 
participation and representation this implies that the encounter of the ICC - 
represented by legal representatives, staff, judges, prosecutors, defence attorneys etc. 
with the traumatic memory of the participating victims always causes silence, 
bewilderment and confusion - emotions. The (un)bearable silences when listening to 
traumatic memory have to be felt and described.  
4.1. Structuring of speaking and hearing  
I have to trace the silences caused by the traumatic memory within the practices 
of participation and representation. This means that within the reconstruction of the 
relations of speaking and hearing I have to be mindful of the silences and the 
possibilities of listening within the practice. In order to detect the silences, one has to 
distinguish between silences and silencing as described above. Within the criminal 
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legal episteme, emotions are silenced, therefore I have to ask where the excluded 
emotionality is negotiated within the practice? Where is bewilderment, confusion, 
injury and dread silenced?  
In contrast to this, the silences described as bearing a resisting potential within 
post-colonial symbolic order are those moments, where the subjects resist to “answer 
or submit to the gaze” - the legal requirements - asked of them to uphold the binary 
images (Kapoor 2008, p. 217).  Within the practice of participation and 
representation this implies to be sensitive to the silences of those who are supposed 
to assume a certain subject position within the organization. Where they refuse to 
speak what is being heard. This silence can be a literal silence, but it can also be that 
which is not heard and irritates the subject-positions foreseen within the practice.  
4.2. Ghosts 
“To urge a troubling of the closures and sometimes pities of identity politics, 
standpoint theories and experienced based knowledge and the backlash against 
identity politics is not to try to close this openness but to keep us moving in 
order to produce and learn from ruptures, failures, breaks, refusals.” (Lather 
2008, p. 223) 
Underlying the ethical implication of the above described conceptions is the idea, 
that closure is not only not possible, but that it is from the gaps, within the lack and 
through the excess that fixed identities and images can be irritated and thereby they 
keep on moving. The ghosts within the texts of law defer meaning and inscribe 
contingency. Like the silences described within the section of enduring silences – the 
refusals to submit to the legal gaze – it is within the legal texts that the surplus and 
lack surfaces. The always failing legal representations leave traces within the texts. 
The constructions of truth and justice as achievable and the subject as autonomous 
and rational relies on the exclusion of that which is not true, not just and not 
autonomous and rational. Legal decisions – fresh judgements - then bear the marks 
of their suppressed others.  
I have to be attentive to the slips, gaps, ruptures of the legitimizing narratives of 
victim participation at the ICC. Where do the ghosts of the narratives of truth and 
justice and healing through participation shine through within the neat legal 
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framework seeking for closure? Where can an excess, or lack of symbolization be 
detected and how is it filled again? 
Consequently, a critical analysis of the practice of victim participation has to strive 
for the openness within and look for the gaps within the representational practices 
implied in the legal, textual and narrative framework of victim participation at the 
ICC. And at the same time, in describing the gaps – producing a narrative from the 
gaps – new ghosts will haunt the research which produces its own gaps.  
5. Reconstructing the representational framework through 
organizational ethnography 
The questions directing my empirical analysis, derived from the ethical 
implications of my theoretical approach, were: 
- How is the relationship of speaking and hearing framed within the practice of 
victim participation and representation? Who speaks for/on behalf of/about 
whom? 
- How is the image of the victim represented? What is the subject position from 
which the participating people can be heard at the ICC? 
- How does the image of the victim drawn within the practice relate to the image 
of the ICC’s self-description? Where are the emotions associated with victims 
located within the practice of representation? Where is a space for listening? 
- Which silences are produced? Where are the gaps within the legal, textual and 
narrative framework of victim participation at the ICC. How does the lack at 
the centre of the representation of the victim subject manifest within the 
practice?  
In order to approach these questions, I chose organizational ethnography. 
Through organizational ethnography, the relationships between different 
subjectivities within a specific organizational process can be analysed and the 
particular form of organizational interaction in specific contexts can be taken into 
account. Looking beyond the “official texts” of an organization, the hierarchical 
relations can be analysed and contestations of the hierarchy within the organization 
addressed. The analysis of the legal framework of participation and representation as 
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it is foreseen within the Rome Statute (RS) and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
(RPEs) and developed in the jurisprudence can be thickened by describing the 
interrelated practical implications within the court. The “behind the scenes” 
organization and implementation of the legal framework and its implications for the 
framing of the relationship of the participating victims to the court can be analysed. 
Through organizational ethnography the “official framework” of speaking and 
hearing can be scrutinized from within. One can 
“describe various aspects of organizational life: organizational actors’ 
sensemaking practices across different situations, engaging with what people do 
and what they say they do; routine patterns as well as dynamic processes of 
organizing frontstage appearances and backstage activities;” (Ybema et al. 2009, 
p. 6) 
As forecasted in the first chapter the legal and non-legal struggles at the courts, 
implying the ICC often lead to the further representation, collectivisation and 
externalization of victims, while upholding the legitimizing narratives of truth and 
justice for victims. Describing these internal struggles is crucial to understand the 
problematic of the discrepancy between legitimizing narratives and the organizational 
practice. Against the backdrop of my theoretical assumptions, understanding the 
implications of speaking and the possibility of being heard - the representational 
framework of truth and justice - is essential to understand the contradiction between 
the noble goals and the disenchanting practice. Through organizational ethnography, 
the concrete organizational framework of representation, of speaking and hearing to 
traumatic memory can be reconstructed in order to then analyse spaces of irritation - 
spaces where the legal striving for closure is disturbed.  
“Such ethnographies describe tensions and discrepancies between official 
pronouncements and unofficial practices, formal design and informal wheeling 
and dealing, front regions and back regions, what people do and what people 
say about what they do, the managed and the ‘unmanaged’ organization…” 
(Ibid., p. 8) 
These irritations are not only, and probably not mainly, represented within the 
official legal texts produced, but can be sensed and experienced when working within 
the organization together with the concerned representatives and the participating 
victims. Above that, while relationships of representation are officially framed 
through the legal decisions, the personal encounters cannot be represented in the 
legal texts, because legal texts attempt to eliminate the personal in order to appear 
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objective. The effects of encounters with the representatives of traumatic memory 
therefore have to be experienced to be described. When, as developed in the first 
chapters, the victim is represented as the emotional other threatening to overburden 
the proceedings in the narratives about international courts, emotions, feeling and 
sensing play a crucial role to grasp the tensions. This dimension of representation can 
only be researched through experience and talking to the involved professionals. 
Therefore, the triangulation of methods characteristic for organizational 
ethnography, participant observation, interviewing and document analysis, and the 
thick description (Humphrey and Watson 2009, p. 41) approach to understand an 
organization seemed especially fitting for my project.  
“As is commonly done, we characterize ethnographic methods in 
organizational settings as the combined field research ‘tools’ of observing (with 
whatever degree of participation), conversing (including formal interviewing), 
and the close reading of documentary sources. These methods rest upon action 
(‘talking, laughing, working, doing’) and proactive perception (‘observing, 
listening, reading, smelling’).” (Ybema et al. 2009, p. 6) 
5.1. Participant observation 
Within the range of methods used by organizational ethnographers, probably 
participant observation is regarded as the central mode of creating knowledge about 
an organization. As a matter of fact, this is the method that is distinctive about 
ethnography. But also in sociology, participant observation, with the focus on 
participation rather than observation, as enacted ethnography is propagated as a 
more holistic approach to gain knowledge (Waquant 2014). The appropriation of 
empathy by using the whole researcher as a skilled and sensitive research tool is said 
to better reflect the invisible dimensions of action, structure and knowledge and its 
interrelatedness and mutual constitution (Ibid., p. 97). This approach also somewhat 
blurs the theory-practice gap and the legitimizing rationality/emotionality dichotomy: 
“Researcher’s lived bodies come not only with minds (which are often privileged 
above all else in academia (and in law A/N) but with spirits, emotions, and whole 
lives.” (Taber 2012, p. 77)  
And, “[B]y reclaiming “contamination” as an organic process of knowledge 
production grounded in (not abstracted from) human experiences, 
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auto/ethnographers resist those who seek to clean up, or confine the mess rather 
than revealing it.” (Ibid.) 
For my participant observation, I worked three months at a human rights NGO 
at Kenya and three months at the OPCV at the ICC in the Netherlands. At Nairobi, 
I worked with Kituo Cha Sheria. According to its self-desciption: 
“Kituo Cha Sheria (Kituo) is a human rights non-governmental organization 
committed to helping the disadvantaged, poor and marginalized prople in 
Kenya access justice. Kituo is largely supported by development partners but 
the organization also received support across the country from volunteer 
advocates, in terms of their professional services and paralegals operating from 
established community and prison justice centers.”144
I got to know Kito Cha Sheria because I worked at a stakeholders workshop, 
„The Dynamics of Kenya’s Election Process“, in Berlin, with Kenyan and German 
guests in cooperation with FriEnt, Institute for Development and Peace (INEF), 
discussing the risk of violence occurring in Kenya following the elections of 2013. 
On this workshop I met several representatives from local NGOs and INGOs, 
among others the project coordinator of the GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit) in Kenya. She organized the contact to Kituo’s 
Peace, Justice and Reconciliation Programme. Given my experiences in international 
criminal law and the master in peace and conflict studies, they decided to have me as 
an intern. I worked in a team comprising a German development worker, my boss (a 
sociologist), and a colleague (lawyer). The main work of Kituo is pro bono legal aid. 
The Peace, Justice and Reconciliation Programme was created to work with victims 
of post-election violence, most of which were internally displaced persons. The 
programme was relatively independent from the rest of the organization. 
Nevertheless, we were located at the main offices in Nairobi, together with the other 
colleagues. Most of the other co-workers were lawyers. Given that the programme 
dealt with all transitional justice mechanisms established in Kenya over a long period, 
my colleagues could put the work of the ICC into perspective within the country. 
Kituo worked closely with the VPRS of the ICC and a former staff member of the 
Peace, Justice and Reconciliation Programme worked as an assistant for one of the 
legal representatives representing victims at the ICC. For my research, it was 
 
                                                 
144 https://kituochasheria.or.ke/, last accessed 21.01.2018. 
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important to work for a local NGO that represents the context of the ICC within the 
situation countries. They submitted amicus curiae in the proceedings and have an 
overview and an insight over the societal struggles around the ICC that are more 
independent than the insight view an ICC organ would have. What is more 
important, they also worked with victim communities that did not fall within the 
scope of the cases which meant that I met people who were “left out” of the process 
and people who were included. An aspect that became clear, while I was in Nairobi 
was, that because I was not directly affiliated with organs of the ICC, I was far more 
flexible. Since the security provisions did not apply to me, I did not have to ask for 
clearance to go to certain areas. Especially for my interviews with spokespersons of 
victim communities this was very helpful. To exemplify this, in a meeting with a 
representative of the VPRS my colleague asked her: “How is it on the other side?”145
“Within the Court, the Office of Public Counsel for the Victims (OPCV) 
provides legal representation to victims throughout proceedings, as well as 
assistance and support to external lawyers appointed by victims. The OPCV is 
an independent office and falls within the Registry solely for administrative 
purposes. This independence is a prerequisite for carrying out the mandate of 
assisting and representing legal representatives of victims and victims. Such 
independence allows the Office to work without being subjected to pressure of 
any kind and preserves the privileged relationship between victims and their 
lawyers. The Office has also an important role in enhancing the rights of 
victims in the proceedings, advocating at different levels and participating in 
specialised meetings with subsidiary bodies of the Assembly of States Parties 
and NGOs.”
 
referring to the fence surrounding their offices. Despite the fact that Kituo is not an 
organ of the ICC, I considered them to be part of the organization of victim 
participation at the ICC. Local NGOs and INGOs play a central role as an in between 
of the court and the affected communities and are relied upon by the ICC organs to 
establish contact with the communities. After my stay in Kenya, I interned at the 
OPCV. According to its self-description:  
146
I opted for an internship at the OPCV instead of the visiting professionals 
programme, because, from my experiences at the ICTY, I knew that interns are 
involved in day to day work practice. Therefore, I officially applied for the internship 
programme and was accepted. Interning at the OPCV at The Hague provided me 
with an insight into the internal cooperation of the organs of the court and the work 
 
                                                 
145 Field notes, 9/1/2014. 
146 https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/victims, last accessed 23.01.2018. 
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atmosphere at the court whereas at the same time working for an officially 
independent office. Furthermore, the OPCV is responsible to provide assistance to 
external legal representatives while at the same time, they represent participating 
victims. Therefore, I had an insight into both modes of representation.  
During both stays, in Nairobi and The Hague, I did observant participation rather 
than participant observation since the focus was not so much my observation, but 
my participation. My first day at Kituo was a strategy meeting, planning the activities 
for the upcoming months. Therefore, my work was integrated into the programme. I 
drafted legal opinions on the IDP Act recently issued and on the application of the 
right to truth and justice to the parliaments decisions to censor certain parts of the 
report of the truth commission. A short version of which was published in a local 
newspaper. Above that, I got access to policy papers planning an International 
Crimes Division at the High Court of Kenya and I attended meetings with other 
NGOs and INGOs working in the field. For my research, a meeting with a 
representative from the VPRS and the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission, were especially insightful. Above that, I visited justice centres, the 
office in Mombasa and talked to so called spokespersons of victim communities in 
order to update them on Kituo’s work and plans.  
At The Hague I was more engaged in legal research than in the actual legal 
representation. The insights concerning the representation were mostly received 
through conversations with my colleagues on the floors and during lunch-time. Also, 
everybody was very open to the fact that I was doing research on their work and they 
were very willing to contribute. I got insight into the ReVision project aimed at 
reforming the registry at the ICC and the general reservations among the staff. 
Participated in team-meetings and at the end of my stay I was asked to help with a 
statistical evaluation of the application form answers, for a planned publication of the 
OPCV.  
The “access to the field” was facilitated by my background in International 
Criminal Law and my previous experiences at the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). I was considered one of the international criminal 
law crowd living and working at The Hague, since interning often is the starting 
point for a job at one of the courts.  
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Through practically participating by working in the field of victim participation 
with other practitioners, the research subject to some extent remains a subject not 
turning to a pure research object (Winter 2014, p. 249). My colleagues were partners 
in dialogue rather than merely being explored. Since I consider myself in a way as one 
of them, my ethic concerns related to “doing research about them” are lowered, 
though not eliminated completely, because I am still also radically criticising. I hope 
this critique will be understood by those criticized as a constructive engagement with 
a practice that I was equally involved in and a critique of the structures rather than 
personalized critique of an individual practicing. Here I agree with Taber who 
describes the standpoint as a former member of an organization that one now 
critiques as an often contradictory standpoint that is nevertheless grounding the 
research and allows one to explore the institution from both ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ 
perspectives (Taber 2012, p. 75). While I would like to add, that the positionality is 
always at the same time in – and outside, and it is sometimes difficult to clearly locate 
oneself. This furthermore shows that whether you are an insider, or outsider is most 
often not a matter of choice, because those you work with decide whether they “let 
you in or leave you out” as a researcher/as a lawyer/as a social/political scientist/as a 
white, female etc., and they permanently decide anew.  
At The Hague I was considered as an interested intern who had some experiences 
“in the field” which I felt was appreciated. Whenever I told my colleagues about my 
experiences in Kenya, they could connect their experiences. I had the impression that 
they mostly shared my critical stance on the marginalization of victims while 
remaining a little sceptical about the legal criticism. 
At Nairobi the disciplinary background did not matter that much, because my 
boss was a sociologist and she embraced my critical approach. There my positionality 
as a white researcher/lawyer from Europe was more decisive for the decisions to in – 
or exclude me; to accept me as an in – or outsider.147
                                                 
147 This positionality is in a way more complex since I could not identify as either white 
researcher/laywer etc, I was always already identified as white and this implied a certain positionality 
outside. And due to language barriers and other deficiencies, I think it was not always a deliberate 
choice to exclude me, but a necessity due to my incompetency. 
 While I still remained a 
muzungu, I felt that working together was functioning quite well despite my 
ignorance in some aspects. It helped that I shared an office with a colleague in the 
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middle of the building where everyone had to pass through and that everyone had 
lunch together. And throughout my research, I felt included, though there were 
situations, both in Nairobi and at The Hague where I was left outside. Above this, 
for myself, this insider/outsider positionality also served as a defence mechanism 
since it allowed to distance myself from the matter in question, switching the 
position and disciplinary background and looking from the outside. 
Against the backdrop of the twofold role of self-reflexivity within my work, I tried 
to maintain a high sensitivity towards my thoughts and feelings, especially these 
defence-mechanisms, while working. Observation in this sense cannot, and can never 
be reduced to observing, seeing, and listening to what happens, but it is also being 
aware of what causes me to see and listen to particular scenes, and when I decide to 
not listen or see. Being aware of how I felt in re-presenting victims, is especially 
important with regard to the trauma theoretical background. Feeling when my own 
defence mechanisms set in, why and how. In general, this requires the openness to 
potentially irritating situations and encounters. (Ploder 2009) Many of these 
encounters and situations will not be represented in this work, they nevertheless were 
absolutely crucial for me to understand, and make sense of victim participation and 
representation at the ICC. One could probably say that the own experiences, feelings 
and defence mechanisms formed part of the tacit knowledge underlying the 
interpretation of the analysed texts. 
5.2. Interviews 
During my stay in Kenya and The Hague, I conducted 25 semi-structured 
interviews, most of them with legal representatives of victims and/or NGO staff 
working in the field, in Kenya and at the ICC. Eight interviews were conducted with 
people who considered themselves victims and representatives of victims who were 
themselves victims. Not all of the latter were participating in the proceedings at the 
ICC – but so called “situation-victims”. My aim was to track the “translation” 
process, the epistemic violence of the language used and the practical exclusions 
within the institution of victim participation. I do not intend to portray, or represent, 
the victim’s understanding of truth and justice. I analyse the truth and justice 
produced in the process of translation and representation and reflect its legitimizing 
function. Therefore, it was not necessarily important to cover as many accepted case-
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victims as possible, but to get an impression on how to establish contact with 
victims’ communities and individuals, how conducting interviews is organized and 
how the affected people relate to the process and the concepts of truth and justice as 
propagated for by the ICC. Furthermore, as will become clear in the following 
chapters, often representatives were asked to represent victim’s views in a general 
way, meaning to include the interests of all victims - registered as participants, or not. 
This was especially the case in the Kenyan cases. Therefore, the people I spoke to 
were representative of the participating victims and of those whose interests should 
be represented in a general way.  
Among the representatives I interviewed were legal representatives from the 
OPCV, an external legal representative in the Darfur, Sudan and the Kenyan 
situation and a staff member of the external legal representatives in different cases. I 
will keep the identities of my interviewees anonymous an only refer to them by their 
function, since their names are not important to understand their positions. Before 
the interviews I informed the interviewees about my dissertation project and they all 
aggreed to participate.  
I developed two different set of possible questions, one for representatives and 
one for victims/victim representatives. But since the interview settings differed 
significantly from meeting in a café in Kisumu to sitting in the cafeteria at the Arc 
building of the ICC. From meeting with women in a community centre in Kibera 
and talking to them with open doors, to meeting a lawyer in his office, adhering to 
the questions was not my primary objective. Furthermore, some interviews were 
done with up to three persons at a time. I rather tried to develop a sense for the 
situation and atmosphere and to follow the lead of the respondent, asking follow-up 
questions that might derive from the set of questions prepared. The questions and 
changes are as comprehensive as possible reflected in my research diary – my field 
notes.  
The questions for the representatives were basically structured in two sections, the 
first was, what I referred to as “more organizational” questions, asking about who is 
responsible for what and how the process of translation and representation is framed 
from the participating victims to The Hague. The purpose of this set of questions 
was to reconstruct the framework and organization of speaking and hearing from the 
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perspectives of the representatives. I also openly asked them if they sometimes felt 
that something gets lost in translation/representation, if there was something that 
they would like to get across to the judges and others, but they do not manage, or if 
they developed strategies to represent “the unrepresentable”. The second part was, 
what I termed “more personal” questions, I intended to bring the interviewees to 
reflect on their role as representatives, their motivations etc.  
The set of questions for people who considered themselves to be victims was also 
divided into two sections – but here I remained more open to listen to what they 
choose to tell me about them being victims/survivors/internally displaced persons 
etc. what it means to them and how they relate to the transitional justice processes 
established within Kenya. Then I asked about their perception of the ICC and the 
possibility of victim participation, what they expect from legal justice and what truth 
means to them. In these interviews I tried to remain as open as possible for my own 
silencing, the silences of my interviewees and the irritating potential of difference. 
Generally, the interview situations were more unpredictable and therefore the whole 
procedure of asking and answering (who was asking, who was answering – who 
expected what from whom) was not as clear as it was with representatives, or this is 
what I thought. I soon had to realize that flexibility and openness was key to 
listening. And that I have to accept that I am “just another mzungu asking 
questions”, which I first felt to be offending. But with the time, I realized that this is 
an expression of my privileged position. We (the westernized, in my case white, elite 
representing the court, INGOs, or NGOs) can treat them as representatives of the 
victims and generalize their interests, they do the same, but this irritates the image, 
since it is not reflective of the self-description of someone who delivers truth and 
justice and enables story telling. I reflected these feelings in my research diary and 
they caused me to refine my theoretical approach. The openness sometimes 
overwhelmed me, either I got angry, sad or I was just helpless, which then reminded 
me of my noble theories again, of the radical relationality and the related feelings this 
might cause. But these were exactly the moments that are crucial to my interpretation 
of all texts produced within the practice of participation, because these are emotions 
caused by encounters.  
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The interviews lasted anywhere between 30 minutes up to two hours, which 
provided extensive transcription material. Before systematically analysing my 
empirical data, I had to decide how to best transcribe the collected material. Some of 
the interviews were not recorded, because I felt uncomfortable and the situation felt 
not appropriate. These notes are literally transcribed from my field notes and do not 
comprise pauses, laughter etc. They are complemented by notes about the location of 
the interview and my impressions before, during and after the interview. The 
recorded interviews were also transcribed literally because I considered it unnecessary 
to reflect slang, accent or the like. Given my theoretical background and the insights 
of trauma theory, I considered it important to include pauses and silence. Again, I 
took notes to cover the context of the interview. Commonly it is assumed that the 
issue under consideration in interviews is not the interview itself, but the thematic of 
the interview. In most of my interviews it was also the interview itself – the situation, 
context, feelings and how it came about. As mentioned above, this then is reflected 
in my field notes, which is reflective of the circumstances and my impressions and 
interpretations.  
The field notes already reflect one step of interpretation against the backdrop of 
my considerations of what could be important – criteria were: Access, language, 
surroundings and atmosphere – in general, aspects that appeared notable to me in 
this special situation with regard to my broad research interest – how are the victim’s 
stories translated and represented through the different intermediaries and 
representatives into the legally authorized story at The Hague. Therefore, I was 
sensitive to what caught my attention and what not – and why. How is the overall 
atmosphere influencing my attention. How are the questions relevant to the court 
influencing what is being answered – what else could there have been told. 
5.3. Document analysis 
In order to analyse the legal framework of victim participation, I analysed 
documents and doctrine, but also selected transcripts of the proceedings, and the 
online presentation. This data helps to understand the organizational framework, 
they are textual communicative practices in which organizations constitute “reality” 
and the forms of knowledge appropriate of it (Coffey 2014, p. 369).  
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“Social Actors who write and read documents bring to bear their knowledge – 
often tacit – of the conventions that go into their production and reception. 
They develop and display a working knowledge of the registers of their 
professions, organizational setting and cultural activity.” (Ibid., p. 372)  
Furthermore, organizational and professional texts bear a particular responsibility 
in ignoring and invalidating difference. Smith argues that,  
“texts shape social relations which flow from such documents…. Texts shape 
social relations, including the delivery of services, to be consistent with 
dominant ideologies, thereby excluding issues related to race, economic status, 
gender, sexual orientation and other differences from discourse.” (J O`Neill 
2015, p. 132)  
This is particularly the case with legal texts that appeal to a rationality, sobriety 
and neutrality and thereby obscure all irrationality, emotionality and partiality and 
constitute subjects as preceding the texts that are actually always also subjectivized 
through the text in relation to the court.148
Accordingly, the documents I analysed are the basic legal texts in the context of 
victim participation. As an entry point of participation, the application forms for 
people who apply to be recognized as a victim participating in the proceedings at the 
ICC and/or applying for reparations. The decisions on said applications and the 
decisions by the different Chambers on victim participation – defining victim’s 
interest, ruling on a set of procedural rights and the mode of representation. Taken 
all together, I analysed the jurisprudence concerning victim participation and 
representation. Furthermore, I analysed submissions by legal representatives, 
sporadically the defence and the prosecution. Also, manuals for victim 
representatives and NGO reports make up the corpus of documents I analysed.  
  
Despite the fact that I studies the Kenyan case in more detail in my participatory 
observation, I analysed legal documents framing the legal practice of victim 
participation and representation from all cases at the ICC so far. The practice of 
victim participation and representation took shape over the time, from the very 
beginnings in the decisions on victim participation in the situations of the DRC and 
Uganda until the latest decisions in the Ongwen case. Since I intend to reconstruct 
and analyse the practice as it developed, the focus had to go beyond the Kenyan 
                                                 
148 Buckel (2007), see also the elaborations on the subject position provided for victims in the 
application forms Chapter 5 1.1. 
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cases.  Therefore, I analysed all central decisions and submissions on victim 
participation in the different situations (Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, 
Central African Republic, Darfur, Sudan, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali) and the 
respective cases (The Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Katanga, Ntaganda,  Bemba, Gbagbo 
and Blé Goude, Abu Garda, Banda, Kenyatta, Ruto and Sang.  
Apart from that, the number of documents produced by the court and its organs 
is enormous and not manageable in the context of this research project. Selectively, 
in order to trace some proceedings, I included transcripts from proceedings in my 
analysis. This was particularly relevant when analysing the presentation of views and 
concerns and testimony in person. In order to reconstruct the self-legitimizing 
practices, it is very insightful to analyse the online presentation of the ICC (which 
changed considerably in the last months) and some selected videos on the ICC you 
tube channel explicating victim participation, the courts mandate etc. It goes without 
saying that legal texts and the self-presentation on you tube follow different narrative 
structures and linguistic registers (Coffey 2014, p. 371). Especially legal documents, 
such as a decision or a submission has a special function within the proceedings and 
applies a specialised legal language, also these documents are interrelated, they refer 
to each other and thereby create a distinct legal meaning. 
5.4. Data analysis 
Strictly defined, my set of data consists of field-notes containing my observations 
and impressions during participant observation, recordings and transcripts of semi-
structured interviews and documents. In the context of organizational ethnography, 
this strict distinction is inadequate to reflect the basis of the analysis. Field-work, 
desk-work and text-work are interrelated. Ethnographic knowledge is always 
‘generated’ in research, rather than as data being collected’ or even accessed’ and 
analysed afterwards (Ybema et al. 2009). “Data analysis is not a discrete and separate 
stage of the research process but rather ongoing throughout and beyond the life time 
of a project.” (Mauthner and Doucet 2003, p. 425) 
For example, while one can say that I analysed data in the form of field-notes, 
observations, interviews and documents there is no clear distinction between the 
different methods used. Interviewing in institutional ethnography can be described as 
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“talking with people” and is understood within a wide range of data, only one of 
which is planned interviews, pinning together a larger picture. Interviews are less 
structured and more collaborative in this context (Devault 2012, p. 384). Interviews 
are consequently also contained in my field-notes and observations. And of course, 
the knowledge contained in documents is ever present and constantly actualized in 
the process of participant observation. Partly because I worked with the documents, 
thereby permanently interpreting and analysing them, which cannot be distinguished 
from my later textual analysis. This combination and overlapping is what constitutes 
organizations and therefore appreciating the complexity involves a combination of 
methods and the acknowledgement that analysis is an ever-ongoing process. 
Especially the notion of the distant observer is blurred when participant observation 
is working in the field instead of just following and observing the processes. 149
This is how I came to the interpretation and representation of the data collected, 
it was a constant back and forth through the texts, be it interviews, legal texts or 
theoretical elaborations. I found patterns, and followed them through the texts, 
wondered about what these patterns include, and what they exclude and how they 
changed (like the notion of the victim – the victims – the relevant victim). According to the 
patterns, I coded and mapped the data. Then I scrutinized my patterns, re-reading 
the texts, I sorted out patterns and found new ones. Here I realized that the intensity 
of the perception of gaps and impossibilities seemed to depend on the proximity to 
victims. This caused me to be more sensitive about the deferrals in meaning and 
representation also in my own writings, the closer I got to the actual participating 
victims. I found repetitions that seemed like mantras and searched the texts for 
explanations of these repetitions and interruptions and challenges of the mantras. 
The most striking mantra that occurs throughout the data, the academic texts 
included, is that participation has to be meaningful and effective. I started to wonder 
about the meaning of meaningful and effective and the function of the repetition. 
Generally, I tried to wonder and question as much as I could, already during the 
 In 
this sense: “Rather than seeking to eliminate the “messiness” of real experience by 
defining and quantifying it, I embraced the mess as a source of meaning…” 
(Ellingson 1998, p. 511)  
                                                 
149 If this clear distance is ever really possible does not have to be discussed here. 
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collection of my data, I wondered about me wondering, but I also tried to be open to 
what seemed all too natural to me, issues I did not wonder about. Wondering in this 
sense means especially questioning the taken for granted, try to wonder about the 
themes no one is puzzled by and question the seemingly natural. 
The theoretical conceptions and questions guided the search for patterns and lead 
my attention while analysing. Through the close reading of the texts produced, a 
narrative evolved. The structure of this dissertation developed with the impression 
that the legal pre-texts of participation are strongly determining the practice and 
framework within which the people had to work. The realization still developed 
while writing. From then on I decided to take the legal basis as a starting point to 
reconstruct the representational practices of speaking and hearing. Drawing on the 
theoretical thought of legal decisions as fresh judgements, I analysed the 
jurisprudence accordingly. And in a last step, the personal perceptions, reflected in 
my field notes, memories and the interviews were analysed against the backdrop of 
this legal framework. This structure was also influenced by the proximity-distance 
complex. The legal texts always invoke a certain objective distance, this is also 
constitutive of the working atmosphere at The Hague, which is not only 
geographically more distant to the participating persons. This distance renders it 
easier to theorise and conceptualise - it was easier to find patterns, because legal 
reasoning relies on rules and patterns of its interpretation. Beside this, the messiness 
of everyday work, work-relations and the complexity of problems one faces when 
working more proximate to the affected communities is more difficult to systematize 
according to scientific requirements. Therefore, in order to make sense of my texts, I 
started with the legal texts which formed the starting point to analyse the other data. 
I am aware that this might once again be a privileging of the allegedly more distant 
view - which is also associated with rationality and neutrality. But I hope that through 
highlighting the importance of proximity, which is represented towards the end of 
this dissertation and the interrelatedness of distance and proximity; rationality and 
emotionality etc. I can show that distance is an illusion always relying on proximity, 
both in legal proceedings and in research  
No analysis can prevent the fact that in one or the other way the results are 
influenced by what one was looking for in the first place and others might have put 
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different foci and certainly would have made different experiences and have different 
impressions. I hope that by rendering my train of thoughts as transparent as possible, 
my interpretation can be put into context. In the course of the analysis, it became 
very clear to me, that I want to provide an alternative narrative of victim participation 
and I hope that the following description and interpretation of the representational 
practices, the irritations and efforts to close gaps and the respective subjectivities will 
vivify a different reading of what is taken for granted within the organization of 
victim participation. I intend to raise troubling questions, questioning the innocence 
of victim participation at the ICC, this intention guided the analysis of my data and 
my approach to the practice of the law; 
“[t]owards a science (law A/N) based less on knowledge (truth/facts A/N) 
than on an awareness of epistemic limits where constitutive unknowingness 
becomes an ethical resource and aporetic suspension becomes an ethical 
practice of undecidebility…Such a stance raises troubling questions about how 
we think about how we think and learning to learn differently, where ‘giving a 
voice’, ‘dialogue’ ‘telling and testifying’, and ‘empowerment’ have lost their 
innocence.”150
6. Limitations 
 
In fixing the unsaid and unheard of victim participation, I am constantly silencing 
through my own writing. My writing is just not a re-presentation of the “reality” of 
victim participation, but rather always already a positioned re-production of this 
reality. Therefore, my personal presuppositions, be it theoretical or otherwise play a 
crucial role in the perception, collection, interpretation and representation of my 
data. And, the social inherent in all human interaction exceeds the words I can 
possibly find to describe said interactions. Using qualitative methodology and 
methods against the backdrop of my theory is, just like victim representation, a work 
“with no guarantees” (Spivak 2001, p. 15). In my work, reflexivity therefore plays a 
twofold role, firstly, as described, a heightened self-reflexivity is required when using 
deconstructive inquiry and post-colonial approaches. Secondly, like elaborated in the 
previous sections, self-reflexivity is essential to the ethics of listening and 
representation. Therefore, beyond reflecting on my role as a researcher, one question 
                                                 
150 Lather (2008, p. 227); explicitly referring to Spivaks notion of unlearning privileges and learning to 
learn from below, and what I refined in the encounter with traumatic memory as ethical listening.  
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leading my inquiry was to find spaces of self-reflexion and narratives that closed 
these spaces again. I constantly tried to ask mysef: 
“What are the ethico-political implications of our representations for the Third 
World, and especially for the subaltern groups that preoccupy a good part of 
our work? To what extent do our depictions and actions marginalize or silence 
these groups and mask our own complicities? What social and institutional 
power relationships do these representations, even those aimed at 
‘empowerment’ set up or neglect? At to what extent can we attenuate these 
pitfalls?” (Kapoor 2008, p. 91) 
Furthermore, against the backdrop of my theory, irritations resulting from the 
confrontation with the lack and excess of the desire of closure are taken seriously in 
order to reveal potential for ethical encounters. (Denzin and Lincoln 2008) Of 
course, I am, through doing research already implicated in these violent 
entanglements, nevertheless I hope that through the “re-turning of the gaze” I can 
reveal some of the epistemic violence reflected in the practice of victim participation 
through instead of observing the other – observe the Western self in its relation to 
the alleged other. The reflection on different aspects of my methods and the data can 
only be sporadic and temporal. And, as Mauthner and Doucet note, time has to pass 
before one can understand and articulate how the research was shaped and by which 
pre-suppositions (Mauthner and Doucet 2003, p. 425). I want to discuss one aspects 
that troubled me throughout my research and to which I did not find a satisfying 
answer or place within this work. 
7. My representations of the victims participating in the 
proceedings 
Throughout my writing I was unsure which term I should use referring to the 
multiple subjectivities of those people who are participating in the proceedings at the 
ICC as victims. Within my writing this manifested in a twofold way: 
Firstly, in order to emphasise the heterogeneity of persons behind the label - the 
victims I also referred to the term individual - individuals - individuality, this is of 
course undermining my theoretical argument that subjects are not autonomous 
individuals. Still I consider the term to be, on the one hand reflective of the symbolic 
order I am situated in - referring to individuality in contrast to collectivity and, on the 
other hand, it is used to contrast it to the legal approach taken which, while 
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pretending to individuality is collectivising the victims in the process of representation. 
A more complex and reflective conception of the subject as developed by Lacan 
helps to understand the function of these terms within the symbolic order wherein I 
am subjectivized just like my related others.  
Secondly, and more importantly, my own terms- the participating victims, the 
victim, the group of victims, the victims, the relevant victim - felt as inadequate as the general 
unreflective legal terminology is. Whenever I wanted to refer to those persons behind 
the representations of the victims produced within the legal framework and the 
practice of the ICC, I referred to victims participating in the proceedings or persons, 
or individuals participating in the proceedings. This is my representation, which is 
also reproducing the representation of victims as an unaccessible group. Whenever I 
knew of the name of a concrete participant, I used the name. When referring to the 
people I interviewed who were considering themselves as victims of post-election 
violence, I did not use the names for reasons of security. 
The problematic of the term victim is that it stands for passivity and dependence 
among other attributions. This is why, for some, the term survivor, emphasising the 
active surviving of violence feels more adequate. When we were talking about the 
terminology used in our work, my boss in Nairobi told me, that a victim they were 
representing once told her that as long as she is a displaced person and cannot 
manage to sustain herself because of the violence that caused her victimhood, the 
term victim still applies for her. Therefore, she wants to use the term to clarify that 
nothing has been done to ease her victimhood.151
                                                 
151 Field-notes, 09/01/2014. 
 She did not feel that she survived 
yet, because life was an ongoing struggle to survive. I do not know if this story was 
told in order to silence our conscience while still using the term victim, not only for 
this woman, but for all persons represented. I can only emphasise that the focus of 
my work is to describe representations not to represent those represented. Doing so, 
I, at the same time, violently represent and reveal the homogenizing violence. For 
this reason, I want to clarify, that my words: victims participating in the proceedings 
represent persons only in their relation to the court. The multiple different and 
interrelated subjectivities of these people are mainly constituted through other 
relations than that to the court. I can say nothing about these other relations.  
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Chapter 5: Representation 
1. The Legal Framework of Representation 
Since the implementation of the legal framework of victim participation and 
representation was basically left to the discretion of the Chambers, only providing 
them with the central norm, Article 68 (3) of the Rome Statute (RS), there is ample 
and diverging jurisprudence on the topic. Each Chamber could decide anew how to 
design victim participation in the respective proceedings. This resulted in many 
different approaches being developed to the application systems, to the modes of 
representation and to the set of procedural rights provided for victim representatives 
during Pre-Trial and Trial Phase. These different approaches respectively frame who 
has access to the court through whom, how, and who can say what during which 
phase. Accordingly, the framework of speaking and being heard is not coherent and 
differs from case to case, situation to situation. In the following these different 
approaches will be unfolded, reconstructing the representational practices of 
speaking and hearing not only with regard to the practical legal provisions, but also 
with respect to the textual practice - the language used - and the self-understanding 
of representatives. Starting with the analysis of the different application forms (1.1.) 
developed through the Chambers and the organization of the first contact of the 
Court and its representatives to those who want to participate as victims in the 
proceedings. Thereafter, the organization of legal representation will be described, in 
which it is determined who is speaking for/on behalf of/about the participating 
victims in the proceedings. (1.2.) Because of the, above mentioned, discretion of each 
Chamber, I discuss all approaches developed by the different Chambers in the 
different cases, taking as a starting point, the relevant norm. Sometimes there is even 
a variation in the representational framework from Pre-Trial to Trial Phase. In both 
areas, application and representation, the institutionalization of victim participation at 
the ICC lead to the further representation, collectivization and externalization. 
1.1. The Application Phase 
The central norm regulating the general requirement of applications and the 
transmission of these applications to the respective Chambers is Rule 89 (1) RPE: 
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„In order to present their views and concerns, victims shall make written 
application to the Registrar, who shall transmit the application to the relevant 
Chamber. Subject to the provisions of the Statute, in particular article 68, 
paragraph 1, the Registrar shall provide a copy of the application to the 
Prosecutor and the defence, who shall be entitled to reply within a time limit to 
be set by the Chamber.“ 
Filling in the application form is the first contact, that people who want to 
participate in the ICC proceedings as victims officially have with the court. Hence, 
the application phase is central within the framework of victim participation, for 
once because, as said, it is the first contact, then of course, because it determines who 
can participate – who is a victim in the proceedings. And, which is probably less 
obvious, the application forms are very often referred to as a source of information 
within the submission of the Legal Representatives of Victims (LRV) and in 
decisions by the Chambers, it therefore also determines to a certain extent what is 
being heard at The Hague. Accordingly, in this phase it is being defined who can 
speak (in principle) and it pre-determines already what can be spoken about – the 
framing of what is being heard, the former and the latter are interrelated.  
1.1.1. The first contact –Who is being reached? 
When the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) opens an investigation, and issues the 
first warrant of arrest, the Pre-Trial Chambers will often request the Registry, namely 
the Victim Participation and Representation Section (VPRS)152, to produce a 
mapping of victims’ communities within the respective situation country and possible 
intermediaries.153
The VPRS works closely with international and national NGOs who are already 
active in the field of human rights, one of which was Kituo Cha Sheria (Kituo). 
Mainly, the VPRS depends on the beaten paths of the international development and 
human rights work infrastructure, and the mapping of possible recipients follows 
similar logics. This is furthermore reflected in the fact, that often international 
NGOs already present in the situation countries help victims of precedent violence 
to fill in application forms and provide legal assistance by lawyers. In the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, the first forms were filled in with the help of the International 
 This often goes hand in hand with outreach activities, so called 
victim education and the training of intermediaries.  
                                                 
152 The VPRS is the responsible office within the Restristry, established pursuant to Rule 86 (9) ROC 
153 HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER UC Berkeley School of Law (2015, p. 22). 
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Federation of Human Rights (FIDH). In the Lubanga case, victims were assisted in 
finding legal representation by local and international organizations. The same holds 
true in the situation of Sudan. 154
 In Nairobi, I was told that the VPRS and Kituo rely on the same intermediaries
  
155
“You have NGOs which are affiliated to for instance to international NGOs. 
And I think that VPRS normally they try to find out if local NGOs are also 
linked to international NGOs quite known so that they can be trusted more.”
 
when it comes to finding and contacting victims. And a representative from another 
case told me that she supposes that the trust in the local NGOs is validated by 
consulting with international NGOs already “in the field”.  
156
For local NGOs the fact that the ICC works with them is perceived as a 
recognition of their years-long work with victims in the field.
 
157
“The development of partnerships is important for reaching the broader local 
population through culturally appropriate intermediaries, particularly where 
ICC staff is unable to contact the general public due to lack of resources, 
logistical or other constraints or security concerns. Developing partnerships will 
also decentralize the dissemination of information and, by supporting the 
creation of local initiatives and/or networks, increase the awareness of the 
general population on Court-related issues.”
 The ICC, in its 
outreach strategy explicitly announces a formal cooperative relationship with partners 
and intermediaries: 
158
After it became clear during the Lubanga trial that intermediaries played a crucial 
role, connecting the Court to the participating victims and that this role is far from 
 
                                                 
154 REDRESS; Representing Victims before the ICC: Recommendations on the Legal Representation 
System, April 2015, p. 5. 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/1504reprentingvictims.pdf, last accessed 
02/2/2017.  
155 Notes from meeting with VPRS representative, 9/1/2014. 
156 Interview with LRV 16/6/2014, these international NGOs are HRW, AI, and more directly dealing 
with victims REDRESS; FIDH, VRWG. The Victims' Rights Working Group (VRWG) is a network 
of over 300 national and international civil society groups and experts created in 1997 under the 
auspices of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC). It was created by a number of 
international NGOs and experts but over the years has evolved to include NGOs from a wide array of 
countries including those countries most affected by the International Criminal Court (ICC), such as 
the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Libya, Sudan 
and Uganda. The VRWG is facilitated by REDRESS. The oureach and education programme for 
victims of post-election violence which was conducted by Kituo was also supported by REDRESS 
and the GIZ, the German Society for International Cooperation.  
157 Interview with NGO staff, 20/3/2014. 
158 Strategic Plan for Outreach of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/5/12, 29 September 
2006, para. 66. 
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defined, lacking the necessary transparency, guidelines governing the relation 
between intermediaries and the Court were released, defining intermediary as: 
“An intermediary is someone who comes between one person and another; 
who facilitates contact or provides a link between one of the organs or units of 
the Court or Counsel on the one hand, and victims, witnesses, beneficiaries of 
reparations and/or affected communities more broadly on the other.” 159
Within the definition of the ICC intermediaries are all those who are located 
between the official personnel of the court and those who are to be reached. This 
could be individuals and organizations. I will further differentiate between the 
international organizations working with the Court (the most important are joined in 
the Victims’ Rights Working Group VRWG and facilitated by REDRESS
 
160), and 
national NGOs like Kituo. Furthermore, there are, more or less, organized 
spokespersons of victim communities who are in contact with national and 
international NGOs and facilitate meetings etc. The latter are referred to as 
intermediaries by the NGOs, while strictly speaking the NGOs themselves are 
intermediaries for the court. And although the guidelines develop criteria for the 
selection of intermediaries applied during a screening and foresee training 
possibilities, my research showed that still a lot of opacity is prevailing in this field. 
By way of example, no interviewee could answer if s/he knew how the 
spokespersons were selected within the community and with which authorization 
s/he spoke for and on behalf of other victims. It was presumed that it is those who 
are most outspoken, at the same time they were assumed to represent the majority of 
victims. Those who are most outspoken do not necessarily represent the majority 
and it was admitted, that there were sometimes fights for supremacy among different 
spokespersons and that thereafter new groups formed.161
                                                 
159 Guidelines Governing the Relations between the Court and Intermediaries, March 2014, p. 5. 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/lt/GRCI-Eng.pdf. Last accessed 26/5/2018. 
 The power dynamics within 
different groups of victims were not transparent at all. Of course, this also means 
that the likelihood that persons who are not yet within the realm of recipients of 
international and national NGOs and their respective spokespersons, who were 
referred to as gatekeepers to the victim communities by my co-workers, is very low – 
160 http://www.vrwg.org/about-vrwg/organisations-and-affiliates, last accessed, 21. February 2017. 
161 Field Notes, 22/3/2014: Preparation of interviews in Kisii and Kisumu. It has to be mentioned 
that this applies to spokespersons of internally displaced persons among whom only some were 
participating in the proceedings.  
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at this early stage of the proceedings.162 Also, voices that do not fulfil the criteria of 
already established NGOs are hardly being represented.163
Regarding the access to possible victim communities before the application 
process starts, with respect to the question who speaks – it is basically the 
intermediaries from international and national NGOs and spokespersons who are 
already present in the field of previous human rights and development work who 
direct the legal staff of the ICC.
 This also applies for 
persons and organizations who deliberately decide to work beside the official 
structures.  
164
“That was several years later. The events occurred in 2003, and I suppose that it 
was in 2006 when the complaints were filed. Some NGOs came, but then they 
would leave without any follow-up. It was only later that we began to receive 
other important people, and they had us fill out various forms and that led to 
the trial what we are at today. Some lawyers who had travelled to the area even 
asked the victims to organise in the - into various groups to carry out a number 
of activities, including farming.”
 They are assumed to somehow have been 
authorized by victims – but this is not verified. This was also reflected in answers 
given by participating victims:  
165
Despite the mapping activity, there still seems to be a lot of randomness. In any 
case, this is also reflected in the perceptions of the participating victims who testified 
before the Court. When they were being asked how they got into contact with the 
ICC for the first time, they talked about white people
 
166
                                                 
162 Given the long duration of the proceedings and the possibility to apply at later stages, it is possible 
that more and more persons who want to apply and who are outside of the previous reach of 
organizations and spokespersons get the opportunity to do so. Furthermore, in the Kenyan case, due 
to the simple registration, this is very likely and even in later stages, when I was at Nairobi, Kituo was 
asked if they knew possible case-victims who are not yet registered.  
 who were coming with others 
and asked for victims:  
163 Haslam and Edmunds (2013), I will come back to the topic of intermediaries and spokespersons in 
the next chapter which entails a closer analysis of the requirements an intermediary has to fulfil. 
164 „...es gibt schon auch Sprecher von Opfergruppen, die sowieso auch viel in der NGO-Szene so 
rumspringen und da wortgewandter sind und sich auch mehr trauen gegenüber einem Anwalt...“; “.... 
and there are also those spokespersons of groups of victims, who jump around in the NGO scene and 
who are therefore more articulate and who also dare more vis à vis their lawyer...“ [my translation], 
Interview LRV, 5/3/2014.  
165 Testimony of Judes Mbetingou: Transcripts, Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, Trial 
Chamber III, 7 May 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08, p. 36. 
166 Testimony of CAR-V20: “When this white lady came, she asked me to present my birth 
certificate...”, Transcripts, Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, Trial Chamber III, 3 May 2012, 
ICC-01/05-01/08, p. 27. 
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“Yes. Let me talk about it. Regarding the first form that we filled with our 
lawyers, those white people came for the first time, they came to look for the 
victims, but it was difficult. There were two ladies who arrived as well as a 
white man. They were accompanied by other people. During that time we were 
afraid to talk with those white people.”167
And they confirmed that it was the chairmen – the spokespersons – who pre-
selected who was reached, because they where the ones who knew who was a victim 
within the respective communities: 
 
“It was in my farm. There was the chairman of our village committee who sent 
a message saying that I should come and see him. I was afraid. And when I 
returned from the fields in the evening I asked my wife about it and she told 
me. On that day we were 12 people from various neighbourhoods, there were 
people from Lipri, Bambu and other places. We went there and we were told to 
give a report. And it was the chairman of the committee. It was on that day that 
notes were taken.”168
“When they came to Mongounba, I was not aware of their arrival. My house is 
located quite far away from where they were staying. Some of the inhabitants of 
our area went to meet those ladies and be registered. The mayor of our area has 
an office in the area where those ladies were staying. He sent someone to fetch 
me to meet them so I could tell the ICC staff what had happened to me. It is 
then that I went to meet those ladies, who put a number of questions to me.”
 
169
“The lawyers did not go to Sibut secretely; they went there officially, and they 
asked people to come and fill out the forms, and so that is how it came to be 
hat I went to that place to fill out the forms. ... There was no one that we could 
file a complaint with, and when the lawyers arrived we rushed to see them to fill 
out the forms and then to wait for some kind of outcome. ... Only victims 
could fill out the forms. The neighbourhood leaders where there to distinguish 
between the victims and those who were not victims. Only the victims could fill 
out these forms.”
 
170
In my own interviews the pre-selection was conducted by my NGO, my 
colleagues decided with whom I could safely speak. They selected the respective 
spokespersons who then chose whom to bring to the meetings. It is the 
spokespersons who decide who is representative of the victims. This pre-selection is 
not transparent at all.
 
171
                                                 
167 Presentation of views and concerns a/01635/13: Transcripts, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Trial 
Chamber VI, 1 March 2017, ICC-01/04-02/06, p. 29.  
  
168 Presentation of views and concerns a/30169/15: Transcripts, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Trial 
Chamber VI, 1 March 2017, ICC-01/04-02/06, p. 52. 
169 Testimony of CAR-V20: Transcripts, Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, Trial Chamber III, 
2 May 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08, p. 26. 
170 Testimony of CAR-V20-02: Transcripts, Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, Trial Chamber 
III, 8 May 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08, pp 44-45. 
171 Fieldn notes, 22/3/2014. 
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1.1.2. Application forms 
In principle, victims who want to participate in the proceedings before the ICC 
have to fill in an application form. For this purpose the VPRs designed a standard 
form to be filled in by each individual applicant.  
With the growing number of situations and cases and over the time, the number 
of victims wanting to apply increased significantly. This lead to a backlog in the 
assessment of the applications and consequently to a prolongation of the 
proceedings. In this respect the VPRS was asked if the legal framework allows for a 
more collective approach to participation in general: 
In response to a question regarding whether there could be a more collective 
approach to victim participation, since victimization in the Rome Statute crimes 
tended to be on a collective basis, the representative of VPRS noted that this could 
be looked into further but that the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide for 
individual applications to be made for participation in proceedings, though legal 
representation can be more collective (rule 90).172
In the course of time, different types of application forms and different 
approaches to the application process were developed by the different Chambers in 
the cases
  
173
Given the experiences with the standard application form in the first case of the 
Prosecution v. Lubanga, and the growing numbers of applications, subsequently 
Chambers developed new application forms and considered more collective 
approaches already at this stage, even though it is not explicitly foreseen in the legal 
framework. In some cases the approaches even varied between the Pre-Trial stage 
and the Trial stage of the proceedings. In order to reconstruct the representational 
practices that developed over the time, the different approaches are analysed more or 
less chronologically.  
.  
                                                 
172 Report of the Bureau on victims and affected communities and Trust Fund for Victims, Tenth 
Session Assembly of State Parties, 22 November 2011, ICC-ASP/10/31, para. 20. 
173 At the ICC situations and cases are distinguished. Situations are states in which the Prosecution 
investigates possibe crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the ICC, such as (Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Uganda, Central African Republic, Darfur, Sudan, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali). Cases are those 
were the the Prosecution brings charges against individual Accused, f.e. The Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 
Katanga, Ntaganda,  Bemba, Gbagbo and Blé Goude, Abu Garda, Banda, Kenyatta, Ruto and Sang. 
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Until now, beside the standard system, with a 7-pages long application174
 In the Gbagbo Pre-Trial-Phase a collective approach was taken
 form 
(previously 17-pages long), five different approaches with different application forms 
were applied: 
175. Against the 
backdrop of the VPRS submissions that an exclusively collective approach would be 
incompatible with the RPE, the Chamber adopted a mixed system. Applicants could 
either submit an individual standard application form, or join with others to form a 
group and fill in the respective form with individual declarations. 176
With the increasing number of people who wanted to participate during the Trial 
Phase in the Kenyan cases, the Chamber decided to delegate the responsibility of 
assessing the eligibility for participation to the LRVs in cases where participants did 
not want to appear before the Chamber.
 
177
The Pre-Trial and Trial Chamber in Ntaganda respectively implemented two 
further approaches.
  
178
And finally, the Chamber in the case of the Prosecution v. Ongwen developed a 
1-page application form.
  
179
The process of institutionalization of victim participation can be observed in the 
streamlining process of the application forms. Based on the standard forms, 
regulated in regulation 86 Rules of the Court (ROC), the different Chambers 
developed different forms pre-determining the representational framework 
practically and textually. It becomes apparent, that when participation is incorporated 
into an institution with its organisational requirements it is subjected to adjustments 
following a specific institutional culture of efficiency. The application process is 
transformed into a manageable, discrete and flexible practice that can be transferred 
from various contexts, cases and situations. This adjustment of the practice of victim 
participation can be observed throughout the developments with regard to victim 
applications, representation and modes of participation. Generally the first step is the 
  
                                                 
174 Annex A. 
175 Annex B. 
176 See Annex B. 
177 The application then was operationalized using a registration form, Annex C.  
178 Annex D. 
179 Annex E. 
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collectivization of victim participants into groups. In the following I will describe this 
process and the adjustments of the application process, to, subsequently, analyse and 
discuss the practice for its silencing effect of representation, collectivization and 
externalization (1.1.3.). 
1.1.2.1. The standard form 
The information required generally within the application forms are regulated by 
regulation 86 ROC. The registry, namely the VPRS is responsible for developing the 
forms.  
1. For the purposes of rule 89 and subject to rule 102 a victim shall make a 
written application to the Registrar who shall develop standard forms for that 
purpose which shall be approved in accordance with regulation 23, sub-
regulation 2. These standard forms shall, to the extent possible, be made 
available to victims, groups of victims, or intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations, which may assist in their dissemination, as widely 
as possible. These standard forms shall, to the extent possible, be used by 
victims. 
2. The standard forms or other applications described in sub-regulation 1 
shall contain, to the extent possible, the following information: 
(a) The identity and address of the victim, or the address to which the 
victim requests all communications to be sent; in case the application is 
presented by someone other than the victim in accordance with rule 89, 
sub-rule 3, the identity and address of that person, or the address to 
which that person requests all communications to be sent; 
(b) If the application is presented in accordance with rule 89, sub-rule 3, 
evidence of the consent of the victim or evidence on the situation of the 
victim, being a child or a disabled person, shall be presented together 
with the application, either in writing or in accordance with rule 102; 
(c) A description of the harm suffered resulting from the commission of 
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court, or, in case of a victim 
being an organization or institution, a description of any direct harm as 
described in rule 85 (b); 
(d) A description of the incident, including its location and date and, to 
the extent possible, the identity of the person or persons the victim 
believes to be responsible for the harm as described in rule 85; 
(e) Any relevant supporting documentation, including names and 
addresses of witnesses; 
(f) Information as to why the personal interests of the victim are 
affected; 
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(g) Information on the stage of the proceedings in which the victim 
wishes to participate, and, if applicable, on the relief sought; 
(h) Information on the extent of legal representation, if any, which is 
envisaged by the victim, including the names and addresses of potential 
legal representatives, and information on the victim’s or victims’ financial 
means to pay for a legal representative." 
According to these required information, the VPRS developed the 7-page long 
standard application form (formerly 17-page form)180
Applicants must therefore demonstrate that they are victims within the meaning 
of rule 85 RPE, this could be both individuals and organizations. Individual victims 
are defined as:  
. Upon its reception, the VPRS 
reviews the forms. In the first proceedings, in these reviews only the completeness of 
the information and documentation required was checked. In later proceedings 
Chambers extended the scope of review including a first assessment whether the 
forms meet the requirements of Rule 85 RPE. In a next step these reviews and the 
applications are transferred to the respective Chambers. The redacted versions of the 
applications are also send to the parties according to Rule 89 (1) RPE. After having 
received the observations of the parties the Chambers finally decide if the 
applications meet the legal requirements – if the applicants are victims eligible to 
participate in the proceedings. This process is also regulated under regulations 105 et 
seqq. Regulations of the Registry.  
"(A) "Victims" means natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the 
commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;" 
Within the jurisprudence this is interpreted to require the following criteria: 
“The victims’ identity appears duly established; 
The events described in the application constitute(s) one or more crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court and with which the suspect is charged; 
The applicant has suffered harm as a result of the crime(s) with which the 
subject is charged.”181
                                                 
180 See Annex A. 
  
181 See, e.g., Pre-Trial Chamber I, The Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé, Decision on victims’ 
participation in the pre-trial proceedings and related issues, 11 June 2014, ICC-02/11-02/11-83, para. 
13 (citing Pre-Trial Chamber I, The Prosecutor v. laurent Gbagbo, Decision on Victims’ Participation 
and Victims’ Common Legal Representation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in the 
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Accordingly, in the first application form, part A consists of questions relating to 
the personal data of the victim, if s/he is applying for another person, or not, contact 
details and if someone is assisting in filling in the form. Interestingly, the victim is not 
addressed directly, but always already presumed to be assisted (represented) by 
someone else. This is reflected in the language used to address the victim, instead of 
using the first person, the question is: “Has the victim already submitted an application for 
participation or for reparations to the ICC?” and in part B - information about the alleged 
crimes, the question is “What happened to the victim?” instead of “What happened to 
you/the person you are acting on behalf of?” When it comes to the language used, 
the victim is always already represented, either by an intermediary, or some person 
assisting, or by the notion of the victim - an abstract entity, to be filled by the person 
applying. The implications of this practice will be discussed in the next Chapters.  
The relevant information expected from the victim - according to the 
requirements set out - is: What happened, when did it happen, where did it happen 
and who might be responsible for what happened. Further, in part C “information 
about the injury, loss or harm suffered” are required. The alleged victim is asked 
what effect the events described in the precedent section had on the life of the victim 
and others around him or her. The possible harm, cited by way of example is 
physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, harm to reputation, economic loss 
and/or damage to property or any other kind of harm. Part D asks question about 
participation, “Does the victim want to present his/her views and concerns in ICC proceedings?” 
Yes - No? If yes, why does the victim want to participate in the proceedings?” And 
as a side note it is remarked that “Usually a victim presents his/her views and concerns 
through a lawyer who represents the victim in The Hague.”. Part E concerns reparations. If 
the victim has a lawyer and if yes whom, and if no, whether they need assistance of 
                                                                                                                                     
Related Proceedings, 4 June 2012, ICC- 02/11-01/11-138, para. 20; Triaö Chamber III, The 
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba, Decision on 772 applications by victims to participate in the 
proceedings, 18 Nov. 2010, ICC-01/05-01/08-1017, para. 38; Pre-Trial Chamber I, The Prosecutor v. 
Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus (“Banda & Jerbo”), Decision 
on Victims’ Participation at the Hearing on the Confirmation of the Charges, 29 Oct. 2010, ICC- 
02/05-03/09-89, para. 2; Pre-Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on 
Victims’ Participation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in the Related Proceedings, 15 Jan. 
2014, ICC-01/04- 02/06-211, para. 18; citing, inter alia, Pre-Trial Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Bahar 
Idriss Abu Garda, (“Abu Garda”), Decision on the 34 Applications for Participation at the Pre-Trial 
Stage of the Case, 25 Sept. 2009, ICC-02/05-02/09-121, para. 11; Pre-Trial Chamber I, The 
Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, (“Kony et al.”), 
Decision on victims' applications for participation, 10 Aug. 2007, ICC-02/04-01/05-252, para. 12; 
Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the DRC, ICC- 01/04-101-tEN-Corr, para. 79. 
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the court to find a lawyer are questions forming part F of the questionnaire. 
Additionally the victims are asked if they wanted to be represented by the OPCV 
until they have a lawyer. The next part consists of information about security and if 
the victim wants his or her name to be communicated. The last part is called 
signatures and here, for the first time, the victim is addressed as an I. “I hereby declare 
that:” instead of “the victim hereby declares that”.  
In abstract, the application forms already regulate how the persons who want to 
participate in the proceedings are addressed (Part A), what is being spoken about 
within the proceedings (Part C), the way of speaking - represented, or in person (Part 
D) and it is also anticipating representational models (Part E) .  
1.1.2.2. The approach of the Trial Chambers in the Kenyan 
Cases 
In the Kenyan approach the task of assessing applications is partly delegated to 
the LRVs in the cases. Deriving from Rule 89 (1) RPE, providing that victims shall 
make written application to the Registrar, who shall transmit the application to the 
relevant Chamber, the applications are only in few cases transmitted to the 
Chambers. Victims who do not want to participate in person register with their 
LRVs, therefore, many of the applications do not even reach The Hague, and the 
LRVs represents a number of victims whose stories dissolve in a generalized story. 
All the stories of those who wish to participate without appearing before the Court 
are not individually considered by the Judges. Those persons register with the court 
by filling in a registration form182
                                                 
182 See Annex C. 
. The registration form requests “basic information 
about the Victim” - Name etc. Then it contains a declaration: first, “I confirm my wish, ..., 
to participate in the ICC proceedings - yes - no; I confirm to have personally suffered from the 
following crime(s): (select all that apply) - murder of a loved one - forced displacement - rape - 
inhumane acts - property loss; Resulting in the following harm: physical - psychological - material - 
other (if other state below), then there is a question about the revelation of, and here 
again the third form is used, the victim’s identity. At the end of the form, there is 
some space for additional information. Consequently, the representation of these 
persons is, already at this stage of the proceedings, fixed as the mode of speaking. 
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Furthermore, what is spoken about is only confirmed, not described. The 
participants confirm that they have suffered harm resulting from a relevant crime.  
The VPRS enters the information into a database which is made accessible to the 
respective LRVs. In instances where the registration is not possible for victims, for 
example for security reasons, the LRVs shall nevertheless speak on their behalf – 
their voices shall be represented “in a general way”183. The VPRS is responsible to 
inform the Chamber periodically with statistics about the victim population and a 
report about the general situation of victims, registered or not.184
All those who want to appear before the Chamber submit a standard form. The 
LRVs then have to submit a request on behalf of these victims, explaining why “they 
are considered to be best placed to reflect the interests of the victims, together with a 
detailed summary of the aspects that will be addressed by each victim if authorized to 
present his or her views and concerns.”
 This is the 
information, reaching the Judges at The Hague. 
185 Then the Chamber “makes a preliminary 
assessments as to whether the suggested form of participation is appropriate and 
identifies a limited number of victims who may be authorized to participate 
individually.”186
The Chamber explained this approach, which is very controversial, with a 
considerable saving of time and resources.
 
187 All amendments to the application 
system are commonly made “in order to ensure efficient but meaningful participation of victims 
during the whole proceedings.”188
                                                 
183 Trial Chamber V, The Prosecutor v. William Ruto & Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on victims’ 
representation and participation, 3 Oct. 2012, ICC-01/09- 01/11-460; Trial Chamber V, The 
Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on victims’ 
representation and participation, 3 Oct. 2012, ICC-01/09-02/11-498, both decisions are similar in 
their regulations on victim participation, therefore only the former is cited, para 52. 
 
184 Ibid., para 55. 
185 Ibid., para. 56. 
186 Trial Chamber V, The Prosecutor v. William Ruto & Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on victims’ 
representation and participation, 3 Oct. 2012, ICC-01/09- 01/11-460; Trial Chamber V, The 
Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on victims’ 
representation and participation, 3 Oct. 2012, ICC-01/09-02/11-498, both decisions are similar in 
their regulations on victim participation, therefore only the former is cited, para. 57; For the Kenyan 
cases, given the termination of the cases, this became irrelevant.  
187 Ibid., para. 36. 
188 Registry, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Organization of the Participation of Victims, 6 Feb. 
2012, ICC-02/11-01/11-29-Red, para 39 (citing, inter alia, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, 
Henry Kirpono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang (“Ruto & Sang”), Registry, Proposal for the common 
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1.1.2.3. Gbagbo variations 
In the case against Gbagbo at Pre-Trial, the applicants could submit a standard 
form individually, or form a group that is represented by a person from their midst 
acting on their behalf. The individual applications are initially assessed by the VPRS 
according to their completeness and whether they meet the requirements of Rule 85 
RPE and then submitted to the Chambers.  
Those applicants whose experiences share common elements, such as “the 
recollection of the events and harm common to the members of the group”189 were encouraged to 
join and submit group forms with individual declarations.190 The person who is 
authorized by the group to submit the application on their behalf may “assist in further 
communications between the court and the victims, if needed.”191 Above that, the individual 
declarations provide the victims with the possibility to confirm the events they have 
suffered from and the harm this caused.192
In its design the group form is similar to the individual standard form, it contains 
information about the identity of the group, among others a name of the group, 
localization, number of persons composing the group and the common characteristic 
of the group. Furthermore, the contact person’s details are requested. Section C then 
contains questions about what happened to the group - with the request to describe 
as detailed as possible the events. When and where the events happened and who is 
responsible according to the group. The following section asks about the harm 
suffered, they are asked about whether they want to participate in presenting views 
and concerns at The Hague, and if yes why. The last parts hence are the same as the 
individual form, replacing the victim by the members of the group. The last section is a list 
with names of the victims and individual signatures. The individual declaration that is 
to be filled in by the members of the group is similar to the registration form 
 
                                                                                                                                     
legal representation of victims, 1 Aug. 2011, ICC-01/09-01/11-243). As a way of streamlining the 
victim participation process more generally, the Registry further proposed “the production of an initial 
mapping report, which would identify the main communities of victims affected by the crimes likely 
to be the subject of the Court proceedings” as well as the development of mechanisms, including “a 
secure core network of intermediaries”, that would “enable it to rapidly identify, contact and assist 
relevant victims.” at paras. 34-38. 
189 Pre-Trial Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Second decision on issues related to the 
victims’ application process, 5 Apr. 2012, ICC-02/11-01/11-86, para.21. 
190 See Annex B.  
191 Pre-Trial Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Second decision on issues related to the 
victims’ application process, 5 Apr. 2012, ICC-02/11-01/11-86, para. 34. 
192 See Annex B. 
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described previously. The individual victim, addressed in the first person, herein, 
confirms that s/he wants to participate, that s/he personally suffered from the events 
and that this caused harm. The contact details and the consent to the contact person 
that is named in the group form.  
The VPRS then reviews all the forms according to their completeness and makes 
an initial assessment as to their chance of admition, the applications are submitted to 
the Chambers and the parties, the respective report entailing the assessment is only 
submitted to the Chamber. The Chamber then makes its final assessment on this 
basis and the submissions of the parties.  
1.1.2.4. Ntaganda 
A further approach was taken by the Pre-Trial and Trial Chamber in the case 
against Ntaganda. After having consulted with the VPRS about their experiences and 
observations concerning the two precedent approaches taken, they decided on yet a 
new way.  
The VPRS, concerning the experiences made, submitted that 
“in proposing and implementing the approach adopted in Gbagbo the Registry 
expressly intended to contribute to a review of the victim application system 
currently under way that is aimed at identifying ways that could be found, 
whether within the existing legal framework or involving amendments to that 
framework, to improve efficiency and sustainability and effectiveness, especially 
in cases involving potentially large numbers of victims, and through the 
Gbagbo experience, to test an approach with a view to its possible refinement 
and adoption as a standard model for other situations and cases. The Gbagbo 
experience provided an invaluable opportunity to test a more collective 
management of an application process for victims to see whether such an 
approach could be more practical and efficient, and already the lessons learnt in 
Gbagbo have been used in designing a victim registration process for victims in 
Kenya. Consequently, the following observations include some reflections on 
the suitability of the approach adopted in Gbagbo for future proceedings.”193
Furthermore, they emphasized that in Gbgabo it actually was a partly collective 
approach, since 
 
“[N]o notion of collective harm has been introduced, and indeed, although the 
alleged events are presented through a common narrative, the Single Judge in 
Gbagbo underlined that this does not mean the harm loses its individual 
                                                 
193 Registry, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Registry Observations in compliance with the 
Decision ICC-01/04-02/06-54-Conf, 6 May 2013, ICC-01/04-02/06-57, para. 5. 
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character. Indeed, each applicant is asked to describe, in the individual 
declaration, the individual harm suffered.”194
Nevertheless, they alleged that the experiences were not only more efficient for 
the court, but even, from a psychological point of view the victims benefitted.
  
195
“This experience has highlighted the positive benefits for many victims of 
holding such group meetings with Court staff from the psychological point of 
view, wherever this is feasible, as this can make the application process and 
other interaction with the Court more satisfying for the victims. Through its 
experience the VPRS has also learnt that grouping victims already at the 
application stage not only facilitates the application process itself, but can also 
facilitate the actual participation of victims subsequently, for instance making it 
easier for victims' legal representatives to manage their own interaction with 
their clients if they are already organised in groups according to location or 
crime.”
 
196
At the same time,  
 
“The Victims and Witnesses Unit ("VWU"), which provided the VPRS with its 
evaluation of the Gbagbo experience after its psychologists attended several of 
the group meetings held with victims, concluded that care is needed in defining 
which groups could be the beneficiaries of this type of approach, as a group 
artificially brought together for the purpose of completing a form could lead to 
a negative experience for the victims.”197
As a result, the VPRS suggests the following approach, which was basically 
adopted by the Chamber:  
 
“…a collective process that involves the collection of core information from 
each victim, while other information pertaining to a group can be collected and 
stored separately by the VPRS (such as information concerning how and where 
to meet members of the group, vulnerable members, security concerns etc). 
This information can be linked to a group in VPRS's information systems. In 
this scenario, each victim would only complete a short form of one or two 
pages with information that is essential for assessing the application as well as 
minimum contact details… so that form could then stand alone as the 
application, as it would include all the information required under the legal 
framework.”198
                                                 
194 Ibid., para. 6. 
 
195 They do not indicate how they came to this conclusion, which is interesting since it contradicts the 
narrative of telling ones story and being acknowledged individually as a subject within the proceedings. 
This will be further discussed, because it also contradicts what LRVs told me about group meetings 
and individual meetings.  
196 Registry, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Registry Observations in compliance with the 
Decision ICC-01/04-02/06-54-Conf, 6 May 2013, ICC-01/04-02/06-57, para. 7. 
197 Registry, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Registry Observations in compliance with the 
Decision ICC-01/04-02/06-54-Conf, 6 May 2013, ICC-01/04-02/06-57, para. 8. 
198 Ibid., para. 9. 
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Accordingly, a two pages application form was drafted, which contained only the 
information “strictly required by law” for the determination of the victim status 
pursuant to rule 85 RPE. Similar to the individual declaration in Gbgbo, the 
applicants therefore provide information about their identity, the date of the 
crime(s), the location of the crime(s), a description of the harm suffered as a result of 
the crime(s) allegedly committed by the suspect in the case, proof of identity and 
signature.199 Again, it is formulated as a confirmation and therefore addresses the 
victim in the first person. “I confirm to have personally suffered from the following events...” A 
crucial difference consists in the part about legal representation. Instead of asking 
whether the victim already has a lawyer, the victim is asked whether s/he has any 
objections to being represented by a single lawyer appointed to represent all of the 
victims in the case. The next question asks which criteria the victim would want to be 
considered in the selection process of a legal representative.200
Like in the case against Gbagbo, the VPRS makes a first assessment and above 
that organizes the applicants into groups. The criteria for this grouping includes the 
location of the alleged crimes, the harm suffered, the gender of the victims, and other 
specific circumstances common to victims.
  
201 Afterwards, the applications, together 
with the respective report are send to the Chamber, redacted versions of the 
applications and the report are then transmitted to the parties. The Chamber assesses 
individually while deciding on each group. The Pre-Trial Chamber applied these 
changes to the preceding approaches "with a view to rationalizing the application process and 
enhancing its predictability, efficiency and expeditiousness.“202
The Trial Chamber in Gbagbo basically took over this approach rather than 
referring to the approach taken by the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
 
When the Pre-Trial Chamber committed Ntaganda to trial in June 2014, the Trial 
Chamber again asked the parties and participants about the application procedure 
                                                 
199 See Annex D; Pre-Trial Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Establishing 
Principles on the Victims’ Application Process, 28 May 2013, ICC-01/04-02/06-67, para. 30. 
200 See Annex D.  
201 Pre-Trial Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Establishing Principles on the 
Victims’ Application Process, 28 May 2013, ICC-01/04-02/06-67, para. 35. The respective reports are 
filed confidential ex parte and are hence not available.  
202 Ibid., para. 1. 
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envisaged in the Trial Phase.203
“[T]he most time and resource consuming element...is the preparation of the 
individual paragraphs describing the Registry’s Rule 85 assessments of 
completeness and inclusion within the scope of the Case. Redactions associated 
with these reports and on the applications themselves are also extremely time 
and resource intensive for the Registry“
 The Registry in turn suggested two possible systems, 
first to take over the system applied in Pre-Trial Phase, noting however that  
204
Given the limited resources, the VPRS predicted a timeline of one year if the 
current system was upheld.
 
205 Against this backdrop, the VPRS then suggested a 
second option (The modified Kenya approach) which it considered to be more 
sustainable.206
„...any said person, organisation and institution deemed to comply with the 
criteria under rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence should be given 
the possibility to enjoy the right as enshrined under article 68(3) of the Rome 
Statute to participate at the trial proceedings in an effective and meaningful 
manner - as opposed to a purely symbolic, including the possibility to 
contribute to the truth to be established and to the Justice to be done as well as 
the possibility to tell their story and to have their story heard within the judicial 
framework.... 
 The LRVs in response to this approach submitted that it would 
deprive the victims of their rights enshrined in Article 68 (3) of the Rome Statute. 
They emphasize that, 
The Legal Representatives submit that the possibility to tell their stories and to 
share their difficult and painful experiences with the judges constitutes one of 
the ways whereby the victims can positively contribute to the search for the 
truth. For the absolute majority of victims, except a very limited number of 
them enjoying the dual status of witness and victim, or appearing in person to 
present their views and concerns, the process of application for participation 
appears to be the only way to provide an account of their experience which 
might be of relevance for the search for the truth.“207
„But none – neither the parties nor the judges – would ever be in a position to 
hear the very personal and tragic stories of the other victims, because they 
 
                                                 
203 Trial Chamber VI, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Order Scheduling a Status Conference and 
Setting a Provisional Agenda, 21 July 2014, ICC-01/04-02/06-339. 
204 Registry, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Registry submission to “Order Scheduling a Status 
Conference and Setting a Provisional Agenda”, 14 Aug. 2014, ICC-01/04-02/06-350, para. 16. 
205 Registry, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Registry submission to “Order Scheduling a Status 
Conference and Setting a Provisional Agenda”, 14 Aug. 2014, ICC-01/04-02/06-350, para. 14. 
206 Trial Chamber VI, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on victims’ participation in trial 
proceedings, 6 Feb. 2015, ICC-01/04-02/06-449, paras 7-9. 
207 Legal Representatives of Victims, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Joint submissions in accordance 
with the “Order Scheduling a Status Conferenceand Setting a Provisional Agenda”issued on 21 July 
2014, ICC-01/04-02/06-351, 14 August 2014, paras 19-20. 
169 
 
would only be invited to register in a manner that is not linked to any judicial 
context.“208
Nevertheless, the Chamber adopted a modified system, taking into consideration, 
the  
  
„specific circumstances of this case, including: (i) the large number of victims 
expected to express interest in participating at trial (ii) the 2 June 2015 trial 
commencement date; (iii) the situation of the victims and (iv) the fact that all 
participants submitted in favour of a greater degree of judicial oversight in this 
case than that required by the Kenya Trials Approach.“209
Within this context, the Chamber developed an approach drawing on the VPRS 
second option. In concrete, the applicants continue to fill in simplified forms, like in 
the Pre-Trial stage, These forms are submitted to the VPRS, which, on the basis of 
the instructions by the Chamber, reviews and assesses them in order to divide them 
into three groups; applicants who clearly qualify as victims (A), applicants who clearly 
do not qualify as victims (B), and those for whom the VPRS could not make a clear 
determination (C). The VPRS maintains a database of those persons who qualify as 
victims and provides the LRVs with access. Applications are transmitted to the 
Chamber „on a rolling basis“.
 
210 The respective report prepared by the VPRS is 
submitted to the Chamber, parties and the LRVs, together with all applications 
falling under group C, 60 days prior to the commencement of the trial. With regard 
to group A and B applications, the Chamber ratifies the VPRSs assessment and the 
report is due 15 days before the trial.211 Every four months the VPRS transmits a 
report on the general situation of participating victims, this is done in cooperation 
with the LRVs who specify „their activities amongst victims“.212
This option was adopted by the Chamber with the explanation that  
 
„The Chamber additionally notes that Rule 89 of the Rules contains no express 
requirement for individual consideration of each application by the Chamber... 
More generally, the Chamber considers that Rule 89(1) of the Rules should be 
interpreted in light of Rule 89(4), which gives the Chamber discretion to 
                                                 
208 Ibid., para. 31. 
209 Trial Chamber VI, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on victims’ participation in trial 
proceedings, 6 Feb. 2015, ICC-01/04-02/06-449, para. 23. 
210 Trial Chamber VI, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on victims’ participation in trial 
proceedings, 6 Feb. 2015, ICC-01/04-02/06-449, para. 24.  
211 Trial Chamber VI, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on victims’ participation in trial 
proceedings, 6 Feb. 2015, ICC-01/04-02/06-449, para. 24.  
212 Ibid., para. 24. 
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'consider the applications in such a manner as to ensure the effectiveness of 
proceedings.“213
„The Chamber does not consider that such a procedure detracts from the 
meaningful participation of victims in ICC proceedings. In fact, this kind of 
procedure will expedite the processing of victims' applications and allow them 
to participate through their LRVs at the earliest possible juncture.“
 
214
„...victim applications are 'an account of their experience' that is of 'relevance 
for the search for the truth'. While the Chamber considers such factors to be 
important within the broader framework of victim participation, it is recalled 
that Chambers have only been evaluating victim applications to a prima facie 
standard for the purposes of participation; they are not making any concrete 
determination on the veracity of the claims therein.“
 
215
Now, the deviation from the norm regulating the application process, Rule 89 (1) 
RPE is expressly stated and the reason is to ensure the effectiveness of the 
proceedings. This effectiveness, it is argued, even benefits the participating victims, 
therefore it is also meaningful. And while recognizing that the information given by 
the participants that reach the Chamber are thereby significantly limited, in the 
context of the search for the truth, this information is said to nevertheless be of 
limited value. 
 
1.1.2.5. Ongwen 
The latest application form was developed in the case of the Prosecution v. 
Ongwen. It consists of a one-page document asking the applicant, or the person 
acting on behalf of “the victim” to confirm to have personally suffered harm, from 
the following events, leaving eight columns to describe the events. The second 
“question” just says: “2. Resulting in the following personal harm:...On this date:...At 
this location... Subsequently there is again one column left to answer “Who, in the 
view of the applicant, is responsible for the events?”.216
                                                 
213 Ibid., para. 31. 
 The third, last, question aims 
at knowing whether “the victim” intends to apply for reparation. At the top of the 
document, information concerning the identity of the applicant are required: Name, 
Date of Birth, or Age and Ethnic Group or Tribe. The form is completed adding the 
signature, the date and the location. The processing of these application forms it yet 
214 Ibid., para. 33.  
215 Trial Chamber VI, The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on victims’ participation in trial 
proceedings, 6 Feb. 2015, ICC-01/04-02/06-449, para. 36. 
216 See Annex E. 
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again simplyfied. The Pre-trial Chamber II, represented by the Single Judge decided, 
that: 
“i) the Registry shall assess all victim applications for participation received or  
collected in the present case, and transmit to the Chamber and the Prosecutor,  
and (redacted as appropriate) to the Defence, all complete applications falling  
within the scope of the case against Dominic Ongwen; in case of doubt, the  
Registry shall consult with  the Single Judge and request guidance; 
(ii) the Prosecutor and the Defence shall have 14 days upon  notification  of  
victim applications to raise any specific objection to individual applications; 
(iii) all those victims whose applications  for participation  have not been  
objected by either party, or otherwise rejected by the Single Judge, are admitted 
to partic ipate in the proceedings upon expiration of the time limit  for the 
parties’ objections; 
(iv) any contested application to  which objections  are presented by either  
party within the relevant time limit shall be  decided upon individually by the  
Single Judge.”217
Basically, the evaluation and decision on admission is left to the VPRS. The Single 
Judge only decides in controversial cases. The information asked from the applicants 
is reduced to a minimum. 
 
1.1.3. Collectivisation, representation and externalization 
The subtext of the institutionalization of victim participation is that the 
implementation has to be meaningful and still effective and the tension is basically 
underlying all legal struggles and reforms. By stating that the deviation from 89(1) 
RPE is necessary to maintain effective proceedings and at the same time allege that 
the meaning is not lost, the tension between effectiveness and meaning is solved. 
When reading these decisions as fresh judgements it is clear, that the application of a 
general norm always entails exclusionary violence. Therefore, in the following I will 
work out the exclusions of the practice of applications. The exclusionary practice 
developed concerning the application process, and the information asked for in the 
application forms, is always also determining who may speak about what, to whom in 
which context. My theoretical approach reveals that practices of representation are 
always also practices of silencing and that although silence can have a subversive 
potential, it is refusal as silence and not being silenced. The following analysis shows 
                                                 
217 Pre-Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Decision concerning the procedure for 
admission of victims to participate in the proceedings in the present case, 3. Sept. 2015, ICC-02/04-
01/15-299, p 7. 
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that the process of institutionalization of victim participation entails a lot of silencing 
of actual individuals while representational relationships are obscured. I differentiate 
in the practices of silencing between representation, collectivization and 
externalization. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that representation is a 
practice that at the same time collectivizes and externalized. Collectivization is only 
possible through different modes of representation and is itself a way to externalize. 
And externalization is achieved through representation and collectivization. The 
three practices of silencing are interrelated. And, they are all hierarchically structured.  
In the first part I will discuss the representational practices entailed in the 
application process and in the language of the application forms (1.1.3.1.). This 
representational practice will be traced throughout this chapter. The same applies to 
the next part addressing the collectivization processes, where the principle of 
individualism prevailing in the context of criminal law is negotiated against the 
backdrop of efficiency and the application process is mainly discussed as managing 
numbers, while upholding the fiction of meaningful participation in the sense of 
individual participation (1.1.3.2.). Externalization processes within the application 
practice are entailed in the subsequent limitation of information asked for in the 
application forms and the fact that these information are kept in a database with the 
Registry and hardly ever reach the Chambers anymore (1.1.3.3.). In the last part, I 
will address the strategies to counter this development, confronting the Judges with 
the exclusionary practices and re-emphasising the meaningful in meaningful and effective, 
thereby upholding the narrative and remaining within the tension (1.1.3.4.).  
1.1.3.1. Representation: “I confirm that the victim is speaking.” 
“I signed that document, because when that person asked me questions, I 
understood that from that point in time onwards, I was one of the victims.”218
There are two dimension with respect to representation that play a role in the 
application process. The first is the personal representation, that is to say, persons 
who represent the applicants in the application process. The second is the 
representation of the victim as victim in the proceedings at the ICC. Meaning the 
framing of the victim that determines who is legible as victim in the proceedings and 
 
                                                 
218 Testimony of DRC-V19: Transcripts, Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 
Trial Chamber II, 21 February 2011, ICC-01/04-01/07, p. 72. 
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who is not. Both are inherently hierarchical with regard to the (legal) relevance and 
the power of definition.  
Concerning personal representation, it is noteworthy that in the application forms 
it is already presumed, that the applicants are assisted by another person, they are not 
directly addressed. Instead, in all application forms, another person allegedly helping 
the victim is directly addressed:  
“Has the victim already submitted an application for participation or for reparations to the 
ICC?”219
This question only makes sense, when assuming that another person assisting the 
victim is the addressee of the form. This person is asked whether the victim has 
already submitted an application. This also means that it is not presumed that the 
person assisting the victim is simply reading the questions in the form to the victim, 
because in this case the question could still have been: Did you already submit an 
application for participation...?  
  
The person assisting the victim is indirectly addressed as the active part, filling in 
the form for the victim and not (more passively) on behalf of the victim. The latter case 
is foreseen for persons acting on behalf of victims under 18, disabled victims or 
victims who gave their consent. Another question asks for the person, or specifically 
interpreter, assisting the victim to fill in the form, this is the person addressed by the 
form in the first place. Hence, from the very beginning it seems to be assumed that 
there is a person acting for the victim, a person who is speaking about the victim. From the 
information about the mapping process it follows that these persons are either 
spokespersons from the victim communities who are trained by national and 
international NGOs and/or personnel from these national and international NGOs 
and/or Registry staff (mostly VPRS). This is to be separated from the provisions for 
legal representation. The victim is always already addressed as someone who is 
represented. Someone who is in need of assistance. 
The hierarchical relationship between the ICC staff, the international NGOs and 
the national/local counterparts is implied in the language - the intermediaries may 
                                                 
219 See Annex A, B, Question 3. and 4. in Annex C, Question 6., 7., 8. Annex D.  
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assist, provide information etc., to a varying extent, they are native informants.220
Concerning legal representation, the principle of choice was still presumed in the 
first application forms, whereas the development then was from “Does the victim 
have a lawyer?” to “Does the victim have any objections to having a single lawyer 
appointed to represent all the victims in the case?
 
Furthermore, the reliability of spokespersons and community leaders is confirmed by 
national NGOs and the latter are in turn validated and confirmed by international 
NGOs, who are self-evidently more trustworthy. All intermediaries are supposed to 
be controlled by the Registry, which then has to report to the Chambers. 
221
In conclusion, with respect to personal representation, in the application process 
the victim is assumed to be always already represented - it is presumed that there is a 
person who is speaking about the victim - who is addressed to become active for the 
passive victim that is in need of assistance.  
 From the very beginning, in a 
note, the victim is informed that representation is the rule, while presenting views 
and concerns in person is the exception.  
The second, probably less obvious dimension of representation, is that the 
individual applicant is only once addressed as a subject that is not yet a victim in the 
application form, as an I - whoever that may be. The space for individuality beside 
the role of the victim is reduced to the confirmation of being a victim. The power to 
define what makes a victim rests with the ICC, as will become very clear in the 
course of the analysis. From the very first moment of contact with the court, the 
individual applicant (I) signs that s/he is represented by the victim throughout the 
proceedings, provided that the deciding authorities accept the victim status of the 
individual. One could re-phrase the confirmation as: I confirm that the victim is 
speaking. (signature). The I can, from now on, only speak as the victim when s/he 
wants to be heard within the legal framework. It is the (legal) definition of the victim 
that determines what can be heard and consequently also regulates who can speak.222
                                                 
220 The field assistants, and the intermediaries of national NGOs as native informants will be discussed 
in Chapter 8. 
 
221 The issue of choosing representation will be discussed in the next part on legal representation.  
222 The notion of the victim will be unfolded throughout the dissertation. The question of who may 
speak as the victim will be analyzed in the next Chapters 6 through 8. 
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The contours of the victim are decisive for the legibility and illegibility within the 
practice of victim participation at the ICC. 
1.1.3.2. Collectivization: From individual to individualized 
participation 
Collectivization can be observed in three forms in the process of 
institutionalization of the application process. Firstly, the application process in the 
Gbagbo proceedings is designed as a partly collective approach, applicants are urged 
to form groups to fill in group forms. Secondly, the application forms are individual 
and the grouping is subsequently organized by the Registry and thirdly, voices of the 
victims (accepted or not, registered or not) are to be presented “in a general way” by 
the VPRS and/or the legal representatives.  
The overall topic of dealing with many individual applicants is effectively 
“managing numbers”223
Since this tendency is contrary to the principal of individuality as it is established 
in the Rome Statute, especially in the Gbgbo case, the tension this caused became 
obvious. The Chamber had to re-iterate the acknowledgement that the harm is still 
perceived as an individual harm. and that the process is only partly collective. The 
justifying argumentations follows a pattern that will be unfolded in the following 
chapters. While turning a generally individual process into a mostly collective one, 
 while collecting and storing the core information of each 
victim. The victim becomes - the group of victims, becomes the victims. This process leads 
to the marginalization and homogenization of individual stories since the victims story 
can be transmitted “in a general way”, thereby it is clear that the individual stories in 
the application forms do not even reach the Chambers any longer. This also 
illustrates that it is not the individual traumatic memory that is of relevance at The 
Hague. Victims and their stories are effectively managed (mainly by the VPRS and 
LRVs) implying that victims are something to be managed and the ICC organs are 
the managers. The victims are passive and unorganized masses to be managed by the 
ICC in the application process. This is a pattern that can be observed throughout the 
practice of victim participation. Basically, from the point of view of The Hague it 
suffices when the Registry and/or the LRVs speak for or about the victims.  
                                                 
223 “Over one thousand is still feasible.” Interview with LRV, 25/6/2014. 
176 
 
individuality is still perpetuated in a sense, that participation is said to remain 
meaningful (individual) while collectivization is necessary to allow effective 
proceedings to be conducted. In this vein, a representative told me:  
“Well until now the application is conceived as an individual process and they, 
meaning the victims, they consider themselves individuals even if they are 
grouped for the purpose of representation. For them it is important that they 
are recognized as an individual.”224
Given the process of collectivization, it is the task of their representatives to give 
the victims the feeling to be recognized individually, which is different to being 
recognized as an individual. 
  
1.1.3.3. Externalization: Pre-selecting relevant information 
Another important development in the application forms is the space provided 
for the description of what happened and the effect this had on the applicant.  
In the beginning there is free space to describe the events in as much detail as possible 
and to also describe which effect the crimes had on the life of the applicant and 
others around him or her. In the latest forms, the applicants could only confirm that 
they had suffered harm from one or more of the listed crimes by ticking the 
respective boxes. The same procedure applies to the resulting harm. This limitation 
from individual information to strictly relevant information under the law is 
furthermore reflected in the reduced page number of the application forms. From 17 
to 1-2 pages. Thereby the notion of the victim to which the individual has confirmed 
to belong (in the individual declarations) is reduced to a legally pre-described image. 
This image is subsequently not being influenced by the victims themselves but it is 
defined and shaped by what the Chambers consider necessary. The relevant 
information with regard to what happened and the effects of what happened are pre-
defined by the ICC to be the crimes and the allegedly resulting harm, which is 
physical, psychological, material, or other. It is not the applicant who decides what is 
the relevant information with regard to the crimes and the harm to transmit to the 
ICC, but the other way around. There is no more space for different emphasis, 
different wording, generally everything that makes information that are included in 
forms in any way more personal. There is no more space for individual stories about 
                                                 
224 Interview with LRV, 16/6/2014. 
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the traumatizing violence and its effects. The language provided for traumatic 
violence is crimes and for the effects it is harm. Thereby complexity, homogeneity and 
feelings are decisively reduced or even effaced from the image of the victims, at least 
during the application process. The own words of individual applicants are hardly 
ever represented in the process. Against the backdrop of the noble goals of 
participation, the development goes from telling one’s story to ticking boxes. The 
transformation of individual applicants into the victims as object of a bureaucratic 
process is the exact opposite of what is propagated. Instead, the victims are 
streamlined within the application process according to the legal requirements set at 
The Hague and thereby everything that is not required by the law is foreclosed. The 
subjective accounts are externalized within the strictly legal proceedings to the 
interactions between the LRVs, intermediaries etc. with those for and about whom 
they are speaking.  
1.1.3.4. Opposition? Emphasizing the meaningful 
As has become relatively clear from the analyses of the application process, the 
victim is addressed by the court in the first formal contact as someone who is already 
represented, the individual dissolves in group representation and becomes the victims 
and the selection of the relevant information required is undertaken by the Registry 
and the Chambers. The irritation this caused, particularly against the backdrop of the 
telos of victim participation propagated by the Court, is negotiated within the tension 
of effective and meaningful. The fact that even the limited information provided in the 
application forms are in most cases not assessed by the Chambers, and therefore not 
perceived by the Judges anymore, raised the opposition of the LRVs in Ntaganda. As 
described, they filed a joint submission reminding the Chamber of the telos of victim 
participation - truth and justice - and that victims should meaningfully contribute to 
the “truth to be established and the Justice to be done.”225
                                                 
225 Legal Representatives of Victims,  Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Joint submissions in accordance 
with the “Order Scheduling a Status Conferenceand Setting a Provisional Agenda”issued on 21 July 
2014, ICC-01/04-02/06-351, 14 August 2014, para 19. 
 Interestingly, the legal 
representatives emphasize that participation, to be meaningful, implies having one’s 
story heard within the legal framework, and not only providing the possibility to tell 
it. Thereby, they touch upon the core problematic of representation. The meaning of 
speaking is being heard, without the listener, speaking has no effect and is therefore 
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meaningless - symbolic. This is what they add to the pair of meaningful and effective - 
symbolic.226
                                                 
226 Joint submissions in accordance with the “Order Scheduling a Status Conferenceand Setting a 
Provisional Agenda”issued on 21 July 2014, Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06-351, 14 
August 2014, para 19. 
 Participation has to be meaningful and effective as opposed to purely 
symbolic, indicating that without being heard, victim participation in general is 
reduced to a symbolic act. That the victim has a symbolic, in a sense of legitimizing, 
function for the ICC is discussed in Part I Chapter 2. But this is a conclusion that 
cannot be openly discussed within the practice of legal representation. In order to 
fulfil the symbolic function, the fiction of the legitimizing narratives of creating a 
framework of meaningful and effective participation, where victims’ views and 
concerns are spoken and heard has to be uphold. The legal representatives threaten 
to reveal the symbolic nature of participation. Nevertheless, instead of radically 
calling into question the feasibility and revealing the emptiness of meaningful and 
effective, which can be filled in any way possible, the legal representatives 
acknowledge the framework by emphasising the meaningful. They are still complicit 
in a way that they confirm the narratives perpetuated in the rhetoric and the 
illusionary believe that at some point there is truth and justice and that the access of 
the victims to the truth and the justice can be organized in a meaningful and effective way. 
They adhere to the notion of legal closure elaborated in the previous chapter. The 
Chambers decision taking into consideration the LRV’s submissions shows that they 
are not considerate of the problematic of hearing, or put differently, they remain in 
the strictly legal rationale of hearing. Namely admissibility- what could principally be 
used within a judgement - determines what is heard in the proceedings. Thereby the 
Chamber re-iterates the legal framework of speaking and hearing. In so doing they 
also determine that the relevant truth is the outcome of the proceedings. And only 
that which fulfils the evidentiary threshold becomes part of the final truth which 
does justice. Thereby the irritations of the possibility of meaningful and effective 
participation caused by adding the symbolic dimension is decided upon. The basic 
legitimizing gap revealing the dependency of the Court on the victims when doing justice. 
The justice gap opens up - and - is closed.  
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1.2. The organization of legal representation 
The tensions occurring during the application phase and the respective strategies 
of representation, collectivisation and externalization within the development of the 
now used modality of application are prevailing in the search for an effective and still 
meaningful mode of legal representation as well. One can easily imagine that the legal 
representation of 4160 victims, in the latest Ongwen case, is a challenge. Arriving at 
the current model of legal representation, applied in the Ugandan situation and the 
Ongwen case, was a struggle throughout which many different modalities were 
developed by the different Chambers. One could rightfully say, that the legal struggle 
fought by the LRVs in the cases is exemplary for the opposition to the development 
of the current model of representation, which is considered to be most effective. The 
trend goes to "in house representation", basically because it is resource saving, 
according to the Chambers.227 As indicated in the application forms, where the 
victims were first asked whether they have legal representation and whom they would 
choose, in the last forms they were simply asked if they have problems with being 
represented by one single lawyer, possibly from the OPCV.228
"Legal representatives of victims 
 Given this 
development, it is clear that the choice of legal representation first granted to victims 
was sacrificed for the more efficient version of common legal representation by the 
OPCV and a field assistant. The Chambers, as is the case with all matters concerning 
victim participation have a large scope of discretion designing the representational 
framework, interpreting the central norm Rule 90 RPE:  
1. A victim shall be free to choose a legal representative. 
2. Where there are a number of victims, the Chamber may, for the purposes of 
ensuring the effectiveness of the proceedings, request the victims or particular 
groups of victims, if necessary with the assistance of the Registry, to choose a 
common legal representative or representatives. In facilitating the coordination 
                                                 
227 Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Laurent Gbagbo, Decision on Victims' Participation and Victims' Common Legal Representation at 
the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in the Related Proceedings, 4 June 2012, ICC-02/11-01/11-
138, para 45; Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire in the case of the Prosecutor 
v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, Directions on the conduct of the proceedings, 3 
September 2015, ICC-02/11-01/15-205, para 70; Trial Chamber IX, Situation in Uganda in the case 
of the Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, Decision on the ‘Request for a determination concerning legal 
aid’ submitted by the legal representatives of victims, 26 May 2016, ICC-02/04-01/15-445, para. 12. 
228 See Annex A Part F, Annex B with the presupposition of free choice, Annex D presupposing 
common legal representation and Annex E lacking any question with regard to legal representation.  
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of victim representation, the Registry may provide assistance, inter alia, by 
referring the victims to a list of counsel, maintained by the Registry, or 
suggesting one or more common legal representatives. 
3. If the victims are unable to choose a common legal representative or 
representatives within a time limit that the Chamber may decide, the Chamber 
may request the Registrar to choose one or more common legal representatives. 
4. The Chamber and the Registry shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that in 
the selection of common legal representatives, the distinct interests of the 
victims, particularly as provided in article 68, paragraph 1, are represented and 
that any conflict of interest is avoided. 
5. A victim or group of victims who lack the necessary means to pay for a 
common legal representative chosen by the Court may receive assistance from 
the Registry, including, as appropriate, financial assistance. 
6. A legal representative of a victim or victims shall have the qualifications set 
forth in rule 22, sub-rule 1."  
Furthermore, regulation 80 of the RoC specifies that,  
"Appointment of legal representatives of victims by a Chamber  
1. A Chamber, following consultation with the Registrar, may appoint a legal 
representative of victims where the interests of justice so require.  
2. The Chamber may appoint counsel from the Office of Public Counsel for 
Victims." 
The central tension of legal representation is illustrated in these norms. In 
principle victims can choose a legal representative, but in the interest of effectiveness 
– and/or in the interest of justice - the Chamber with the assistance of the Registry 
may group victims and choose common legal representation for them. Generally, the 
regulations are based on the right to a counsel, which includes the freedom to choose 
counsel. But in practice this proved cumbersome and now the application of Rule 90 
(2) RPE in combination with regulation 80 RoC became the rule rather than the 
exception. Furthermore, although in principle otherwise regulated, it is unclear how 
the victims are involved in this process. Against the backdrop of the representational 
practices framing who is speaking for whom, this practice makes clear that one can 
hardly speak of the victims’ voices at The Hague any more. Legal representatives are 
the voices of the victims at the court and the victims themselves in the minority of 
cases chose their own representatives. Sometimes, Chambers even decided against 
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the expressed will of the participating victims.229 Above that, similar to the 
development in the application phase, victims are more and more collectivised and 
the numbers of participating victims represented by a single LRV are increasing.230
To illustrate these developments, I will proceed by analysing the decisions relying 
on Rule 90 RPE taken by the Chambers in the different cases before the Cout 
framing legal representation.  
 
Furthermore, the processes of consultations between lawyer and clients are very 
obscure, different types of intermediaries and field assistance play an important role 
here. Accordingly, the chain of representation from The Hague to the individual 
victim is further prolonged.  
1.2.1. Lubanga/Katanga231
In the beginning, as foreseen in the RS and the RPE, the appointment of external 
legal counsels as legal representatives was the rule. During the Pre-Trial Phase the 
victims who were granted participatory rights were represented by the lawyers they 
chose. There were only four victims participating represented by three external 
lawyers.
 : External legal representation 
232
                                                 
229 See the discussion of the Chambers decisions in the situation of Darfur, Sudan in the case of the 
Prosecution v. Banda and Jerbo, in the following; 1.2.3. and the Trial Chamber decision to change the 
LRV from Pre-Trial to Trial Phase, in the following: 1.2.7.. 
 During the confirmation of charges hearing, lawyers represented the 
victims with the assistance of the OPCV. However, at that early point in time and 
given the few victims participating, it seems that the Pre-Trial Chamber simply did 
not consider it necessary to impose common legal representation. Nevertheless, in 
the first decision on victim participation issued by Trial Chamber I in the Lubanga 
proceedings, it was considered necessary to adhere that 
230 See the development discussed below in 1.2.1. from the case of the Prosecution v. Lubanga, to the 
case of the Prosecution v. Bemba, 1.2.2. In the Kenyan cases, the voices of the victims shall be 
represented in a general way, not eben referring to the individual participants any longer, see 1.2.7. 
231 In the most recent case, three victim applicants have all indicated their wish to be represented by 
the same external lawyer, who was on the list of counsel and therefore appointed by the Chamber as 
the common legal representative in the case. Trial Chamber VIII, Situation in the Republic of Mali in 
the case of the Prosecutor v. Ahmad al Faqi Al Mahdi, 'Decision on Victim Participation at Trial and 
on Common Legal Representation of Victims', 8 June 2016, ICC-01/12-01/15-97-Red, para 38. 
232 Legal Representative of Victims, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of 
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Written submissions of the legal representative of victim 
a/0105/06, 1 December 2006, CC-01/04-01/06-745-tFR; Legal Representative of Victims, Situation 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 
Observations made during the confirmation of charges hearing on behalf of Victims a/0001/06, 
a/0002/06 and a/0003/06, 4 December 2006, ICC-01/04-01/06-750-tEN. 
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“the personal appearance of a large number of victims could affect the 
expeditiousness and the fairness of the proceedings, and [given] that the 
victims’ common views and concerns may sometimes be better presented by a 
common legal representative”233
This line of argumentation anticipates an important pattern that can be traced 
throughout decisions on participation and representation. This pattern is underlying 
the development up to the common legal representation of all victims participating in 
a case as one group by one LRV. At that point in time, however, compared to the 
numbers of victims participating in the more recent cases, the number of 146 
persons participating in the Lubanga Trial Phase was relatively low, all the more so, 
as they were represented by five teams of lawyers.
.  
234
„the language spoken by the victims (and any proposed representative), links 
between them provided by time, place and circumstance and the specific crimes 
of which they are alleged to be victims will all be potentially of relevance.“
 When taking into consideration 
the possible need to organize common legal representation, the Trial Chamber 
anticipated the following considerations: 
235
The Chamber then agreed with the submissions of the legal representatives of 
victims that decisions under rule 90 RPE should not be rigid  
 
„and instead will depend on whether at a certain phase in the proceedings or 
throughout the case a group or groups of victims have common interests which 
necessitate joint representation. The Chamber accepts the defence submission 
that this approach should promote clarity, efficiency and equality in the 
proceedings.“236
The approach actually taken is unique, and the Chamber already indicated that the 
practice might not become the rule. In the following decisions, common legal 
representation was progressively pre-defined by the Chambers, especially, when the 
practice changed to only applying regulation 80 RoC without even considering the 
 
                                                 
233 Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor 
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on victims’participation, 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-
1119, para. 116. 
234 See, Case Information Sheet, ICC-PIDS-CIS-DRC-01-015/16_Eng. 
235 Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor 
v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on victims’participation, 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-
1119, para 124. 
236 Ibid., para 125. 
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sequential structure for the selection of common legal representation underlying rule 
90 RPE.237
In the second Congolese case against Katanga, initially, during Pre-Trial Phase 
there were eight external legal representatives, who were appointed by their clients. 
The OPCV represented those who were yet unrepresented. For the Trial Phase, Trial 
Chamber II considered it necessary, given the increasing number of applications, to 
organize common legal representation.
 
238 The guidelines leading the decisions were 
that participation through legal representatives should be as meaningful as possible as 
opposed to being purely symbolic, to that end there should be a steady and reliable flow of 
information to the victims and real involvement of the victims.239 At the same time 
the Chamber considers itself to be duty-bound to ensure efficient proceedings with 
appropriate celerity. Thus, the participation of victims should not have a too heavy 
burden on the defence.240 Furthermore, while acknowledging that victims are in 
general free to choose a legal representative, “this right is subject to the important 
practical, financial, infrastructural and logistical constraints faced by the Court.”241
“Common legal representation is the primary procedural mechanism for 
reconciling the conflicting requirements of having fair and expeditious 
proceedings, whilst at the same time ensuring meaningful participation by 
potentially thousands of victims, all within the bounds of what is practically 
possible.”
 
And,  
242
For these reasons, in the end of the Trial Phase two external counsel were 
appointed for 366 participants. The group of victims was divided into former child 
 
                                                 
237 I will elaborate on this in the next paragraphs. Generally, it is striking that the development is 
similar to the development at the ECCC, where common legal representation of all victims as one 
group is now mandatory while in the beginning a strictly individual approach was envisaged, see Part I 
Chapter 1.  
238 Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Order on the organisation of common 
legal representation of victims, 22 July 2009, ICC- 01/04.01/07-1328.  
239 Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Order on the organisation of common 
legal representation of victims, 22 July 2009, ICC- 01/04.01/07-1328, para 10. 
240 Ibid., para 10. 
241 Ibid., paras 10-11. 
242 Ibid., paras 10-11. 
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soldiers and other victim participants.243 The common legal representatives were 
asked to “both represent(ing) the common interests of the victims during the 
proceedings and for acting on behalf of specific victims when their individual 
interests are at stake.”244 Two lawyers representing participants during the Pre-Trial 
Phase were appointed as common legal representatives in the Trial Phase.245
1.2.2. Bemba: External legal representation 
 
In December 2008, The Single Judge representing Pre-Trial Chamber III in the 
case against Jean-Pierre Bemba, rendered a decision requesting all victims recognized 
in the case to choose one common legal representative from the Central African 
Republic.246
To ensure the effectiveness of the Pre-Trial proceedings the Judge considered it 
appropriate for those who were granted victim status to present their views and 
concerns through a single common legal representative.
  
247
“allege to have suffered of mainly similar crimes, which occurred on the 
territory of the Central African Republic (the “CAR”) and were allegedly 
committed by the same group of perpetrators” wherefore “one common legal 
representative, preferably from the CAR, should be chosen by all victims...” 
The criteria applied are “(i) the language spoken by victims, (ii) links between 
them provided by time, place and circumstances (iii) the specific crimes of 
which they allege to be victims, (iv) the views of victims, and (v) respect of local 
traditions.”
 Noting that all 
participants, 
248
Those who objected to being represented by a common legal representative were 
represented by the OPCV.
 
249
                                                 
243 Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Order on the organisation of common 
legal representation of victims, 22 July 2009, ICC- 01/04.01/07-1328, paras 9-10. 
 
244 Ibid., para 13.  
245 Registry, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, “Désignation définitive de Me Fidel Nsita Luvengika 
comme représentant légal commun du groupe principal de victimes et affectation des victimes aux 
différentes équipes”,  22 September 2009, ICC‐01/04‐01/07‐1488. 
246Pre-Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic in the Case of the Prosecutor v. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Fifth Decision on Victims’Issues Concerning Common Legal 
Representation of Victims, 16 December 2008, ICC-01/05-01/08. 
247 Ibid., para. 7. 
248 Ibid., para. 9. 
249 Ibid., para. 12. 
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The Trial Chamber then decided that two common legal representatives were to 
represent participating victims during trial, the groups were formed following a 
geographical logic.250
„(a) the need to ensure that the participation of victims, through their legal 
representative, is as meaningful as possible, as opposed to purely symbolic; (b) 
the purpose of common legal representation, which is not only to represent the 
views and concerns of the victims, but also to allow victims to follow and 
understand the development of the trial; (c) the Chamber's duty to ensure that 
the proceedings are conducted efficiently and with the appropriate celerity; and 
(d) the Chamber's obligation under Article 68(3) of the Statute to ensure that 
the manner in which victims participate is not prejudicial to or inconsistent 
with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.“
 Basically the criteria developed in the jurisprudence of the court 
has been applied:  
251
In the specific circumstances of the case, the Chamber urged the Registry to put 
particular emphasis on “the need to respect local tradition.” 
 
252 For this reason, the 
ability “to speak the victims’ language, share their culture and know their realities” 
was considered to be crucial for representation “to be more meaningful”.253
“such an approach could facilitate communications between the common legal 
representatives and the represented victims. This should further ensure that the 
victims’ views and concerns are effectively transmitted to the parties and the 
Chamber during the trial proceedings.”
 The 
Chamber is of the view that:  
254
Since the decision was taken only shortly before the commencement of the trial, 
the Chamber considered that the “views of each victim on such issue can only be 
taken into account to the extent possible.”
 
255 In addition the Chamber referred to 
rule 90 (5) RPE and the possibility of a common legal representative being chosen by 
the court. Victims who are dependent on financial assistance only “have limited 
freedom of choice to select their own legal representative.”256
                                                 
250 Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on common legal representation of victims for the purpose of trial, 
10 November 2010, ICC-01/05-01/08-1005.  
 Given the envisaged 
time constraints, the Chamber considered it unlikely that all victim participants could 
251 Ibid., para. 9. 
252 Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on common legal representation of victims for the purpose of trial, 
10 November 2010, ICC-01/05-01/08-1005, para 11.  
253 Ibid., para 11.  
254 Ibid., para. 11. 
255 Ibid., para, 14.  
256 Ibid., para. 16.  
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be asked individually whether they would agree or not to common legal 
representation as foreseen in an application form of the VPRS.257
“to assist the legal representatives of victims rather than representing individual 
victims in court. [...] It is only “where appropriate” that the OPCV may appear 
before the Chamber, and solely “in respect of specific issues”. This restrictive 
wording supports the interpretation according to which the OPCV should not 
act, in principle, on behalf of individual victims.”
 With regard to the 
role of the OPCV, the Chamber held that it is primarily  
258
This is remarkable given the changing jurisprudence hereon, which will be 
elaborated in the next sections. 
 
1.2.3. Banda/Jerbo: Prelude 
The Banda and Jerbo case is discussed as one of the turning points in the practice 
of legal representation concerning the Registry’s approach to common legal 
representation and consultation with participating victims.259
During the Pre-Trial Phase the applicants for participation were represented by 
six external counsels of their own choice.
  
260
“counsel may be intending to use these proceedings, despite its repeated failed 
attempts, as a vehicle to express the views of the Government of the Sudan 
(“GoS”) and its President, who is currently refusing to recognize the authority 
and jurisdiction of this Court.“
 However, already before the case being 
accepted for trial, the Prosecution and the Defence in the case objected to two legal 
representatives, holding that their proximity to the Sudanese government, and more 
particularly to President Al Bashir, suggests that the  
261
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to restrain legal representatives for the victims a/1646/10 & a/1647/10 from acting in proceedings 
and for an order excluding the involvement of specified intermediaries, 6 December 2010, ICC-
02/05-03/09-113.  
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For the Trial Phase, the Chamber ordered the Registry to start consultations on 
the organization of common legal representation. After consultations with the 
Registry, the former legal representatives of participating victims submitted joint 
observations on this matter. 262 They proposed an own approach to legal 
representation in the case, involving three groups of victims, taking into 
consideration the distinct interests of the victims and the views expressed by them on 
their priorities regarding representation. These three teams of representatives 
proposed to work together to ensure that the interests of victims are commonly 
represented, sharing time allocated for them in court, pages for submissions, etc. 
Thereby, no extra time would be needed. Furthermore, they submitted that only two 
teams needed legal aid.263
Referring to the instructions by the Chamber to finalize the consultation process 
and inform the Chamber of the common legal representative, the Registry then 
submitted a report and a proposal.
 
264 According to the Chamber’s instructions, the 
Registry should either inform the Chamber of the common legal representative 
chosen by the victims, or alternatively, in case the victims are unable to choose a 
common legal representative, to submit an own proposal. In the respective report it 
is submitted that, although the Registry has not been able to meet directly with 
victims, they were unable to choose representation, wherefore the Registry asked for 
an extension of time limit for its own proposal.265
                                                 
262 Victims’ Legal Representatives, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the case of The Prosecutor v. 
Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Joint Observations of Victims’ 
Legal Representatives on Common Legal Representation, 18 July 2011, ICC-02/05-03/09-182. 
 The reasoning for this 
argumentation is twofold. On the one hand, the Registry argues that, without 
assistance, victims are often not able to agree on common legal representation and 
that given the inability of the Registry to provide the needed assistance in this case, 
263 Ibid., para.15. 
263 Victims’ Legal Representatives, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the case of The Prosecutor v. 
Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Joint Observations of Victims’ 
Legal Representatives on Common Legal Representation, 18 July 2011, ICC-02/05-03/09-182. 
264 Registry, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the case of The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer 
Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Report on the organization of common legal 
representation, 5 August 2011, ICC-02/05-03/09-187; Registry, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the case 
of The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Proposal 
for the common legal representation of victims, 25 August 2011, ICC-02/05-03/09-203. 
265 Registry, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the case of The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer 
Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Report on the organization of common legal 
representation, 5 August 2011, ICC-02/05-03/09-187. 
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due to limited resources and time, the victims were unable to choose. 266
“this proposal emanates not from the victims themselves but from the current 
legal representatives of the victims. […] Moreover, the document does not 
detail the views expressed by the victims themselves or the circumstances in 
which they might have been provided to the lawyers.”
 On the 
other hand, it is alleged that the joint observations on common legal representation 
submitted by the former legal representatives of the participating victims cannot be 
regarded as an agreement among the victims themselves. Explaining that 
267
For these reasons, the Registry submits its own proposal based on rule 90 (3) of 
the RPE. On this occasion, it summarized the practice of organizing common legal 
representation hitherto and developed recommendations for the present case and for 
further proceedings.  
 
1.2.4. Excursion: Registry report on the organization of common legal 
representation 
The development of the so called new approach is divided into three parts, the 
legal framework, the practice to date and finally the recommendations. Generally, the 
Registry endorses an open and transparent selection of legal representatives. 
Referring back to Trial Chamber II in Katanga, reminding the Chamber of the 
principal behind the organization of common legal representation, which is to 
“reconcile the conflicting requirements of having fair and expeditious proceedings, 
whilst at the same time ensuring meaningful participation...”268
“However, given logistical and security considerations, it is apparent that in 
practice a proposal is likely to be made by victims only rarely, and then only if 
the Registry is in a position to provide significant assistance. It is perhaps in 
recognition of this reality that rule 90 enables the Chamber to recognize that 
victims are unable to choose a common legal representative, and thus requests 
the Registry to do so.”
 Against this backdrop, 
it is acknowledged that in principle, according to the legal framework provided for in 
rule 90 RPR, priority is given to victims’ own proposal for legal representation.  
269
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Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Proposal for the common legal representation of 
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Anticipating and suggesting that this will become the rule, despite the different 
structure of rule 90 RPE, the Registry submits their new approach. Reconsidering the 
former approach which favored counsel that were already active in the case, 
meaning, counsel who were already representing victims in the case, the Registry 
concludes that this should only be one criterion among others. Given that it would 
“tend to reward and encourage the practice among counsel of “fishing for victim 
clients”.270
“[Q]uestions may be raised as to whether the victims have had a real, informed 
choice about their representation. Furthermore, they are likely not aware of 
other options for legal representation and can be ill-equipped to assess the 
relative skill and professionalism of the lawyer contacting them as compared 
with others. While lawyers involved in this practice might sometimes have 
qualities which are desirable in a victims’legal representative, this is not 
necessarily the case.”
 In this respect, 
271
The new approach, also applied in the Kenyan cases, should promote the best 
quality of victim representation before the court.
 
272
First, the Registry, according to rule 90 (4) RPE develops recommendations with 
respect to the number and composition of victim groups. The Registry notes that of 
course there are a variety of different interests among victims and seeks to identify 
those which are substantial enough to justify separate representation.
  
273
“[T]he Registry considers it inevitable that cases before the Court will involve 
victims who have suffered various forms of harm. This does not of itself mean 
that the victims have different interests. Where the victims’ interests relate 
 Therefore it 
differentiates between conflicting and distinct interests as provided for in rule 90 (4) 
RPE. In the present case it does not see any conflicting interests and only discusses 
distinct interests. In the latter case, it holds that the interests must be substantially 
different to justify separate representation. Typical distinct interests may arise 
because of a different harm from which the individual victims suffered. Hereon,  
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principally to a desire for justice and/or reparations, these interests may 
substantially coincide.”274
Another distinct interest of victims, which, according to the Registry was often 
voiced by the victims wanting to participate is to be represented by a person from 
their country, speaking the language.
  
275
“The Registry understood these requests to stem above all from a desire to 
achieve mutual understanding and good and regular communication. The 
Registry considers this to be an important goal, but one which could be 
achieved through ensuring a legal team with multiple members which includes 
different languages and countries of origin in composition. The Registry has 
not received information from the victims or from the legal representatives 
suggesting that such an approach would not meet their concerns.”
  
276
After discussing the particularities of the present case, which includes concerns to 
the contrary voiced by legal representatives, the Registry recommends to “arrange 
one team with sufficient and appropriate members to represent the entire group of 
victims.”
 
277
This is reflective of a general view advocated by the Registry, that there are 
considerate advantages of minimizing group numbers and arranging victim 
participation and representation through as few groupings and corresponding legal 
teams as appropriate.
 
278 Given concerns raised with regard to lacking procedures of 
consultation with victim participants on this issue, the Registry contends that this is a 
problem, especially in the present case, “[H]owever victims’ views as presented to the 
Registry in previous meetings have been taken into account “.279
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In the next step, the selection criteria and the respective weigh accorded to them 
are outlined and discussed. Beyond the minimum criteria laid out in Rule 22 RPE 
which primarily apply to the defense counsel, the Registry takes into account what 
they consider to be the particularities of victim representation and participation.280
“the counsel’s interventions in the proceedings, including compliance with ICC 
procedures, communication with their clients, communication with the Court, 
submissions filed, appearances at hearings. As far as possible from the 
information available, the extent and nature of interactions with represented 
victims should also be assessed. Ideally this should also involve the receipt of 
victims’ views regarding their representation to date, however it is recognized 
that such views are difficult to obtain without direct and private interactions 
between the Registry and victims, which may not always be possible.”
 
Concerning the criteria considered, whilst acknowledging the exceptionality of the 
situation where the victims being granted participatory rights already established a 
relationship of trust to a legal representative, the Registry urges to not put undue 
weight on such a relationship because this could be detriment of other important and 
desirable characteristics. With that said, the extent to which the present legal 
representative is better placed than others is taken into account concerning a trust 
relationship and familiarity with the case in question, but other factors will equally be 
applied. The information used to check the criteria, is  
281
The procedure subsequently applied is to assess applications by counsel who are 
interested and available and produce a shortlist of candidates who are then asked to 
answer a set of questions. Based on the results an interview panel is created, 
composed of Registry staff from the VPRS and the Counsel Support Section. This 
panel eventually makes recommendations.
 
282
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For the Banda and Jerbo case this meant that the Registry recommended that the 
victims participating should not be divided into groups, but be represented by one 
team that is sufficiently equipped to represent the entire group of victims.283
1.2.5. Banda/Jerbo: The struggle 
 
The Registry’s recommendation caused opposition among the currently 
representing counsel of victims. In a joint observation they clarified the position of 
the participants they are representing and their bewilderment about the new 
approach taken by the Registry. 284 They alleged that none of the participants has 
been consulted prior to the filing of the recommendations. Given this lack of 
consultation with victims they emphasize the procedure foreseen in rule 90 RPE, 
namely the prerogative of a choice made by the victims themselves before the 
Registry may propose a common legal representative.285 In a second observation they 
respond to the allegations made by the Registry that the submissions by the legal 
representatives concerning the choice of legal representation did not actually 
represent the views and concerns of the represented victims.286 They question the 
basis for this assumption, especially against the background of the admitted fact that 
participating victims themselves could not be consulted on this issue.287
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The LRVs selected by the Registry, who initially submitted their views in the joint 
submission discussed, now that they were appointed by the Chamber, submitted new 
observations in response to the request for reviewing the proposed appointment of 
legal representatives.288 They allege that, with the exception of the two legal 
representatives of the participating victims from Darfur, all former legal 
representatives transmitted their files and assisted in the transfer of their clients. 
Concerning the argument made by the respective legal representatives that the 
participants from Darfur have distinct interests. They submit that, from a legal 
perspective, the interests are neither conflicting nor separate, “since the aim to seek 
redress for harm caused by one and the same attack, and to demonstrate that the 
attack was illegal and a war crime” is common to the victims who are only granted 
participatory status because they suffered harm from the same attack.289
“underscored the wish to have taken into account the close cultural and social 
links which had been forged between those representatives and the victims over 
the course of two years, but did not highlight conflicts of interest between the 
various victims in their aim to obtain reparations and to see those responsible 
for the war crimes at the root of their suffering face international justice.”
 According to 
the newly appointed common legal representative, the joint observations submitted 
before 
290
In a further step, it is argued that the fact that all other victims participating 
accepted the new LRVs shows that rule 90 (1) RPE should not be considered 
absolute and could be consistent with rule 90 (2) and (3) RPE.
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 According to the 
observation, a close reading of the statements made by the two victims from Darfur 
“causes puzzlement and casts doubt on their credibility and probative value in that it 
raises questions as to whether they are the genuine, direct and totally uninfluenced 
289 Ibid., paras 24-27.  
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expressions of the victims themselves.”292 Given the background of the main 
intermediary who assisted the victims to draft the English statements, the common 
legal representatives doubt that there was no pressure on the victims to sign.293
1.2.6. Banda/Jerbo: The decision 
 
The final decision taken by the Trial Chamber in the case mainly endorsed the 
Registry’s new approach.294 Re-interpreting rule 90 RPE, it re-emphasizes that the 
rule does not contain an absolute right to be represented by a legal representative of 
one’s choice. The contextual and literal interpretation showed that it has been drafted 
in a sequential manner. Once the Registrar acts under rule 90 (3) RPE, the choice is 
with the Registry and not with the participants any more.295 The question at hand in 
the present case is, whether the Registrar acted in violation with rule 90 RPE in 
proposing a common legal representative, while disregarding the proposal made by 
the former legal representatives. In conclusion, the Chamber holds that it was a mere 
proposal and as such not binding to the Registry, which in turn was legitimately 
applying their own criteria, which have been fully endorsed by the Chamber.296 The 
Chamber does not address whether, given the proposal of the legal representatives of 
the victims, the Registry could legitimately assume that the victims were unable to 
choose. In the following elaborations, it goes on discussing whether the Darfuri 
victims have distinct interests that render separate representation necessary, which is 
denied.297
“the absence of “direct” consultation with the victims was not prejudicial to the 
two victims as their views were largely conveyed through their legal 
representatives. The Chamber is persuaded that these views will continue to be 
 In a last step the lack of any direct consultation with the respective victims 
concerning their distinct, or conflicting interests is addressed, which, according to 
their former representatives would amount to a violation of regulation 79(2) RoC. 
Declaring that a consultation process does not mean that the wishes will be satisfied, 
the Chambers concludes that 
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appropriately expressed through the Appointed Legal Representatives, who will 
act in accordance with the Code of Conduct to best serve the interests of their 
clients.”298
It is unclear, why for the purpose of determining whether the participating victims 
have distinct or conflicting interests, the submissions by the legal representatives 
suffice to express the views and concerns of the victims, while the proposals made by 
the same representatives do not express the genuine views and concerns of the 
victims with regard to the choice of legal representation. Why despite the joint 
observations of the legal representatives proposing a mode of representation, the 
Registry legitimately assumes that the victims were unable to agree on common legal 
representation. 
 
Finally, the two former legal representatives filed an application for leave to 
appeal the decision of the Trial Chamber pursuant to article 82(1)(d) RS, rule 155 and 
regulations 33 and 65 RPE. Since this right to seek leave to appeal a decision is 
exceptional and not designated for victims, they had to demonstrate that the 
impugned decision “would significantly affect the fair and expeditious conduct of the 
proceedings, and for which an immediate resolution by the Appeal Chamber may 
materially advance the proceedings.”299 The Chamber rejecting the leave to appeal 
simply held that the former legal representatives have no standing to seek leave to 
appeal, since they are no party to the proceeding and that their submissions do not 
meet the requirement that the decision significantly affects the fair and expeditious 
proceedings.300
1.2.7. Kenya: Mixed approach 
  
The Kenya Pre-Trial and Trial Phase is reflective of the above outlined new 
approach of the VPRS to impose common legal representation on victims and the 
opposition this caused among participants who were already represented by lawyers 
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of their choice. It is illustrative of decisions taken at The Hague without any 
consultation with the affected victims and even more so, against the explicit wish of 
the participating victims. In bypassing rule 90 RPE, and directly referring to 
regulation 80 of the RoC, the Chambers in both Ruto and Sang and Kenyatta et al. 
thereby avoided the procedure of consultation with participating victims foreseen in 
the RPEs altogether.301
Participants, in the Pre-Trial Phase have already appointed lawyers of their choice 
to represent them during the proceedings. Nevertheless, the Single Judge, referring to  
  
„the number of victims admitted as participants in the present proceedings and 
with the view to ensuring meaningful victims' participation as well as fairness 
and expeditiousness of the proceedings, is of the opinion that common legal 
representation should be provided for the victims hereby admitted as 
participants and that all of them should be represented by a single common 
legal representative“302
The Pre-Trial Chamber, following the submissions of the Registry argued that 
although continuity of legal representation is one criteria for the selection of legal 
representation, it is one among others and in the present case, the others outweighed 
continuity. It referred to criteria developed by the VPRS in its report on the new 
approach going beyond the legal requirements, based on previous experience and 
jurisprudence:  
 
„First, the candidate "should demonstrate an established relationship of trust 
with the victims or the ability to establish such a relationship". In considering 
this criterion, the Registry has taken into account whether a candidate: (i) 
already represents the victims in the case or in the situation at stake; (ii) has an 
engagement with victims in other fora; (iii) is known to the victims as a human 
rights advocate or a community leader; (iv) shares cultural, ethnic, linguistic 
heritage with all victims, or part of them; and (v) will enable victims to speak 
frankly about the crimes experienced.“303
Endorsing these criteria the Pre-Trial Chamber decided that 
 
                                                 
301 See, a very critical review of the representational system: REDRESS; Representing Victims before 
the ICC: Recommendations on the Legal Representation System, April 2015, p. 12. 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/1504reprentingvictims.pdf, last accessed 
02/02/2017. 
302 Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the Case of the Prosecutor v. William 
Samoe Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, 5 August 2011, ICC-01/09-01/11-249, 
para 65. 
303 Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the Case of the Prosecutor v. William 
Samoe Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, 5 August 2011, ICC-01/09-01/11-249, 
para 69. 
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"the benefits of continuity of representation are minimal in respect of the 
existing private legal representatives in the present case", since the Registrar is 
not convinced either (i) that "the current legal representatives have established 
meaningful relationships of trust with significant number of their clients" or (ii) 
that "counsel's representation to date in this case indicates a particular 
familiarity with ICC proceedings".304
 
  
On the basis of the criteria the Registry conducted a selection process that did not 
imply consultation with victim. The process is comprised of:  
„(i) a request for expression of interest sent to the lawyers on the Registry's list 
of counsel; (ii) an initial review of the candidates who provided the information 
requested; (iii) an evaluation of written answers to questions on the proposed 
approach towards legal representation of victims; and (iv) a telephone 
interview.“305
In a request to reconsider the appointment of common legal representation in the 
case, the former lawyers submitted that the represented victims do not agree to being 
represented by the selected candidate, who was imposed on them. Moreover, they 
emphasize that the motion contains the views and concerns of the victims 
represented and “is not just the result of an agreement between them and the legal 
representatives that have worked with them”.
 
306 The participating victims complained 
that they were at no point in time consulted and that the procedure culminating in 
the decision to appoint remained obscure to them.307 This lead to a situation where 
neither the LRV knows the participants nor the participants know who is to be 
representing them. Given the short time left before the Confirmation of Charges 
hearing (three weeks), it is impossible to build a relationship of trust which in turn 
renders a meaningful representation impossible.308
                                                 
304 Ibid., para 75. 
  
305 Ibid., para 76. 
306 See, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the Case of the Prosecutor v. 
William Samoe Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Motion from Victims 
a/0041710, a/0045/10, a/0051/10 and a/0056/10 requesting the Pre-Trial Chamber to Reconsider 
the Appointment of Common Legal Representative Sureta CHANA for All Victims, 31 August 2011, 
ICC-01/09-01/11-314, paras. 5-6. 
307 Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the Case of the Prosecutor v. William 
Samoe Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Motion from Victims a/0041710, 
a/0045/10, a/0051/10 and a/0056/10 requesting the Pre-Trial Chamber to Reconsider the 
Appointment of Common Legal Representative Sureta CHANA for All Victims, 31 August 2011, 
ICC-01/09-01/11-314, paras 11-12. 
308 Ibid., para. 13.  
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Beside the issue of representation itself, the victims were of the opinion that they 
were deprived of their right to request a review of the legal representative chosen for 
them, provided for in 90 (3) RPE. The decision on this request was filed after the 
confirmation of charges hearing already took place, therefore the decision on who 
speaks legitimately for the participating victims at this central stage of the 
proceedings was factually taken before.309 In the respective decision on the bespoken 
motion, the Pre-Trial Chamber then replies that since the decision to appoint the 
common legal representative was based on regulation 80 (1) RoC and not on rule 90 
RPE, no possibility of seeking review is foreseen.310
„The Applicants attached four annexes containing declarations signed by 
victims a/0041/10, a/0045/10, a/0051/10 and a/0056/10, in which these 
victims allegedly oppose the appointment of Ms. Chana as their legal 
representative.“ 
 Also, the Chamber throughout 
the decision contends that “the victims allegedly oppose” the common legal 
representative appointed, implying that the legal representatives are not speaking on 
behalf of the victims, despite the fact that signed declarations are annexed to the 
motion.  
311
In response to the lawyers’ request on behalf of their clients to express views and 
concerns in person, when there is no decision on legal representation, or when they 
are still not willing to be represented by the foreseen candidate, the Single Judge 
holds that,  
 
                                                 
309 The Single Judge somewhat sarcastically states in the last paragraph, that „Lastly, since the confirmation 
of charges hearing in the present case is over, the Request for Postponement becomes moot.“, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the Case of the Prosecutor v. William Samoe Ruto, Henry 
Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on „Motion from Victims a/0041710, a/0045/10, 
a/0051/10 and a/0056/10 requesting the Pre-Trial Chamber to Reconsider the Appointment of 
Common Legal Representative Sureta CHANA for All Victims“, ICC-01/09-01/11-330, 9 September 
2011, para. 19. In fact, against this backdrop to a certain extent most of her decisions are practically 
moot, nevertheless this demonstrates clearly how the efficiency of the proceedings is overweighing 
even the most fundamental issues of legal representation.  
310 Ibid., para 15. 
311 One of the indications for this allegation is that two of the victims already met with the „new legal 
representative“ in the presence of the „old“ one before the motion was submitted and that in the 
motion they then state that they never have seen the „new“ representative. Pre-Trial Chamber II, 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the Case of the Prosecutor v. William Samoe Ruto, Henry 
Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on „Motion from Victims a/0041710, a/0045/10, 
a/0051/10 and a/0056/10 requesting the Pre-Trial Chamber to Reconsider the Appointment of 
Common Legal Representative Sureta CHANA for All Victims“, ICC-01/09-01/11-330, 9 September 
2011, paras 5,16.  
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„the Statute provides that any views and concerns that the victims can have 
may be presented by the legal representative. The Single Judge considers that, 
unless otherwise decided, the legal representative of the 327 victims admitted to 
participate in the present case is and remains Ms. Chana. Accordingly, the views 
and concerns that any of these victims may wish to express may be exclusively 
presented through Ms. Chana. Thus, the Request for Expression of Views and 
Concerns is also rejected.“ 312
In fact, given a second change in representation ordered by the Trial Chamber, 
this decision on the motion after the Confirmation of Charges Hearing took place 
was only manifesting legally, what has already been decided practically. Namely, these 
participants could neither chose representation, nor were they asked whether they 
agreed, and when they made their dissenting view explicit (through other 
representatives) it was not believed that this was their view and decided otherwise. 
Even the wish to not being represented by the common legal representative in the 
case was denied.  
 
When the cases moved to Trial, the LRV was again replaced, a completely new 
model was applied and once again, participants were not consulted beforehand. In 
the initial decision on victim representation and participation during Trial, the Trial 
Chamber listed the requirements applied by the other Chambers:  
„(a) the need to ensure that the participation of victims, through their legal 
representative, is as meaningful as possible, as opposed to purely symbolic; (b) 
the purpose of common legal representation, which is not only to represent the 
views and concerns of the victims, but also to allow victims to follow and 
understand the development of the trial; (c) the Chamber's duty to ensure that 
the proceedings are conducted efficiently and with the appropriate celerity; and 
(d) the Chamber's obligation under Article 68(3) of the Statute to ensure that 
the manner in which victims participate is not prejudicial to or inconsistent 
with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.“313
Against the backdrop of these requirements, the Chamber found it necessary for 
the LRV to be based in Kenya. They believed that the geographic proximity 
enhances communication between the LRV and his/her clients. In order to 
practically implement this, the Chamber decided that,  
 
„the OPCV will, as stated above, be permitted to attend all hearings in which 
victims are allowed to participate. It will be the responsibility of the OPCV to 
                                                 
312 Ibid., para 18. 
313 Trial Chamber V, Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the Case of the Prosecutor v. William 
Samoe Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on victims' representation and 
participation, 3 October 2012, ICC-01/09-01/11-460, para 59. 
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communicate with the Common Legal Representative, who will instruct the 
OPCV to make submissions on his or her behalf.“314
Thereby an entirely new model was created, with the principal counsel being 
based in Nairobi and the OPCV being representative in the courtroom at The 
Hague. Only at central stages of the proceedings, f.e. opening and closing statement, 
the lead counsel is allowed to address the court at The Hague. The former common 
legal representative refused to relocate to Kenya and submitted that she could 
nevertheless carry out her duties appropriately.
 
315 Regardless of the submissions by 
the VPRS and the OPCV, the Chamber, Judge Eboie-Osuji dissenting316, decided 
that the requirement to be located in Kenya is crucial and that given the 
unwillingness of the former legal representative, a new LRV is appointed to represent 
the participating victims.317 The Chamber repeatedly states, that this is in the best 
interest of the participating victims without having consulted with said victims in 
advance.318
Against the background of the modified application system described above in 
combination with this model of representation applied without further consultation, 
the Kenyan model is one of the most externalized and collectivized representational 
practice. The LRV, who was not chosen, represents all victims, registered or not, as 
participating victims. For most of the time this external LRV is not present in the 
courtroom, while the counsel from OPCV are in the courtroom, but hardly ever 
directly meet the victims they represent. Furthermore, the voices of those victims 
who do not register “shall nevertheless be voiced, in a general way, through common 
legal representation.“
  
319
                                                 
314 Ibid., para 60. 
 
315 Trial Chamber V, Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the Case of the Prosecutor v. William 
Samoe Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision appointing a common legal 
representative of victims, 23 November 2012, ICC-01/09-01/11-479, para 4. 
316 Judge Eboie-Osuji valued continuity over proximity. 
317 Trial Chamber V, Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the Case of the Prosecutor v. William 
Samoe Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision appointing a common legal 
representative of victims, 23 November 2012, ICC-01/09-01/11-479, paras 6-7. 
318 Ibid., para 8.  
319 Trial Chamber V, Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the Case of the Prosecutor v. William 
Samoe Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on victims' representation and 
participation, 3 October 2012, ICC-01/09-01/11-460, para 52.  
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1.2.8. Gbagbo/Ntaganda - OPCV as LRV 
Another practice developed is to appoint a counsel of the OPCV to be the LRV 
of participants in a case pursuant to rule 80 (2) RoC.  
The approach of the Registry before making its proposal to the Pre-Trial 
Chamber basically reflects the new approach, described previously. As a result,  
“[T]he Panel recommended, inter alia, the name of principal counsel and 
identified a person of Ivorian nationality as a suitable candidate to be the team 
member based in the field. With respect to the latter, the Panel submitted that 
this counsel had demonstrated a "strong understanding of the case as well as of 
the local political context", concluding that this person would have the capacity 
to provide the Lead Counsel with "first-hand experience of the local context 
and a capacity to rapidly obtain the trust of victims in the case." The Registrar 
indicated that the costs of the proposed common legal representative would 
likely rely on the Court's legal aid scheme under rule 90(5) of the Rules.”320
Concurring with the Registry on the proposed team structure (lead counsel, field 
assistant and case manager) and endorsing the criteria applied, the Single Judge, 
however, given the short time remaining before the confirmation of charges hearing, 
decided to apply rule 80 (2) RoC. In this context, the Single Judge appoints the 
OPCV as principal counsel with experience and expertise of proceedings before the 
Court and a field assistant, paid from the legal aid fund, who “would provide the 
Principal Counsel with valuable complementary experience and expertise that will be 
required for the representation of victims in the case, and in particular the capacity to 
rapidly become familiar with the team's clients' circumstances and views.”
 
321
According to the Single Judge “this is the most appropriate and cost effective 
system at this stage as it would enable to combine understanding of the local context 
with experience and expertise of proceedings before the Court, without causing 
undue delay in the case at hand.”
 
322
                                                 
320 Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Laurent Gbagbo, Decision on Victims' Participation and Victims' Common Legal Representation at 
the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in the Related Proceedings, 4 June 2012, ICC-02/11-01/11-
138, para. 39. 
  
321 Ibid., paras 43-45. 
322 Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Laurent Gbagbo, Decision on Victims' Participation and Victims' Common Legal Representation at 
the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in the Related Proceedings, 4 June 2012, ICC-02/11-01/11-
138, para 45. 
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The system though may be revisited at a later stage in light of the views and 
concerns of victims.323
In the Trial Phase the cases of Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé were 
joined. Since in both cases the same approaches to common legal representation 
were taken (the same victims were granted participatory status), for the purpose of 
deciding on this issue the joinder did not have any relevance. In the requested report 
and proposal by the Registry, it recommends the continuation of the combination of 
OPCV and field assistant based in Abidjan, since 91 % of the victims consulted 
expressed a respective wish.
 Thereby, for the first time, the Pre-Trial Chamber only partly 
adopts the proposal of the Registry and applies rule 80 (2) RoC appointing the 
OPCV as an ICC-based counsel for the common legal representation of participating 
victims.  
324 The OPCV submitted information on the precedent 
communication with participants in the cases.325 And finally, the Trial Chamber 
approved of this model and appointed the OPCV as principal counsel in the Trial 
Phase, it finds that “[U]nder these circumstances, […] the current system meets all of 
the requirements for effective and fair representation of victims, and decides that it 
should be maintained during trial proceedings.”326
In Ntaganda, the Pre-Trial Chamber asked the Registry from the beginning to 
take the OPCV as possible common legal representative into account when 
consulting with victims and making a proposal. Accordingly, the Registry while 
pointing at 213 applicants who attached power of attorney for six lawyers to their 
application, recommends to consider the distinct interests of the group of former 
child soldiers and the victims of the child soldier’s attacks and form two groups 
commonly represented by two legal representatives.
 
327
                                                 
323 Ibid., para 45. 
 The OPCV submits that they 
324 Registry, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire in the case of the Prosecutor v. Laurent 
Gbagbo ,“Report on the Legal Representation of Victims for the Purpose of the Trial pursuant to 
Decision ICC-02/11-01/11-800”, 30 April 2015, No. ICC-02/11-01/15-49-Conf-Exp.  
325 OPCV, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire in the case of the Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo 
and Charles Blé Goudé, Information on Common Legal Representation of Victims in the 
proceedings, 15 May 2015, ICC-02/11-01/15-53-Red. 
326 Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire in the case of the Prosecutor v. Laurent 
Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé, Directions on the conduct of the proceedings, 3 September 2015, 
ICC-02/11-01/15-205, para 70. 
327 Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Concerning the Organization of Common Legal 
Representation of Victims, 2 December 2013, ICC-01/04-02/06-160, paras. 10-14. 
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can constitute two distinct legal teams lead by principles counsels from their office.328 
In her analysis the Single Judge comes to the conclusion that there are diverging 
views among victims with regard to legal representation and that none of the victims 
who have expressed preferences for lawyers have not indicated if they would pay for 
them. Hence, she assumes that these victims would rely on the legal aid scheme of 
the court, which in turn lead her to “to appoint, pursuant to regulation 80 of the 
Regulations, two counsel from the OPCV as common legal representatives of the 
two groups of victims that will be admitted in due course.”329
The Trial Chamber then reconsidered common legal representation balancing the 
need to be familiar with the case with the preference of a Congolese lawyer for 
reasons of proximity to the victims. 
Again they are 
supported by a local field assistant.  
“In this regard, it considers that proximity to the victims does not necessarily 
require physical proximity. Any counsel representing victims should have 
knowledge of the victims' culture, the context in which the alleged crimes took 
place (i.e. the armed conflict) and - in order to assess the impact of the alleged 
crimes on the individual victims - also the circumstances in which the victims 
live.”330
Accordingly, the majority found that the counsels of the OPCV have proven a 
high degree of understanding of the situation on the ground and of the needs of 
victims in general and sees no reason for changing the system of common legal 
representation.
 
331
1.2.9. Ongwen: The compromise: OPCV or External legal 
representation? 
 Judge Ozaki dissented to this decision, her argumentation will be 
addressed later on.  
In the recent decisions on victim participation and representation the tension 
between the external LRVs and “in house” representation culminated in an éclat. 
Organized victims in Uganda chose external counsels and the latter requested to be 
                                                 
328 Ibid., para 14. 
329 Ibid., para 25. 
330 Trial Chamber VI, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Second decision on victims' participation in trial proceedings, 16 June 
2015, ICC-01/04-02/06-650, para 28. 
331 Trial Chamber VI, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Second decision on victims' participation in trial proceedings, 16 June 
2015, ICC-01/04-02/06-650, paras. 29, 31, 32. 
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appointed by the Pre-Trial Chamber in the case against Ongwen. The Single Judge 
decided that the participants may be represented by the two counsels and appointed 
the OPCV to represent the yet unrepresented victims who were admitted to 
participate. At the same time, it was decided that the expenses for legal 
representation are not covered by the legal aid scheme, since the counsels were not 
appointed by the Chamber, and Rule 90 (5) RPE only refers to representatives 
chosen by the Court. Those victims who depend on legal aid have to join the victims 
who are represented by the OPCV, since they were chosen by the Court and hence 
all expenses are covered.332 De facto this would have meant that almost all victims 
would have to change legal representation. Predictably, this caused strong resistance 
by victims NGOs who wrote a letter to the court, calling upon the Registrar’s 
prerogative to decide on legal aid for victims and to reconsider to appoint the 
counsels according to the victims’ choice.333 Trial Chamber IX subsequently issued a 
decision confirming the Pre Trial Chamber’s ruling334
„Indeed, different policy considerations underlie the scheme established by 
Rule 90 of the Rules which is intended to provide a balance between the 
victims’ right to choose their own legal representative(s), on the one hand, and 
the effectiveness of the proceedings and cost containment, while preserving 
victims’ participatory rights before the Court, on the other hand.“
, emphasising that underlying 
tension within victim participation is regulated through rule 90:  
335
Finally, the decision remained with the Registrar, who may „decide on its own the 
LRVs’ further request for legal assistance paid by the Court according to Regulation 
85(1) of the Regulations.“
  
336
                                                 
332 Trial Chamber IX, Situation in Uganda in the case of the Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, 
Decision on Requests Concerning Organisation of Victim Representation , 17 June 2016, ICC-02/04-
01/15-476. 
 Which he subsequently decided to do. This decision 
finally put an end to the discussion through a compromise. The Chamber did not 
change its jurisprudence but directed the Registry to decide with regard to legal aid. 
333 http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/1611letter%20registrar.pdf, last accessed, 
30/01/2017. 
334 Trial Chamber IX, Situation in Uganda in the case of the Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, 
Decision on Requests Concerning Organisation of Victim Representation , 17 June 2016, ICC-02/04-
01/15-476. 
335 Trial Chamber IX, Situation in Uganda in the case of the Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, 
Decision on the ‘Request for a determination concerning legal aid’ submitted by the legal 
representatives of victims, 26 May 2016, ICC-02/04-01/15-445, para. 12.  
336 Trial Chamber IX, Situation in Uganda in the case of the Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, 
Decision on Registry’s Request for Clarification on the Issue of Legal Assistance Paid by theCourt for 
the Legal Representatives of Victims, 14 November 2016, ICC-02/04-01/15-591, para. 3. 
205 
 
Nevertheless, the problematic tension that is underlying the mantra-like appeal to 
meaningful and effective victim representation at the ICC, while practically turning Rule 
90 RPE upside down, is not solved. Reversing the logic of Rule 90 RPE while still 
appealing to meaningful representation, when meaning was initially attached to 
individual choosing of one’s LRV, is once again reflective of the obscuring of the 
silencing effects of the decisions taken.  
1.3. Collectivisation, representation and externalization 
The developments in the practice of legal representation vividly reflect the 
problematic of the institutionalization of victim representation. Firstly, it shows how 
the tension between meaningful and effective is negotiated and filled with meaning, while 
also re-iterated almost mantra-like when actually emptying the previously constructed 
meaning, given the increasing numbers of participating victims and the respective 
grouping processes. In this vein, the explorations on legal representation are 
illustrative of the argumentative structure referring to the victims genuine interests - 
which is in a next step - without consultation - defined by the Registry, the LRVs and 
the Chambers respectively. Thereby, the notion of the victims addressed in the 
application forms takes shape. Within the negotiations of what is meaningful and effective 
and what the interests of victims are, there is a strong mainstream interrupted by 
opposition from legal representatives and by the separate opinion voiced by Judge 
Ozaki.  
1.3.1. Representation: who is represented by whom and who decides?  
Since legal representation is the rule in the proceedings before the ICC, the legal 
representatives have a pivotal role as those speaking for victims at The Hague and 
communicating with participants throughout the proceedings. Therefore, they are 
situated in between the victims and the court, representing the victims at the court and 
the court vis á vis the individual participating victims. For this reason, it goes without 
saying that the selection of these legal representatives is crucial within the 
representational practices of victim participation. As became clear from the 
foregoing, in theory, victims could choose someone who represents them according 
to their ideas of how they want to be represented in the legal proceedings. 
Principally, in a counsel-client relationship, the counsel has to report and consult 
with the client, thereby the client can ensure that his or her interests are represented 
206 
 
appropriately. Certainly, there is no representational practice that is totally 
transparent and it is not least the legal language that can never be an exact 
representation of the voice of the client. Still, in this part I will only address the 
personal selection of representation that already implies a lot of implicit images of the 
victim and the proper legal representatives constitutive of the proper proceedings and the 
proper outcome of the trials. These implicit images are shaped in the process of 
negotiating the rule of personal choice provided for in rule 90 (1) RPE (meaningful), 
with the possibility of choosing for the victims provided for in 90 (3) RPE (effective) 
against the backdrop of the increasing numbers of victims who apply. As has been 
shown, the tendency is even to resort to regulation 80 RoC, while still somehow 
referring to meaningfulness of representation to uphold the fiction of the 
legitimatizing narratives of victim participation.  
The exception to the rule of choosing legal representation is already laid out in the 
very first decision on legal representation of victims in the proceedings. From then 
on, this rule was gradually undermined. The Registry propagates an approach where 
at best one representative can speak for all victims who are granted participatory 
status in the proceedings. The requirement for this approach to be transparent and 
meaningful is prior consultation with the victims. Once again, this rule was 
undermined in different manners with different lines of argumentation, culminating 
in the reinterpretation of expressly voiced objections by victims, and/or the outright 
disregard of views and concerns. Generally, participants do not chose who speaks 
about them in the proceedings before the ICC.   
1.3.2. Collectivization: grouping and managing numbers 
From the very beginning, the predictable large numbers of participating victims 
caused the Chamber in Lubanga to indicate that common legal representation will 
become the rule rather than the exception. For the organization of this common legal 
representation two main criteria are central to determine how groups are formed, 
distinct and conflicting interests (see Rule 90 (4) RPE). Deviating from the principle 
of individual choice and individual representation – collective representation swiftly 
became the rule, and criteria were developed how grouping should be organized. 
Following the Registry’s recommendations, the starting point is one group of all 
participants being represented by one LRV. Only if the Chamber is convinced that 
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there are distinct and conflicting interests among the participating victims, this group 
is divided. Interestingly, with regard to defining the interests that could be distinct, or 
conflicting and the reasons for diverging interests, no consultation with the 
concerned victims themselves is foreseen. The primary indication referred to when 
deciding whether there are distinct or conflicting interests among the victims is the 
harm suffered as a result of the crimes. Hence, a decision on the grouping of victims 
is taken on the basis of the information in the application forms, which was gradually 
limited. Until now, the only cases where the Registry proposed separate 
representation for the reason of conflicting interests is former child soldiers and the 
victims of the crimes allegedly committed by these soldiers. For any other cases, the 
Registry argues, that given the fact that it is inevitable to have victims participating 
who have suffered from various forms of crimes, this does not per se constitute a 
conflict of interest. After all, victims’ principal interests are considered to be justice 
and reparations - regardless of the diverse crimes, contexts, personal situations etc. 
The legal representatives in Banda and Jerbo similarly held that victims’ interests are 
basically to seek redress for the harm caused and to have the illegality acknowledged 
thereby supporting the definitions of the Registry and the Chambers. 337 These 
conclusions are made after a legal analysis, without having spoken to the participants 
concerned. In this particular case, the participants from Darfur expressly, through 
their former legal representatives, voiced opposition to being grouped together with 
all the other victims participating in the case. The argumentation to overrule this 
opposition is that although a consultation process is principally foreseen and 
appreciated, this does not imply that the wishes will be satisfied. The Chamber is 
convinced that the views and concerns can adequately be represented together in a 
group of victims.338
                                                 
337 Common Legal Representative of Victims, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the case of The 
Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Observations in 
response to the request for review of the proposed appointment of common legal representation, 12 
October 2011, ICC-02/05-03/09-230-tENG, paras 24-27.  
 Also, when distinct interests are voiced among the group of 
victims, the legal representatives are obliged to reflect this in their submissions and, 
in case there is an irresolvable conflict of interest, separate legal representation is 
provided for. In the latter case, the OPCV represents a group within the group. 
338 Trial Chamber IV, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the case of The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda 
Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Decision on common legal representation, 25 
May 2012, ICC 02-05/03/09-337, para 50. 
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Similarly, in the Kenyan cases, it is assumed that LRV can represent interests “in a 
general way” 339
By way of conclusion, the victims are defined by the suffering caused by the crimes 
tried and remedied at the ICC and grouped accordingly. Also, the justice, victims are 
allegedly longing for, is the justice provided for in the legal proceedings at The 
Hague. On the one hand, the possible interests of victims that could be distinct, or 
conflicting are hereby streamlined to what the court can deliver, which stabilizes the 
image that the court is bringing justice to victims. On the other hand, victims’ 
interests are homogenized which perpetuates the developments laid out in the 
application process. At the same time diverging, or conflicting interests can 
principally not even be heard, because they were pre-defined in the application forms 
and no consultation is foreseen. This practice externalizes all complexity and diversity 
and, as a consequence thereof, the potential for the irritation of the propagated image 
is reduced.  
, implying that the interests of the group of participating victims are 
basically the same. In the other cases, there was no (visible) opposition to being 
summarized in one group and represented by on LRV of the OPCV, therefore the 
exclusionary effects of the decisions, forcing a heterogeneous group of people into 
one group assuming a common interest, did not appear that obviously.  
Obviously, this leads to huge groups of victims being represented by only few 
persons and in court by one legal representative. The legal representatives are the 
ones who have to reconcile individuality and collectivity, heterogeneity and 
homogeneity, complexity and simplicity. They have to organize the transmission of 
many individual views and concerns in one oral or written submission. When being 
asked about groups, the sizes of groups and the everyday practice of representation, 
the legal representatives I interviewed, on the one hand reproduced the image of a 
homogenous group, while on the other hand pondering about the difficulty of 
actually getting to know what each individual participant is concerned about. Taking 
into consideration the possibility to hold individual meetings and group meetings, the 
                                                 
339 Trial Chamber V, Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the Case of the Prosecutor v. William 
Samoe Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on victims' representation and 
participation, 3 October 2012, ICC-01/09-01/11-460, para 52.  
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respective organization and preparation and lastly the micro-power processes within 
the group, which admittedly remained obscure.340
„...at least in our experience, they are normally quite homogenous, uniform I 
would say in what they are asking.“
  
341
„...we travel and we have group meetings with people, because if you represent 
20 it is fine, you can have individual meetings, but if you represent hundreds it 
is a little bit difficult. So, it is sometimes easy to group them depending on 
events or age. Normally, you do not consult people over 50 years and older 
together with somebody who is 15. They do not grasp the same concept, they 
do not have the same way of interacting with you, so you need to be a little bit 
cautious, when you group them. Normally, what we do is we contact the 
assistant in the field. The person is briefed and then this person goes back to 
the victims and then back to us. If there is a specific question some of us travel 
to the field. It depends also a lot on the capacity of the assistant. We normally 
tend to recruit someone with a legal background, because of cause this 
facilitates a lot the communication and the way in which you collect.“
 
342
“I do not know when you ask me about victim participation it is more the 
challenges that come to my mind, how are you going to deal with large 
numbers of victims…how can you assure that they communicate with the court 
in an effective manner…?”
 
343
The perception that victims are a homogenous group, is partly due to the 
undifferentiated legal pre-definition of legitimate interests. Almost every interest 
voiced by victims can somehow be subsumed under truth, justice and reparations. 
The perception of victims as homogenous or heterogenous depends decisively on the 
perspective taken and on the proximity to them. The heterogenous views and 
concerns are ideally assorted by the field assistants who prepare the meetings before 
the LRVs talk to their clients.
 
344
                                                 
340 See also, the statements on how group-leaders, spokespersons and intermediaries are selected. 
Field-notes, 22/3/2014. 
 Concerning the perspective taken, when hearing 
participants through the legally pre-defined categories and definitions, for example of 
distinct and conflicting interests, legal representatives often just reproduced the 
Chambers ruling:  
341 Interview LRV, 16/6/2014.  
342 Interview LRV, 16/6/2014. Similarly, Interview LRV, 15/3/2014: “... dass es so viele Opfer sind, 
dass man gar nicht jeden einzeln ansprechen kann, dass man eben versucht zu rotieren und samples 
aus verschiedenen Gruppen, die nach Wohnort eingeteilt werden, dass man immer wieder versucht 
verschiedene Leute anzusprechen und sozusagen rotiert.“ . 
343 Interview LRV, 25/6/2014. 
344 A situation that was illustrative of this pre-selection responsibility of Kituo at Nairobi, was, when 
they were asked to gather victims who can talk about different experiences for a scientific study for 
which a variety of experiences was crucial. At some point it feels like: “Ordering the right victim”. 
Field notes, 9/1/2014. 
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„Because when legal representation is organized, it is to avoid any conflict of 
interest. The only conflict that could have a reason is, if, for example, victims of 
the attacks were together with child soldiers, which never happened...they are 
not mixed. And in any case, they have the same interest. There is no conflict of 
interest.“345
The argumentation is that, when the ruling of the Chamber, that there is no 
conflict of interest, was applied, there can be no conflict of interest apart from the 
legally acknowledged conflict between former child soldiers and victims of the 
attacks. It seems as if the legal pre-definitions of what distinct and conflicting 
interests could be strongly influence the perception of legal representatives. They 
reproduce the image that victims’ primary interests are truth, justice and reparations 
under which almost everything can be summarized. Thereby the legal representatives 
pre-select and sort out illegitimate interests before they could be represented at The 
Hague.
 
346 There was a discrepancy between the explanations given with regard to the 
homogenous interests of victims represented and the descriptions of ways of 
communication with many participants. The elaborations at first were very clear and 
convinced, but when asked how communication with victims and individual 
meetings are actually organized, the explanations got more vague. Some 
representatives emphasised that they met with each participating victim individually 
for at least 30 minutes347, when summing up the 30 minutes per victim in the 
respective case, it became clear that this was impossible within the number of days 
mentioned. Other representatives admitted that individual meetings were not always 
possible, only in the course of years, one manages to meet every single participant. 348 
The prevailing form of organizing contact seems to be group-meetings.349
In conclusion, with regard to defining distinct and conflicting interests among 
participating victims for the purpose of grouping, the Chambers, the Registry and the 
LRVs speak about victim’s interests. Since the interests are pre-defined and assumed 
 
                                                 
345 Interview with LRV, 19/6/2014; similarly, Interview with LRV, 20/6/2014. 
346 This was a common scheme. And if legally illegitimate interests were voiced, they saw their task in 
explaining the victims what their legitimate interests can be. Furthermore, those interests that could be 
met by the court are determining the questions asked. When, in a meeting at Kituo we were talking 
about getting to know the interests of victims, questions were not formulated in an open manner: 
What are you interests at this point in time? The aim was formulated to be: Empower victims to 
identify, articulate and express their needs with regard to their psychological and socio-economic situation. 
Thereby, the possible needs are already pre-defined. Field notes, 9/1/2014. 
347 Interview LRV, 25/6/2014.  
348 Interview LRV, 19/6/2014. 
349 Interview LRV, 15/3/2014, Interview LRV, 16/6/2014, Interview LRV, 25/6/2014, Interview 
LRV, 19/6/2014, Interview LRV, 27/6/2014. 
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without prior consultation, one can neither say that the legal representatives are 
speaking for victims, nor the Registry making the suggestions. Through the 
collectivization of participants into one group, the homogenization of interests fitting 
the rationale of the Court is facilitated. The practice already inherent in the 
application forms, namely that the participating victims are not addressed as 
individuals and always already represented by someone who is speaking about the 
victims is perpetuated in the practice of grouping and defining the respective interests. 
This is the silencing effect of collectivization within the practice of organizing legal 
representation.  
1.3.3. Externalization: selecting the right representatives 
The selection of those who speak for, on behalf, or about large groups of 
participating victims was until now a controversial process. Considering that legal 
representation is crucial within the practice of victim participation since victims 
hardly ever speak for themselves, the developments in selecting legal representation 
for victims rather than accepting the victims’ choice is yet another step in the 
direction of completely externalizing the voice of actually participating victims. Or, as 
a colleague of mine at Nairobi formulated, victims are being participated.350
                                                 
350 Interview NGO staff, 20/3/2014. 
 This 
passive role that is attributed to the participants themselves becomes very clear when 
analysing the line of argumentation in relation to the selection of legal representation. 
The image of the passive victim perpetuated in the practice of selecting is 
accompanied by the respective paternalistic notion of the competent, active court 
providing the necessary assistance. Once again, for the sake of effectiveness, victims 
are grouped and represented and to still consider the requirement of meaningfulness, 
it is argued that this is better for the victims themselves. Thereby, all interests that 
may be conflicting with the legally defined interests are, from the very beginning, 
excluded. This is even furthered by taking over the selection process of LRV. In the 
following we will see that the respective reasoning can take rather absurd forms, 
when, against the expressive will of participants, it is still argued that measures taken 
are in the interest of victims. The Registry recommendations in Banda/Jerbo is 
especially illustrative in this aspect.  
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According to the Registry, “The new approach should promote the best quality of 
victim representation”351
In Banda and Jerbo, the Registry firstly doubts that the submissions by the legal 
representatives are based on the real informed choice, because for the victims to 
make such a choice, they would have needed assistance. Assistance by the Registry, 
who were for practical reasons not able to provide this assistance. The Registry 
knows “what is desirable in a legal representative”, victims participating do not 
necessarily know what criteria are important. 
. The practice of selecting legal representation for victims 
and developing criteria without consulting with the actual clients begs the question 
who promotes the best quality for whom - who is of relevance, the actual victim, or 
the victims constructed by the registry to subsequently decide what is in the best 
interest of this victims. The line of argumentation when deciding against the expressed 
will of represented victims, illustrates the paternalistic stance taken by the Registry 
and the concurring image of the victims. 
352 Similarly, in the Kenyan case, the 
Chamber, in order to overrule the expressive opposition of victims, refers to it as 
alleged opposition. Whereas when referring to the legally defined victims’ interests, 
they refer to them as victims’ interests. 353
                                                 
351 Registry, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the case of The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer 
Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Proposal for the common legal representation of 
victims, 25 August 2011, ICC-02/05-03/09-203-Anx1, para. 11. 
 It is remarkable which criteria are now 
demanded of a genuine expression of victims’ views given that nearly each 
application for participation could be challenged if these criteria were applied. It is 
reflective of the practice of representation that these criteria are demanded when the 
view of participants may be conflicting with the interests of the court, and otherwise 
consultation is considered dispensable. This implies that the definition of the 
Chamber, the recommendations of the Registry and the submissions by the (right) 
legal representatives are neutrally representing the victims’ interests, whereas 
whenever there is opposition to these decisions, the views are not genuine and must 
have been partially influenced. In labelling these interests as alleged interest that are 
352 Ibid., para. 8, fn. 8. 
353 Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the Case of the Prosecutor v. William 
Samoe Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on „Motion from Victims 
a/0041710, a/0045/10, a/0051/10 and a/0056/10 requesting the Pre-Trial Chamber to Reconsider 
the Appointment of Common Legal Representative Sureta CHANA for All Victims“, ICC-01/09-
01/11-330, 9 September 2011, paras 5,16.  
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not genuine, or politically influenced, all non-fitting interests are excluded to 
maintain the image of the neutral, unpolitical Court.  
Furthermore, it becomes particularly clear that the victims are 
perceived/constructed to be in need of assistance. In need of assistance by the court. 
They are not addressed as subjects with agency, rather the (right) agency has to be 
activated by the court. Without the help of the Registry they are unable to make a 
choice - when in fact, they made a choice, just not the right choice according to the 
Registry. This is remarkable, since it suggests that rather than letting the victims make 
bad choices on their own, the Registry makes choices for them. This implies that the 
Registry is in a position to know better what is in the interest of victims than the 
victims themselves. The Banda and Jerbo case shows that the victims themselves are 
not accepted to be political. 354 Rather the court has to protect the victims from being 
politically instrumentalized, the participants themselves are not imagined as political 
subjects, but as merely wanting reparations and justice, like foreseen by the ICC. 355 
The truth, justice and reparations provided for by the court are unpolitical, whereas 
all other interests are always potentially political. The Court is a neutral and impartial 
institution wherefore organs of the Court are in the best position to assist the 
victims. This paternalistic stance continues when the Registry makes own 
recommendations356
                                                 
354 Office of the Prosecutor, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the case of The Prosecutor v. Abdallah 
Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Objection to the Continued 
Representation of Victims a/1646/10 and a/1647/10 by Messrs Geoffrey Nice and Rodney Dixon, 6 
December 2010, ICC-02/05-03/09-110, paras. 2-3; Defence, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the case of 
The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Application 
to restrain legal representatives for the victims a/1646/10 & a/1647/10 from acting in proceedings 
and for an order excluding the involvement of specified intermediaries, 6 December 2010, ICC-
02/05-03/09-113.  
, allegedly based on the victims’ interests, but in most cases 
without consultation of the participating victims. For example, the interest voiced by 
victims that they prefer a legal representative speaking their language is considered, 
but re-interpreted to mean that there has to be a field assistant with the same cultural 
background as sufficient. The weighting of different interests and the respective 
criteria is also finally done by the Registry, when deciding that the trust relationship is 
355 Registry, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the case of The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer 
Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Report on the organization of common legal 
representation, 5 August 2011, ICC-02/05-03/09-187, para. 5. 
356Registry, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the case of The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer 
Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Report on the organization of common legal 
representation, 5 August 2011, ICC-02/05-03/09-187. 
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less relevant than other criteria developed. In the best case, victims’ views are 
considered. This best case is when they concur with the selection of the Registry. 
Otherwise, the Registry’s assessment is pivotal. Thereby not only the victims’ 
interests are streamlined and controlled, but also the ones through whom the views 
and concerns are transmitted to The Hague, because their quality and performance is 
assessed by the Registry. In conclusion, the Registry recommends to form one group 
with one representative per case to become the rule and weigh their own assessment 
of the quality of legal representation over the assessment made by victims. 357
Yet again, this practice supports the legitimizing narratives perpetuated. The 
Court controls the selection of legal representation in the best interest of the victims. 
These interests are pre-defined in the practice of selection according to what the 
Court can deliver. Thereby, victim participation as it is practiced at the ICC generates 
the victims and the truth and justice they deliver accordingly. They are constructing the 
victim to exactly mirror the image the ICC draws of itself. The practice produces the 
perfect victim reproductive of the image of the benevolent efficient Western court. 
The opposition to this practice voiced in the submissions of the legal representatives, 
again re-emphasise the purpose of victim participation and re-iterates the rule as set 
in 90 RPE. They re-claim the authority to speak for the participating victims. 
Basically, it amounts to a struggle among legal representatives and the Registry over 
who legitimately may speak for the victims. This is the legal illustration of a struggle 
that was also reflected in my interviews. When arguing why they consider themselves 
to be good representatives as opposed to others, interviewees emphasised that they 
are able to organize and manage personal meetings with numerous clients, while at 
the same time being an expert in the legal proceedings at The Hague.
  
358 Thereby, 
they ensure that victim participation is meaningful and effective. Interestingly, this 
terminology was only used by my interview partners at The Hague. In Nairobi 
different emphasis and different wording was used, and in general doubts as to the 
feasibility of victim participation as it is foreseen were prevailing. 359
                                                 
357 Registry, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the case of The Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer 
Nourain and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Proposal for the common legal representation of 
victims, 25 August 2011, ICC-02/05-03/09-203-Anx2, para. 15. 
 Influential 
NGOs lobbying for what they consider to be victims’ interests are openly challenging 
358 See interviews LRVs, 20/6/2014; 26/6/2014.  
359 See interviews with LRVs, 15/3/2014; 20/3/2014; Interview with NGO, 20/3/2014. 
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the practice of legal representation as it emerged over the time. They emphasize the 
initial role of the OPCV as a supporting unit for external counsel and the advantages 
of the external counsel system.360
Either way, the victims are represented and removed from the process itself. The 
legal representatives and NGOs, adhering to the legal logic, are complicit in 
constructing the image of a passive victim without agency who is always already in 
need of assistance in order to speak. It then is the Chambers that ultimately and with 
the legal authority invested in them, decide, who authoritatively spoke for the victims 
and thereby determine what is considered as the victims’ interests.  
  
2. Conclusion 
“When it is managerialized and marketed, then what matters is not so much 
whether participation works, or is well done, but how it can help protect and 
advance institutional authority. Consequently, far from being taken up for 
people’s empowerment or democratic governance, PD [participatory 
development] is taken up, first and foremost, for institutional aggrandizement.“ 
(Kapoor 2008, p. 246)  
Similar to the ideal of participatory development as described by Kapoor in the 
quote, within the institutionalization process of the organization of application and 
representation at the ICC, if participation still works (meaningfully) faded into the 
background of effectively managing participation while still symbolizing the 
benevolent institution. However, meaningful and effective participation, each apart 
from the other, is always already lacking, and since the meaning attributed to each is 
binary, they are irreconcilable. Against this backdrop, the decisions by the Chambers 
defining meaningfulness and effectiveness, reaching for a just decision, can only fail. 
Because legal reasoning reaches for finality and closure, the fresh judgements taken 
within the practice of victim application and representation are inherently violent to 
irreducible complexity, heterogeneity and diversity. With regard to representational 
practices, these decisions always have a silencing effect. Within the application 
process and the practice of legal representation, the silencing manifest in practices of 
representation, collectivization and externalization.  
                                                 
360 Letter to the Registry on behalf of the VRWG, 17 August 2011, 
http://www.vrwg.org/VRWG_DOC/2011_08_17_VRWGLetter.PDF, last accessed 1/2/2018. 
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The effect of representation could be observed in two dimensions, the 
assumption that there is always already someone representing the participants and 
the image of the victims that is a representation of those victims who participate in the 
proceedings. First, the participants are represented by someone helping them to fill 
in the application forms, someone who is supposed to speak about the applicants. 
Then, the LRVs are selected for the participants and have to represent their clients’ 
interests in a general way. This is possible because a legal representation of victim’s 
interests is always already legally assumed. All other interests are not heard – they are 
described to be not genuine, or not relevant within the legal framework.  
Collectivization took place through grouping victims already for the purpose of 
filling in application forms and subsequently as the victims suffering harm from the 
crimes tried at The Hague grouped to be represented by one legal representative. The 
grouping is organized according to the representation of victim’s interests that fits 
the self-legitimizing image of the Court. Thereby, all diverging interests, all 
complexity, heterogeinity, individuality, the personal is externalized from the 
proceedings at The Hague. This is furthered by providing less and less space for 
information about possible interests of the participating victims in the application 
forms. Now, the traumatic violence is represented by crime – ticking the respective 
box in the form. And the effects of trauma on the participants is represented by harm. 
These representations also determine how the participants are grouped since the 
definition of distinct and conflicting interests is made accordingly.  
The individual participants signs in the application form that s/he belongs to the 
victims. The victims are represented in one group and in most cases, they do not know 
who is representing them before the proceedings start. Only with the time, 
communication between representatives and their clients is established. Those 
working directly with the participants - those who have to reconcile complexity and 
simplicity, heterogeneity and homogeinity, individuality and collectivity, the 
meaningful and the effective- introduce the ghost of the symbolic function of the 
victims for the Court. The legal narrative of meaningful and effective while basically 
turning the norm, Rule 90 RPEs, upside down, deriving from the underlying 
preference for individual choice moving towards prescribed collective representation, 
is questioned. Meaning is related to hearing and without ensuring that the 
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participants are heard within the proceedings - victim participation is purely 
symbolic. This challenge of the legal framework is closed again by the Chamber. The 
Judges re-iterate the legal framework of speaking and hearing and decide that only 
what can be heard within this framework can be meaningful. The justice gap is closed 
and the ghost of the symbolic - the meaninglessness of criminal legal proceedings for 
the participants foreclosed. 
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Chapter 6: Subject I 
1. Shaping “the victims” 
As has been established in the previous chapter, “the victims” is a representation 
the individual victim has to accept in order to be participated at the ICC. In fact, it is 
often the legal representatives who speak and who are addressed as the victims in the 
written communications in the proceedings. Hence, “the victims” potentially signifies 
the group of participating victims, the victims in general or both. With the exception 
of the very rare cases when participating victims may present views and concerns in 
person, it is the legal representatives who speak on behalf of and about “the victims”. 
The representation of “the victims” at the ICC took shape in the decisions of the 
different Chambers interpreting Rule 85 RPE and the central article within the victim 
participation framework: Art. 68 (3) RS. The development of the jurisprudence is 
once again reflective of a legal struggle, establishing who “the victims” are and 
negotiating a space for “the victims” in the proceedings. Rule 85 RPE and Art. 68 (3) 
RS determine who “the victims” are, what they can say, at which stages, in which 
manner and to whom. The institutionalization of the representation of “the victims” 
as a subject speaking at the Hague is the topic of this chapter. While in the last 
chapter, the application phase and the selection and organization of representation 
was addressed, now the definition of the victim (2.), the requirements to participate 
(3.) and the modalities of participation (4.) within the proceedings, beside the parties, 
are analysed. 
Rule 85 RPE entails a definition of victims that is the starting point for the 
institutionalization of “the victims” within the proceedings at the ICC which in turn 
is reflective of the silencing effect already described with regard to the application 
and representation phase. Reading Rule 85 RPE together with the victim’ interest 
requirement of Art. 68 (3) RS, those victims who are granted participatory rights in 
the proceedings before the respective Chambers are defined. And lastly, based on the 
definition of interests, a set of procedural rights is accorded to the LRVs.  
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2. “The victim” 
Rule 85 Definition of victims 
“For the purposes of the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence: (a) 
“Victims” means natural persons who have suffered harm as a result of the 
commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;” 
 
According to the text of rule 85, the definition of victims is rather broad, 
potentially all persons who suffered harm as a result of the commission of any crime 
listed in Article 5, 11 et seqq. RS would be implied and therefore eligible for 
participation. Against this backdrop, the first criteria to be fulfilled by a victim 
applicant is that:  
i) his or her identity as a natural person must be established; and 
ii) he or she has suffered (personal) harm;  
For the purpose of determining who is the victims participating in different stages 
of the proceedings, Rule 85 RPE is complemented by the personal interest element 
of Art. 68 (3) RS, adding a third criteria to the list:  
“iii) the harm suffered is as a result of an incident falling within the parameters of 
the confirmed charges”361 in the Pre-Trial Phase and Trial Phase362
A similar approach is applied when deciding upon participation in judicial 
proceedings during Investigation Phase. The applicants must demonstrate whether 
the personal interests are affected by the issue that is subject-matter of the judicial 
determination. 
. 
363
                                                 
361 Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor 
v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victims' Participation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in 
the Related Proceedings, 15 January 2014, ICC-01/04-02/06, para. 18.  
  
362 Trial Chamber VIII, Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Public redacted version of 'Decision 
on Victim Participation at Trial and on Common Legal Representation of Victims, 8 June 2016, ICC-
01/12-01/15-97-Red, para. 17. 
363 Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision on Victims' Participation in 
Proceedings Related to the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 3 November 2010, ICC-01/09-24, para 
16. 
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In the more recent decisions in Mahdi and Ntaganda, these criteria are presented 
as established jurisprudence.364
2.1. His or her identity as a natural person must be established 
 The interpretation of the respective rules and the 
corresponding argumentation leading to the fixation of this third criteria is indicative 
of the institutionalization of victim participation at the ICC. Therefore, although 
undisputed jurisprudence, it will be described in more detail.  
With regard to the identity as a natural person, there is no legal dispute. The 
practical problematic of obtaining substantial identification documents in areas of 
conflict, was solved by applying a low evidentiary threshold according to Art. 55 II 
RS.365 Hence, the requirement of proving one’s identity is low and the Chambers 
accept a wide range of documents.366
2.2.  He or she has suffered personal harm 
  
Harm is not defined in the Statute or RPE, but was defined by the Chamber in 
the Congo Situation to confine economic loss, physical suffering and emotional 
suffering.367 These types of harm and the decision that having suffered one of them 
suffices is established jurisprudence of the Court.368
                                                 
364 Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor 
v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victims' Participation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in 
the Related Proceedings, 15 January 2014, ICC-01/04-02/06, para. 18. 
 Furthermore, the injury, loss, or 
damage must be personal. This requirement was introduced by the Appeals 
365 Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Public Redacted Version 
Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings by VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3 and 
VPRS 4, 17 January 2006, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, para. 99.  
366 See, among others, Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Republic of Côte d`Ivoire in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Decision on victim participation, 6 March 2015, ICC-02/11-01/11-
800, para. 31 and footnotes contained therein. This may include: passport; birth certificate; national 
identity card; driving license; electoral card; marriage certificate; consular identity card; death 
certificate; document pertaining to medical treatment, rehabilitation or education; church membership 
card; family registration booklet; employee identity card; political party membership card; pension 
booklet; or a signed declaration from two witnesses accompanied by their proof of identity, attesting 
the identity of the applicant. This decision was adopted in the last ruling thereon: Trial Chamber VIII, 
Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, Public redacted version of 'Decision on Victim Participation 
at Trial and on Common Legal Representation of Victims, 8 June 2016, ICC-01/12-01/15-97-Red, 
paras 18-19. 
367 Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Public Redacted Version 
Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings by VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3 and 
VPRS 4, 17 January 2006, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, paras 81-82. 
368 Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor 
v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victims' Participation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in 
the Related Proceedings, 15 January 2014, ICC-01/04-02/06, para 28.  
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Chamber, denying the inclusion of indirect victims within the realm of Rule 85 RPE 
when they lack a personal relation with the direct victim.369
“Indirect victims must establish that, as a result of their relationship with the 
direct victim, the loss, injury, or damage suffered by the latter gives rise to harm 
to them. It follows that the harm suffered by indirect victims must arise out of 
the harm suffered by direct victims, brought about by the commission of the 
crimes charged.” 
  
“Excluded from the category of ‘indirect victims’, however, are those who 
suffered harm as a result of the (later) conduct of direct victims. The purpose 
of trial proceedings at the ICC, as stated by the Appeals Chamber, «[i]s the 
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused person of the crimes 
charged» and it is only victims of the crimes charged who may participate in the 
trial proceedings pursuant to Article 68(3), when read together with Rules 85 
and 89(1). […] Although a factual overlap may exist between the use of the 
child actively to participate in hostilities and an attack by the child on another, 
the person attacked by a child soldier is not an indirect victim for these 
purposes because his or her loss is not linked to the harm inflicted on the child 
when the offence was committed.”370
The requirement of a personal harm is accepted jurisprudence and an inherent 
component of the notion of “the victims”. 
  
“In this respect, the Single Judge recalls the findings of other Chambers of the 
Court, including the Appeals Chamber, to the effect that "the notion of victim 
necessarily implies the existence of personal harm".371
Accordingly, the strict definition of harm is loss, injury and damage, material, 
physical and psychological harm while in a second step, relating Rule 85 RPE to Art. 
68 (3) RS, this harm is required to be the result of – causaly linked to- the crimes 
under consideration. This could be the crimes allegedly committed in the situation 
country, the crimes in the Document Containing the Charges (DCC), or the crimes 
the accused is charged with on Trial in the respective phases of the proceedings. This 
link is established through the requirement of the harm to be personal to exclude 
  
                                                 
369 Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Corrigendum to the 
“Decision on the Applications for Participation Filed in Connection with the Investigation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo by a/0004/06 to a/0009/06, a/0016/06 to a/0063/06, 
a/0071/06 to a/0080/06and a/0105/06 to a/0110/06, a/0188/06, a/0128/06 to a/0162/06, 
a/0199/06, a/0203/06, a/0209/06, a/0214/06, a/0220/06 to a/0222/06, a/0224/06, a/0227/06 to 
a/0230/06, a/0234/06 to a/0236/06, a/0240/06, a/0225/06, a/0226/06, a/0231/06 to a/0233/06, 
a/0237/06 to a/0239/06 and a/0241/06 to a/0250/06, 31 January 2008, ICC-01/04-423-Corr-
tENG, para 4. 
370 Ibid., para 4. 
371 Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor 
v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on Victims' Participation at the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in 
the Related Proceedings, 15 January 2014, ICC-01/04-02/06, para. 30.  
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certain indirect harms caused by crimes that are not directly subject of the respective 
legal proceedings. The link requirement is furthermore read into the words “as a result 
of” a crime under the jurisdiction of the court. The reasoning is derived from the 
interpretation of Art. 68 (3) RS. This interpretation was undertaken in relation to 
determining if participating victims have an interest in participating in different stages 
of the proceedings in general and in a next step to determine the modalities of 
participation that are appropriate and not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the 
rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. 
3. Victims’ interests  
The first decision extensively dealing with the interpretation of 68 (3) of the Rome 
Statute and the nature of the personal interest of “the victims” was Pre-Trial 
Chamber I’s decision on participation in the investigation phase. It held that the 
victims have a right to effective participation which consequently entails an obligation 
of the Chambers to permit victims to present their views and concerns and a 
corresponding obligation to examine them which is defined to be the effective and 
concrete manner of participation. In this first decision the Chamber held that victim 
participation should be concrete and effective – as has been shown, the term 
concrete was replaced by meaningful in the course of the time. Moreover, the 
Chamber indicated that participation requires the presentation of views and concerns 
as well as their examination by the Chamber – the voice to be heard and considered. 
“S’agissant de l’article 68-3, la Chambre estime qu’il impose une obligation à la 
Cour vis-à-vis des victimes. L’utilisation du présent de l’indicatif dans la version 
française du texte (« la Cour permet ») ne laisse aucun doute sur le fait qu’au 
droit d’accès des victimes à la Cour correspond une obligation positive à la 
charge de celle-ci de leur permettre d’exercer ce droit de manière concrète et 
effective. Par conséquent, il échoit à la Chambre la double obligation, d’une 
part, de permettre aux victimes d’exposer leurs vues et préoccupations, et 
d’autre part, de les examiner.”372
According to the same decision, this right to present views and concerns is 
derived from the affected personal interests:  
 
                                                 
372 Situation en République Démocratique du Congo, Décision sur les demandes de participation à la 
procedure de VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 et VPRS 6, La Chambre Péliminaire I, 17 
Janvier 2006, ICC-01/04-101, para. 71. 
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“Le droit de présenter leurs vues et préoccupations et de déposer des pièces en 
relation avec l’enquête en cours est le résultat du fait que les intérêts personnels 
des victimes sont concernés…”373
Similarly, the Pre Trial Chamber in the Uganda situation stated that “pursuant to 
Art. 68, paragraph 3, of the Statute the paramount criterion for participation to be 
allowed is that the “personal interest” of the applicant victims have to be affected.”
 
374
The personal interest requirement is established as the central criterion defining 
“the victims”, linking their harm to the criminal proceedings.  
  
“That the personal interest of a victim are affected in respect of proceedings 
relating to the very crime in which that victim was allegedly involved seems 
entirely in line with the nature of the Court as a judicial institution with a 
mission to end impunity for the most serious crimes.”375
“…the constituent elements of the definition of victim under rule 85 of the 
Rules are present, the fact that such a victim's personal interests are "affected" 
by criminal proceedings relating to the event or events in question seems 
incontrovertible. Indeed, commentators regard the fact "that individuals who 
suffered harm from a criminal conduct have a personal interest in the criminal 
process related to that conduct" as a self-evident assumption;…”
 
376
The line of argumentation is that individual victims suffered harm as a result of a 
crime under the jurisdiction of the court and therefore they naturally have an interest 
in the criminal proceedings related to the crime. “The victims” at The Hague, 
accordingly, are defined by their harm which is linked to the crime which in turn 
constitutes their personal interest in the proceedings at the ICC. Henceforth, this is 
linked to the mission and nature of the court itself – ending impunity. 
 
This general interest in criminal proceedings is specified interpreting the interests 
of victims in line with international human rights law, namely the right to truth, 
justice and reparation. Thus, the link is drawn from criminal proceedings, to truth 
and justice to the personal interests of victims (their needs caused by the 
victimization). 
                                                 
373Situation en République Démocratique du Congo, Décision sur les demandes de participation à la 
procedure de VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 et VPRS 6, La Chambre Péliminaire I, 17 
Janvier 2006, ICC-01/04-101, para. 72. 
374 Pre Trial Chamber I, Situation in Uganda, Decision on applications for participation a/0010/06, 
a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, 10 August 2007, 
ICC-02/04-101, para. 9. 
375 Ibid., para. 10. 
376 Ibid., para. 9. 
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3.1. Specifying general (natural) interests: truth and justice 
When terminologically, contextually and teleologically interpreting the norms on 
victim participation in the Rome Statute, Pre Trial Chamber I in the DRC situation 
referred to the rights to truth and justice as to derive “the victims” personal interests 
in the proceedings. Relating to international developments in human rights law, 
specifically to the Declaration and the Guidelines discussed in Chapter 2, the 
Chamber observes that as a part of it, articles 68 (3) of the RS, 91 and 92 of the RPE 
as the main features of the victim participation framework at the ICC can be located 
within the broader international framework of victims’ rights and constitute a novelty 
in international criminal law. To that effect, Pre-Trial Chamber I held that victims 
interests are in a general way affected by the clarification of the facts, the punishment 
of the responsible and finally by possible reparations.377
Accordingly, Pre-Trial Chamber I expressly draws back to the Declaration when 
interpreting article 68 and states that the objective and purpose are not different 
from those considerations that are at the roots of the role granted to victims in 
domestic criminal systems, namely, the recognition that the issue of guilt and 
innocence of those investigated and prosecuted affects victims’ core interests and 
such interests are better acknowledged when providing victims with a meaningful 
and independent role within the criminal legal proceedings. 
  
378 With regard to the 
clarification of facts, it is elaborated further that the right to truth implies the 
declaration of truth by a competent body and clarification connotes that facts are 
determined closing the possible gap between factual findings resulting from the 
criminal proceeding and the actual truth.379 Inherently linked to this is the core 
interest of victims in the guilt or innocence of the accused. Referring to an empirical 
study on war victimization and victims’ attitudes towards addressing atrocities, it is 
maintained that interests go beyond the determination of what happened and include 
the prosecution, conviction and punishment of victimizers.380
                                                 
377 Situation en République Démocratique du Congo, Décision sur les demandes de participation à la 
procedure de VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 et VPRS 6, La Chambre Péliminaire I, 17 
Janvier 2006, ICC-01/04-101, para 53. 
 All these aspects are at 
378 Pre Trial Chamber I, The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision 
on the Set of Procedural Rights Attached to Procedural Status of Victim at the Pre-Trial Stage of the 
Case, 13 May 2008, ICC-01/04-01/07-474, para. 160. 
379 Ibid., para. 32. 
380 Ibid., para 35, Kiza et al. (2006). 
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the root of the right to justice acknowledged separately from the right to truth, 
although closely linked and containing interrelated elements. Thus, it is confirmed 
that the victims’ personal interest is affected by the outcome of the Pre-Trial Stage.381
The decisions initially interpreting Art. 68 (3) RS all contain elaborations 
pertaining to the right to truth and justice, underlying the victim participation 
framework, which is celebrated as a novelty in international criminal law. Defining 
personal interests, the decisions rely on international principles to avert that the very 
purpose of victim participation is the victims’ legitimate interest in truth and justice, 
which has to be provided to them through granting participatory rights in the 
proceedings. It is the criminal proceedings conducted at the ICC that produces truth 
by clarifying the facts and thereby closing the gap and as a consequence provides 
justice – therefore, naturally, victims have an interest. This interest in turn is 
constitutive of the very definition of “the victims”. The legitimizing narrative of the 
ICC vis à vis victims is read into the definition of victims itself, thereby, it is 
impossible to find a victim irritating this legitimizing basis, since this would, by 
definition, not be a victim. With this operation, the nature of the victim is fixed and 
linked to the nature of the court and the inherent legitimizing link is presented as self-
evident – as natural. Consequently, it is always already in the nature of the court to 
serve victims’ interests regardless of the variety of different interests victims might 
have. Thereby, hearing is framed in such a way that what is being heard by the court 
is always already a confirmation of its own self-legitimization. The lack and excess of 
representation and the (im)possibility of truth and justice and the related justice gap 
is barred. This preclusion by definition is furthered when specifying the alleged 
interests in truth and justice by the requirement to link the harm suffered by the 
applicant to the crime charged. The truth of the victims is thereby represented by 
their harm and the justice delivered by the court is related to the crime under 
 
Taking this into consideration, participants should be given a meaningful role 
allowing them to substantially impact the proceedings. Interestingly, in these early 
decisions, meaningful was still linked to having an impact – speaking was required to 
have consequences which is only possible if it is heard.  
                                                 
381 Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Decision 
on victims' modalities of participation at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, 6 October 2009, ICC-02/05-
02/09-136, para 5. 
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consideration. In so doing, it is ensured that not only does the ICC, in general, always 
already serves victims interests in truth and justice, but that each Chamber anew 
serves the interests of the participating victims.  
3.2. Harm and crime – the link – as a result of rule 85 
Initially, Trial Chamber I in Lubanga found that “neither rule 85 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence nor the Rome Statute framework has the effect of 
restricting the participation of victims to the crimes contained in the charges 
confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.”382 This decision was appealed both by the 
Prosecution and by the Defence and it was clarified by the Appeals Chamber that 
“[F]or the purposes of participation in the trial proceedings, the harm alleged by a 
victim and the concept of personal interests under article 68 (3) of the Statute must 
be linked with the charges confirmed against the accused.”383
In the appealed Trial Chamber decision, the judges held that  
  
“[A] victim of any crime falling within the jurisdiction of the court can 
potentially participate. However, self-evidently, it would not be meaningful or 
in the interests of justice for all such victims to be permitted to participate as 
victims in the case against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, given that the evidence 
and the issues falling for examination in the case (which will be dependent on 
the charges he faces) will frequently be wholly unrelated to the crimes that 
caused harm to victims coming from this very wide category.”384
Against the backdrop of this assertion, the Trial Chamber constructed a filter 
similar, but different from the now established general link between the harm 
suffered and the crimes under consideration:  
 
“(i) Is there a real evidential link between the victim and the evidence which the 
Court will be considering during Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo's trial [...], leading 
to the conclusion that the victim's personal interests are affected? Or  
(ii) Is the victim affected by an issue arising during Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo's 
trial because his or her personal interests are in a real sense engaged by it?”385
The Appeals Chamber generalized this filter to imply a link between the harm and 
the crime under consideration since this would be in accordance with the personal 
 
                                                 
382 Appeals Chamber , Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the appeals of The 
Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 
January 2008, 11 July 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, p. 3, summariing the issues in appeal. 
383 Ibid., para 2. 
384 Ibid., para 41. 
385 Ibid., para 41. 
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interest requirement of Art. 68 (3) RS and the object and purpose of Rule 85 RPE. 
Consequently, the decision if the harm is linked to the crime is constitutive of the 
definition of “the victims” in the case. In a first step, it is argued that the effect of 
Art 68 (3) RS is that victims must be linked to the charges, because only those 
victims would have a personal interest in the respective proceedings. This would be 
inherent in the definition of the victim:  
“The Appeals Chamber acknowledges that rule 85 does not have the effect of 
restricting the participation of victims to the crimes charged. However, the 
provision must be read in context and in accordance with its object and 
purpose.”386
…the object and purpose of rule 85 is to define who are victims. Thus, whilst 
the ordinary meaning of rule 85 does not per se, limit the notion of victims to 
the victims of the crimes charged, the effect of article 68 (3) of the Statute is 
that the participation of victims in the trial proceedings, pursuant to the 
procedure set out in rule 89 (1) of the Rules, is limited to those victims who are 
linked to the charges.
 
387
“Given that the purpose of trial proceedings is the determination of the guilt or 
innocence of the accused person of the crimes charged, and that the application 
under rule 89 (1) of the Rules in this context is for participation in the trial, only 
victims of these crimes will be able to demonstrate that the trial, as such, affects 
their personal interests. Therefore, only victims who are victims of the crimes 
charged may participate in the trial proceedings pursuant to article 68 (3) of the 
Statute read with rule 85 and 89(1) of the Rules. Once the charges in a case 
against an accused have been confirmed in accordance with article 61 of the 
Statute, the subject matter of the proceedings in that case is defined by the 
crimes charged.”
 
388
Once again, the personal interest in criminal proceedings is inherently linked to 
the very definition of “the victims”. In a next step, this link is specified by the harm 
suffered (the victim) and the crimes charges. 
 
“It is for the Trial Chamber to determine within this framework whether an 
applicant is a victim, because he or she suffered harm in connection with the 
particular crimes charged, and if so, whether the personal interests of the 
applicant are affected. If the applicant is unable to demonstrate a link between 
the harm suffered and the particular crimes charged, then even if his or her 
personal interests are affected by an issue in the trial, it would not be 
                                                 
386 Appeals Chamber , Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the appeals of The 
Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 
January 2008, 11 July 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, para. 54. 
387 Ibid., para 58. 
388 Ibid., para 62. 
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appropriate under article 68 (3) read with rule 85 and 89 (1) of the Rules for his 
or her views and concerns to be presented.”389
Step by step it is established, that naturally victims have an interest in the 
establishment of guilt or innocence – in criminal proceedings – and that this interest 
is a precondition for being a victim within the participatory framework. What defines 
a victim is the personal harm suffered, hence, this harm has to be linked to the 
crimes under consideration. And finally, although the personal interest in the criminal 
proceedings dealing with the very crimes the victims claim to have suffered from was 
established to be inherent in the definition of the victims, in case there should be 
different personal interests they would not be appropriate within the proceedings at 
the Court. Thus, in a last step, it is acknowledged that there might be diverging 
interests – but they are excluded as inappropriate within the proceedings. The last 
sentence can be read as an assurance against the lack and excess of the 
definition/representation of “the victims”. Since the victims were defined by their 
alleged interests in the proceedings and thereby all those individuals who might have 
different interests are already precluded by the very definition of “the victims”, to 
which the individual victims have confirmed to belong by their signature in the 
application forms, it was already precluded in the definition/representation of the 
victims that there might be different interests. Nevertheless, the Chamber felt the 
necessity to reiterate the inappropriateness of such interests within the proceedings. 
This can be read as a sign for the always already lacking representation of the victims 
which was sensed by the Chamber and re-assured by defining and excluding all 
possible other interests as inappropriate. Two different operations are at work here. 
Applying the first filters is in fact already a decision about what is and what is not 
appropriate in the proceedings – a fresh judgement on appropriateness – the very 
character of which was instantly obscured by the naturalization of “the victims” and 
“their interests”. The decision did not state that the appropriate victims are those 
who have appropriate interests matching the appropriate mission of the court, since 
this would reveal the inherent exclusionary violence of the decision. Instead, the 
Chambers held that the victims, because of the link between their harm and the 
crime under consideration – their interest in truth and justice – naturally have an 
 
                                                 
389 Appeals Chamber , Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the appeals of The 
Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 
January 2008, 11 July 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, para 64. 
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interest in the proceedings pertaining to the crimes of the accused. The second re-
assuring operation then was to exclude all inappropriate interests. This reveals the 
always already lacking definition/representation of “the victims” which in turn 
reveals their operation as fresh judgement bearing the traces of the undecided.  
From then on, Chambers without exception apply the criterion of a special link 
between the harm and the crime when deciding who is eligible to participate. For an 
according determination, the information contained in the application forms is used. 
Since, in the recent forms this information is confined to exactly these legally 
relevant information, the decision appears to have become a matching operation. Do 
the boxes ticked by the victim concerning the harm suffered, and the information 
concerning the time and the location of the alleged crimes link to the crimes 
contained in the DCC, or in the crimes confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber and 
admitted to Trial?  
Indicative of the exclusions produced by the definitional practice is once again the 
Banda case. Here the prosecution charged the accused with crimes committed during 
an attack against an AU-Peacekeeping compound, the MGS (military groups site) 
Haskanita. Residents of the nearby village, Haskanita, that was also attacked, 
submitted that they had suffered harm as a result of the attack and therefore qualify 
as victims in the case. Some claimed that they had suffered harm due to 
abandonment of the MGS Haskanita by the African Union (AU), as a consequence 
they lost their jobs and had to leave their homes.390 The Chamber held that even if 
this harm could be linked to the attack on the MGS Haskanita, it would be too 
remote from the alleged crimes to be still considered as a result of those crimes 
within the meaning of rule 85 (a) of the RPE.391 Another group of applicants alleged 
that they were residents of Haskanita village which was looted and houses were 
burned shortly after the attack on the MGS and that they suffered psychological and 
material harm as a result of the attack on the village since they had to flee.392
                                                 
390 Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain 
and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Decision on Victims’Participation at the Hearing on the 
Confirmation of Charges, 29 October 2010, ICC-02/05-03/09-89, para. 13. 
 The 
Chamber was not satisfied that the harm claimed by the applicants was caused by the 
attack on the compound itself, since the applicants submitted that they left the area 
391 Ibid., para. 15. 
392 Ibid., paras 19-20. 
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of Haskanita in response to the attack allegedly perpetrated by the rebels on the 
village of Haskanita and not as a result of the attack on the MGS.393 As a 
consequence the applicants were not considered victims of the case. Yet other 
applicants submitted that they worked on the compound on the day of the attack and 
that they suffered psychological and physical harm as a result. They further explained 
that due to the termination of the AU presence in Haskanita they lost their jobs and 
had to leave their homes and possessions and therefore also suffered economic 
harm.394
“that only the alleged psychological harm suffered by the applicants qualifies as 
harm resulting from the charges against the suspect, since both applicants were 
traumatised as a result of the attack, during which their own lives were 
threatened and they witnessed AU soldiers being killed and injured.”
 The Chamber differentiated, it held, 
395
With regard to an applicant who worked at the compound until shortly before the 
attack, and when returning to the village heard the shooting and was afraid of an 
attack on the village (which subsequently took place and his house was burned), the 
Chamber decided that “[S]ince the applicant did not see the attack, but only heard 
gunfire from the direction of the camp, the Chamber is of the view that the 
applicant’s experience is too remote to satisfactorily establish that he suffered 
psychological harm as a result of it.”
  
396
Dealing with the differentiation of the three relevant types of harm, the Chamber 
drew clear lines, demarcating relevant harm from irrelevant harm. This also implied a 
determination of trauma as psychological harm. The harm must be caused by direct 
physical violence, or by directly witnessing – seeing – the violence. The complex 
situation implying a pattern of violence that was exercised against human beings and 
their belongings in Haskanita and the interrelated anxiety related to the exposure to 
this violence and its consequences on the lives of the applicants were divided into 
manageable units which were hierarchically structured. Thereby, the messiness of the 
situations under consideration is sanitized and trauma is reduced to harm causally 
linked to the crimes – speakable at the court.  
 
                                                 
393 Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain 
and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus, Decision on Victims’Participation at the Hearing on the 
Confirmation of Charges, 29 October 2010, ICC-02/05-03/09-89, para. 21. 
394 Ibid., paras 27-28. 
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3.3. Externalization 
The practice of institutionalization of the victim definition therefore implies two 
externalizing filters. The first filter is the combined reading of Rule 85 RPE with Art. 
68 (3) RS making the link between the personal harm and the respective crimes 
under consideration a requirement to participate. This link is derived from the 
personal interest element entailed in Art. 68 (3) RS.  
Through these filters, as has already been indicated in the previous chapter, “the 
victims” abstract interests in truth and justice, elaborated in the theoretical 
framework, are transformed into the notions of harm and crime. In this chapter the 
link of the harm to the crime negotiated is drawn, ensuring that the harm is 
manageable at the ICC. The representation of “the victims” therefore is shaped by 
their alleged interests and this determines what they might say. The space for 
articulation is framed by determining harm and this has to be linked to the 
determination of crimes, the latter frame what can be heard (legally 
processed/translated into legal decisions and judgements). Consequently, after 
transforming truth and justice into harm and crime, all the allegedly non-legal aspects 
of truth and justice are externalized and the image of the ICC delivering truth and 
justice is re-produced. Simultaneously, trauma is represented by the legal category of 
psychological harm, which is caused by directly witnessing, or being subjected to 
physical violence. It is distinguished from physical and economic harm. The different 
types of harm are strictly separated and the Chambers apply the logic of causality to 
determine which harm is precluded. Harm that is indirect must be personal – that is, 
the crime is the starting point and if the harm of the applicant is too remotely linked 
to the harm directly caused by the crime – s/he is no victim in the case. Thereby, the 
messiness, complexity and intangibility of violence and trauma is sanitized. Trauma is 
manageable as psychological harm that can be addressed by the Court. By shaping 
the representation of “the victims” accordingly, the traumatic Real is precluded. 
4. Finding a space within the proceedings 
After having defined the victim as described, the Chambers still have to decide on 
the set of procedural rights of the participating victims, or to be precise, their 
representatives. The interpretation of personal interests in combination with views and 
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concerns pursuant to Art. 68 (3) RS is decisive in this context. The personal interest in 
truth and justice as the telos of participation, which was then translated into harm 
and crime defining “the victims” is now appropriated in yet another step, depending 
on the different stages of the proceedings.  
4.1. Investigation Stage 
As mentioned above, one of the first decisions, exclusively dealing with the 
interpretation of article 68 (3) RS addressed the question of whether victims are 
entitled under the Rome Statute to participate in the Investigation Phase of a 
situation prior to a case being opened or outside the scope of an opened case.397 
Initially, basing the reasoning on the victims’ interest in truth and justice and the 
respective international principles, Pre-Trial Chamber I confirmed this participatory 
right pursuant to Art. 68 (3) RS. To that effect, Pre-Trial Chamber I states that 
victims interests are in a general way affected by the clarification of the facts, the 
punishment of the responsible and finally by possible reparations.398 Referring to the 
judgements of the ECtHR the Pre-Trial Chamber declares that victims should play 
an independent role, especially vis à vis the Prosecution.399 It was considered to be 
sufficient to determine victims’ interests in relation to the stage of the proceedings as 
opposed to an analysis in relation to specific procedural activities.400
                                                 
397 La Chambre Péliminaire I, Situation en République Démocratique du Congo, Décision sur les 
demandes de participation à la procedure de VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 et VPRS 6, 
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 The Appeals 
Chamber revised this general interpretation to the extent that it differentiated 
between the Prosecution’s investigative activity and judicial proceedings during the 
Investigation Phase, allowing victims to participate only in the latter. By so doing, 
398 Ibid., para 53. 
399 Ibid., para 51. 
400 Similarly, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Darfur Sudan, Decision on the Applications for 
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a/0235/07, a/0237/07, a/0324/07 and a/0326/07 under rule 89, 10 March 2009, ICC-02/04-180. 
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victims’ participation was confined to judicial proceedings provided that the personal 
interest is affected by the issue arising for resolution.401
This is a very much criticised decision, since it is at this stage where the Accused 
and the specific charges are determined and decided upon. The charges in turn define 
who is victim in the case – who can demonstrate a link between the harm and the 
crime. Especially in the first case against Lubanga the narrow charges were criticized 
for excluding sexualized violence and hence all respective victims from the 
proceedings (SáCouto 2011, pp. 338–339; Spiga 2010, pp. 197–198; Pena 2010, 
pp. 507–508). In conclusion, beside the rights enshrined in art. 15 (3) and 19 (3) RS, 
victims have no saying in the process of defining the scope of the cases.  
  
As concerns the judicial proceedings, the Court authorized victims to address the 
Chamber requesting to present their views and concerns, to file documents 
pertaining to the relevant situation, to request the Pre-Trial Chamber to order special 
proceedings and to have notification rights. The Court limited the participatory rights 
of the victims by not giving them access to any non-public document contained in 
the record of the situation. Unless otherwise decided upon request, victims’ 
representatives were not allowed to attend confidential proceedings.  
4.2. Pre-Trial 
Pre-Trial Chamber I, deciding on the set of procedural rights at Pre-Trial Stage, 
finds that the recognition of the issue of guilt and innocence of those investigated 
and prosecuted affects victims’ core interests and such interests are better 
acknowledged when providing victims with a meaningful and independent role 
                                                 
401 Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Judgment on victim 
participation in the investigation stage of the proceedings in the appeal of the OPCD against the 
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 7 December 2007 and in the appeals of the OPCD and the 
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within the criminal legal proceedings.402 Thus it is confirmed that the victims’ 
personal interest is affected by the outcome of the Pre-Trial Stage.403
When such general interests are confirmed, in a second step, it is at the Chamber’s 
discretion to develop a set of procedural rights determining what presenting views 
and concerns would entail.
 
404 While this determination of general victims’ interests 
was conducted in the earlier decisions, later, Pre-Trial Chambers confined themselves 
to defining the set of procedural rights.405
In case the victims claim further participatory inventions they again have to show 
a specific personal interest. In Pre-Trial Phase, the victims’ representatives 
accordingly have an established right to make opening and closing statements (Rule 
89 I RPE), to be present in public hearings (Rule 91 II RPE) and to have access to 
the public record of the case, this implies all public filings and the transcripts of 
public sessions and the public evidence (Rules 131 II, 89, 91 RPE). With regard to ex 
parte hearings, the Chamber retains the option to decide on a case by case basis upon 
request by the legal representatives. Whether the legal representatives are granted 
access to confidential filings also depends on the respective decision of the 
Chambers on a case by case basis. In such a request the legal representatives have to 
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demonstrate a personal interest of the victims in the filing, or evidence by 
demonstrating a link between the harm suffered and the content of the confidential 
material.406 Legal representatives are furthermore entitled to file written motions, 
responses and replies in relation to all matters for which the Statute or the Rules does 
not exclude their intervention (91 II RPE).407 Pre-Trial Chamber II ruled that the 
right to file written submissions also preconditions an application to that effect, 
demonstrating that the issue under consideration affects the victims’ personal 
interests.408 If legal representatives wish to question witnesses, they must make an 
application to the Chamber.409
In more recent cases, the set of procedural rights was modified to the benefit of 
the participating legal representatives and their clients. Now the access to 
confidential filings and the attendance of non-public hearings is granted in general 
and an exception to this rule can only be ordered if specific reasons warrant such 
measure.
 
410
                                                 
406 Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the case of the Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu 
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Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Victim’s Participation at the Confirmation of 
Charges Hearing and in the Related Proceedings, 5 August 2011, ICC-01/09-01/11, paras. 86-97. 
 Furthermore, they are generally allowed to make written submissions and 
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Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Victim’s Participation at the Confirmation of 
Charges Hearing and in the Related Proceedings, 5 August 2011, ICC-01/09-01/11, para 101. 
408 Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the case of the Prosecutor v. William 
Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, Decision on Victim’s Participation at the 
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para 101. 
409 Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the case of the Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu 
Garda, Decision on victims' modalities of participation at the Pre-Trial Stage of the Case, 6 October 
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have a right to respond in writing.411
 
 These amendments expedite the proceedings 
and are an expression of the normalization of the presence of legal representatives of 
“the victims” in the proceedings. Against the backdrop of the experiences with legal 
representatives in the courtroom and as a “third participant”, the previous 
reservations of the Prosecution and the Defence and also of the Judges seemed to 
have declined. This is also an outcome of the institutionalization of victim 
participation.  
4.3. Trial Phase 
Generally, during Trial Phase, victims and their legal representatives have a 
broader set of procedural rights. In addition to those at Pre-Trial Stage, at Trial 
victims, meaning their representatives, have the right to lead and challenge evidence, 
and/or present their views and concerns in person. Also, the right to question 
witnesses is elaborated in more detail here, since all modes of participation were 
discussed and are representative of the search for a space within the proceedings vis 
á vis the parties. Hence, the interests of the victims are defined by distinguishing 
them from the parties’ interests. The genuine victims’ interests are mainly demarcated 
from the interest of the Prosecution – searching for a space within the proceedings 
and balancing the rights of victims with the right to a fair trial of the accused. This is 
illustrative of yet another impossibility of the subject position of “the victims” within 
the proceedings - on the one hand the victim is said to be in need of truth and justice 
and healing through participation and therefore has a right to an own standing within 
the proceedings, on the other hand interests are, so far, interpreted in line with what 
the court can deliver - finding and judging the facts of the crime which is equated 
with the harm suffered of “the victims”. As demonstrated above, harm and crime are 
the equivalents of truth and justice and “the victims” are defined to be in need of this 
kind of truth and justice - their very definition is linked to these interests. Now, 
finding the facts and seeking a judgement are exactly the tasks of the Prosecution and 
the Chamber, which renders it difficult to claim a position beside these two organs, 
without adding additional prosecutors which is frequently criticised by the Defence. 
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Yet, this is exactly what is being asked of “the victims”, who, in order to claim a right 
to question witnesses, lead evidence and present views and concerns in person, have 
to demonstrate that they have an interest beside the original interest already 
represented by the Prosecution and the Chambers. The respective legal struggles are 
illustrating the further assimilate “the victims”. 
4.3.1. Leading and challenging evidence 
The decision of the Lubanga Trial Chamber to allow victims - their 
representatives - to lead and challenge evidence and the subsequent confirmation by 
the Appeals Chamber, at the time, surprised many commentators (Vasiliev 2015, 
p. 1169; Friman 2009, p. 492). In the doctrine the legal construction authorizing the 
legal representatives of victims to submit evidence referring to Art. 69 (3) RS and the 
Chambers power to request the submission of evidence that it considers necessary 
for the determination of the truth, is rather controversial (Vasiliev 2015, p. 1169). 
Although by now the right to lead and challenge evidence is established 
jurisprudence, the initial decision of the Appeals Chamber was discussed very 
controversially. The decisions on the requirement to demonstrate a personal interest 
in the judicial proceedings so far were more restrictive and would not have suggested 
the change of direction taken, when granting such a right to victims. The two 
dissenting opinions show the controversy, especially about the position of 
participants and their legal representatives beside the position of the Prosecution. 
Given the clear wording of Art. 69 (3) and Art. 64 (8)(b) RS providing a right to 
challenge and submit evidence exclusively for the parties to the proceedings, from a 
legal point of view, the decision was very innovative. Victims are participants in the 
proceedings, this is a novel position, which can neither be found in the civil legal 
tradition, nor in common law. Therefore, the Chambers struggled to define this 
unprecedented status, which had to be in some way distinctive of the position of the 
parties. This distinction was drawn with recourse to the requirement of a personal 
interest which has to be demonstrated in each case a new. Accordingly, in a previous 
decision the Appeal Chamber held that:  
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“More generally, an assessment will need to be made in each case as to whether 
the interests asserted by victims do not, in fact, fall outside their personal 
interests and belong instead to the role assigned to the Prosecutor.”412
Thereby, they clarified that the interests of victims in the proceedings become 
personal in the sense of Art. 68 (3) RS and therefore legitimize victims to participate, 
when they do not fall within the interests implied in the role of the Prosecution. 
Along these lines, with respect to the relation of participating victims to the Judge 
Pikis, in his dissenting opinion, emphasized that:  
 
“In relation to what can victims express their views and concerns? Not in 
relation to the proof of the case or the advancement of the defence. The 
burden of proof of the guilt of the accused lies squarely with the Prosecutor 
(article 66 (2) of the Statute). Provision is made in the Statute (article 54 (1)) for 
the Prosecutor to seek and obtain information from victims about the facts 
surrounding the crime or crimes forming the subject-matter of the proceedings. 
That the judicial process should follow its ordained course is a cause common 
to all; its sustenance is the responsibility of the Court, the guardian of the 
judicial process. It is not the victims' domain either to reinforce the prosecution 
or dispute the defence. Participating victims' views and concerns are referable 
to the cause that legitimizes their participation, the cause that distinguishes 
them from other victims, namely their personal interests to the extent they are 
affected by the proceedings.”413
This quotation illustrates the difficulty of finding a decidedly distinct position in 
proceedings that are designed in an adversarial manner, in principle. With the 
Prosecution being responsible for the facts – the truth of the case. The Defence for 
rebutting this truth. And the Chamber for guaranteeing fair proceedings and for 
determining the truth beyond reasonable doubt and judging this truth according to 
the law – defining justice. Judge Pikis goes as far as to say, the victims share their 
interest with the rest of the world. Where then should victims be located in this 
amalgam of interests that are already distributed among the parties of the 
proceedings and its audience? 
 
“The victims have no say in the matter. Their interest is that justice should be 
done, coinciding with the interest of the world at large that the criminal process 
should run its course according to law, according to the norms of a fair trial. 
Both the submission of evidence and its reception affect the parties to the 
adversity. It is not the victims' concern, a matter directly related to the 
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reception of evidence, to either prove or disprove the charges. The interests of 
justice are safeguarded by the Chamber […]”414
In contrast to this view, the initial decision of the Trial Chamber in Lubanga held 
that it is not the exclusive right of the parties to present and challenge evidence. They 
ascribe this conclusion to the Chamber’s role to determine the truth, which is not 
restricted to the parties’ evidence. 
 
“The Trial Chamber considers that the right to introduce evidence during trials 
before the Court is not limited to the parties, not least because the Court has a 
general right (that is not dependent on the cooperation or the consent of the 
parties) to request the presentation of all evidence necessary for the 
determination of the truth, pursuant to Article 69(3) of the Statute. [...]It 
follows that victims participating in the proceedings may be permitted to tender 
and examine evidence if in the view of the Chamber it will assist it in the 
determination of the truth, and if in this sense the Court has "requested" the 
evidence.”415
The victims’ role, as foreseen by the Chamber, is assisting the Chamber in the 
determination of the truth and the Chamber states that,  
 
“[…] there is no provision within the Rome Statute framework which prohibits 
the Trial Chamber from ruling on the admissibility or relevance of evidence 
having taken into account the views and concerns of the victims, in accordance 
with Articles 68(3) and 69(4) of the Statute. In appropriate circumstances, this 
will be allowed following an application.”416
Here, the Chamber combines its own power pursuant to Art. 69 (4) RS with the 
requirements of Art. 68 (3) RS and therefore links the right to tender and challenge 
evidence to the rationale of Art. 68 (3) RS, namely the presentation of views and 
concerns, when it is appropriate, the personal interests are affected and it is not 
prejudicial or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial. 
This extension of rights, that is not expressly granted under the victim participation 
framework is once again attributed to the objective of participation to be effective 
and meaningful.  
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“To give effect to the spirit and intention of article 68 (3) of the Statute in the 
context of the trial proceedings it must be interpreted so as to make 
participation by victims meaningful. Evidence to be tendered at trial which does 
not pertain to the guilt or innocence of the accused would most likely be 
considered inadmissible and irrelevant. If victims were generally and under all 
circumstances precluded from tendering evidence relating to the guilt or 
innocence of the accused and from challenging the admissibility or relevance of 
evidence, their right to participate in the trial would potentially become 
ineffectual.”417
The determination of the manner the victim representatives may tender, or 
challenge evidence are then confining the right to the requirements of Art. 68 (3) RS, 
which, according to the Appeals Chamber majority, is a sufficient safeguard to 
distinguish the interests of victims and the role of the Prosecution:  
 
“The Trial Chamber has correctly identified the procedure and confined limits 
within which it will exercise its powers to permit victims to tender and examine 
evidence: (i) a discrete application, (ii) notice to the parties, (iii) demonstration 
of personal interests that are affected by the specific proceedings, (iv) 
compliance with disclosure obligations and protection orders, (v) determination 
of appropriateness and (vi) consistency with the rights of the accused and a fair 
trial. With these safeguards in place, the Appeals Chamber does not consider 
that the grant of participatory rights to victims to lead evidence pertaining to 
the guilt or innocence of the accused and to challenge the admissibility or 
relevance of the evidence is inconsistent with the onus of the Prosecutor to 
prove the guilt of the accused nor is it inconsistent with the rights of the 
accused and a fair trial.“418
Judge Pikis, in contrast, referred the confines of the legal basis, which does not 
permit participants to proof or disproof the case and emphasized the adversarial 
character of criminal proceedings. 
 
“The Prosecutor is the only authority the accused has to confront in relation to 
the charges. The two sides are locked into a conflict upon the denial of the 
charges by the accused. Neither the Trial Chamber nor the Pre-Trial Chamber 
is concerned with the collection of evidence. The Trial Chamber, as provided in 
article 69 (3) of the Statute, may request either party to submit all evidence that 
it considers necessary for the determination of the truth […] An adversarial 
hearing casts the Prosecution and the defence in opposition, confronting one 
another in a process designed to determine whether the burden cast on the 
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Prosecution is discharged at the end of the day. Fair trial imports equality of 
arms…”419
The victims’ role – domain - within this adversarial setting in which Prosecution 
and Defense fight over the truth and the Chamber is responsible for its final 
determination and to render justice, is then confined to their personal interests, that 
distinguish the victims from the parties, namely their loss or injury – their suffering.  
 
“In relation to what can victims express their views and concerns? Not in 
relation to the proof of the case or the advancement of the defence. The 
burden of proof of the guilt of the accused lies squarely with the Prosecutor 
(article 66 (2) of the Statute). Provision is made in the Statute (article 54 (1)) for 
the Prosecutor to seek and obtain information from victims about the facts 
surrounding the crime or crimes forming the subject matter of the proceedings. 
That the judicial process should follow its ordained course is a cause common 
to all; its sustenance is the responsibility of the Court, the guardian of the 
judicial process. It is not the victims' domain either to reinforce the prosecution 
or dispute the defence. Participating victims' views and concerns are referable 
to the cause that legitimizes their participation, the cause that distinguishes 
them from other victims, namely their personal interests to the extent they are 
affected by the proceedings. The decision of the Appeals Chamber of 12 
December 2006 supports this proposition. Victims have an interest that the loss 
or injury they have suffered, a matter of individual concern, should surface in 
the proceedings and be brought to light. Such evidence would presage any 
claim to reparations as well as illuminate the gravity of the crime.”420
Furthermore, “[t]he proof or disproof of the charges is a matter affecting the 
adversaries. The victims have no say in the matter. Their interest is that justice 
should be done, coinciding with the interest of the world at large that the 
criminal process should run its course according to law, according to the norms 
of a fair trial. […] The interests of justice are safeguarded by the Chamber, 
trusted to ensure that only relevant and admissible evidence, in the context 
earlier defined, can be received in proceedings before it.”
 
421
As a consequence, according to Judge Pikis, the sole appropriate interest of “the 
victims” that distinguishes them from all parties and the Chamber, is their personal 
experience of the crimes – the harm suffered. Similarly, Judge Kirsch argues that the 
orderly conduct of the proceedings covering and protecting all interests of the parties 
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and participants can only be safeguarded, when not confusing the role of the victims 
with that of the Prosecutor.422
The majority, however, held that although it is not the unfettered right of 
participants to lead and challenge evidence, it is an opportunity that is subject to the 
Trial Chambers authorization. Thereby they still exercise a control over this way of 
participation by conditioning it to the victims’ interests which are thereby further 
defined in each decision. The initial uncertainties pertaining to the role of victims as 
participants in the courtroom were overcome by aligning their basic interest in truth 
and justice to that of the Chamber and putting their interventions under tight control 
by the latter.  
  
The following Chambers developed criteria for the admission of leading and 
challenging evidence that are illustrative for this control. Every time the legal 
representatives want to tender or challenge evidence they must apply in writing 
indicating how the evidence in question is relevant and how it may contribute to the 
determination of the truth.423
 “The Chamber recalls, in this respect, that the participation of victims in the 
fact- finding process of the Court is conditional upon their making a real 
contribution to the search for the truth.”
 
424 The victims’ interventions then may 
“enable the Chamber to understand some of the matters at issue, given their 
local knowledge and social and cultural background.”425 This requirement “to 
make a genuine contribution to the ascertainment of the truth” is emphasized 
by Trial Chamber III in Bemba. 426
“a. Whether the proposed testimony relates to matters that were already 
addressed by the Prosecution in the presentation of its case or would be 
unnecessarily repetitive of evidence already tendered by the parties.  
 To ensure this contribution, the criteria 
developed to evaluate the contribution of victims is  
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b. Whether the topic(s) on which the victim proposes to testify is sufficiently 
closely related to issues which the Chamber must consider in its assessment of 
the charges brought against the accused.  
c. Whether the proposed testimony is typical of a larger group of participating 
victims, who have had similar experiences as the victim who wishes to testify, 
or whether the victim is uniquely apt to give evidence about a particular matter.  
d. Whether the testimony will likely bring to light substantial new information 
that is relevant to issues which the Chamber must consider in its assessment of 
the charges.” 427 These criteria are implicitly acknowledged in the following 
cases by the different Chambers.428
Since, as demonstrated above, the Prosecution is responsible for finding the truth, 
the Defense for rebutting it and the Chamber for ascertaining fair proceedings, 
determining the final truth and based in that for finding a judgement, the space 
attributed to the victims is beside the Chamber playing an assisting role in the 
determination of the truth. This has also consequences for the manner in which legal 
representatives of victims – the victims, as referred to in the decisions – might 
question witnesses. 
  
 
4.3.2. Questioning witnesses 
Whereas Rule 91 (3) RPEs generally authorizes legal representatives of victims to 
question witnesses it does not give any guidance on the admissible scope and mode 
of questioning. Furthermore, the right is subject to judicial authorization pursuant to 
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Art. 68 (3) RS and Rule 91 (3)(b) RPE, as such the Chambers once again hold 
considerable discretion in this regard.429
The personal interest requirement provided for in Art. 68(3) RS hence confines 
the scope and mode of questioning and consequently is indicative of the 
representation of “the victims” and the respective role at the Court. In the first 
decision on the modes of victim participation at the ICC, the Trial-Chamber in 
Lubanga held that,  
  
“[F]ollowing an initial determination (…) that the victim shall be allowed to 
participate in the proceedings, thereafter, in order to participate at any specific 
stage in the proceedings, e.g. during the examination of a particular witness or a 
discussion of a particular legal issue or type of evidence, a victim will be 
required to show, in a discrete written application, the reasons why his or her 
interests are affected by the evidence or issue then arising in the case and the 
nature and extent of participation they seek.”430
Like described above, this link between the matter under consideration and the 
interest is mostly demonstrated by linking the harm suffered to the respective issues:  
  
“During Trial, ‘the victim must describe the way in which his or her personal 
interest is affected, for example by identifying how the harm he or she suffered 
relates to the evidence or the issues the Chamber is considering.’431
The first dealing with the modes and scope of questioning witnesses, took place in 
court session, in an oral decision of the same Chamber on the application of LRVs to 
question an expert witness. The problematic raised by the Defence, opposing the 
applications for reasons of a lack of interest of the represented victims, was that the 
matters under consideration were of general interest and therefore do not engage 
with the personal or individual interests of the victims. As a consequence, the 
Prosecution would be in a better position to address these interests, “the victims” 
should not “become a secondary body” to the Prosecution.
 
432
                                                 
429 Vasiliev (2015, pp. 1176–1177). 
 The Chamber in turn 
developed confining criteria while generally granting the applications of the victims’ 
legal representatives. They decided that whereas a general interest in the outcome of 
430 Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga-Dyilo, Decision on victims’ participation, 18 January 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, 
para 96. 
431 Ibid., paras. 102-103. 
432 Transcript, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga-Dyilo, 17 June 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-193-ENG, p. 5. 
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the case does not suffice to justify a right to question witnesses, in this case the 
victims have  
“...an undoubted interest in setting their personal experiences, and the harm it is 
said they individually experienced, in their true historical, economic, and social 
context [...] Therefore, the victims are entitled to explore such aspects of these 
background matters as are relevant to each of them provided, and to the extent, 
that the areas are relevant to, and are of assistance in, establishing the context in 
which the alleged crimes have been committed.” 433
In conclusion they stated that the interests have to be personal but not unique or 
singular. They re-emphasize though that  
  
“[I]t is critical that the areas of context and historical background have real 
relevance to the victims on whose behalf the questioning is being conducted. 
[...]Accordingly, this examination by participating victims will be confined to: (i) 
the issues and areas in which the victims have a personal interest; (ii) the 
context and history which is relevant to the charges the accused faces; and (iii), 
the matters within the expertise of Mr. Garreton. To date the questions by the 
representatives of victims have been proportionate, relevant, and focused, and 
notwithstanding the wide range of issues raised by these applications, this 
approach must be maintained.” 434
In a subsequent decision the Chamber decided on the nature and manner of 
questioning through the LRVs in the case. Again, the position of victims within the 
proceedings - the position vis á vis the parties - is negotiated and their genuine role 
outside the traditional criminal legal framework - as participants, not parties - 
emphasized.  
 
“The victims' legal representatives, however, fall into a category that is distinct 
and separate from the parties, and in this regard a description of the manner of 
questioning by the victims' legal representatives that uses the concepts of 
"examination in chief", "cross-examination" and "re-examination" is not 
necessarily helpful. This particular aspect of the proceedings at trial - the 
manner of questioning by the victims' legal representatives - is an example of 
the novel nature of the Statute, which is not the product of either the Romano 
Germanic or the common law legal systems. As participants in the proceedings, 
rather than parties, the victims' legal representatives have a unique and separate 
role which calls for a bespoke approach to the manner in which they ask 
questions.“435
                                                 
433 Transcript, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas 
Lubanga-Dyilo, 17 June 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-193-ENG, p. 7-8. 
 
434 Ibid., pp 9-10. 
435 Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga-Dyilo, Decision on the Manner of Questioning Witnesses by the Legal 
Representatives of Victims, 16 September 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-2127, para 24.  
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Referring to the Appeal Chambers’ decision granting victims the right to lead and 
challenge evidence and the related elaborations on the role of victims beside the role 
of the prosecutor in the proceedings, the Chamber reiterates that, depending on the 
circumstances, the alleged guilt of the accused might legitimately fall within the 
personal interests of victims.436
“victims' legal representatives may, for instance, question witnesses on areas 
relevant to the interests of the victims in order to clarify the details of their 
evidence and to elicit additional facts, notwithstanding its relevance to the guilt 
or innocence of the accused.”
 Therefore,  
437
This decision is, like the decision on leading and challenging evidence, based on 
the assumption that the role and position of the victims in the proceedings is 
“assisting the bench in its pursuit of the truth.”
 
438 This link between the role of 
the legal representatives of victims in the proceedings and the power of the 
Chamber to determine the truth drawn by the Appeal Chamber “tends to 
support a presumption in favour of a neutral approach to questioning on behalf 
of victims. Putting the matter generally, they are less likely than the parties to 
need to resort to the more combative techniques of "cross-examination". In 
certain circumstances, however, it may be fully consistent with the role of the 
victims' legal representatives to seek to press, challenge or discredit a witness, 
for example when the views and concerns of a victim conflicts with the 
evidence given by that witness, or when material evidence has not been 
forthcoming. Under such circumstances, it may be appropriate for the victims' 
legal representatives to use closed, leading or challenging questions, if approved 
by the Chamber.”439
In conclusion, generally, the Chamber derived from the object and purpose of 
questioning, namely assisting the Chamber in finding the truth, that the legal 
representatives are confined to a neutral form of questioning, unless otherwise 
suggested by the personal interests of “the victims”.
 
440
With regard to the concrete procedure in the courtroom, the legal representatives 
have to make an oral request when they wish to depart from the neutral style. 
 The image of “the victims”, in 
contrast to the parties is outlined as interested only in the truth - not as combative.  
441
                                                 
436 Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga-Dyilo, Decision on the Manner of Questioning Witnesses by the Legal 
Representatives of Victims, 16 September 2009, ICC-01/04-01/06-2127, para 25. 
 The 
alignment qua definition of “the victims” with an interest in truth is furthered by the 
position that is ascribed to the victim representatives in the courtroom. Beside the 
interest in truth, which “the victims” allegedly share with the Chambers, it is a certain 
437 Ibid., para 26. 
438 Ibid., para 27. 
439 Ibid., para 28. 
440 Ibid., para 29. 
441 Ibid., para 30. 
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truth, “the victims” are supposed to contribute to with their knowledge, which helps 
the Judges to understand the matters at issue - social and cultural knowledge. When 
finding (creating) a special position for “the victims” in the courtroom and allocating 
different interests to them. Often Chambers come to the conclusion that “the 
victims” provide local and cultural knowledge that could frame the truth heard at 
The Hague.  
“The Chamber recalls that such questioning must have as its main aim the 
ascertainment of the truth, since the victims are not parties to the trial and have 
no role to support the case of the Prosecutor. However, their intervention may 
potentially enable the Chamber to better understand some of the matters at 
issue, given their local knowledge and social and cultural background.”442
Providing this knowledge and assisting in finding the truth is nevertheless a very 
restricted endeavor for the victims’ representatives. The criteria developed by the 
Chamber in Katanga, which applied the strictest regime is yet again an expression of 
the extent of control exerted vis á vis the participating victims, even when it is only 
their representatives speaking in the courtroom. It can be understood as a 
continuance of the neat control over the selection of the representatives themselves. 
The legal representatives of victims,  
 
“will have an opportunity to question witnesses after the Prosecution’s 
examination-in-chief or after its cross-examination of a Defence witness. Any 
application for this purpose must state how the intended question is relevant 
and must comply with the procedure defined by the Chamber in the Decision 
on Rule 140, whether for questions under article 75 of the Statute, anticipated 
questions or unanticipated questions. The questions which the Legal 
Representatives may put must essentially relate to points to clarify or 
supplement evidence already given by the witness. Accordingly, a neutral style 
of questioning should be adopted.” 443
Consequently, the legal representatives, in case of anticipated questions, have to 
file a request each time they want to question a witness on a matter related to Article 
75 RS. They have to clarify the scope and purpose of questioning and how it relates 
to the interests of “the victims”.
  
444
                                                 
442 Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 22 January 2010, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, para 
75. 
 If, after the examination-in-chief of the witness in 
question, the Chamber is of the view that the matters raised by the legal 
443 Ibid., paras. 77-78.. 
444 Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Directions for the conduct of the proceedings ans 
testimony in accordance with rule 140, 20 November 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07-1665, paras. 84, 87.  
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representatives in their request has not been sufficiently addressed, it may authorize 
the legal representative to pose questions before cross-examination.445 In case of 
unanticipated questions which nevertheless go to the personal interests of victims, 
the question of the legal representative is put to the witness through the Chamber, if 
the latter considers it necessary for the ascertainment of the truth or for clarification 
of the testimony.446 Concerning the scope of questioning, the Chamber in Katanga 
concurs with Trial Chamber I in Lubanga in deciding it should be in principle limited 
to questions clarifying the evidence.447
“a) Questions may not be duplicative or repetitive to what was already asked by 
the parties. 
 Questions that go beyond these confines are 
subject to the conditions that:  
b) Questions must be limited to matters that are in controversy between the 
parties, unless the Victims' Legal Representative can demonstrate that they are 
directly relevant to the interests of the victims represented. 
c) In principle. Victims' Legal Representatives will not be allowed to ask 
questions pertaining to the credibility and/or accuracy of the witness' 
testimony, unless the Victims' Legal Representative can demonstrate that the 
witness gave evidence that goes directly against the interests of the victims 
represented. 
d) Unless the Chamber specifically gave authorisation under regulation 56 of 
the Regulations, Victims' Legal Representatives are not allowed to put 
questions pertaining to possible reparations for specific individuals or groups of 
individuals.”448
Again, the questions should be posed in a neutral manner, exceptions must be 
authorized by the Chamber on a case to case basis. 
 
449
The Katanga approach was so far the strictest regime with regard to questioning. 
The Bemba Trial Chamber mainly referred to the jurisprudence of Trial Chamber I 
in Lubanga, holding that “although there are slight differences in the formulation of 
the approach adopted respectively by Trial Chambers I and II, the underlying 
 
                                                 
445 Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Directions for the conduct of the proceedings ans 
testimony in accordance with rule 140, 20 November 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07-1665, para 88. 
446 Ibid., para 89. 
447 Ibid., para 90. 
448 Ibid., para 90. 
449 Ibid., para 91. 
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position is the same.”450 The following decisions on questioning all in principle 
confirmed the developed approach.451 In the Kenyan cases, the questioning were 
conducted by the OPCV acting on behalf of the legal representatives. The questions 
have to be relevant to the victims interests, they shall not be repetitive and no new 
allegations against the accused are to be formulated.452
“The necessity and propriety of any particular question will be dealt with on a 
case-by-case basis, noting the Presiding Judge’s obligation to (a) make the 
questioning of witnesses and the presentation of evidence fair and effective for 
the determination of the truth and (b) avoid delay and ensure the effective use 
of time.”
 The questioning shall be 
conducted in a neutral form. The seven days deadline for the required application is 
not mentioned. It is notable, that in the later decisions on questioning are not 
specifically on the participation of victims any longer, but entailed in the general 
decision on the conduct of the proceedings, determining the schedule of the trial, the 
admission of evidence and the conduct of all parties and participants. This is a sign 
for the normalization of the participation of legal representatives within the 
courtroom. This normalization and the legal tradition of the Presiding Judge might 
have lead to the developments in the latest decisions on the conduct of the 
proceedings. The German Judge in the Ongwen case decided to not regulate the 
questioning of witnesses in the abstract - for neither parties, nor participants. The 
distinction between examination in chief, cross-examination and re-examination is 
not foreseen.  
453
                                                 
450 Trial Chamber III , Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision in the participation of victims in the trial and on 86 applications by 
victims to participate in the proceedings, 30 June 2010, ICC-01/05-01/08-807, para 40.  
  
451 Trial Chamber IV, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the case of the Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda 
Abakaer Nourain, Decision on the participation of the victims in the trial proceedings, 20 March 2014, 
ICC-02/05-03/09, paras. 31-33; Trial Chamber VI, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 
the case of the Prosecution v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on the conduct of the proceedings, 2 June 
2015, ICC-01/04-02/06, para 22; Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire in the 
case of Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goundé, Directions on the conduct of the 
proceedings, 3 September 2015, ICC-02/11-01/15, para 37.  
452 Trial Chamber V , Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the case of the Prosecutor v. William 
Samoei Ruto and Joshua Sang, Decision in victims’representation and participation, 3 October 2012, 
ICC-01/09-01/11, paras. 74-76; Trial Chamber V , Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the case of 
the Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision in 
victims’representation and participation, 3 October 2012, ICC-01/09-02/11, paras. 73-75. 
453 Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen, 
Initial Directions on the Conduct of the Proceedings, 13 July 2016, ICC-02/04-01/15, para. 5. The 
same approach is taken by the Trial Chamber in the Mahdi case, but this trial was special because of 
the accused’s guilty plea: Trial Chamber VIII, Situation in the Republic of Mali in the case of the 
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5. Conclusion 
In the decisions on the definition of victims who are allowed to participate in the 
proceedings, the subject position of “the victims” was gradually shaped according to 
the requirements of the court. Firstly, “the victims”, in general, are defined to have a 
(natural) interest in finding the truth, being rendered justice and receiving 
reparations. This abstract interest is then appropriated to the clarification of facts, 
punishment and reparations. Since these are still general interests, a link has to be 
established between the specific victims and the ascribed interests. What renders an 
applicant into a victim is the harm suffered, which must be causally and directly 
linked to the crime under consideration. The subject position of “the victims” is 
thereby constructed to always already be interested in the truth and justice delivered 
by the ICC and more specifically, in the judgement of the respective Chambers. As a 
consequence of this construction of “the victims”, trying to find a space for “the 
victims” represented by their lawyers within the proceedings beside the parties and 
the Chamber becomes impossible. Since the Prosecution is responsible for the facts 
constituting the truth, the Defense rebuts these facts with their own facts and the 
Chamber determines the truth and renders justice in the form of a judgement and 
sentence, all defined interests that are naturally attributed to “the victims” are already 
served. In order to still provide a meaningful role for “the victims” they are allocated 
the assisting role in the truth finding mission of the court by contributing with what 
distinguishes them - their harm suffered and their local and cultural knowledge. The 
modalities of assisting are tightly controlled by the Chamber ensuring that no 
inappropriate interest can be articulated within the proceedings. Therefore, “the 
victims” who are defined to have an interest in ICC style truth and justice are not 
allowed to shape truth and justice - they are expected to be delivered with it by the 
Prosecution and the Chamber. The extent to which they shape truth and justice is 
limited to neutrally questioning beyond this they are the representatives of harmn 
suffered and culture.  
These limitations are in contrast with the normative claims attributed to the right 
to truth and justice in the first decisions, namely providing victims of mass atrocities 
                                                                                                                                     
Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi al Mahdi, Directions on the Conduct of the Proceedings, 22 July 2016, 
ICC-01/12-01/15, para. 3. 
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with an active role within the proceedings, independent of that of the Prosecution.454
An interrelated development that can be observed is the search for a place in the 
courtroom, - a role within the proceedings - in the course of the process of 
institutionalization of victim participation. The Chambers in the beginning were 
struggling to legally conceptualize the role of participants in contrast to parties to the 
proceedings which, already due to the wording, has to be somehow distinct. The 
distinction was drawn primarily vis á vis the Prosecution in the decisions on the 
modalities of participation, namely the right to lead and challenge evidence, which is 
a genuine right of the parties and in the decisions on the questioning witnesses in the 
courtroom. Interestingly, the alleged interests of “the victims” that were guiding in 
the decisions if, and how victims may participate, were compared to that of the 
Judges - namely determining the truth. On the one hand, this again speaks for the 
alignment of the definition of interests with the objective of the Court - the search 
for truth. On the other hand, the role of victims can hardly be called independent 
anymore, and is factually under the control of the Judges, who decide whether the 
requested evidence goes to the interests of victims and contributes to the truth, 
because legally, the Chamber is requesting the submission of the evidence that it 
considers necessary for the determination of the truth pursuant to Art. 69 (3) RS. 
“The victims” special role is restricted to assisting the Chamber in better 
understanding the socio-cultural background of the case to which their local knowledge 
enables them.  
 
Just like the development of the application process and the selection of LRVs, 
firstly, the Chambers establish general norms, often referring to international human 
rights law and general principles of law, to then gradually undermine these general 
normative claims through the interpretation of the very same norms.   
Apart from this, the modes of intervention by “the victims” - meaning their legal 
representatives - in the courtroom are tightly controlled, similar to the selection of 
representatives. Nevertheless, with the normalization of having the legal 
representatives of victims in the courtroom, in the course of the time, the control 
was loosened and the requirements for questioning became less strict. This is also an 
                                                 
454 See this Chapter 6, 3.1. 
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effect of institutionalization, once the positions and procedures are stabilized, the 
order is fixed and the unexpeceted (excess) excluded - the control can be loosened.  
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Chapter 7: Subject II 
1. From “the victims” to “the relevant victims” 
“On that day we were 12 people from various neighbourhoods. ... The second 
time we were called up again. Some other people did not show up, but I 
showed up. Today I am alone, but the other people who had been called up 
alongside me the first time are not here.”455
This Chapter deals with the pre-conditions for directly addressing the court, the 
criteria for, and corresponding practice of, being heard personally within the legal 
framework. The criteria developed are essential in defining the subject position 
victims have to assume when testifying or presenting views and concerns in the 
proceedings. As developed before, the subject position of “the victims” is confined 
by distinguishing it from the position of the parties in the proceedings. Accordingly, 
hardly any space is left for “the victims” beside the truth finding mission of the 
Chamber, the fact-finding mission of the Prosecution and the fact rebutting mission 
of the Defence. Moreover, the Chambers, from the very beginning, clarified that, in 
principle, victim participation takes place through legal representation. This means 
that the legal representatives, in general, speak for and on behalf of “the victims” in 
the courtroom. Against this backdrop it is not surprising that the Chambers were 
very reluctant to grant participants to present views and concerns in person, stating 
that for reasons of language, security and expediency legal representation might be 
the better way of presentation.
  
456 In fact, out of 2287 acknowledged victims who, at 
that time, participated in the Bemba trial, two were admitted to travel to The Hague 
to testify and three were allowed to present views and concerns in person via video 
link from Bangui.457
                                                 
455 Presentation of views and concerns a/30169/15, Transcripts, Situation in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, 1 March 2017, ICC-01/04-02/06, p. 52. 
 Trial Chamber I granted the request of three participants out of 
129 (their testimony was subsequently dismissed as unreliable) and Trial Chamber II 
granted four out of 370 (two of which were considered unreliable even before their 
456 Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga-Dyilo, Decision on victims' participation, 18 January 2008, ICC 01/04-01/06-1119, 
para. 116. 
457 Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the supplemented applications by the legal representatives of 
victims to present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, 22 February 2012, ICC-01/05-
01/08-2138, partly dissenting opinion Judge Steiner, para 22. 
254 
 
testimony).458 In the Ntaganda proceedings, the legal representative requested to call 
nine participants as witnesses and four as victims to present views and concerns in 
person.459 The Chamber decided to authorise the presentation of evidence by two 
participants and the presentation of views and concerns of six participants.460
Initially, the opportunity to present views and concerns in person as a right 
enshrined in Art. 68 (3) RS was celebrated as the milestone in providing a meaningful 
role for victims in international criminal proceedings (See Chapter I). It was this way 
of participation which distinguished the role of victims at the ICC from the role of 
victims at its predecessors. The main criticism of the ad-hoc tribunals regarding its 
relation to victims of the tried atrocities was the restricted and potentially re-
traumatizing position provided for the victims within the proceedings, namely the 
role as witnesses. Those who are victims of the crimes and called as witnesses are 
calles fact witnnesses:  
 
“Fact witnesses have knowledge and testify about what happened. They can be 
crimes-based witnesses when they have suffered harm and testify as witnesses 
about what happened to them. Some of these witnesses can also hold the status 
of participating victims before the Court; they are called dual-status 
witnesses.”461
Witnesses are called by either party to proof their respective cases. They serve to 
support the narration of the crimes determined by the parties and have no agency 
with regard to the narrative shaped. They serve as corroborating evidence to build a 
case and are therefore objectified to serve the needs of others. Now, with the 
introduction of victim participation at the ICC, participants should be enabled to 
submit their own stories, to shape the proceedings as subjects. The legal means are 
provided for in the form of the presentation of views and concern. 
 
                                                 
458 Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga-Dyilo, Decision on victims' participation, 18 January 2008, ICC 01/04-01/06-1119, 
para. 116; Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Modalities of Victim 
Participation at Trial, 22 January 2010, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, para 60.  
459 Trial Chamber VI, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Bosco Ntaganda, Public redacted version of ‘Decision on the request by the Legal Representative of 
the Victim of the Attacks for leave to present evidence and victims’ views and concerns ‘, 15 February 
2017, ICC-01/04-02/06, para 3. 
460 Trial Chamber VI, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Bosco Ntaganda, Public redacted version of ‘Decision on the request by the Legal Representative of 
the Victim of the Attacks for leave to present evidence and victims’ views and concerns ‘, 15 February 
2017, ICC-01/04-02/06, para 59. 
461 https://www.icc-cpi.int/about/witnesses. Last accessed 05/06/2018. 
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Whereas in principle this right is exercised through the legal representatives, some 
participants are allowed to address the court personally through the presentation of 
their views and concerns. As has been described before, by way of linking Art. 69 (3) 
RS and the authority of the Chamber to request the submission of evidence that it 
considers necessary for the determination of the truth to the requirements of the 
presentation of views and concerns pursuant to Art. 68 (3) RS, the Chambers 
implicitly acknowledge that a way of presenting views and concerns is testimony. 
Interestingly, in the first cases before the ICC, Lubanga and Katanga, the Chambers 
considered testifying to be more meaningful than simply presenting views and 
concerns. The line of argumentation was, that by giving evidence the victims 
contributed to the legally relevant truth, since only witnesses testify under oath and 
are exposed to cross-examination and their testimony can therefore become part of 
the judgement.462 The meaningfulness of participation was measured by the legal 
effect of the testimony in contrast to presenting views and concerns. For these 
reasons, in the first cases, the few participants who were granted the right to appear 
before the Court in person were allowed to testify and thereafter, if granted, to 
present views and concerns as well. The first case where participants were only 
invited to present views and concerns was Bemba.463 Now in Ntaganda, following 
the Bemba approach, there is a distinction between participants who testify and those 
who present their views and concerns in person.464
This development is interesting for two reasons: Firstly, initially, “the victims” 
were once again confined to objects of the criminal proceedings, namely witnesses 
who deliver testimony that is asked of them by their legal representatives and the 
other parties. Secondly, eventually, this confinement was abandoned and “the 
  
                                                 
462 Appeals Chamber, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment on the appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial 
Chamber I's Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008, 11 July 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-
1432, para 97; Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Decision on the Modalities of Victim 
Participation at Trial, 22 January 2010, ICC-01/04-01/07-1788-tENG, para 60.  
463 Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the supplemented applications by the legal representatives of 
victims to present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, 22 February 2012, ICC-01/05-
01/08-2138; Trial Chamber VI, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Public redacted version of ‘Decision on the request by the Legal 
Representative of the Victim of the Attacks for leave to present evidence and victims’ views and 
concerns ‘, 15 February 2017, ICC-01/04-02/06. 
464 Ibid., para 59. 
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victims”, by presenting views and concerns in person, in theory, assume a subject 
position. The representation of “the victims” described hitherto which was distanced 
from the Court through the practice of representation, externalization and 
collectivization is confronted with individual participants. The participating victims, 
who initially signed to be represented by “the victims” in their applications, are now 
allowed to address the court in person. Hence, the practice of testifying and 
presenting views and concerns in person, is illustrative of an encounter of the 
representation of “the victims” and the actual individual participating victim. 
Furthermore, it is an encounter of the Court, which is in need of a certain 
representation of “the victims” for its self-legitimization, with the actual victims. The 
tension implied in these encounters manifest in the control by the Chamber and 
parties when demanding from the individual participants to comply with the 
representation of “the relevant victim” and the reactions of the individuals when 
trying to speak and being heard beyond this representation. Furthermore, in theory, 
the Court encounters the traumatic memory as narrated by the individual victims 
themselves. It will be seen however, that the confinements of the subject position 
and the related restricted concept of trauma, that was shaped in the legal practice of 
the court, effectively structure the way victims speak and are being heard, with hardly 
any space for irritation. 
In the following, the practice of speaking and being heard through testifying and 
presenting views and concerns is unfolded in three steps. Firstly, the criteria for 
selecting those participants who are authorized to appear in person are analyzed (2.). 
The criteria are indicative of the subject position that is required to be heard at the 
court - it is the position of “the relevant victim”. In a next step, the actual practice of 
testifying (3.) and presenting views and concerns (4.) is analyzed. The encounters 
between the Court and the actual individual victim and their traumatic memory 
within the practice of testifying and presenting views and concerns will be analysed. 
At the same time these situations are an encounter of the actual participants with the 
subject-position of “the relevant victim” that frames speaking and hearing. The truth 
about their traumatic memory is legally framed. The irritations these encounters 
produce manifest in specific ways that will be unfolded. 
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2. The criteria for speaking and being heard 
Like indicated in the previous chapter, the criteria for presenting views and 
concerns in person, be it via testimony or not, are very strict. The Chambers, with 
slightly varying reasoning, all developed similar requirements. In order to preserve 
the stability of the legal proceedings, the Chamber in Lubanga, felt the necessity to 
remind the parties and participants that “this is a Court of law” and that the criminal 
legal proceedings are a speciality for lawyers who talk the legal language and thus 
know how to adequately talk about very difficult things that have happened:  
“It needs to be remembered that this is a Court of law and, in particular, this is 
the criminal trial of the accused, and the presumption is that those who 
participate in the proceedings will be lawyers, lawyers acting for individuals or 
for bodies, for entities. If individuals are to be allowed to participate in person, 
there would have to be cogent, indeed powerful, reasons for that exceptional 
course [...] because [...] people without legal training coming to talk about very 
difficult things that have happened to them could have a real capacity for 
destabilising these Court proceedings.”465
In the initial decision on victim participation, the Chamber held that participation 
is, for reasons of language, security, or expediency, better exercised through common legal 
representation.
 
466
Less drastic, the Chamber in Katanga held that in order to ensure expeditious 
proceedings that are not prejudicial to the rights of the accused and a fair and 
impartial trial, the possibility of victims to testify is subject to limitations.
 
467 Thereby 
the Chamber referred to the restricting requirements of Art. 68 (3) RS. Referring to 
the Lubanga ruling, only those victims are allowed to testify whose testimony will not 
“undermine the integrity of the proceedings.”468
                                                 
465 Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the request by victims a/ 0225/06, a/0229/06 and a/0270/07 to 
express their views and concerns in person and to present evidence during the trial, 26 June 2009, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx, para 23. 
  
466 Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga-Dyilo, Decision on victims' participation, 18 January 2008, ICC 01/04-01/06-1119, 
para. 116. 
467 Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Directions for the conduct of the proceedings and 
testimony in accordance with rule 140, 1 December 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07-1665-Corr, paras. 21-22. 
468 Ibid., para 24. 
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From a theoretical viewpoint it is remarkable that the Chamber considered it 
necessary vis à vis the individual victims to re-iterate that the ICC is a Court of law 
and that the victims – not knowing how to speak their language – have the capability 
to destabilize the process, endanger the integrity of the proceedings. The decision 
thereby justifies its exclusiveness and determines that only few victims can 
participate.The criminal legal process has to be exclusive in order to remain stable. 
And the stability is obtained by ensuring that participants in legal proceedings have 
legal training - speak the legal language. Victims, when they are not represented by a 
lawyer, not knowing how to speak adequately “about very difficualt things that have 
happened to them” have the capacity to destabilize the proceedings. The very difficult 
things that have happened to them, will mostly be the traumatic violence, the individual 
victims are asked to talk about. Implicitly, thereby, the Chamber in Lubanga 
anticipates the destabilizing effect of traumatic memory - that is not complying with 
legal requirements of speaking. In order to prevent this destabilization of the legal 
symbolic order by the traumatic memory, the Chambers developed and applied a 
strict regime.  
In the Bemba proceedings, initially, the legal representative of victims requested 
to call 17 victims to participate, which was according to the parties “excessive”, 
“unnecessary and disproportionate”, thereupon, the Chamber asked the legal 
representative to reduce the number to maximum eight “relevant victims”.469
“[T]he former is, in essence, the equivalent of presenting submissions, and 
although any views and concerns of the victims may assist the Chamber in its 
approach to the evidence in the case, these statements by victims (made 
personally or advanced by their legal representatives) will not form part of the 
trial evidence. In order for the victims to contribute to the evidence in the trial, 
it is necessary for them to give evidence under oath from the witness box.”
 
Distinguishing views and concerns and testimony, Chambers held that, 
470
                                                 
469 Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the supplemented applications by the legal representatives of 
victims to present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, 22 February 2012, ICC-01/05-
01/08-2138, partly dissenting opinion Judge Steiner, paras 3-4. 
 
470 Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the request by victims a/ 0225/06, a/0229/06 and a/0270/07 to 
express their views and concerns in person and to present evidence during the trial, 26 June 2009, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx, para 25; Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic in 
the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the supplemented applications 
by the legal representatives of victims to present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, 22 
February 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08-2138, para 19. 
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Consequently, the different modes of presentation of views and concerns are 
governed by different requirements which are elaborated upon separately below. 
Referring to the requirement of being a “relevant victim” however, the Chamber in 
Bemba developed common criteria for those victims who are authorized to address 
the court in person and who are consequently entitled to have an own voice in the 
proceedings: 
“The Relevant Victims should be those who, in the Legal Representatives' view, 
are (i) best-placed to assist the Chamber in the determination of the truth in 
this case; (ii) able to present evidence and/or views and concerns that affect the 
personal interests of the greatest number of participating victims; (iii) best-
placed to present testimony that will not be cumulative of that which has 
already been presented in this case; and (iv) willing for their identity to be 
disclosed to the parties in the event that they are permitted to testify and/or 
present their views and concerns. ”471
In general, only “the relevant victims” are entitled to participate in person, since 
the criteria they have to fulfil ensures that the proceedings are not destabilized: They 
have to be themselves representative for as many victims as possible, what they have 
to say must be relevant to the charges and assist the Chamber to find the truth and 
the presentation of their views and concerns must not repeat what has already been 
discussed. Within this tight framework of “the relevant victim” the practice of 
personal participation is exercised. Accordingly, this framework determines the 
subject position of “the relevant victim” which is hearable within the proceedings at 
the ICC. The individual participants have to assume this position in order to make 
sense in the proceedings. The unpredictable, excessive and challenging structure of 
trauma and violence is thereby precluded. 
 
This exclusionary practice with regard to participants causes discontent, not only 
among victims’ interest groups.472 Judge Steiner drafted a strong dissent to the 
“Decision on the supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to 
present evidence and the views and concerns of victims”.473
                                                 
471 Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Second order regarding the applications of the legal representatives of victims 
to present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, 21 December 2011, ICC-01/05-01/08-
2027, para 12. 
 The dissent indicates the 
472 fidh. “Five Myths About Victim Participation in ICC Proceedings.”, December 2014, 
https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/cpi649a.pdf, last accessed 26/6/2015; Garbett (2013).  
473 Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the supplemented applications by the legal representatives of 
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disproportion of the practice and hence suggests a certain lack of contact with the 
reality of the disturbing potential of victim participation so far. 
 “Before turning to the factual and legal basis underpinning my partly dissenting 
opinion, I wish to recall that the number of victims participating in the Bemba 
case is unprecedented in this Court. To date, a total of 2287 victims have been 
authorised to participate in the proceedings and a further 2903 applications are 
presently pending before the Chamber. For the purpose of ensuring effective 
and expeditious trial proceedings, all participating victims are represented by 
two legal representatives. 
Furthermore, it must be recalled that victims authorised to participate in the 
proceedings have been allowed, through their legal representatives, to question 
witnesses under the conditions imposed by the Chamber in its Corrigendum to 
Decision on the participation of victims in the trial, on 86 applications by 
victims, made to date, to participate in the proceedings and in its Decision on 
Directions for the Conduct of the Proceedings and that at no point can their 
participation be seen as having had a negative impact on the expeditiousness of 
the trial.”474
This indicates that the majorities’ decision is not based on the actual disturbing 
experiences with victims and their representatives, but is rather a fear that is based on 
a certain image/projection of the victim. This is further supported by Judge Steiners 
view, that the decision is based on criteria lacking the legal or factual basis: 
 
“In my view, the strict limitations imposed by the Majority to the presentation 
of evidence by victims and the "case-by-case" analysis of the victims' right to 
present their views and concerns reflect a utilitarian approach towards the role 
of victims before the Court, which has no legal basis and appears to 
unreasonably restrict the rights recognised for victims by the drafters of the 
Statute.”475
She confronts the decision with the abstract holding that victims are entitled to 
participate meaningfully, thereby, she reveals the inherent problem of all fresh 
judgement and calls into question that the decision taken on the basis of this abstract 
rule 68 (3) of the Rome Statute is a justified decision. She then re-consideres the 
abstract term of meaningful participation as a victims’ interest and thus challenges 
the justice of the decision taken by the majority.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
victims to present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, 22 February 2012, ICC-01/05-
01/08-2138, partly dissenting opinion Judge Steiner. 
474 Ibid., paras 8-9. 
475 Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the supplemented applications by the legal representatives of 
victims to present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, 22 February 2012, ICC-01/05-
01/08-2138, partly dissenting opinion Judge Steiner, paras 8-11. 
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 “It is my understanding that the concept of "meaningful participation" needs 
to be interpreted as a right conferred to the victims, and not as an useful tool 
for the parties or even the Chamber. It implies that victims have an 
independent voice in the trials, a ''right to be heard" which, in my view, 
constitutes one of the most significant features of the proceedings before the 
International Criminal Court. As a result of this interpretation which, in my 
view, is the only one compatible with the statutory framework, I am forced to 
disagree with the criteria set out in paragraphs 23 to 25 of the Decision. For the 
same reasons, I cannot agree with the conclusion that, as decided by the 
Majority, the victims' testimony would not "contribute" to the proceedings on 
the basis of a hypothetical risk of unduly delaying the trial, and with the 
Majority's decision to reject the major part of the requests formulated by the 
legal representatives.”476
What forced Judge Steiner to disagree (again the language is quite strong) is the 
justice gap she perceived with regard to “the relevant victim”. Where the gap 
becomes intolerable – the exclusionary violence within the decision is revealed and 
subsequently the gap is closed again by another decision taken by Judge Steiner in 
this instance. Once more, the space for victims within the proceedings is negotiated 
referring to the meaningfulness of participation, which is linked to having a voice and being 
heard as opposed to being useful within the legal framework. Judge Steiner indicates 
that speaking and hearing are confined by the subject position of “the relevant 
victim”. Furthermore, she shows that the majority’s approach is utilitarian, which is 
exactly what was criticised about the role of witnesses at the ad-hoc tribunals. This is 
then confronted with the right to be heard. As mentioned, she indicates that the space 
of being heard is narrowed by the utilitarian notion of “the relavent victim”. 
Accordingly, the questions that will be dealt with in the following are:  
 
How do these criteria effect the actual practice of testifying? How does the frame 
of the subject position of “the relevant victim” entitled to give testimony determine 
the way of giving testimony - of speaking and how does it frame what is being 
perceived - being heard? And how does this position differ from the subject-position 
provided for participants who present views and concerns in person?  
                                                 
476 Trial Chamber III, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the supplemented applications by the legal representatives of 
victims to present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, 22 February 2012, ICC-01/05-
01/08-2138, partly dissenting opinion Judge Steiner, paras 22, 25. 
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3. Evidence – the relevant witnesses 
The criteria developed by the respective Chambers differed slightly according to 
the mode of presentation - testimony, or presenting views and concerns. As has been 
said above, in the first decisions, the Chambers granted one to two participants the 
right to testify under oath, because this was considered to be more meaningful within 
the legal framwork of speaking. In a legal sense the victims are only heard, when they 
give testimony since only then, “the victims” truth can become part of the 
judgement. After giving testimony, the Chambers reserved the possibility to grant to 
present views and condcerns. Therefore, the distinction did not become important. 
The requirements for testifying are:  
“a. Whether the proposed testimony relates to matters that were already 
addressed by the Prosecution in the presentation of its case or would be 
unnecessarily repetitive of evidence already tendered by the parties.  
b. Whether the topic(s) on which the victim proposes to testify is sufficiently 
closely related to issues which the Chamber must consider in its assessment of 
the charges brought against the accused.  
c. Whether the proposed testimony is typical of a larger group of participating 
victims, who have had similar experiences as the victim who wishes to testify, 
or whether the victim is uniquely apt to give evidence about a particular matter.  
d. Whether the testimony will likely bring to light substantial new information 
that is relevant to issues which the Chamber must consider in its assessment of 
the charges.” 477
These criteria are implicitly acknowledged in the following cases by the different 
Chambers.
  
478
                                                 
477 Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Directions for the conduct of the proceedings and 
testimony in accordance with rule 140, 1 December 2009, ICC-01/04-01/07-1665-Corr, para 30, cited 
in:  Trial Chamber III,  Situation in the Cenral African Republic in the case of the Prosecutor v Jean 
Pierre Bemba, Decision on the supplemented applications by the legal representatives of victims to 
present evidence and the views and concerns of victims, 22 February 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08-2138, 
para 24. 
 
478 Trial Chamber V, Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the case of the Prosecutor v. William 
Samoei Ruto and Joshua Sang, Decision on victims’representation and participation, 3 October 2012, 
ICC-01/09-01/11, paras. 77; Trial Chamber V, Situation in the Republic of Kenya in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Decision on 
victims’representation and participation, 3 October 2012, ICC-01/09-02/11, para 76; Trial Chamber 
IV, Situation in Darfur, Sudan in the case of the Prosecutor v. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, 
Decision on the participation of the victims in the trial proceedings, 20 March 2014, ICC-02/05-
03/09, para 27; Trial Chamber VI , Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the 
Prosecution v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on the conduct of the proceedings, 2 June 2015, ICC-
01/04-02/06, paras 69-70; Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire in the case of 
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Once again, participants when providing testimony have to find a position beyond 
the Prosecution, since their testimony should not be repetitive. Nevertheless, the 
matters have to be related to the charges brought against the Accused by the same 
Prosecution. In this respect the testimony has to make a substantial contribution to 
the assessment of the charges and at the same time be representative of as many 
victims as possible. Hence, on the one hand, participants need to contribute exactly 
to the truth acquired by the Chamber based on the facts brought by the Prosecution 
and the Defense, on the other hand, they have to contribute something unique. 
Furthermore, what makes the victims “relevant” is their representativeness of as 
many other victims. They have to be unique and ordinary at the same time. As 
evidence they are treated as objects within the proceedings, serving to illuminate the 
legal truth, as victims they are supposed to be subjects in the proceedings and assist 
the Chamber. This somewhat contradictory subject position - between object and 
subject and the confining requirement of being relevant to the charges manifests 
differently within the practice of testifying. Moreover, since the witness-object is 
confronted with the victim-subject (3.1.) and the required relevant truth with regard 
to the charges (the appropriate narrative for trauma) is confronted with the individual 
traumatic memory (3.2.). Trauma has to be turned into evidence (3.3.) requiring a 
causal connection to the crime in question (3.4.) This causes irritations, since the 
legal framework shaping the subject position and the appropriate traumatic truth is 
from time to time challenged by the testifying victims (3.5.). These irritations are 
indicative of the lack and excess of the relevant victim and the impossible closure and 
confinement of trauma within the legal framework.  
3.1. Mr. and Ms. Witness - we ask, you answer.  
While being addressed as the victim in the application forms, “the victims” who 
are deemed relevant by the Chambers are, when testifying, addressed as Mr. and Ms. 
Witness.479
                                                                                                                                     
the Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goundé, Directions on the conduct of the 
proceedings, 3 September 2015, ICC-02/11-01/15, para 31. 
 The de-individualization by collectivization and representation that was 
already characteristic of the practice of representation, is therefore continued. In 
some cases this is due to security reasons, when the testifying victim is a protected 
479 See, by way of example, Testimony of a/0225/06: Transcripts, Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 12 January 2010, ICC-
01/04-01/06-T-225-Red-ENG, p. 3. 
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witness. In other cases it is not necessary for security reasons, but applied anyway. 
Before every testimony, the Judges ask the testifying participants if they could call 
them Mr, or Ms. Witness, throughout the questioning. The appellation links the 
subject position directly to the function of the victims required by the court. This is 
illustrative of the utilitarian approach as criticized by Judge Steiner in her dissenting 
opinion. The victims who come to testify agree to serve as evidence and to being 
addressed accordingly. Most witnesses complied. But one witness denied being called 
Mr. Witness and insisted on being called by his first name:  
“Q: “Would you be so kind throughout your questioning if I could call you 
“Mr. Witness”? Would that be agreeable to you?” 
A. “My name is Judes and I’d like to be called by my first name” 
Q: “That is understood. I will call you “Mr. Judes.” Is that ok by you?” 
A. “ I agree.””480
Mr. Judes Mbetingou wants to be called by his first name - unlike Judge Steiner 
expresses - this is just not understood. For the rest of the testimony the first name is 
taken as the last name. This illustrates that the legal unimportance of the actual name 
of the witness and the related irrelevance of the individuality of the witness in the 
proceedings structures hearing within the courtroom. For the sake of formality that 
has to be maintained in the proceedings, the testifying witness cannot be called as he 
wished - Judes - but is referred to as Mr. Judes.  
 
“Q: Thank you, Witness - I mean, Mr. Judes...”481
Whenever a witness testimony transgresses the legally confined hearing with what 
he or she says, it is either not understood, expressly rejected as irrelevant or adjusted 
according to the respective requirements - either ways, it is not heard. The testifying 
individuals have to provide the legally relevant information that are confined by the 
charges brought against the Accused. This objectivization manifests in little slips by 
the parties:  
 
“Mr. Haynes: Yes. Well, that will enable us to conclude with the witness today. 
                                                 
480 Testimony of Judes Mbetingou: Transcripts, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case 
of the Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, 3 May 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08, p. 44. 
481 Testimony of Judes Mbetingou: Transcripts, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case 
of the Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, 4 May 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08, p. 5. 
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Presiding Judge Steiner: Conclude with the testimony, I understand. 
Mr. Haynes: Yes, sorry.”482
Witnesses are concluded with, when the Prosecution, Defence or LRVs got the 
information, they decided is relevant to the case. Questioning, in this context, is 
retrieving information, it is just no dialogue where one party wants to really know the 
other parties position. Accordingly, it is a unilateral situation, where the roles are 
fixed to those who question and those who answer. Whenever a witnesses breaks 
with this rule of only being allowed to answer whatever questions are posed to them, 
they are reminded of their function as information providers:  
 
“Q: Madam Witness, you’re not allowed to ask me questions, ...”483
“Judge Steiner: ... When it’s time for the Defence, or the Prosecution first, to 
put questions to you they may refer again to the video but for you, as a witness, 
it’s not important to know who made this video. This is for the Judges to 
consider at the end of the case. The Judges will analyse the origin of the 
video.”
 
484
Even further, the witnesses subject position is reiterated – “for you, as a witness, 
it’s not important to know”. Although, the witness – Judes – expressly asked who 
made the video, he was supposed to give information about, and therefore 
demonstrated his interest in knowing, Judge Steiner recalled that as a witness this is 
not important. Since, it is the Judges concern within the proceedings. As Judes, this 
might be his interest, as a witness, it is not. And Judes is only heard as a witness.  
 
The same disciplining regime is applied by the Judges and the parties when a 
witness is addressing issues that are beyond the relevant information – the unique 
information - defined by the Chambers:  
 “Judge Femr: Sorry, Mr. Witness. I have to interrupt you. Mr. Seprun, I 
understand that you need some introductory passage before you reach the core 
of the testimony, but as we, the Chamber, several times emphasised this. Those 
witnesses, three witnesses that you proposed have been invited to come 
because their testimony is somewhat unique. But the history of the conflict, you 
                                                 
482 Testimony of Judes Mbetingou: Transcripts, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case 
of the Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, 3 May 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08, p. 23. 
483 Testimony of CAR-V20: Transcripts, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, 2 May 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08, p. 42. 
484 Testimony of Judes Mbetingou: Transcripts, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case 
of the Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, 7 May 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08, p. 8. This was after 
Mr. Mbetingou was repetitively asked about the video, which he thought to be fabricated. He asked 
where this video came from. In their Judgement, the Judges concurred with this opinion.  
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know, we have listened to many witnesses on that topic. So I would like to skip 
this topic and focus on those parts of the testimony which are unique to this 
witness, please.”485
3.2. Truth 
 
According to the legal framework developed by the Chambers, the relevant victim 
provides relevant (unique) information and thus serves to assist the Chambers in 
their search for the truth. This assisting role in the truth-finding mission is re-iterated 
throughout the testimony of the witnesses.  
“Judge Cotte: ...you are providing assistance to the Court so that we can 
establish the truth.”486
The witness, from the very beginning of the testimony is sworn in to “tell the 
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth”. This identification of testimony 
and truth and the respective role of the witness testifying was reproduced by the 
individual witnesses. Especially during cross-examination, when their credibility was 
openly challenged. 
 
“I cannot say anything that is not true. I am telling only the truth.”487
“I did not come here to lie…”
 
488
Whenever, the individual witnesses felt challenged, they re-iterated their oath to 
remain within the legal framework – to be heard. The scope of this truth then is 
defined by the parties and is summarized by Maître Douzima-Lawson, a legal 
representative, before questioning the victim-witnesses:  
 
... The questions I will be putting to you will be very simple in nature: When, 
how, why and so on and so forth. The questions will not be for me as such, but 
rather will be questions that will enable you to provide answers that will 
enlighten the Trial Chamber as to what you suffered, as to what your 
experience was as you put it so well in your own words. 489
                                                 
485 Testimony of V3: Transcripts, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, 12 April 2017, ICC-01/04-02/06, p. 10. 
 
486 Testimony of DRC-V19: Transcripts, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of 
the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 21 February 2011, ICC-01/04-
01/07, p. 5. 
487 Presentation of views and concerns a/30169/15: Transcripts, Situation in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, 1 March 2017, ICC-01/04-02/06, p. 51. 
488 Testimony of Judes Mbetingou: Transcripts, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case 
of the Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, 4 May 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08, p. 8. 
489 Testimony of CAR-V20: Transcripts, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, 1 May 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08, pp 9-10. 
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The truth required, framing the testimony is: when did the cause of your suffering 
happen, how did it happen, why did it happen. The suffering – or the harm suffered 
– as we have seen in the last Chapter is the representation of the traumatic memory 
at the court. The elaborations on the harm suffered are made in order to enlighten 
the Chamber and facilitated by the legal representatives. Trauma – harm suffered – is 
thereby confined to serve as evidence in the case and hence 
communicated/spoken/contained in a very specific legal framework that sometimes 
appears very disturbing.  
3.3. Trauma as evidence 
Trauma as evidence provided by the witnesses is spoken within the described legal 
framework. Since the witnesses are objectified as information providers the first 
disturbing manifestation of trauma as evidence is the fact that the traumatic memory 
is addressed through questions – but not answered. This means that, in most cases, 
there is no reaction to the gruesome story told. Instead of speaking – and hearing in 
the sense of processing, cognitively and emotionally what has been said, immediately 
after the answer a new question is posed – retrieving the legally necessary 
information from the witness:  
“A. “...I tried to resist. And they gave me - they hit me with the butt of the rifle 
in my mouth and I lost some teeth. Subsequent to that they raped me and then 
they told me to leave. 
Q: Thank you, madam, for that information. I would like us to come back to 
Pluto, that is to say the moment of time when you were in fact still in 
Mongbwalu...”490
Sometimes these interruptions were made in order to comply with the time-
schedule of the hearings. Here, the LRV, anticipating the schedule, interrupts the 
witness in the middle of her story of how she was raped:  
 
“...they had rifles and every time that they go on me to rape me they still had 
their rifles on them. 
Ms. Douzima Lawson: Your Honour, I don’t want to be reminded of the time 
again so I see that it’s the time now.”491
                                                 
490 Testimony of a/30365/15: Transcripts, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case 
of the Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, 11 April 2017, ICC-01/04-02/06, p. 18.  
 
491 Testimony of CAR-V20: Transcripts, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, 1 May 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08, p. 37. 
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Regardless of the reason for the non-reaction, or interruption, they appear as an 
inadequate response to what has been said. Almost brutal. The violence of trauma as 
evidence becomes most evident in these moments. This exemplifies the violence to 
the traumatic memory, that goes far beyond the legal confines of truth, and the 
violence to the victim-subject, when having to serve as witness-object. The witness-objects 
do not only serve as information providers assisting the Chambers in their truth-
finding mission, they are also used by the legal representatives to justify the cause of 
victim representation itself. This seems even more disturbing, since victim 
participation as provided for in the Rome Statute was introduced to overcome the 
objectification of victims for the sake of the legal process. Now, the individual 
victims are objectified by their own representatives in order to proof that victim 
participation is working. And to allow their representatives to call more victims as 
witnesses in the future – to serve the interests of the legal representatives.  
“...Now, yesterday your answers were perfectly clear, and to my mind your 
answers showed the interest that the legal representatives have in ensuring that 
victims give testimony. We have been dealing with a number of witnesses and 
we have heard testimony from rape victims, but I think this is the first time we 
have heard testimony to the effect that a witness has been raped by 14 people. 
With the new international criminal procedure in effect now, which is a bit of a 
hybrid, finding itself somewhere in between the English tradition in which 
victims do not have official standing and the French language legal tradition 
whereby the victim is a full-fledged part of the entire process and not just a 
participant. So you see we have this new system of international justice lying 
somewhere in the middle, and victims can also appear in Court and give 
testimony, although their rights may be somewhat limited. And I think in the 
future we will benefit from the possibility, and we do hope that legal 
representatives will have opportunity to call more victims before the Court.”492
The fact that this women as witness, as opposed to other men and women who 
testified before, was raped by 14 men makes her unique within the legal framework 
and therefore, within these tight confines – a “relevant victim”. This seems 
particularly bewildering. It is not the witness herself to define her uniqueness, in fact 
her individuality is totally irrelevant within the legal framework of “the relevant 
victim” testifying. Her individuality as witness is defined by her uniqueness of being 
raped by 14 men which made her relevant. “The victims” are identified with their 
harm suffered linked to the charges, which is what distinguishes them from the other 
  
                                                 
492 Testimony of CAR-V20: Transcripts, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, 2 May 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08, p. 3. 
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parties. “The relevant victim” is identified with the “relevant harm” that must be 
unique, not repetitive and substantial within the scope of the charges.   
3.4. Trauma as a consequence 
The described confines of trauma as evidence and the representation of trauma as 
physical, psychological and material harm suffered, elaborated in the previous 
Chapter, manifests in the practice of testifying as the requirement of narrating trauma 
as a consequence. To be heard within the legal framework, the harm suffered has to 
be a consequence of the alleged crime falling into the scope of charges. Trauma, 
hence, has to be narrated as a causal effect of the crime. The structure of the 
questions asked, often already forestall this narration.  
“Mr. Keta: I was putting the question to you as to the consequences or effects 
of your actions when you attempted to stop the children from being captured. 
A: Thank you for the question. The consequences of my actions are multiple. 
There are several consequences to my actions, and they are serious. The first 
direct consequence is the blows that I received subsequent to my intervention. I 
received several blows and my physical state changes as a result. Another 
consequence is that there was material loss, whether it be my personal property 
or the property of the school. There are also other consequences that come to 
mind; notably the harm, which is still very much present in my mind. Notably 
the fact that my life might come to an end some day, because speaking to you 
now, I find it difficult to concentrate. And sometimes my lack of concentration 
means that I lose grasp of the situation. And I have blank moments. I have 
difficulties reasoning. And these are the effects, the results of the blows that I 
received and this is detrimental to me.”493
The traumatic experience of this witness is unfolded within the structure of causes 
and consequences until blank moments and difficulties in reasoning fit into the logic 
of causes and consequences.  
 
“Could you tell us what physical harm you have suffered? What sort of side-
effects or lasting effects have you had subsequent to these events? 
A: Thank you, Counsel. Well, as for the physical damage or harm, after 
everything I went through, well, I can tell you this. You see, every women has 
her monthly period, but what I have seen is that each time I have my ovulation 
it is difficult for me to put my finger into my vagina.  
The second problem that I have is with my head. I just can’t keep control of 
my feelings, or keep myself under control as a human being. I have 
                                                 
493 Testimony of a/0225/06: Transcripts, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case 
of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 12 January 2010, ICC-01/04-01/06-T-225-Red-ENG, p. 
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psychological problems, disturbances, headaches, sometimes I even have 
hallucinations, and all of this is because I was involved in these massacres and 
all these other atrocities committed by these men. I have also problems with my 
lungs, because I was struck. I received blows.”494
The legal framework structures the traumatic memory according to its own 
requirements and the individual witnesses mostly comply with this narration. This 
structure of causes and consequences is the symbolic order within which the 
traumatic memory – the reminder of the Real – can be contained. Even the 
description of loosing ones subjectivity within this symbolic order by being subjected 
to extreme violence – the impossibility of being within the symbolic order – can be 
narrated as a consequence within this very same symbolic order. The intangible can 
be spoken as a consequence of humiliating treatment, degrading treatment and 
inhuman treatment. The effect is a loss of dignity – of the essence of the human 
being as defined legally. The intangible itself – the Real – can only be sensed, as a 
strange inadequacy of the legal form, never spoken, within this framework. 
 
“Q: How do you feel? 
A: Thank you for putting this question to me. In my community I am no longer 
considered a human person, and by extension in the whole of the CAR I’m not 
considered a human being. You know, I was a human being, but I was treated 
like an animal, a burden, and that is why I cannot live normally. I cannot live 
with - calmly and live as all other girls of my age do. I cannot do that because I 
was treated like an animal.  
You see, I’m a women. Before these events I was a women with dignity. I could 
have a family with dignity, but I lost my dignity. I was forced to change the man 
in my life. Really, I have no longer any dignity. That is the reason I insisted to 
come to testify publicly without any protective measures. Really, I suffered 
humiliating treatment, degrading treatment and inhuman treatment.”495
3.5. Challenging objectification 
 
The sense that the legal framework of testifying is not doing justice to traumatic 
memory and that the address of Mr. and Ms. Witness is de-individualizing the victim-
subject is from time to time voiced by the Judges:  
„...This may seem to you as a very artificial question, whereas on the 24th of 
February, 2003, you were trying to save your life and the life of your child. We 
have certainly understood this, but if you could fill in this detail, explain this 
                                                 
494 Testimony of CAR-V20: Transcripts, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, 1 May 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08, p. 4. 
495 Ibid., p. 53. 
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detail, then we would be happy. If you can’t, then Mr. Kilenda will move on to 
another question.”496
“...We will call you “Madam Witness” in a very impersonal fashion.”
 
497
But most often the violence of the legal framework is revealed by the refusal of 
the individual victim-subjects to comply with the position of the witness-object.  
 
“A: If we continue looking at these videos, I will stop testifying. I did not come 
here to give testimony on photographs.”498
Witness Judes Mbetingou on the one hand threatened to stop testifying – to quit 
as a witness – and on the other hand he challenges the objective of the proceedings. 
Rather than giving testimony on photographs – representations of what happened- 
he wants to speak about his perception of what happened. Thereby he reveals what 
distinguishes him from the Judges and the parties: They will always only speak about 
representations of what happened, while he experienced it. Truth at court is a 
representation, this is the trauma of law vis á vis the truth.  
 
“Are we having – can you have a trial, can you conduct a trial, with 
photographs?”499
Judge Steiner, subsequently addressing Judes Mbertingou as Mr. Witness again, 
reminds him that he is a witness and as such he has to answer the questions: 
 
“So it’s important, Mr. Witness, that you answer to the questions when you are 
called to explain the pictures, to identify, and if you don’t know who these 
people are, you just say, : “I don’t know who these people are.” There is no 
problem if you say that you don’t know, but if you have an answer to the 
question and I ask you please to be patient and to allow the Defence to 
continue.”500
Due to the fact, that Mr. Mbetingou had taken off his headphones, the means to 
hear the Judges, he could not hear the reminder. Judge Steiner had to repeat herself. 
He, being the one who refuses to listen, turns the roles upside down and 
 
                                                 
496 Testimony of DRC-V19: Transcripts, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of 
the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 22 February 2011, ICC-01/04-
01/07, p. 64. 
497 Testimony of DRC-V19: Transcripts, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of 
the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 23 February 2011, ICC-01/04-
01/07, p. 58. 
498 Testimony of Judes Mbetingou: Transcripts, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case 
of the Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, 8 May 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08, p. 33. 
499 Testimony of Judes Mbetingou: Transcripts, Situation in the Central African Republic in the case 
of the Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, 8 May 2012, ICC-01/05-01/08, p. 27. 
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demonstrates the dependency of the court. The court needs witnesses who serve as 
representations of what happened in order to establish the truth. They are in fact not 
only assistants – they represent the truth which is then shaped by the Court 
according to their requirements. When the victim-subject refuses to serve as a 
witness-object by, in this case, questioning the objective and purpose of the trial, 
s/he is referred back to the position of the witness-object. The appellation re-iterates 
the function and the challenging of the object (the video) voiced by Mr. Mbetingou is 
framed as not knowing. Not knowing equals cannot provide relevant information 
within the legal framework. For witness-objects there is no space for questioning, or 
challenging.  
When the traumatic facts – the witnesses’ truth – is challenged, which is mostly 
done by the Defence, for obvious reasons, this means that the relevant victims’ 
subjectivity is challenged. Within the legal framework, this is an existential threat, 
because this is the only possible subject position for individuals appearing before the 
Court. In such existential moments, the reactions of the victim-subjects as witness-
objects are most radical:  
“Thank you. It was the riverbank, and at that place there was a military base 
and it was at that place that I was raped. I am telling you everything I suffered 
and I understand that the chief or leader in question and the soldiers are trying 
to deny the facts, but what separates us is death and what brings us together is 
pardon, but I refer to my Counsel and the Judges present here. Please do not 
forget that there is somebody, the supreme person above everybody, who sees 
everything that happens, and he is able to provide justice and that’s what I can 
tell you.”501
The witness invocates a higher power as a provider of justice. Thereby she 
relativizes the self-awarded role of the ICC to render justice to the victims. Above 
that, she prevents her legal death as a witness – the denial of credibility – the denial 
of her truth, of her relevance, by referring to the supreme person above, who sees 
her truth. Furthermore, she directly addresses the Judges and the Counsels and urges 
them to not forget this supreme person – their limitation which is the (im)possible 
truth – the always already blocked access to her truth, to the trauma. Because what 
separates the witness with the rest of the courtroom is death.  
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4. Views and concerns - the relevant victim 
In order to avoid the objectivization of victims as witnesses that was criticised 
with respect to the ad-hoc tribunals, victims can present views and concerns 
personally before the Chambers at the ICC. It already became clear, that this way of 
participation is the most restricted one. The legal representatives of victims have to 
“determine whether they [the victims] are best placed to undertake this exercise or 
whether the relevant matters would be more effectively introduced by their legal 
representatives.”502 As has been shown, the only distinction that renders a victim 
relevant and therefore the only possible subject position from which a participating 
victim can be heard - is their suffering. The Chambers accordinly define that the 
relevant victim only have a legitimate interest in portraying the harm suffered which has 
to be linked to the charges brought against the accused.503 Otherwise, it is considered 
to be in their own interest to be legally represented.504
In the first cases, the personal presentation of views and concerns was granted 
after the conclusion of the testimony. In this context, the regime of giving testimony, 
described in the previous paragraphs was still prevailing, when the testifying victims 
were asked whether there was anything else they would like to tell. For this reason, 
distinct modalities for victims presenting their views and concerns, were developed 
by the Chamber in Bemba and Ntaganda that granted different victims either the 
right to present views and concerns or to testify. Therefore, these cases are indicative 
of the legally framed subject position of “the relevant victim” beside the witness-
object position and its effects.  
  
In general, the Chambers struggled to develop the modalities of the presentation 
of views and concerns in person. This can be explained by the ambivalent subject-
position that is assigned to “the relevant victims”. On the one hand, they are only 
                                                 
502 Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga-Dyilo, Decision on victims' participation, , 18 January 2008, ICC 01/04-01/06-
1119, para. 115.  
503Appeals Chamber, Situation in Uganda in the case of the Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony et al., Decision 
on legal representation, appointment of counsel for the defence, protective measures and time-limit 
for submission of observations on applications for participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, 
a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, 27 October 2008, ICC-02/04-164, para 11; 
Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga-Dyilo, Decision on victims' participation, , 18 January 2008, ICC 01/04-01/06-
1119, paras. 102-103. 
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relevant, when they comply with the requirements of a witness - best-placed to assist 
the Chamber in the determination of the truth, able to present views and concerns 
that affect the personal interests of the greatest number of participating victims, best-
placed to present testimony that will not be cumulative of that which has already 
been presented in this case. On the other hand, they do not testify and therefore it 
would be prejudicial to the Defence, if they provided evidence without being forced 
to reveal their identity to the parties, without being under oath and without being 
cross-examined. The only position left given these requirements, is the representation 
of the harm suffered - the traumatic memory. Within the legal framework, as has 
been already demonstrated, this is the only distinguishing feature that turns the 
individual victim into “the victims” and finally into “the relevant victim”. At the same 
time, it is exatly this traumatic memory, that is always framed to potentially 
overwhelm the proceedings - threatening its integrity. As displayed in the fist 
Chapters, in order to uphold the legal fiction, the law’s others - in this case the 
victims - are framed as emotional, unpredictable, subjective, partial etc. This fiction 
stabilizes the Court’s image to be factual, predictable, objective, impartial. Now, the 
relavant victim whose only possible position within the proceedings is shaped 
according to this picture of the other of law - represening the harm suffered - is at 
once necessary to uphold the fiction and existentially threatening to this fiction. In 
order to manage this tension, the narration of the harm suffered by the 
representatives of the traumatic memory is once again tightly controlled by criteria 
that are reproductive of the symbolic order upholding the fiction and leaving hardly 
any space for listening to traumatic memory. And it is once again the LRVs to whom 
the controlling function is delegated.  
4.1. Mr. and Ms. Victim are guided throught their harm 
Once again, “the relevant victim” presenting views and concerns in person are not 
addressed by their name, but by their “function” witrhin the proceedings:  
“...if I may call you Madam Victim that will present is today with her views and 
concerns as authorised by the Chamber. Welcome, madam....” 505
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Republic in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, 25 June 2012, ICC-01/04-02/06, 
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Mr. and Ms. Victim are then guided through the presentation of views and 
concerns by their respective legal representatives who are the facilitators and 
streamliners of the presentation.  
“The Chamber reminds the parties that the relevant legal representative, in this 
case Maȋtre Douzima Lawson, will be responsible for guiding the victim 
through the presentation of her views and concerns. Nevertheless, the 
intervention of the legal representative shall be limited to questions that 
facilitate the presentation of the views and concerns of the victim.”506
 “The legal representative representing the victims, Mr Seprun, will be 
responsible for guiding the victims through the presentation of their views and 
concerns. The intervention of the legal representatives shall be limited to 
questions that facilitate and streamline the presentation of the views and 
concerns by the victim. 
 
507
Since this mode of presentation resembles the framing of testimony, the 
representatives are compelled to ensure that the presentation of views and concerns 
is a narration, rather than a testimony. In contrast to testifying, the presentation of 
views and concerns is described to be a space for telling one’s story - for a narrative. 
But instead of just giving this space to the individual participants to narrate whatever 
is in his or her interest, it is the legal representatives who “have the victims tell their 
story”.  
  
“The Chamber nevertheless encourages the legal representatives to have the 
victims give a narrative as much as possible.”508
“Q (legal representatove): Madam, we are in open session and I will tell you to 
tell your story to the Judges.”
 
509
Corresponding to “the victims” signing the application forms, “the relevant 
victim” is always already framed to be in need for assistance, even when it comes to 
telling one’s own story. The role of the legal representative and the respective 
conflation of speaking for and speaking on behalf of - the conflation of the modes of 
representation - is revealed more than once in little slips:  
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“Q; I am the legal representative of victims in this case; that is the case before 
us. The President has already stated that the Chamber has authorised the legal 
representative of victims to express their views and concerns, and I mean has 
authorised the victims to express their views and concerns. You are one of 
those victims and, as you know, I am your representative. The President has 
also stated that it is my role to put questions to you which will give you an 
opportunity to narrate to the Court, to tell the Court what happened to you and 
what happened to your community. Do you hear me? In fact, I will ask you 
questions such as “When?”, “How?”, “Why?” and so on and so forth.”510
The legal representatives, by their mode of questioning, frame what is being said 
and how. The questions enable the victims to narrate. When the questions, as 
becomes obvious from this quote - when how, why - come too close to testimony, 
discussions start about the nature of testimony and views and concerns. These 
discussions are characteristic of a difficulty to designate the meaning of views and 
concerns within the legal framework - and hence are characteristic of the 
(im)possibility to designate a space for individual victims. The difficulty becomes 
apparent when the parties and the judges are searching for the appropriate words 
defining views and concerns:  
 
“But one general comment from my part, I would like to highlight the 
difference between testimonies of victims, which will be heard in April, and 
presentation of their views and concerns which, in my view, should be mainly 
focussed on, as is even in the name of this procedural measure, views and 
concerns, which, in my understanding, means that obviously it’s not 
unavoidable that during this presentation also some facts have - have to be 
mentioned but, in my view, the core of such presentation should be, if possible, 
focus especially on those views and concerns, which normally is not part of the 
classical testimony. 
But, as I said it is understandable that we also, before listening about feelings 
and has affected the victim, that we also have to hear something about the 
sources of this harm.”511
Since the definition is drawn in opposition to testimony, the distinction between 
views and concerns reproduces the binary structure that was carved out in the first 
chapter. Testimony is within the realm of legal proceedings, consequently it goes to 
the facts of the case. Views and concerns, in contrast, relate to the emotions. 
Emotions are described as psychological. The practice of linking the image of the 
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victims to their harm and thereby implying a quasi natural interest in proceedings as 
remedy described in the previous chapter is continued. Concerning the distinction of 
views and concerns this takes yet another form. Since victims represent the harm 
suffered it must be their interest to speak about this harm - not to speak to the facts. 
Whereas “the victims” were described to naturally be interested in criminal 
proceedings dealing with their harm suffered, “the relevant victim” (in contrast to the 
witness- object that has by definition no interests as an information provider512
The (im)possibilities of upholding the binary images reproducing the fiction of a 
clear distinction become obvious in the encounter with the actual relevant victims. 
The tension of the produced image of the emotional victim representing the harm 
suffered and hence the traumatic memory that always endangers to overwhelm the 
legal proceedings, is unveiled when the parties, Judges and participants discuss the 
framework of the presentation of this harm. Since it cannot be organized like a 
testimony and at the same time it must not undermine the integrity of the 
proceedings, the space for victim within the legal proceedings is negotiated within 
this tension. 
) 
naturally have a distinct interest - narrating their harm. On one side, there is no space 
for the individual victims beside the Judges and the parties, since they serve as the 
law’s legitimizing others. On the other side, because “the victims” interests were 
aligned with that of the Court (truth and justice), the distinct image of “the relevant 
victim” is left with the remaining definitional element - the harm. Due to the fact that 
the harm in criminal proceedings is addressed as facts establishing the truth that 
serves justice, and that the individual victims in the context of presenting views and 
concerns have to be distinct, their interests are defined as the opposite. Facts stand 
for legal proceedings, feelings/emotions stand for victims. Witnesses serve to 
provide facts, “the relevant victims” serve to provide feelings. In legal proceedings 
victims as witnesses testify, as relevant victims presenting views and concerns they 
narrate. As witnesses they provide information, as “relevant victims” they are told to 
tell their story.  
“The Defence is very concerned by the way this is taking place... and one must 
realise that the expression of views and concerns are considerations of a general 
                                                 
512 The fact that the witness-object has no interests is illustrated in the way the parties and the judges 
reacted to the questions of the witnesses.  
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nature to take into account the views of the victims on a purely psychological 
basis...However, ever since this hearing started, we have not heard any views 
and concerns. What we are instead listening to is an account of incriminating 
facts.”513
“ I believe that this question in itself calls for facts, calls for a description of the 
events and I don’t think that this is the purpose of hearing the views and 
concerns of the persons we are about to hear this morning and today.  
 
We should limit our self, of course, saying what they went through, but we 
should focus on what is important for victims, and that is while do they see the 
harm they suffer, what do they want from the court, what do they feel about 
what happened, but not a detailed description. Even though it is not under 
oath, it is highly prejudicial.”514
Views and concerns are henceforth described as considerations of a general 
nature having a purely psychological basis. What is described as important for victims 
is that they see the harm they suffer (?), what they feel about what happened - at the 
same time there should not be a too detailed description of what had happened. 
Related to these topics that are described to be important interests of victims, the 
form of speaking is understood to be different from the form of a testimony. More 
story-telling than fact finding with regard to the harm suffered. 
 
“Ms Kneuer (Prosecution): ...but our understanding of how the victims are 
supposed to present their views and concerns was a different one. Perhaps our 
expectation was wrong, but we would had thought that the witness would be 
given an opportunity to present her views and concerns in context basically in 
one row as a story or as an essay. Also, our understanding was rather that the 
views and personal perspectives or opinions that the victim wants to share with 
the Judges, you Honours, about matters that are under consideration here, 
meaning the harm they suffered and what affect that has on their life and 
potential reparations. With regard to concerns, when we go by both terms, we 
had expected again information with regard to their personal interest and not so 
much related to evidence...”515
It is remarkable that whereas “the victims” and the “relevant victims” giving 
testimony, as witnesses, are described to have a personal interest in the facts of the 
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case relating their harm suffered to the charges, “the relevant victim” presenting 
views and concerns are described to be interested in the harm they suffered, the 
effect and possible reparations. The defintion of participating victims as witnesses 
and the related interests differ from the definition of participating victims as victims 
presenting views and concerns without testifying. Since, by definition, 
testimony/witnesses cannot be the same as the presenting views and concerns as 
victim, witness and victim are determined to have divering interests according to the 
positions they assume within the proceedings. This reveals that the personal interest 
of the victims depends on the requirement and the space provided for within the 
proceedings, not on what the individual victims define as their personal interests.   
Practically, the Chambers attempted to maintain the distinction of testimony of 
victim-witnesses and the presentation of views and concerns of victims by asking the 
legal representatives to ask less detailed questions and to focus on the harm suffered.  
“Judge Steiner: ...avoid putting to the witness - to the victims, I’m sorry, so 
many specific questions...So, with this recommendation, The Chamber will 
proceed with Victim 542 and requests Maȋtre Douzima to be less detailed in her 
questions and conduct the victims to focus now from now on on the harm 
suffered, on the consequences of the alleged conducts for her life and other 
kind of views and concerns that she may wish to express in relation to the facts 
allegedly occurred.”516
In fact, it is mainly the legal representatives who frame the narratives of “the 
relevant victims”. They are responsible for the selection and for guiding them 
through their presentation. They bear the responsibility to frame the hearing so as to 
confine the individual victims to “the relevant victim”.  
  
 “Madam, you have been called before the ICC to provide the Judges and the 
other parties in the courtroom material on your personal experience and those 
of your friends relating to the events that took place in 2002 - late 2002, early 
2003 and to talk about the harm and damage that you and members of your 
family suffered subsequent to those events and also about the impact that these 
events had on your personal life.”517
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“Thank you. Thank you madam. You have done very well so far, but I would 
like to ask you to now focus on what happened after you met up with your 
children following that period of absence and then also tell the Court the 
impact of these events on yourself and on your daughters and on your family as 
well. Can you focus on that, madam?”518
Clearly, in order to enable the Chamber to fully understand your views and 
concerns, it will be necessary to know who you are, your story, to know your 
story, what happened to you, and also to understand what your views and 
concerns are, as well as your expectations of the International Criminal Court in 
this matter.”
 
519
Instead of the participants’ views and concerns, the legal representatives stage 
what is expected to be the victims views and concerns - the harm suffered. Hence it 
is not the participants talking about what they want - telling their story - it is the legal 
representatives framing the relevant story. This becomes particularly obvious in this 
instance, where the individual participant asks the representative what he wants her 
to talk about:  
 
“a/01635/13: “...Now, after my daughter was relieved following the treatment - 
well, do you want me to talk about my daughter, or to talk about myself?” 520
The function of the legal representatives is to lead the victims according to the 
legal requirements set before. This also applies to the adequate expectations 
participants may have. The expectations are aligned with the defined interests in truth 
and justice and complemented by what is exceptionally granted to them: telling their 
story. Once again, it is exactly what is allegedly delivered by the court that is expected 
to be expected by “the relevant victims”:  
 
“...This may seem obvious, but this is something essential for the victims, 
namely that justice be rendered in relation to the events that occurred on the 
24th of February 2003, in Bogoro. They are yearning that justice be done and 
that the people responsible for these events are found guilty within full 
compliance of the law.  
The fact that victims have an opportunity to take part in these proceedings is 
already an important step ahead for them, and finally, we see that the system of 
                                                                                                                                     
Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. Bosco  Ntaganda, 1 March 2017, ICC-01/04-
02/06, p. 38 
518 Presentation of views and concerns a/01635/13: Transcripts, Situation in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, 1 March 2017, ICC-01/04-02/06, p. 20.  
519 Presentation of views and concerns Voloube De Mbioka Francis Félicien : Transcripts, Situation in 
the Central African Republic in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, 26 June 
2012, ICC-01/04-02/06, p. 13. 
520 Presentation of views and concerns a/01635/13: Transcripts, Situation in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, 1 March 2017, ICC-01/04-02/06,  p. 21.  
281 
 
international justice is reaching out to the victims, the people who were affected 
most directly. Up until now, some victims have been given an opportunity to 
come here and tell their stories in their own words before the Court....”521
This line of questioning, that is directed at getting the „right“ answer from “the 
relevant victim” can also be interpreted as a desire for affirmation in the face of the 
gruesome stories presented. Justice in the face of the trauma seems impossible, the 
representatives of this traumatic memory have to re-assure the possibility of justice - 
the raison d’être of the court.  
 
“Q: Madam, as a victim of the war in Ituri in 2002 and 2003, what do you 
expect from the International Criminal Court at the end of this trial of Bosco 
Ntaganda, that is from the point of view of justice? 
A: I would want the ICC should assist me and administer justice to me. 
Q: When you say you need assistance, what are you referring to?` 
A: Justice must be done. The criminals have to be punished.522
“Q (legal representative): As a victim of the war in Ituri in 2002 and 2003, what 
do you expect from the ICC subsequent to this trial of Bosco Ntaganda? 
 
A: Thank you for your question. Someone by name of - well, it was an official 
of the Court who came to our area, he came to the school, they asked everyone 
to come and tell their story. Nicolas Kwaku. He wrote down the names of all 
the victims. And I belive that is the list that he presented to you were you are.  
Q: What I am asking you is what do you expect from the ICC at the end of this 
trial of Bosco Ntaganda, that is from a point of view of justice? 
A: Personally, I am happy to have been called up to give an account of what 
happened to me. ... “523
And when the individual victims frame their expectations differently, which was 
often the case, the legal representatives either summarize the expectations to be 
justice:  
 
“A: I would like the Judges to deal with this dossier that the people concerned 
know what bad things they have done and for the Judges to give the right 
                                                 
521 Procedural Matters: Transcripts, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the  
Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 21 February 2011, ICC-01/04-01/07, p. 
5. 
522 Presentation of views and concerns a/30286/15: Transcripts, Situation in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, 1 March 2017, ICC-01/04-02/06, pp 61-
62.  
523 Presentation of views and concerns a/30169/15: Transcripts, Situation in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, 1 March 2017, ICC-01/04-02/06, pp 49-
50. 
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decision. They should look at the dossier whereby I have come here and that 
they listen to me in a correct fashion. This is why I am here. 
Q: So to sum up what you have just said, what is important for you is that 
justice should be done, is that correct? 
A: Yes.”524
Or, the expectations are getting lost in translation and just not replied to:  
 
“I am suffering with this artificial leg that I am currently wearing. I have no one 
to help me. That is why I am begging the Judges. I beg you, please help me get 
a new artificial leg, or help me have a repair done to this artificial leg that I 
currently have.  
The Interpreter: Message from the Sango booth: Could someone please ask the 
victims to speak more slowly? 
Judge Steiner: Yes, Maȋtre Zarambaud, just to ask you to remind the victim to 
speak a little bit slower? 
The interpreter: Many thanks from the interpreters. 
Mr. Zarambaud: Thank you, your Honour. A few moments ago I gestured to 
the witness - correction, the victim - and he himself - and he himself has 
understood what you have just said, your Honour.  
Mr. Victim, I would now like to ask you whether you received any 
compensation for the goods that you lost, as well as for the goods of your 
mother...”525
Lost in translation in this instance literally happened. Abstractly, whenever the 
individual victims had very specific expectations of the court, that could not be 
summarized as truth and justice, or abstract reparations, they were just left without 
comment since they could not be translated into the abstract notions of truth and 
justice delivered by the court.  
 
With regard to views and concerns, as the new form of victim participation that is 
also legitimized by the narrative of healing through participation and the therapeutic 
effect of telling one’s story, the re-assuring questions are put slightly differently:   
                                                 
524 Testimony of DRC-V19: Transcripts, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of 
the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 22 February 2011, ICC-01/04-
01/07, p. 38. 
525 Presentation of views and concerns Voloube De Mbioka Francis Félicien : Transcripts, Situation in 
the Central African Republic in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, 26 June 
2012, ICC-01/04-02/06, p. 24. 
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“Q: Madam Victim, beside your physical problems, the Chamber would like to 
know how are you feeling after having appeared before the Chamber to tell 
your story? 
A: Madam President, thank you for that question. I do not feel at ease each 
time I have to give an account of the acts that I was subjected to, but for the 
time being, I feel relieved. 
Q: Madam Victim, why did you decide to come and tell your story before the 
Court? 
A: I have told you what happened to me. If I did not do that, I would not feel 
comfortable. It is for that reason that I decided to express all my concerns and 
talk about everything that happened to me to the Court.”526
Answers to the same question, that go beyond the relieving effect of telling one’s 
story and that raised expectations which were left unanswered: 
 
“A: I do feel a sense of satisfaction, because I have been able to come before 
the International Criminal Court and I do believe that my expectations will be 
met and the Prosecutor has all the evidence so that decisions can be made 
about everything that we were subjected to.”527
“A: I feel a sense of joy, After expressing my views and concerns, I am feeling 
quite satisfied. I am coming towards the end of my testimony, and I am waiting 
for the Court to do something to help me get another artificial limb. I am 
waiting for good-hearted people to help me and find me a house that I can live 
in. So, there you have it. This is everything that I am expecting from the 
Court.”
 
528
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Analyzing the practice of testifying and presenting views and concerns in person 
the practice of representation, collectivization and externalization are continued and 
manifest in the criteria for speaking and being heard as a witness-object and as a 
“relavant victim” subject. Firstly, the legal boundaries have to be reiterated in the face 
of the representation of “the victim” as described in the first chapter, since it is at 
                                                 
526 Presentation of views and concerns a/0542/08: Transcripts, Situation in the Central African 
Republic in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, 25 June 2012, ICC-01/04-02/06, 
p. 29. 
527 Presentation of views and concerns a/0394/08: Transcripts, Situation in the Central African 
Republic in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, 26 June 2012, ICC-01/04-02/06, 
p. 8. 
528 Presentation of views and concerns Voloube De Mbioka Francis Félicien : Transcripts, Situation in 
the Central African Republic in the case of the Prosecutor v. Jean Pierre Bemba Gombo, 26 June 
2012, ICC-01/04-02/06, p. 27. 
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once securing the identity of the international criminal proceedings as rational, 
neutral and impartial etc., on the other hand it is exactly this image of the victim that 
is always already threatening to overwhelm the proceedings. Against this backdrop, 
the Chambers re-iterated the legality of the proceedings and re-emphazised that they 
have to strictly control who might speak within these confines, because otherwise the 
integrity of the court is endangered. The control applied results in the development 
of criteria to be fulfilled to become a “relevant victim”, either to give testimony, or to 
present views and concerns in person before the Court. The subject position of “the 
relevant victim” henceforth frames the actual encounter between the individual 
participants and the Court. “The relevant victim” is requires to be unique and 
representative at the same time. While “the relevant victim” should not be repetitive, 
the harm suffered must be linked to the crimes charged by the Prosecution. The 
defined unique characteristics of “the relevant victim” is the harm suffered. This 
image frames the speaking and hearing once “the relavent victims” come to the 
Hague and testify, or present views and concerns.  
“The relavant victim” as witness-object is confined to being an information 
provider, assisting the Chamber in their determination of the truth. As such the 
testifying individual participants are addressed from the very beginning. Beside the 
facts considered relevant by the parties and the Chamber, information are either 
ignored, not understood, or rejected as irrelevant. “The relevant victim” serves as 
evidence and has no interests him/herself. Their harm – the traumatic memory – is 
turned into evidence serving the court. Instances where the witness explains what 
happened without any reaction but another question, are the most disturbing 
moments, were the inadequacy, the lack of the legal framework vis á vis trauma 
becomes very obvious. Furthermore, trauma has to be described as a causal (direct529
                                                 
529 See the definition of relevant harm in the previous Chapter 6.  
) 
consequence of the crime under consideration. Thereby, the legal framework of 
testifying on the one hand provides a means to speak about the unspeakable trauma. 
Thus, even hallucinations and blank moments can be narrated as a consequence of 
the crime instead of a rupture of the symbolic order. On the other hand, the complex 
and intangible structure of traumatic memory that barres symbolization is sanitized. 
Whenever the victim-subject challenged the witness-object position their position as 
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information providers without interests is re-iterated by the Judges. Challenging 
questions is described as not knowing within the framework of testifying. Not 
knowing means, not able to provide the relevant information. The violence of this 
framework, its inadequacy in the face of trauma, is revealed in the slips, outbursts, 
bewilderment and the subsequent attempts to re-integrate the testimony into the 
symbolic order of the Court.  
Presenting views and concerns personally is even more challenging to the legal 
framework at the ICC. Whereas the modalities of testifying are clear, the modalities 
for this mode of participation were non-existent and therefore had to be developed 
by the Chambers. The problematic of the image of “the victims” as both legitimizing 
and threatening to the identity of the court became more urgent in this context, 
because “the relevant victim” was defined by its harm – trauma - and within the 
realm of presenting views and concerns it could not be confined to the position of a 
witness-object and thereby controlled. Whereas “the victims” are interested in 
criminal proceedings dealing with their harm but never appeared within the 
proceedings, since they are legally represented and witnesses as information provider 
have no interests, “the relevant victims” presenting views and concerns have an 
interest in presenting the harm suffered. The position of “the relevant victims” is 
then developed in opposition to the position of a witness. The witness speaks about 
facts, gives a testimony in detail and provides relevant information to determine the 
truth. “The relevant victims” presenting views and concerns speak about emotions, 
narrate in a more general fashion – tell their story. Once again, this is, on the one 
hand, exactly the position that is described as endangering the integrity of criminal 
proceedings, on the other hand, the description as the opposite is also already a 
confining framework ensuring a certain structure of speaking and hearing that 
forecloses irritations. Whenever Mr. and Ms. Victim exceeded this framework, they 
could be disciplined by reminding them of their position, their interests. This task is 
to be fulfilled by their legal representatives. Serving as facilitators, guides and 
streamliners who have “the relevant victims” tell their story, the legal representatives 
bear the responsibility to stage the relevant story and the expected expectations.  
When the court comes closest to an encounter with actual victims, the 
overwhelming experience of radical relationality and the related revelation that the 
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self-image of the factual, neutral and impartial court relies on its opposite – the 
victims – needs to be forestalled. By defining the relevant victims and framing their 
testimony and views and concerns accordingly, the symbolic order stabilizing this 
image is reproduced and the (im)possibilities concealed. Those who cannot foreclose 
the encounter by relying on the legal structuring of criminal proceedings are the legal 
representatives, who are the legal guides through the harm of “the relevant victims”. 
They are responsible to represent, translate and select “the relevant victims” for the 
court.  
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Chapter 8: Relations  
1. Finding the (right) relevant victim 
„This is an area in which the legal representatives have a crucial role to play: it 
is of undoubted importance that the participating victims receive careful and 
comprehensive advice as to the most appropriate form of participation by them 
in this trial.“530
It is the legal representatives’ responsibility to select among the victims those who 
are able to assume the position of “the relevant victim”. Unlike the Chamber, 
however, the legal representatives are the representatives of the actual individual 
participating victims. The perception of the exclusionary violence inherent in the 
practices of representation and subject formation constituting victim participation at 
the ICC is decisively influenced by the proximity or distance to the individual 
victims.
 
531
Whereas these distancing practices allow practitioners at The Hague to rationalize 
their own work according to legal principles without being disturbed by the 
complexity and impossibilities of representation given the heterogeneity, diversity 
and individuality of the actual participants, the tension is sometimes unbearable for 
those who are in direct contact with victims. It is at this point within the practice of 
victim participation, where the perception of radical relationality is most likely and 
the urgency becomes obvious. “[p]art of the success was due to a fact that the lawyer 
 Proximity and distance are not solely understood geographically, although 
this dimension also plays a role. The actual participants are distanced through the 
practices of representation, collectivisation and externalization – or the court thereby 
distances itself from the victims. This also influences the space for perceiving 
irritations. As shown in the previous chapters, the closer the actual participants came 
to the court – the more control was exerted to foreclose the unexpected encounter 
and to thereby protect the integrity and stability of the court. 
                                                 
530 Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the request by victims a/ 0225/06, a/0229/06 and a/0270/07 to 
express their views and concerns in person and to present evidence during the trial, 26 June 2009, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx, para 27. 
531 In institutional (organizational) sociology this is referred to as periphery and centre, whereas the 
centre is rationalizing the work of the perphery which then leads to tensions because of the exclusions 
inherent in reducing complexity. See: Klatetzki (1993).  
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was able to identify, for instance, the right victims to appear in Court, now the right 
victims is probably to write into brackets...” 532
This Chapter addresses the effect of the subject position of “the relevant victim” 
within the search for the (right) victim. The formulation of the right victim was 
relativised by the LRV immediately after it had been said. I was asked to write right 
in brackets. I will use this (right) throughout this chapter because it is reflective of a 
sensibility I found among representatives who directly work with participants and 
therefore are more aware of the heterogeneity of victims. They have to reconcile 
 
heterogeneity with homogeinity; complexity with simplicity; individuality with 
collectivity. For this reason, they bear the (im)possibilities of representation. This 
manifests differently within the practice of representation. Firstly, the construction of 
the relevant victim frames the search for “the (right) victim”. The narrow criteria defining the 
relevant victim influenced the representational practices and could be traced as patterns 
that affected the way in which victims were preceived. Thereby, the relevant victim also 
shapes the way in which speaking and hearing between the LRV and their clients is 
framed. It determined to a certain extent, how stories are told and pereceived, the 
content of these stories, and the selection of those who tell the stories. The first part 
will therefore outline the preconsitions and context of speaking and hearing within 
the situation countries (1.2.). Here, language and translation become a crucial issue 
(1.1.) and, within this chain of translation, the hierarchy of representation within the 
situation countries will be addressed (1.3.).533
In the second part, since the possibility of perceiving radical relationality is higher 
in the direct encounter with individual victims, the effects of these encounters will be 
described (2.). Although these are very personal experiences and can not easily be 
generalized, there are patterns within the interviews that correspond with my own 
experiences. In this chapter these patterns are summarized as the urgency of relating 
(2.1.). These encounters are representative of the relationality of the ICC with its 
others – the victims and its effects within the institution itself. Nevertheless, the 
tensions these encounters produce are acted out by the legal representatives between 
  
                                                 
532 Interview with LRV, 16/6/2014. 
533 Personal experiences reflect only the situation in Kenya, whereas the information retrieved from 
interviews with legal representatives are reflective of almost all situation countries (Côte d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Uganda).  
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narcissistic samaritanism and despair (2.2.). On the one hand, legal representatives 
resort to reproducing the mutually constituting images of the benevolent legal court 
and the dependent victim. On the other hand, they fundamentally doubt the meaning 
of victim participation and its legitimizing narratives. This reflects the justice gap 
always already inherent in the representation.  
1.1. Relations are a matter of language 
Since the responsibility to find “the relevant victim” is delegated to the legal 
representatives, they developed their own modification of “the relevant victim”, 
calling it “(right) victim”: 
“…part of the success was due to a fact that the lawyer was able to identify, for 
instance, the right victims to appear in Court, now the right victims is probably 
to write into brackets, but... people who could explain. And another thing, I 
think, what was appreciated by the judges and this is tangible, we have seen it, 
was the fact that victims could contribute with a plus.”534
It is obvious that the requirements developed by the Chambers defining “the 
relevant victim” influence the criteria of finding “the (right) victim”.  
 
The first implicit criteria for “the relevant victim” that is also important for “the 
(right) victim” was established by the Chamber in emphasising the distinct legal 
language spoken at the Court and the possible destabilization by legally untrained 
victims who come to the Court and speak “about very difficult things that have 
happened to them..”535 Within the search for the right victim, this requirement of 
speaking the right language is reflected in the fact that representatives repeatedly 
emphasised that the legal language differs from the language of the victims.536 This is 
also reflected in the requirement of being able to explain.537
                                                 
534 Interview with LRV, 16/6/2014. 
 Accordingly, the 
requirement constituting “the (right) victim” is, that they are able to adapt to the 
language spoken at the Hague which enables them to explain the very difficult things that 
have happened to them in an adequate language. In theoretical terms one could say that 
legal representatives are looking for individual victims who are able to narrate trauma 
535 Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the request by victims a/ 0225/06, a/0229/06 and a/0270/07 to 
express their views and concerns in person and to present evidence during the trial, 26 June 2009, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-2032-Anx, para 23. 
536 Expressly mentioning different languages and the need for translation: Interview with ICC staff, 
5/3/2014; Interview with NGO staff, field notes, 4/2/2014. 
537 Interview with ICC staff, 16/6/ 2014. 
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within the given symbolic order – articulate the harm suffered as a result of the crime 
tried within the legal framework.  
The second reqirement mentioned is to “contribute with a plus”. This reflects the 
requirement of being unique and not repetitive. Furthermore, it is illustrative of the 
defining characteristic attributed to victims, which renders their truths unique – their 
cultural background.  
Within the search for “the (right) victim” who is able to explain and to contribute with 
a plus, translation from one language into another,538
“Next time I'm going actually to specify that or because sometimes this could 
be also misunderstanding of course, because we are not speaking the same 
language in the Courtroom than when we meet with them.”
 from one culture to another plays 
a crucial role. Language is essential for explaining and hence for understanding, it is 
the basis of relations:  
539
Language is fundamental for speaking and hearing and therefore translation is the 
facilitator of relations. In the context of legal representation, the language barriers 
imply at least two dimensions, the respective native languages and the legal language. 
Dimensions of culture, are inherently linked to language – accordingly one speaks of 
a legal culture to which the specialized legal language belongs. Above that, 
understanding the culture of the situation countries and the specific cultural 
background of the victims is described as necessary within the practice of victim 
participation. For once, to understand participating victims, but also because this is 
the plus to add by the victims – their contribution to the truth which is supposed to 
help the court to understand the context of the respective cases. In conclusion, 
language and its cultural dimensions have a decisive impact on hearing and speaking 
and hence frame the search for “the (right) victim” who speaks the “right language”.  
 
Within the practice of representation there are hierarchies of representation, 
reflecting who speaks the “right language” and who does not. Curiously, the “right 
language” is the language that is hearable at the court, not the other language spoken 
                                                 
538 Translate: To bear, convey, or remove from one person, place or condition to another; and: To 
turn from one languge into another; “to change into another language retaining the sense”  Johnson; 
also, to express in other words. Oxford English Dictionary, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/204841?rskey=4BHq0F&result=2&print, last accessed 
27/11/2014. 
539 Interview ICC staff, 19/6/2014. 
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by the participating victims. Their language has to be translated into the language in 
the courtroom. Again, the lack of understanding participants is described as their lack 
of speaking and understanding the legal language. This is reflective of a hierarchy of 
representation with those who speak the legal language, the LRVs at the top. But in 
order to understand the participating victims, translators are needed. These 
translators are the field assistants speaking one of the local languages and preferably 
have a legal background.540 Those assistants are representatives of a national elite, 
who could afford to go abroad for their studies to learn the “right language”. 
Since,“[S]ometimes there is pure incomprehension! It helps when they have been 
abroad at some point.”541 Abroad refers to European or American universities. The 
same applies for intermediaries from local NGOs who legitimize themselves by 
claiming that they speak the victims’ s language and thereby distinguish themselves 
from international organizations.542
In fact, although the hierarchy and self-image are constructed otherwise, it is the 
ICC that is always already in need of assistance for reaching and understanding the 
participating victims. This dependency is obscured by constructing the translators as 
native informants and describing the victim as always already in need of assistance as 
will be elaborated on below.  
 While at the same time they have to proof that 
they are comprehensible in both languages. 
1.2. Who relates to whom? 
“The development of partnerships is important for reaching the broader local 
population through culturally appropriate intermediaries, particularly where 
ICC staff is unable to contact the general public due to lack of resources, 
logistical or other constraints or security concerns. Developing partnerships will 
also decentralize the dissemination of information and, by supporting the 
creation of local initiatives and/or networks, increase the awareness of the 
general population on Court-related issues.”543
In order to understand the chain of translation from the participating victims 
through the intermediaries, field assistants and legal representatives to the Chambers 
at the Hague, the figure of the field assistant and intermediary can be conceptualized 
 
                                                 
540 Interview with LRV, 20/6/ 2014. 
541 Field notes, 22/1/2014.  
542 Interview with NGO staff, field notes, 4 February 2014. 
543 Strategic Plan for Outreach of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/5/12, 29 September 
2006, para. 66. 
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as a ‘native informant’. This understanding reveals the hierarchical structure inherent 
in the chain of translating victims’ views and concerns from the situation countries to 
the Hague. 
The figure of the ‘native informant’ is conceptualized in post-colonial theory, 
tracing the continuities of colonial exploitation of knowledge and the respective 
politics of oppression and governance. Colonial officers and researchers relied on 
people from the communities for access, information and translation.544 The native 
informant is a person whose experiences allow him/her to speak as someone who 
“was there and knows” (Grewal 2016, p. 34). They are persons relied on to render 
legible and transparent “the otherwise opaque culture of the non west.”545 
Accordingly, they are referred to as culturally appropriate intermediaries in the 
Strategic Plan for Outreach of the ICC. 546
This description can be applied to the description of the tasks and personality of 
the field assistant by the Chambers and the Registry. And, to a certain extent, this 
also applies to the intermediaries working at local NGOs, who belong to an urban 
elite who organize access to the victims’ communities and allegedly speak both 
languages.
  
547 It is important to note that the figure of the ‘native informant’ is, from 
the perspective of the West, described as a two-way translator and an information 
provider - not as a subject with an own agenda. Of course, this description fails to 
acknowledge the potentially subversive role of the native informant, that became 
obvious in the Lubanga case.548
                                                 
544 The native informant as cultural broker  
 In any way, the native informants are on the one 
hand complicit in upholding the asymmetrical relationship, on the other hand they 
545 Grewal (2016, p. 34). Not going further into the philosophical figure of the native informant 
developed by Spivak in A critique of postcolonial reason.  
546 Strategic Plan for Outreach of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/5/12, 29 September 
2006, para. 66. 
547 Language, in this context is not only literally the language spoken, but refers to cultural 
background, social background etc. This of course is an illusion, because many of the victims 
participating do not belong to the national elite, but to marginalized groups. In the context of my 
research, Kituo and my two colleagues and the translator were my ‘native informants’. I depended a 
lot on them and their interpretation of the situations and interviews. 
548 In Lubanga, the credibility of intermediaries was often challenged and a more transparent policy 
was the lesson learnt. Within the judgement there are detailed and careful findings on witnesses and 
“intermediaries” who facilitated contact with potential witnesses who may have manipulated them; 
Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012, ICC-01/04-
01/06-2842, paras. 63-220. 
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bear a central role since they control information. They are the in-between the ICC - 
LRV - and victim communities.  
“An intermediary is someone who comes between one person and another; 
who facilitates contact or provides a link between one of the organs or units of 
the Court or Counsel on the one hand, and victims, witnesses, beneficiaries of 
reparations and/or affected communities more broadly on the other.” 549
In the dichotomy between meaningful and effective, the field assistants as native 
informants, are responsible to ensure the meaning of victim participation by 
enhancing the flow of communication between “the victims” and the court. They 
speak their language, know their culture, and can understand their realities. They are based 
in the field, providing the Lead Counsel with "first-hand experience of the local 
context and a capacity to rapidly obtain the trust of victims in the case."
 
550 Whereas 
the Lead Counsel has experience with legal proceedings, the field assistant provides 
the counsel with complementary experience. 551 Thereby, the understanding of the 
local context is combined with legal expertise of proceedings before the Court. 552
Accordingly, the role of the field assistants can be described as a translator of the 
local to the global. The local is equated with culture. The specifics of the local culture 
are addressed as something that needs to be translated in order to be understood. 
The own legal culture is thereby naturalized as something universal. The periphery 
needs to be translated to the centre by native informants. As already mentioned, the 
own incapacity of speaking their language is not perceived to be a lack, whereas their 
incapacity to speak our language is the problem to be solved and the gap to bridge 
through the field assistant as native informant. The OPCV prefers field assistants 
who have a legal background, who speak both languages and hence are familiar with 
both cultures.
 
553
                                                 
549 Guidelines Governing the Relations between the Court and Intermediaries, March 2014, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/lt/GRCI-Eng.pdf, last accessed on 29/5/2018. 
 “We normally tend to recruit someone with a legal background, 
550 Pre-Trial Chamber I, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Laurent Gbagbo, Decision on Victims' Participation and Victims' Common Legal Representation at 
the Confirmation of Charges Hearing and in the Related Proceedings, 4 June 2012, ICC-02/11-01/11-
138, para. 39. 
551 Ibid., paras 43-45. 
552 Ibid., para 45. 
553 Interview with LRV, 16/6/2014; Similarly, a colleague of mine said: “It is better when they studies 
abroad.” Field notes, 22/1/2014. 
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because of cause this facilitates a lot the communication and the way in which you 
collect.“554
Beyond translating victims’ views and concerns into the legal representatives` 
language, who subsequently translate the views and concerns into legal submissions, 
the field assistants, as described previously, are responsible to prepare and organize 
group, and individual meetings. They receive information from the legal 
representatives concerning the topics of the meetings and then organize 
transportation, location, distribute questionnaires etc. They organize information and 
they organize “the victims” to ensure a smooth execution of the field trips of their 
Lead Counsels, who in turn organize the information and impressions they collected. 
NGOs rely on intermediaries or rather spokespersons
 
555 to establish and maintain 
contact with victim communities. Many of these persons are themselves victims and 
claim to represent, speak for and on behalf of other victims.556 In any case, they 
could convince the NGOs to be representative of a majority of victims, which is 
crucial for becoming a “(right) victim”557
The field assistant/native informant is complementary to the Lead Counsel and 
provides him/her with the required assistance, but the Lead Counsel is the lawyer 
from the OPCV, or an external counsel selected by the Registry who has the legal 
expertise. The Lead Counsel is described as legally effective, the field assistant as 
culturally meaningful and the latter serves the former. The reconciliation of 
. The need for spokespersons demonstrates 
that in fact the native informants themselves depend on translation, since they are 
not necessarily speaking the language of the participating victims. Consequently, the 
chain of translation from the individual victims to the Hague is very long and 
involves multiple steps and persons. Ultimately, although there is a clear hierarchical 
structure, the preconditions for speaking and being heard remain opaque.  
                                                 
554 Interview with LRV, 16/6/2014, similarly, Interview with LRV 5/3/2014: “... dass es so viele 
Opfer sind, dass man gar nicht jeden einzeln ansprechen kann, dass man eben versucht zu rotieren 
und samples aus verschiedenen Gruppen, die nach Wohnort eingeteilt werden, dass man immer 
wieder versucht verschiedene Leute anzusprechen und sozusagen rotiert.“ . 
555 Intermediaries in the literal sense only channel views, according to my findings, intermediaries used 
rather understood themselves as persons who represent the interests of a group and thus they already 
translated it.  
556 Interviews with victim-representatives, field notes 23, 24/2/2014; In a meeting between Kito and a 
representative from the ICC, they agreed that they were working with the same intermediaries.  
557 Field notes, 22/3/2014. 
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meaningful and effective is in this context discussed as the translation between the 
binaries of local - global; culture - nature; periphery - centre, special and universal.  
The binary between abstract universal law and the specifically located site of (non 
Western) culture is thereby reproduced and the native informant serves to bridge the 
binary by translating the local to the global, the culture to the nature, the periphery to 
the centre and the special to the universal.  
1.3. Questioning the hierarchy 
Already at the Hague, the hierarchy inherent in the organization of representation 
was questioned and thereby revealed by Judge Ozaki, in her dissenting opinion on 
the organization of legal representation: 
“There is a risk that the voices of participating victims, and the reality of their 
situation on the ground, can become filtered out in the relay from a village in 
Ituri to the courtroom in The Hague. The importance therefore to a Chamber 
of receiving the victims' perspective on the ground as directly as possible 
through the appointed LRVs must be stressed.”558
She questioned whether diversity is lost when being legally filtered by 
representatives located at The Hague. Thereby she addresses the practice of 
representation as a filtering of diversity into homogeneity. Filtering is always a 
selection process and exclusions are inherent. She emphasizes that something is 
getting lost in representation. Instead of describing the filtering as collecting the 
relevant informationm, she emphasizes the loss. The description of native informants 
as facilitators of information collection from victims, used by the legal 
representatives, draws an image of the victims as holders of information that are 
accessible through the informants. It suggests that whenever certain kind of 
information is needed, it can be collected and that this is a neutral process. The 
description obscures that the kind of information retrieved depends on the kind of 
information asked, the language used, the context of speaking and hearing and that 
the whole process is hierarchically structured. It insinuates that any selection is 
deliberately controlled by the legal representatives who have access to all possible 
 
                                                 
558 Trial Chamber VI, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Bosco Ntaganda, Partly Dissenting of Opinion Judge Ozaki, 16 June 2015, ICC-01/04-02/06-650-
Anx, para 14. 
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information. When directly speaking with participating victims, this assumption turns 
out to be an illusion.  
Furthermore, the dissent addresses the role of field assistants and their proximity 
to the participating victims. Implicitly, Judge Ozaki questions and thereby reveals the 
described hierarchy of representation between those who are working meaningfully 
with the victims there and those who are efficiently representing victims legally here. 
She values proximity over distance as a benefit to the proceedings as a whole: 
“In this context, I do not consider that contact with members of the LRVs' 
teams in the field can adequately substitute for the victims having a proximate 
relationship of the nature described above with the LRVs themselves. As noted 
by a significant number of victims in the consultation process, proximity 
requires personal engagement, and this should be facilitated to the maximum 
extent possible within the limits necessarily imposed by common legal 
representation. The work of the field teams should supplement the counsel-
client relationship, not replace it. As elaborated further below, ensuring that 
lead counsel - who will be framing the submissions and, when appropriate, 
appearing before the Chamber - is the person with whom the victims have a 
proximate relationship is to the benefit of the proceedings as a whole.”559
Judge Ozaki, in her dissent, confronts the practice of representation with its 
losses, namely proximity and diversity. She furthermore warns that the current 
practice is actually silencing through filtering and problematizes the streamlining 
processes.  
 
Above that, she indicates that the OPCV might not be perceived as independent 
because it is located at The Hague. In this context she raises the problematic that the 
OPCV being located at the ICC, as opposed to external legal representatives could 
appear less independent.560 “By way of example, victims' interests may not always be 
in conformity with those of the Court as an institution, and LRVs who are 
structurally aligned with the Court may be perceived as having greater conflict in that 
regard.”561
                                                 
559 Trial Chamber VI, Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo in the case of the Prosecutor v. 
Bosco Ntaganda, Partly Dissenting of Opinion Judge Ozaki, 16 June 2015, ICC-01/04-02/06-650-
Anx,, para 9. 
 The later warning reveals that far from being neutral, the Court, as a 
location, also stands for a dependent view. Rather than assuming the own neutrality 
and independence, the change of perspective allows to address own embeddedness. 
Above that, Judge Ozaki exposes the hierarchy within the representational practice 
560 Ibid., para 12. 
561 Ibid., para 13. 
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and problematizes the proximity/distance complex. She suggests that it is important 
to have the LRV close to the participating victims and that it does not suffice to have 
native informants, but that the native informants should become the Lead Counsels. 
Thereby, the emphasis is shifted from the effective to the meaningful.  
This dissent shows that already at the Hague, the inherently exclusionary practice 
produces opposition and that it is often zhrough this opposition that the inherent 
hierarchical structure of the practice is revealed. The ghosts of the decisions taken at 
the Hague appear between the lines of dissent.  
Still, since the binary of here and there described previously is not generally 
questioned, and the mutual dependency of the constructions not acknowledged, the 
dissent only shifts the emphasis without touching upon the structure itself.  
In this vein, and to comply with this demand raised by Judge Ozaki, legal 
representatives saw their role in transmitting the reality on the ground to the courtroom 
at The Hague: 
“to use their words in the courtroom to give some more reality to the judges 
and to the people in the courtroom of what happened and then give you the 
cultural context, educational background and the feeling of the people....”562
Given the binary constructions of here and there this is an impossible endeavour 
and the consequences of this impossibility are mostly perceived by the legal 
representatives and the field assistants, and intermediaries who bear the responsibility 
to translate.  
 
“We are fed up, we are the ones who speak the language – who are supposed to 
understand their (victims A/N) needs, they (ICC staff A/N) are coming to 
us.”563
For now, it is important to bear in mind, that the practice of participation involves 
many native informants who facilitate relations between the court and the individual 
victims and the legal representatives and their clients and filter voices. They set the 
context of speaking and they are far from neutral. Outbursts, like we are fed up are 
quite common among native informants. But frustration is not the only expression of 
the impossibilities inherent in the current practice of victim participation.  
 
                                                 
562 Interview LRV, 5/3/2014. 
563 Interview with NGO staff after a meeting with ICC staff, field notes, 4/2/2014. 
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2. Feeling the urgency of proximity – everybody should go there 
”I think that basically everybody involved in a trial should go and see what, 
what the life of the people is. Because, I do not think that it is obvious that the 
arc is giving you an idea of what the real situation of people is. It might solve a 
lot of issues. Because, judges or assistants of judges should definitively go and 
see and realize that we are definitely not in The Hague when we are over there. 
Yeah, I think it should be mandatory. But it should be mandatory for 
everybody working for the court, even in finance... meaning the broad. broad 
picture. You are still working for the court. So, you basically should have an 
interest in what is going on. It is easier for me because I am in the middle of it, 
but I really think that it might solve a lot of issues.” 564
“...meet these people, because the rest of the time you are sitting either in court 
or behind your computer. And then I think that is why everybody should go, is 
to be reminded of why you are doing that. …to be reminded quite often that , 
it is not just legal arguments but that it is about real people. I think this is 
essential...”
 
565
What is getting lost in the process of institutionalization of victim participation 
and representation, the direct encounter with participating victims, is described by 
most of the legal representatives as something that is crucial to understanding what the 
ICC is all about.
 
566
“This is something you need to see - you need to be there to understand, if not 
you get dry...” “What comes to my mind..., comes to my mind, ...faces, the 
people I met, many different types of emotions of...expressed by people and 
that I felt, although it is very important to have a proper distance when you do 
your work for many other reasons, but of course, you do not stop feeling 
things.” 
 The encounter with the reality over there shows how it is and is 
important for understanding what the here is all about. This is when feelings enter the 
legal stage, it is described as building a relationship to those who should be the main 
actors:  
567
 “...maybe, for me the most important is that, yeah, it is people related. You 
have to listen to them. Which tends not to be the case for everybody.... And I 
think although participation itself is not granting you a lot of prerogative in 
trial. But I think they are the main actors.”
   
568
Within the theoretical framework this is indicative of the encounter with the 
constituting others of the court, an encounter with them there. This encounter is 
 
                                                 
564 Interview with LRV I, 19/6/2014. 
565 Interview with LRVI , 19/6/2014. 
566 Interview with LRVs 5/3/2014; 18/3/2014; 16/6/2014; LRV I and II, 19/6/2014; Interview with 
NGO staff 20/3/2014. 
567 Interview with LRV II, 19/6/2014. 
568 Interview with LRVI , 19/6/2014. 
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sensed and can be described as feelings. And although feelings are constructed as 
destabilizing within the legal process, when describing the importance of victim 
participation, the legal representatives emphasise that it is feelings that enables 
understanding and relations.  
Like indicated previously, the wording and emphasis changed the closer, or the 
more removed the people I interviewed were from the actual participants they were 
representing. While those in Kenya emphasised the challenges of victim 
participation, the representatives located at the Hague adhered more to the legal 
language, covering difficulties under the smoothing assertion of effective and still 
meaningful.569 The latter were often more reluctant to talk about difficulties related to 
representing victims within the proceedings at The Hague. They were, for once more 
involved in the everyday institutional practice at the ICC, which comprises talking 
the official legal language and communicating, on a daily basis, with different organs 
of the court. Problems described then concerned either, legal issues, like participation 
in the investigation phase in order to broaden the scope of the cases.570 Or legal and 
institutional struggles to create space for the acceptance of the views of victims 
represented by them at the court.571 With respect to meeting the participating victims, 
one of the main issues addressed was requesting the required financial resources for 
field trips.572 This stands in contrast to the problems described by those at Nairobi, 
whose critique was more radical and whose reaction was stronger and more 
emotional.573
In the words of a colleague from Nairobi:  
 An issue that appeared throughout the interviews was the fear that 
victim participation, a project they all felt was absolutely necessary, could be an 
empty ritual, could in fact be meaningless to those who should benefit - might indeed 
be impossible given the current practice. The ghost of the symbolic was ubiquituous.  
“We are fed up ... the process is disconnected from victims. Say it is just for 
justice, do not hide behind victims!”574
And in the words of a representative at the Hague: 
 
                                                 
569 See interviews with LRVs 16/6/2014; 20/6/2014; LRV I and II 25/06/2014. 
570 Interview with LRV I 25/06/2014. 
571 Intreviews with LRVs LRV I and II, 19/6/2014; 27/6/2014.  
572 Intreviews with LRVs LRV I and II, 19/6/2014. 
573 See Interview with LRVs 5/3/2014; 18/3/2014, Interview with NGO staff, 20/6/2014. 
574 NGO staff, field notes 9/1/2014. 
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“Somebody asked me to stand up in the courtroom alone and to be able to 
represent stories, thousands of stories, of people I`ve never met, living places I 
have never seen. For me this is not working.”575
“..because it is important in order to represent them to meet with them and to 
know what they expect from you. Ahm, otherwise I guess they are just on 
paper and it is not really efficient...”
  
576
Interestingly, from the last quote it becomes clear that the sense of meaningful 
and effective is different for the legal representative than it is in the legal submissions 
by the Registry and the decisions of the Chamber. Framed in the description of 
meaningful and effective developed by the Chambers, it would have probably read: 
“Otherwise, victim participation would be symbolic (on paper) as opposed to 
meaningful for the victims.” Here what is meaningful for the Court becomes 
efficient for the victims, when the perspective changes.  
 
The meaningfulness of participation as it is practiced at the ICC is also an issue 
that is questioned by the legal representatives:  
 “So in any case at some point you lose track of the real people. Because you 
have to discuss things. I mean, even me, representing victims, I have to write 
submissions that are very legal, which is very good, I mean if I do not do it, 
then it is not in the best interest of my clients and that is why they have a 
lawyer... but they have immediate needs, and it is very long. For them it is even 
longer...”577
“It is also because they have to be remembered that what they do is for these 
people. Otherwise what is the real meaning of justice? Just to...discuss issues 
that basically nobody cares about except for people working here, or because 
things should not happen again?”
 
578
When the here and there are disconnected, the meaning is lost. The problem is, that 
all descriptions still reproduce the binary logic of here and there, of facts and emotions 
etc.. And it is the other over there that remind us over here wherefore we work, namely 
for them. It does not reverse the logic of the ICC as the provider of justice for 
victims.  
 
This perceived discrepancy caused many legal representatives to generally doubt 
the possibility of meaningful truth and justice for victims participating in the 
                                                 
575 Interview with LRV II, 19/6/2014 
576 Interview with LRV I, 19/6/2014. 
577 Interview with LRV I, 19/6/2014. 
578 Interview with LRV I, 19/6/2014. 
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proceedings. Subsequently, the own work is called into question which obviously is a 
threat to the self-image as the providers of truth and justice and the facilitators of 
healing.  
3. Between despair and narcissistic samaritanism 
The legal representatives oscillate between despair resulting from impuissance vis 
á vis the immediate needs of the own clients and the resulting doubts about the 
importance of the own work and the re-iteration of the good they do. The conviction 
of doing good and always being in the right side serving victims, can be compared to 
what Kapoor describes as narcissistic samaritanism.579
Even when representatives addressed the disparity perceived between the here and 
there, the impossibility of bridging the gap, and the fiction of justice for victims, 
which caused them to challenge the whole idea of victim participation: 
 He describes narcissistic 
samaritanism as: “…being promoted as benevolent, while professing neutrality in 
order to ‘empower’ the Other.” (Kapoor 2008, p. 228)  
“…sometimes I thought it might be better to leave out victims. Leave them out 
of the criminal process, then nobody can exploit victims’ interests, because this 
is what everybody does!”580
“Because what they need is definitely not to listen to things, this is not going to 
solve their immediate problems. And it might be more difficult than to have 
discussions with them. ... Ah, but I think for them they have immediate 
problems to solve and yeah, I understand that listening to their rights layer 
might not be the best.”
 
581
They almost immediately resort to a modified notion of justice as empowerment 
that could still be delivered to the victims by them and thereby legitimize their work:  
 
“Overall, I think it is the right idea to involve victims in the proceedings, I 
mean in international criminal proceedings as well … to include victims’ 
interests. I think that for the victims, at least those few who are being 
reached…they somehow benefitted. Not justice, but recognition and being 
                                                 
579 Again, I want to emphasize that this description also applies to myself. I do not want to exclude 
myself by pointing at others. The feeling of doing something good, feels good and one gets respect 
from others for it. And since “the victims” are portrayed as someone in need of assistance and help, 
someone who is per se innocent and good, being of assistance for “the victims”, representing their 
views, which are otherwise not heard could never be offensive.  
580 Interview with LRV, 5/3/2014. 
581 Interview with LRV I, 19/6/2014. 
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taken seriously by an international body … well I think it has a certain effect at 
least that is what I hope for.”582
Even those (at The Hague), who were not as critical and disillusioned, formulate 
the ideal of justice for victims much more carefully and they constantly seem to 
justify the ideals before the interviewer and probably also before themselves: 
 
“How can you deny a place to the only person that really deserves in the end, 
no? It is very abstract concept – fighting impunity and delivering justice but in 
the end when you look into practical terms, who is asking for justice? I think it 
maybe is the victims, no?”583
The notion of justice as accountability and ending impunity was complemented by 
the own notion of justice that was more individual: 
 
“You can push for that and you know there is a good cause behind that and 
that you do something useful for justice and for the fight against impunity but 
also for the individual and I think in the end that is the most important, the fact 
that you have the big picture of that fight against impunity and justice and this 
individual dimension and it is the mixture of the two things that makes me 
passionate about what I am doing.”584
When asked about the benefits and challenges of victim participation for both the 
Court and the victims, it suddenly seemed to be self-evident why and how victims 
benefit from being granted the opportunity to “tell their story” and “being 
recognized as someone who suffered harm”
 
585
“Well, for victims you can see them [benefits A/N] in an immediate way, like 
they are recognized as such is already something for them. Then you can also 
see of course there is like a feeling of justice is something that you will bring to 
them if the participation is meaningful and effective.”
 
586
“Those moments that we shared individually with them are the ones which 
count the most for them. Because that is when, finally, they have this 
impression that they do exist, that they have somebody really caring about their 
very own case.” 
 
587
“Well yes, well many of them, because it is not similar, they are not similar, 
because they are all different people, but yes, for instance in Kenya there is, a 
year and a half ago at the end of a meeting with one, an interview with one 
victim, the person stood up and suddenly came back and sat down again and 
took my hand and tell me, wow, you know I did not mention that, but now I 
 
                                                 
582 Interview with LRV, 5/3/2014. 
583 Interview with LRVs, 25/6/2014 and 27/6/2014.  
584 Interview with LRVs, 25/6/2014 and 27/6/2014. 
585 While it seemed to not be so easy to describe why and how the Court benefits. 
586 Interview with LRVs, 25/6/2014 and 27/6/2014. 
587 Interview with LRV II, 19/6/2014. 
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spend an hour with you talking about what I went through and whatever is 
happening now, I am satisfied, because I, and that is what I was telling you 
before, it is not even my words, it is their words. Because this is part of my 
daily fight and now that I look, I could talk to you, I feel less heavy, because 
many things I was carrying on my shoulders alone, I know somebody is taking 
care of.” 588
Despite the previously voiced doubts about the meaningfulness of truth and 
justice as foreseen by the ICC for the participating victims, legal representatives 
almost immediately resort to the benefits of individual encounters with them. 
Thereby, they “bring to them a feeling of justice, make them feel that they exist, 
because they know that somebody is taking care of the weight on the shoulders.” 
Somehow, we are still doing good seems to be the reassurance to continue with the 
work.  
 
Narcissistic samaritanism “creates a feel good community experience, but elides 
the behind the scenes stage management.” (Ibid.) Hence, listening to the voices of 
victims is understood to be a justice delivered by the Court and its staff, which is 
exactly the reproduction of the narrative of truth and justice for victims and the 
empowering function of telling one’s story. This stands in peculiar contrast to what 
the representatives say about the time and possibility to meet victims individually – 
“the behind the scenes management”.589 While on the one hand emphasizing the 
importance of building trust and highlighting the effect of individual meetings for 
victims, they, on the other hand, describe how it is merely impossible to meet with all 
of the participants individually.590
These moments of doubt are caused by the feeling of a stark discrepancy between 
what the court can offer and the “reality of the victims”. These encounters with the 
“reality, when going there and speaking to them” is drastically described by most of 
the legal representatives
 They abstract from the instances of direct 
individual contact the notion of justice for victims through telling their story to 
legitimize their work and thereby implicitly also legitimize the Courts notion of 
justice. The moments of doubt and reflection, that I interpret through my theoretical 
lens as ghosts haunting the legitimizing discourses of the ICC, are closed. 
591
                                                 
588 Interview with LRV II, 19/6/2014. 
 Almost all referred to these moments as the most 
589 Interviews with LRVs, 16, 19, 20, 25, 27/6/2014. 
590 Interviews with LRVs, 16, 19, 20, 25, 27/6/2014. 
591 Interview with LRV I, 19/6/2014. 
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important in their work and the urgency caused by the discrepancy between the here 
(The Hague) and the there (situation countries) causes many legal representatives to 
demand that “everyone should go there”.  
But these moments of encounter are foreclosed through the practice of legal 
representation explored previously, when “the victims” are portrayed as in need of 
assistance, defined by the harm suffered which is pre-defined in legal terms and 
therefore always already represented within the legal narrative. This representation is 
naturalized in the legal narrative and interrupted by the direct encounter with the 
participating victims which renders this encounter crucial for the self-reflexive stance 
vis á vis the exclusionary violence inherent in legal practice. It is the feelings of 
urgency and despair facing the impossibilities of bridging the here and there, that 
should have a space within the legal proceedings because it is an expression of the 
lack within the symbolic order.  
4. Embracing radical relationality 
Until now, in this dissertation, the individual participating victims were described 
as the representatives of heterogeneity, diversity – the constructed others potentially 
destabilizing the integrity of the court of law. They are objectified to illustrate the 
exclusive practices of representation and participation and the irritations and spaces 
for opposition which are opened within the exclusive legal practices of defining 
subject positions such as “the victims” and the “relevant victim”, and the “(right) 
victim” – then closed again. In this last section, I want to describe two personal 
situations which irritated me and caused me to reflect on the hierarchical structuring 
of information collection within interview situations – within the direct encounter 
with individual victims. As already indicated the moments of irritation are very 
personal and subjective they are not necessarily representative. Nevertheless, I 
consider it important to describe this situation to show how a reflection process on 
the exclusionary violence inherent in legal proceedings of representation and subject 
formation might be triggered and how the encounter with individual participating 
victims might have such a subversive effect. Furthermore, just like representation 
within the institution of victim participation at the ICC, out of many individuals who 
caused me to feel the exclusions and impossibilities of the current practice, two 
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situations are selected – two “(right) victims” within my research. I chose these 
situations among other reasons because it is not the stereotypical situation where the 
mere description of extreme violence causes silence. Just like the previously 
described process of translation, I depended on my colleagues at Kituo to meet with 
individual victims, some of them participated in the proceedings, some did not and 
therefore belong to the group of “wrong victims”. They arranged contact to so called 
spokespersons, my colleagues called them gatekeepers to the victim community. 
These spokespersons then arranged meetings with themselves present and other 
persons from the community whom they considered representative. When I 
conducted interviews I was at once a researcher and a representative of Kituo 
collecting information necessary to organize a fundraising workshop and inform about 
the state of the proceedings at the Hague. 
4.1. „I have a lot of reports“ 
One of these ‚work interviews’ was introduced by my interview partner an 
internally displaced person because of the post-election violence in Kenya 2007/08 
with the words: 
„I have a lot of reports“592
While saying this he looked at me as if asking – which report do you need? Which 
of my stories do you want to – or need to hear? I had to think about this 
introduction a lot, and against the backdrop of post-colonial theory, I could interpret 
the bewilderment it caused. I refer to the situation in my conceptualization as 
revelation and subversive questioning. 
 
‚I have a lot of reports’ reveals that the interview situation is relational in a specific 
way, which is often obscured in the framing of interviews, especially in the framing 
of legal representational practices. Classically, as shown previously, interviews are 
framed as a situation where I, the interviewer am the active part who collects information 
from the passive victim. I collect – the other provides. Thereby, from a post-colonial 
perspective – the Western lawyer is the active collector of information from the 
periphery – the specific site of culture to translate it to the centre in order to right 
their wrongs for them – to deliver truth and justice. 
                                                 
592 Field notes, 25/2/2014. 
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“I have a lot of reports” reveals that this is a fiction and subversively questioned 
the inherent naturalized hierarchy. This is what caused my bewilderment. He showed 
me, that he is the one who chooses the reports he wants to tell me. And he 
demonstrated that he knows that there are many mzungus (white persons) coming to 
collect information and not all of them need and therefore hear the same reports. This 
reveals the selectivity on both sides. I can only hear the information institutionally 
required and he will only tell my what he wants me to convey. The information is not 
just out there for me to be collected and translated – they are pre-selected by my 
interview partners. This turns the naturalized hierarchy upside down and thereby 
reveals that the representational practice is hierarchically structured. The situation 
that I, the Western lawyer, collect information from “the victim” who is willing to tell 
me anything I want to hear is discursively naturalized. I decide what I want to hear – 
“the victim” delivers the information.  
I interpreted the bewilderment the statement ‚I have a lot of reports’ caused in 
me, as a short moment where my privileges were revealed as privileges, because I 
could not perceive of them as natural anymore. Thereby, the power of definition and 
interpretation was shifted. In this moment, he reversed the positions and took over 
control, demonstrating that he decides what to say and what to keep to himself. 
Which report he wants me to hear. What is being said and what is being heard. The 
story I tell, be it in my research, or at The Hague is co-constituted. Every attempt to 
control information, is always also an attempt to re-claim naturalized privileges of 
having the power of definition and interpretation.  
The interview situation, just like the legal representational relationship is a 
moment of differential identity formation, where knowledge about the respective 
other is mutually constituted. From the institutional perspective this is where “the 
truth” about “the victim” is created. This relationship is structured by post-colonial 
images about the Other. Which, among others, implies the power of definition and 
interpretation from the periphery to the centre. The centre (the ICC) needs the 
periphery (the victim) to present itself as in control, as the institution that is able, 
through neutral operation, to find the truth and deliver justice, to those who are not 
able. This representation is a fiction which is constantly revealed by participants like 
my interview partner, the revelation has to be taken seriously. 
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4.2. Anger - resignation - silence 
Another situation caused me to be ashamed of my ignorance and obtrusiveness. 
My interview partner repeatedly tried to tell me about a domestic court proceeding 
that a self-help group of women initiated. The court decided on a rape case in their 
neighborhood and the perpetrator was send to live imprisonment which made her 
happy. She was working together with other rape-victims to support women and girls 
throughout the proceedings. When I asked her about the ICC cases, she ignored my 
questions and kept on talking about her cases. When the translator, who was a 
representative from Kituo working in one of the community justice centres, 
explained that the questions do not concern the Kenyan cases, but the ICC cases, she 
got angry. She said that she is bored with the proceedings at The Hague and asked: 
“For how long shall we follow up on these cases?” I could not answer and there was 
an uncomfortable silence between us. I had the impression that we both realized in 
this very moment, that I cannot hear her within my framework. Instead of trying to 
fit into the framework, she challenged it and this caused silence and resignation. My 
interview partner refused to be represented within my framework, which caused me 
to be ashamed of its exclusiveness. She refused to return the gaze, showing the one-
sidedness of the gaze. She revealed the limitation inherent in the framework. In that 
moment, I was forced to question the framework that prevents me to hear what she 
wants to convey. Instead of being convinced that my legal knowledge is a privilege 
allowing me to represent the voices of “the victims”, I conceived of this knowledge 
as a loss, inibiting me to understand her.  
As described in the Part II Chapter 4, silence plays an important role within post-
colonial theory. Silence in the sense described above can be read as having a resisting 
potential within the hierarchical framework of speaking and hearing. Silence reveals 
the (im)possibilities of representation within the post-colonial episteme. This silence, 
in contrast to the silencing described in the previous chapters, can, if listened to, 
cause the questioning of own privileges, which is a pre-requisite to learn to listen 
(Castro Varela, Maria do Mar and Dhawan 2003, p. 279).  
Taking this as a starting point, my interview situations and the bewilderment and 
shame, could be interpreted as an irritation through subversive revelation of the 
relatedness and the implied hierarchy. And instead of neglecting this moment to 
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subsequently regain control and reinstall the postcolonial hierarchy of definition and 
interpretation, these moments should be valued as irritations of the fixed images 
which reveal the implied naturalized violence in the legal practice of representation. 
5. Educating “the victims” vs. learning to listen?  
The representation of “the victims” and the “relevant victim” also frames the 
representatives relationships to their clients. In the LRVs search for the”(right) 
victim” they depend on native informants connecting the here and the there, the global 
and the local. The chain of translation between the representatives of the Court and 
the affected communities and the participating victims is very long and it is 
hierarchically framed. Since it is framed to bridge the unbridgeable gap between the 
binaries of here and there, the effects of the (im)possibilities inherent in the search are 
acted out by all those who are located in between. Those who are in the middle of it.593
On an organizational level, the frustration is addressed by suggesting to improve 
the outreach in order to “built knowledge and manage expectations”:  
 
They feel the urgency of proximity - the urgency of the excluded while constitutive 
others. The urgency of radical relationality. The resulting feelings of despair vis á vis 
the (im)possibilities - the ghost of the symbolic haunting victim participation in 
general - are silenced again by referring to own notions of justice for victims.  
“Early outreach should include a general description of what participation 
before the Court involves, the participation process and what victims who 
apply to participate can expect. Providing accurate information at an early stage 
will build knowledge and trust in the ICC, which is essential for victims to 
engage, and manage expectations. It is also essential to prevent frustration if 
progress in a situation or case is slow.”594
Organizational learning is described as educating the others to comply with the 
legal framework. The problematic of the practice of victim participation is perceived 
not to lie with the legal exclusionary practices but with those who are not able to 
understand the necessary limitations of such a framework. Organizational learning is 
 
                                                 
593 Interview with LRV I, 19/6/2014. 
594 Independent Panel of Experts Report on Victim Participation at the International Criminal Court, 
26 July 2013, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/document/?indexNumber=IOR53%2f001%2f2013&langu
age=en. Last accessed 19/5/2018. 
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not learning to hear what is being expected, but educating the participants to just 
demand what can be delivered - to comply with the subject position of “the victims” 
without being frustrated by its limitations. Thereby the myth about meaningful 
participation can be rescued:  
“Meaningful victim participation in ICC cases will remain a myth without more 
widespread victim education about the court, its processes, and its procedures. 
the legal process is complex and often disconnected from the needs and 
concerns of victims. More outreach and training is needed, particularly in rural 
regions, to ensure that victim participants understand their rights, their options 
for participation, and the limitations of the court’s mandate.”595
Instead of learning to listen and an understanding of own privileges as a loss 
preventing to hear the others’ knowledge, the others have to learn and their 
knowledge is questioned. The hierarchy is re-installed and the symbolic order re-
iterated.  
 
 
                                                 
595 The Victims`Court? A Study of 622 Victim Participants at the International Criminal Court 
Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Human Rights Center UC Berkley 
School of Law, 2015, https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/The-Victims-
Court-November-2015.pdf, last accessed 6/2/2018, p. 74. 
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Postlude: Listening to the Silence – Sensing the Noise 
“Speech harbors silences; silences harbor meaning. When silence is broken by 
speech, new silences are fabricated and enforced; when speech ends, the 
ensuing silence carries meaning that can only be metaphorized by speech, thus 
producing the conviction that silence speaks.” (Brown 2005, p. 83) 
In this dissertation, I wanted to speak the silences of the legitimizing narratives 
surrounding victim participation at the ICC and its manifestations in the organization 
of victim participation at the Court. I began by analyzing the images conveyed in the 
narratives framing the success story of victims and/in international criminal law, and 
demonstrated that, while there is a general development in acknowledging a role for 
victims within international proceedings, the depiction of victims did not change 
significantly. The image of the victims as emotional, subjective, partial and political is 
opposed to the image of criminal courts as factual, objective, impartial and 
unpolitical can be traced from the narratives at the time of Nuremberg, through the 
Eichmann trial, the ECCC to the ICC. The dichotomous image construction 
stabilizes the self-depiction of international criminal justice as “one of the most 
significant tributes that power has ever paid to reason.”596
Then I argued that “the victims” play a crucial role in legitimizing international 
criminal law, thereby bridging the justice gap in the classical criminal legal theories. The 
victim’s rights to truth and justice, developed in human rights law, are referred to 
when elaborating on the positive effect trials can have on individuals and the 
respective societies. The so called therapeutic ethic is referred to as a legitimization of 
legal proceedings. But, just as described, the analysis of empirical experiences 
 This binary construction is 
also represented in the conception of retributive and restorative justice. Victim 
participation and the involvement of victims in general at the respective courts is 
negotiated under the restorative justice paradigm that is opposed to the retributive 
(criminal) legal paradigm. It is this theoretical and structural tension within which 
victim participation is located and negotiated. Consequently a justice gap is detected in 
the practical implementation which is then ascribed to the tension between the 
dichotomous conceptions of justice.  
                                                 
596 Opening Statement before the International Military Tribunal Robert Jackson  
https://www.roberthjackson.org/speech-and-writing/opening-statement-before-the-international-
military-tribunal/. Last accessed on 29/5/2018. 
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debunks these noble goals once again. The justice gap seems to haunt international 
criminal courts. 
This semblance lead over to the deconstructive theoretical approach towards truth 
and justice for victims and the therapeutic ethic that refrains from discussing victim 
participation within the binary of restorative and retributive justice. 
In a first step, reading the gap in justification with Derrida suggested that it is 
inherent in the legal claim to find the truth and bring justice and that the very 
reference to these ideals as something tangible obscures the exclusionary violence of 
legal truth finding efforts. In a next step, the notion of the rational autonomous 
subject underlying the therapeutic ethic is analysed from a psychoanalytical Lacanian 
perspective. Thereby, the practices of the representation of victims could be read as 
effects of the epistemic violence inherent in the conceptualization of a subject 
position of “the victim” in the narratives that frame the relation between 
international criminal courts and victims. The mutually constituting images – that of 
the rational, sober, impartial and objective law and that of the irrational, emotional, 
partial and subjective victim – can only be uphold by excluding, representing and 
collectivizing the actual participants who would disturb this image. Furthermore, it is 
the “African victim” that is portrayed as the emotional, irrational representative of 
the lack which has to be closed by the rational Western legal court which brings truth 
and justice to those who are incapable of finding it by themselves. “The African 
Victim“ can thus serve to produce an image of trauma and violence which re-
produces the image of a rational non-violent version of Western rule of law and 
courts righting their wrong for them. 
All theoretical approaches develop what I called (im)possible ethics, indicating that 
the critique is the starting point to go beyond fixed understandings of justice, truth 
and the subject. The beyonds are located exactly within the (im)possibilities of justice 
and the identical subject. Building on these theoretical insights, I took the ethics of 
representation, ethics of listening and measuring and enduring silence as a starting 
point from which to empirically analyse the practice of participation and 
representation at the ICC. These ethical questioning of representational practices, of 
speaking and hearing and of the silencing effects of fixed subject positions within the 
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legal framework striving for the truth and the justice lead my empirical research and 
informed my questions. 
Based on the data generated through organizational ethnography and the 
interpretative textual analysis, I showed that representation, collectivization and 
externalization are silencing practices naturalized referring to the mantra of meaningful 
and effective participation. The ghost of symbolic participation which would reveal the 
legitimatizing function of “the victims” and the interrelated dependency of the Court 
is foreclosed. In the practice of victim participation at the ICC a subject position of 
“the victims” is produced which is shaped in such a way that it always already 
confirms the self-legitimizing image of the ICC as deliverer of truth and justice. All 
participants potentially challenging these images are excluded as inappropriate. The 
dichotomies of rational - emotional, unpolitical- political etc are underlying the 
mutually constituting images. This image of the victims, as always already interested 
in ICC style truth and justice has the effect that the only interest that distinguishes 
“the victims” from other parties and the Chambers, is the harm suffered and the 
cultural background. The binary construction of the ICC and “the victims” informs 
the decisions shaping the subject position from which the participants can speak and 
are heard. As an emotional narrator of a general account of suffering, when 
presenting views and concerns in person.  
I argue that the representational practices are hierarchical and reproduce the 
image of the benevolent Court of Western tradition (here) righting the wrongs of the 
others (there). The closer the participants come to the Court. the tighter are the 
control mechanisms to foreclose the encounter revealing the radical relationality. At 
the same time, the close proximity of legal representatives and their clients causes 
irritations within the here and there dichotomy. These irritations are acted out between 
narcissistic samaritanism and despair. Building on this finding I claim that feeling and 
sensing is crucial to listen to the silencing and silences within the practice of 
representation and participation. Feeling the urgency of proximity reveals the radical 
relatedness in the sense that the dependency of the ICC on “the victims” when it 
comes to self-legitimization and the (im)possibilities entailed become obvious.  
The reader might have had the impulse, while reading, as I had while writing, to 
ask: “Well, but how else?” My point is not to suggest that the organization of victim 
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participation could function without exclusions. My point is, however, that the 
exclusions have to be revealed and analysed as exclusions and not always already 
framed as necessities for the sake of legal effectiveness. In order to make visible the 
inherent violence in the legal framing of who is relevant, the exclusions have to be 
dramatized - the silences spoken. Thereby, the inherent impossibilities in the legal 
endeavour for closure can be revealed, reflected and possibly addressed more 
sensitively. And, the practices of representation can be reflected, instead of being 
naturalized as self-evident. Within the practice of participation the ICCs own voice is 
imposed on the participants as “the victims” - therefore it is another form of absence 
and silence - not presence and voice.  
Nevertheless, the justice gap is a potential, listening to the silence within the 
practice of participation one feels the noise of the excluded constitutive others. 
Embracing this relationality would imply to take the gaps seriously as always 
deferring and therefore as a producer of alternative, yet inextricable meaning. This 
goes to the very foundations of international criminal law - these foundations are 
always also non-foundations and the non is haunting all international courts. Instead 
of closing this foundational gap - it should be considered as a chance. The traumatic 
Real in international criminal law is the (non)foundation. It is the traumatic violence 
perpetrated to which one has to react. And it is the always already lacking reaction. It 
is the feeling of solidarity with victims - and it is the (im)possibility of understanding. 
Taking this as a starting point would require to listen to the silences within 
international criminal proceedings as a reminder of the (im)possibilities of justice. 
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